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Foreword
A group of scholars based at several Australian universities have long been 
influential in the development of our understanding of hybrid political 
order. The term was first used in relation to peacebuilding (to the best of 
my knowledge) by Kevin Clements, Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Wendy 
Foley and Anna Nolan in a now seminal paper published in 2007 called 
‘State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation 
of  Political Order’ in Political Science. A bolt out of the prescriptive 
liberal blue, it turned this field of debate on its head.
Discussions of agency, particularly local agency, of the possibility of 
new political forms—of resistance, but also of the risks of neocolonial 
forms of administration—suddenly swung into our view. They formed 
part of a broader and emerging intersection between liberal, Marxist 
and postcolonial thought, and the use of this concept has proliferated 
enormously ever since. It is now the mainstay of policy thinking in conflict-
affected societies around the world, as well as the target of much academic 
debate. Hybridity is nothing if not highly complex and controversial, but 
it has attracted the interest of many academic and policy quarters because 
of its intuitive and easily observable empirical dimensions: relationality in 
a rapidly globalising and fluid world. It also points to power inequalities 
and injustices, to the painful yet plausible potential of rubbing along 
together after conflict, as well as to the prescriptive over-reach of liberal 
interventionism on the post–Cold War world. Somewhere between the 
liberal peace, its interventionary nature and individualist/constructivist 
rationalities and the older concepts associated with anti-colonialism and 
non-alignment, a real sense of the current reality of peace and order in 
the periphery began to emerge, with both unnoticed positives as well 
as obvious dangers.
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Thus, it is very apt that this important discussion is carried forward in 
this volume, including by some of the concept’s original scholars. What 
has become clear over the time that this concept has come into use is 
that it can be used in negative ways (to indicate or even camouflage 
neo-trusteeship or counter-insurgency) and in positive ways, where it 
takes an important place in the production of new political orders, in 
which rights are expanded and peace is more sustainable. In my own work 
I have used the notion of post-liberalism to point to this potential as 
a way of escaping problems in particular relating to the limits of liberalism 
in Eurocentric form.
At a workshop in Canberra in December 2015 (where I was present) 
held to discuss the draft chapters for this volume, it became clear how 
widely entangled the dynamics of hybridity are, across so many issues 
from rights, identity, indigeneity, materiality, local governance, justice, 
reconciliation, sustainability, the nature of the state and international 
system, globalisation and the commons, to name but a few. It begins to 
bring a far more complex view of peace and order, one that accentuates 
the open and hidden violence of more parsimonious approaches. Indeed, 
as an epistemological framework, with methodological–ethical sets of 
tools, it offers a completely new ontology of relationality across at least 
four dimensions as opposed to the black-and-white world of rational 
self-interest. Due to the work of the scholars included in this study, it 
is gradually becoming clear that another world is not just ‘possible’ but 
is already in existence and that concepts and thinking about peace and 





The further we advance into the twenty-first century, the broader spreads 
the realisation that we are moving deeper into a ‘post-Western’ world. 
Ideas and institutions developed in Europe and North America, which 
came to dominate global orders and expectations, are becoming less 
and less authoritative as new, non-Western centres of power rise and as 
precolonial ideas and institutions reassert themselves. The big question, 
of course, is what a post-Western world will look like. For those of us 
sceptical of a future shaped by a ‘clash of civilisations’, our contemporary 
world provides abundant evidence of the interplay and mutual influence 
of different cultural approaches to order—or as the scholars writing in this 
book call it, ‘hybridity’.
This collection of essays represents the product of a sustained intellectual 
conversation that took place over the course of a seminar series and 
a  workshop held at The Australian National University during 2015. 
Like many fruitful academic collaborations, this one had its gestation in 
informal conversations and deliberations among a group of scholars based 
at the time in the ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs. This group 
applied for, and was awarded, a small grant to organise the Bell School’s 
inaugural Horizons Seminar Series in 2015. The Horizons Series aims 
to nurture interdisciplinary conversations and research collaborations 
among scholars working on diverse aspects of social and political change 
in the Asia–Pacific region. ‘Hybridity: History, Power and Scale’ was the 
theme chosen for the inaugural seminar series.
The seminar series brought together scholars from a range of disciplinary 
backgrounds whose work engaged in some way or another with the concept 
of hybridity. Areas of research represented included peacebuilding, state 
formation, legal pluralism, transitional justice, security governance and 
development. The series culminated in an international workshop in 
December 2015 that engaged critically with core themes that had emerged 
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during the course of the seminar series. As well as those who had presented 
seminars, the organisers invited a number of additional speakers and 
participants, including Oliver Richmond, one of the foremost authorities 
on hybridity in the critical peacebuilding field, and Hilary Charlesworth, 
a leading scholar in the fields of international law, human rights and 
gender. Other participants included Anne Brown and Volker Boege, 
who, along with other colleagues at the University of Queensland, had 
developed the concept of ‘hybrid political orders’; Helene Maria Kyed, 
who has utilised the concept of hybridity in the context of policing and 
legal pluralism; Shahar Hameiri, who has undertaken extensive critical 
analysis of contemporary statebuilding practice; Peter Albrecht, who has 
examined the nature of hybrid authority at the level of local governance; 
Matthew Allen and Sinclair Dinnen, who have deployed the concept of 
scalar politics as an analytical alternative to hybridity in exploring ongoing 
processes of state formation; and Damian Grenfell, who has examined 
the relevance of the concept of hybridity in the context of gender-based 
violence.
The essays in this volume have thus emerged from an intensive process of 
presentation, discussion, critique and reformulation. Most, though not 
all, argue that the concept of hybridity has heuristic value for thinking 
about the uncertain ‘post-Western’ world we are entering. While they pose 
more questions than they answer, together they point the way to rich and 
ongoing conversations across disciplinary and geographic boundaries and 
to exciting future collaborations.
Michael Wesley
Dean
College of Asia & the Pacific
The Australian National University
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Introduction
Lia Kent, Srinjoy Bose, Joanne Wallis, 
Sinclair Dinnen and Miranda Forsyth
Hybridity as a conceptual tool has long been discussed in a range of 
disciplines including the biological sciences, social sciences and even 
literature and literary criticism. In its literal sense, and as used in biology, 
the term ‘hybrid’ refers to the product of a process of mixing or combining 
two or more distinct elements. The concept originated in the biological and 
zoological sciences, where it was appropriated into the highly controversial 
pseudoscientific theories of race that informed debates about European 
imperialism in the nineteenth century. In the social sciences, hybridity 
later became prominent in discussions of identity,1 culture,2 economic 
and power relations, and political systems,3 and has been characterised as 
the outcome of encounters between hegemonic practices and attempts to 
decolonise peoples, territories and knowledge. In the field of postcolonial 
studies, for example, hybridity was first articulated to help understand 
complex processes of sociopolitical interaction and relationships4 between 
colonial powers and colonised subjects. Critical of the coloniser’s or 
intervener’s aims to reform the ‘Other’ (that is, attempts to mould the 
colonised in the image of the coloniser or intervener), Bhabha stressed 
themes such as resistance to domination and the agential power of the 
colonised or subaltern subjects.5 Similarly, Kapoor argued that hybridity 
recognises the strategies of those who resist overt and subtle forms of 
1  Barry, Beginning Theory; Young, Colonial Desire.
2  Ashcroft et al., The Empire Writes Back; Ashcroft et al., Post-colonial Studies; Bhabha, ‘Signs Taken 
for Wonders’; Bhabha, The Location of Culture; Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’.
3  Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States.
4  Bhabha, ‘Signs Taken for Wonders’.
5  Ibid.; Bhabha, The Location of Culture.
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colonisation.6 This framework was subsequently developed and applied 
to international relations and development literatures, specifically studies 
in conflict resolution, intervention and peacebuilding.7
In conflict resolution, hybridity implies a combination of elements from 
different—seemingly incompatible and inharmonious—world views. 
A hybrid order comprises a mixed structure of informal and formal 
institutions of power. Hybridity is ‘a state of affairs in which liberal and 
illiberal norms, institutions, and actors coexist’.8 Viewed in this way, the 
‘state’ is only one institutional actor and source of power among others 
within a ‘hybrid political order’, and ‘state order’ is only one of a number 
of competing orders claiming to provide security, frameworks for conflict 
regulation and other forms of welfare provision.9 Today, as Millar has 
noted, conflict resolution (and the associated concepts of peacebuilding, 
development, transnational justice and so on) lies at the heart of most 
debates on intervention, with many scholars problematising the roles 
of external interveners and local agential power.10 More specifically, the 
term hybridity has been used in critiques of the spate of ‘liberal’ peace 
interventions that occurred during the second half of the 1990s and the 
first decade of the new millennium. Focusing on the externally driven, 
state-centric, technical and formulaic orientation of these interventions 
and their neglect of local contexts, some recent critiques have adopted the 
notion of ‘hybrid peace’ to denote the interactive and contested quality of 
the processes involved in such encounters.11 This usage seeks to capture the 
‘intertwined relationship between the global and the local, the formal and 
the informal and the liberal and the illiberal’12 that characterises the actual 
practice of contemporary peacebuilding, as opposed to the assumptions 
of its underpinning (liberal peace) theory. It is argued that the outcome of 
these interactions—the ‘hybrid peace’—is both a more accurate depiction 
of the complex realities on the ground, and more legitimate than the 
6  Kapoor, ‘Acting in a Tight Spot’, 568.
7  See Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: 
How Does Hybrid Peace Come About?’; Richmond, ‘De-romanticising the Local, De-mystifying the 
International’.
8  Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, 22.
9  Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States; Clements et al., ‘State Building 
Reconsidered’; Donais, Peacebuilding and Local Ownership; Richmond, A Post-liberal Peace.
10  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
11  Mac Ginty, ‘Gilding the Lily?’; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down 
and Bottom-Up Peace’.
12  Björkdahl and Höglund, ‘Precarious Peacebuilding’, 293.
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liberal peace because it taps into local agency and knowledge, thereby 
broadening the peace constituency and more effectively capturing the 
dynamic and interactive processes involved.13
The term hybridity has also gained significance in policy discourse and 
practice set against the backdrop of growing international interventionism 
in recent decades.14 A notable example is the World Development Report 
2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, in which the World Bank 
acknowledged that in those parts of the global South in which state 
institutions are weak and much of the population lives according to local 
sociopolitical beliefs and practices, it might be necessary for international 
actors to move away from unilinear processes of institutional transfer from 
the global North and instead adopt flexible ‘best fit’ approaches that draw 
upon ‘combinations of state, private sector, faith based, traditional, and 
community structures for service delivery’.15 These developments suggest 
there has been a shift away from seeing local sociopolitical practices and 
institutions primarily as hurdles or spoilers to achieving a universal model 
of liberal democracy, towards a greater recognition of their potential 
strengths in advancing larger goals of peacebuilding and development.
The growing prominence of the hybridity concept in the conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding literatures, and in policy discourse and 
practice, helps to explain the current emphasis on interactions between 
the ‘international’ and the ‘local’. The hybrid approach was introduced to 
unsettle the statist,16 Eurocentric and linear logic of liberal peacebuilding, 
and locates peace both in the agency of the local, and in the hybrid 
formations of liberal and non-liberal institutions and values resulting 
from such encounters.17 Hybridity denotes ‘how local actors attempt 
13  Ibid.
14  Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and Practice’; Paris, At War’s End.
15  World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 106.
16  According to Nadarajah and Rampton, the hybrid approach characterises international 
peacebuilding as coercive, top-down, technocratic and blind to the conditions of the local 
environment. Thus, liberal peacebuilding is held to favour the interests of statists (those who 
favour the interests of local elites and international interveners) rather than the majority who suffer 
the weight of both conflict and peace engagements. The latter are systematically alienated from 
statebuilding and  peacebuilding processes. This renders the liberal peace illegitimate and drives 
various resistances that make impossible its advance and sustainability. Nadarajah and Rampton, 
‘The Limits of Hybridity’, 54.
17  Ibid., 49–50.
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to respond to, resist and ultimately reshape peace initiatives through 
interactions with international actors and institutions’.18 Nadarajah and 
Rampton argue that hybridity allows the ‘liberal peace’ to be:
transcended and its narrow ethnocentric boundaries, technocratic 
tendencies and fixation with state and institution-building overcome 
to produce a more empathetic, responsive, culturally sensitive and 
ultimately radical peace encompassing the local, indigenous and quotidian 
experience, especially that of the subaltern categories, within conflict-
affected spaces and societies.19
As noted above, hybrid processes arise from resistance to hegemony. 
The resistance may manifest itself in outright violence, active reform of 
introduced practices, co-optation and so on. Some within the policy and 
academic communities have tended to perceive obstacles to peace as lying 
primarily in deficiencies in local and state institutions in contemporary 
contexts of interventions.20 But does this view not smack of older and 
discredited colonial epistemologies? Richmond reminds us that grassroots-
level actors often have a more nuanced understanding of the limitations 
and potential of both their own frameworks and those promulgated by 
international authorities.21 He argues that blaming local actors for their 
own ills and conditionality is common among interveners, and that 
this imbues these interventions with a neocolonial character.22 Others, 
drawing on Spivak’s work,23 have argued that the colonised/intervened 
are active agents in creating, maintaining and modifying the colonial 
and postcolonial sociopolitical orders. They argue that local actors can be 
equipped to play an active role in statebuilding and peacebuilding processes 
and discourse. Quoting Duffield24 and Richmond,25 Wallis remarks that 
‘critiques converge on the emerging consensus that statebuilders should 
seek to engage in “unscripted conversations”26 with ordinary people, 
about the design of their state’.27 Writing in a postcolonial studies 
tradition, Bhabha is somewhat more critical, arguing that material power 
18  Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 8.
19  Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’, 53.
20  See, for example, Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’.
21  Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’.
22  Ibid., 51.
23  See Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’.
24  Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War.
25  Richmond, ‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism’; Richmond, ‘A Post-liberal Peace: 
Eirenism and the Everyday’.
26  Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 234.
27  Wallis, ‘A Liberal–Local Hybrid Peace Project in Action?’, 736.
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imbalances between the (typically Western) hegemon and (typically non-
Western) subaltern ensures that the latter are structurally incapable of 
modifying existing power dynamics and relations.28
Alongside the growing prominence of hybridity as a concept is an emerging 
critique of hybridity.29 One aspect of the latter is its focus on the paradoxical 
ways in which the concept of hybridity can often serve to reinscribe the 
problematic binaries it seeks to overcome. Discussions of hybridity have 
often focused on the relationship between the ‘international’ and ‘local’, 
characterising their interactions in dichotomous terms: ‘liberal’ versus 
‘illiberal’, ‘modern’ versus ‘traditional’, ‘Western’ versus ‘non-Western’, 
‘state’ versus ‘non-state’, ‘coercion’ versus ‘resistance’, ‘insurgent’ versus 
‘government’, and ‘peace’ versus ‘conflict’. Such binaries are unhelpful30—
they homogenise categories, oversimplify complex contexts and milieus,31 
and essentialise local (and international) groupings.32 By contrast, several 
scholars have highlighted the multiplicity of outcomes that can occur when 
two entities meet and interact. This critique also points to the extent to 
which, given the historical influences of colonialism and globalisation, 
both ‘international’ and ‘local’ actors and institutions are themselves the 
products of earlier processes of hybridisation. Pitting the international 
against the local therefore distorts the multifarious and continuous 
processes of interaction that characterise all human and societal exchange. 
Pieterse, cognisant of the role of globalisation, comments that hybridity 
indicates profound changes brought about by mobility, migration and 
multiculturalism.33 In other words, hybridity reminds us that categories 
are the site of contestation and negotiation, yet also stresses the fluidity 
within and between categories. Anthropologists have long argued that local 
practices are never static; they are constantly evolving,34 particularly when 
encountering the forces of intervention and globalisation. Petersen argues 
that it is the shift away from these binaries and absolutes that appears 
as the primary appeal of hybridity.35 While nuanced analyses seek to do 
28  Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 330.
29  Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-linearity’; Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’; 
Newman, ‘A Human Security Peace-building Agenda’; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking 
of Hybridity’.
30  de Guevara, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding’; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking 
of Hybridity’; Heathershaw, ‘Conclusions: Neither Built Nor Formed’.
31  Moreiras, ‘Hybridity and Double Consciousness’; Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
32  Peterson, ‘“Rule of Law” Initiatives’; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’.
33  Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, So What?’, 221.
34  Brown, ‘Security, Development and the Nation-building Agenda’, 155.
35  Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’, 12.
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justice to these complexities, contemporary usage of the term ‘hybridity’—
accentuated by the limitations of our available vocabulary—often serves 
inadvertently to reinscribe binaries even as it seeks to unpack them.
A second criticism relates to the frameworks used to discuss hybridity. 
Millar suggests that the literature on hybridity can be characterised as 
either ‘prescriptive’ or ‘descriptive’.36 Descriptive accounts explain what 
hybridity is (and isn’t) and how it comes about. This usage of hybridity 
offers a mechanism for viewing the outcomes of interchange between 
external actors and complex local contexts, as well as for understanding 
the critical role of local agency in mediating external interventions. 
Prescriptive accounts, on the other hand, examine how hybridity can be 
purposefully designed into statebuilding, peacebuilding and governance 
projects.37 Many have warned that prescriptive accounts give licence 
to external intervention, including ambitious and intrusive projects of 
social engineering.38 More importantly, perhaps, critical scholars have 
expressed doubt as to whether hybridity can be harnessed to implement 
stated objectives and goals; some go so far as to suggest interveners 
should not even attempt to harness hybridity.39 Millar is also critical of 
prescriptive approaches, arguing that ‘prescriptive hybridity assumes that 
administering hybrid institutions will foster predictable peace-promoting 
experiences’.40 Others stress the importance of prescriptive hybridity, 
arguing, for example, that customary norms, values and institutions need 
to be incorporated into new structures designed to promote peace, stability 
and development if the goals of creating capable, effective and legitimate 
states are to be realised.41 They argue that while it is a necessary starting 
point, a merely descriptive use of hybridity—describing how things are—
fails to address more fundamental questions about the power imbalances 
and inequality underlying particular hybrid configurations and how these 
might be overcome.42 Politically, a hybrid approach considers hybridity as 
a space where local and international practices are continuously negotiated 
in interactions of differential power; hence, when merely observing the 
pluralistic outcomes of these interactions, the underlying differentials 
in power that animate these outcomes are often glossed over.
36  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 501.
37  Ibid.; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’.
38  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’.
39  Visoka, ‘Three Levels of Hybridisation Practices’; see also Hameiri and Jones, this volume.
40  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 502.
41  Clements et al., ‘State Building Reconsidered’, 48.
42  Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Multiculture.
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What these critiques highlight is that the use of hybridity in both 
descriptive  and prescriptive accounts can serve to mask underlying 
injustices and power differentials between international and local actors, 
as well as within each of these spheres. A purely institutionalist approach 
that privileges the processes and outcomes of institutional interaction can 
thus render them devoid of their inherently political character. For example, 
a pure focus on the hybrid features of a hybrid court can detract attention 
from the constrained political circumstances in which these courts are 
established or from questions about whose interests these models serve in 
practice. There are also concerns that attempts to instrumentalise ‘hybrid 
governance’ can be appropriated as part of broader neoliberal agendas 
and used to hollow out already ‘weak’ states by outsourcing the provision 
of public goods to international actors, private providers or, indeed, 
to poor communities themselves.43 Likewise, there are well-founded 
concerns about ‘romanticising the local’ and downplaying significant 
power differentials at the local level based on gender, age, ethnic or other 
significant divisions. All of this suggests that if the hybridity concept is 
used without sufficient attention to the power dynamics and conflictual 
elements in the specific context in question, it can ultimately serve to 
reproduce existing patterns of hierarchy, domination and prevailing 
relations of power.
History, power and scale
Against the background of the growing prominence of the hybridity 
concept and the emerging critiques, it seemed to us as a group of scholars 
engaged in these issues that questions of history, power and scale had 
not been adequately examined. The seminar series, which along with 
the workshop provided an important part of the genesis of this edited 
collection, set out to probe these questions in greater detail. For example, 
we asked presenters to consider whether hybridity describes a relatively 
new undertaking, or whether it merely crystallises processes of interaction 
and syncretism that have deep historical roots. We similarly challenged 
them to reflect on whether focusing on hybridity as a potential ‘solution’ 
to enduring problems of conflict and instability obscures important 
questions of power and agency that are inherent in contested sites of 
institutional transformation, thereby risking potentially unintended and 
43  Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’.
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undesirable outcomes. Finally, we asked presenters to analyse the role of 
scale in relation to hybridity, including whether and how interactions play 
out differently at local, national, regional and international levels.
Participants at the workshop were asked to reflect on the extent to which 
their work resonates with one or more of six central themes that had 
emerged during the seminar series. The first of these was ‘plurality’. Many 
speakers at the seminar series noted the need to broaden the conventional 
state-centric focus of disciplines such as political science, international 
relations, development studies and law in order to recognise a more 
comprehensive spectrum of state and non-state actors, institutions and 
practices. We asked speakers to consider whether this plurality poses 
difficulties in terms of disentangling different scales of intervention 
spanning ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ levels. How might analyses 
of hybridity work to decentre the conventional focus on the state? How 
might they adequately recognise the complex of linkages, relationships, 
frictions and shifting scales between international and local institutions, 
actors and discourses in particular contexts? Might these relationships and 
frictions also contain emancipatory or generative potential?
The second key theme that emerged during the seminar series was that 
of ‘history’. The role of history, including colonialism, was identified 
repeatedly as playing a fundamental role in the determination of present-
day relationships between institutions in postcolonial societies and, 
indeed, in many cases, their very existence. Much analysis of hybridity 
in disciplines outside history, however, tends to be ‘history blind’. Policy 
discourse, in particular, is often narrowly focused on current circumstances 
and priorities with scant attention to historical precedent. The problematic 
historical uses of hybridity in the discipline of anthropology and its 
unhelpful connotations of essentialism was also raised. Might a more 
historically grounded approach problematise and enrich the concept 
of hybridity?
The third key theme was ‘power’. The prevalence, but also the potential 
invisibility, of power dynamics within and between a wide range of groups 
emerged as a key theme in the seminar series. Some speakers noted that 
the concept of hybridity can mask underlying injustices and power 
differentials between international and local actors, as well as within each 
of these spheres. In this regard, there was an echoing of the concerns raised 
in the emergent critique of hybridity including a tendency to romanticise 
the ‘local’ and neglect local power differences. Other speakers noted that 
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international and national actors and institutions disproportionately 
shape the terms of hybrid arrangements because of structural imbalances 
in the distribution of power and control of resources. Might it be possible 
for analyses of hybridity to pay more attention to conflictual elements and 
power dynamics? While other orders exist, should the particular power 
and resources of the state be analysed differently?
The fourth theme was that of ‘scale’, drawing, in particular, on the 
insights of human geographers, and was one that resonated with many 
speakers from different disciplines. Consistent with the ‘local turn’ in 
peacebuilding scholarship, much of the hybridity literature has an explicit 
orientation towards the most local level in contexts of intervention. 
Given continuing assumptions about the centrality of the nation-state 
as the normal way of organising social and political life, this growing 
sensibility to the significance of subnational scales provides a welcome 
corrective. We nevertheless need to avoid being constrained by artificial 
categorisations of space and scale that obscure the realities of the flow of 
ideas, people, resources and politics across all such categories including 
‘the local’. While assumptions about the centrality of states remain deeply 
entrenched in disciplines like international relations, political science, law 
and development studies, the lived realities of contemporary globalisation 
are much less static and spatially fragmented owing to the dynamic flows 
across what many continue to view as bounded spaces. Analysing these 
fluid and multilayered complexities requires a new spatial imaginary freed 
from such artificial boundaries.
The fifth theme was that of ‘reinscribing binaries’. Another point 
raised during the seminar series was the fact that the hybridity concept 
often reinscribes problematic binaries even as it seeks to unpack them 
(for instance between the global/local). Given the historical influences of 
colonialism, globalisation and intervention, it is often argued that actors 
and institutions are continuously negotiating and renegotiating a range 
of locally derived and non-localised norms and in this sense are already 
‘hybrid’. Does this suggest the need for a different term? Do terms such as 
pluralism, syncretism, the third space, intersections or friction offer more 
theoretically adequate alternatives to the hybridity concept?
The sixth and final theme was ‘conceptual tools’. During the seminar series, 
many speakers identified that ambiguities exist in relation to the ways 
in which the hybridity concept is ‘operationalised’ through policies in 
areas including rule of law and statebuilding and peacebuilding. In some 
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ways, the most superficial of these insights has been exploited by those 
driving reforms as a way of co-opting more resources and undermining 
potential opposition. However, the more profound insights about the 
need to engage more equitably with systems, institutions and individuals 
operating on the basis of fundamentally different principles, values and 
world views has been overlooked. We asked speakers to consider what 
conceptual tools might enable the translation of the hybridity concept 
into more meaningful and equitable policy development.
The chapters
Reflecting themes raised in the chapters, we have divided this book into 
four sections. The first, ‘Theorising Hybridity’, contains six chapters 
which interrogate the conceptual foundations of hybridity. Anne Brown’s 
chapter sets the theoretical scene for the book, as she traces the ‘family 
trees’ of the concept of hybridity, ranging from biology to postcolonial 
studies. While Brown notes that neither the concept nor phenomenon of 
hybridity is new, she describes how it emerged in the context of specific 
debates about statebuilding and peacebuilding to bring fresh attention to 
the ‘dense layering of interactions, relations and institutions that make 
up political community and constitute the basis of state formation’. 
She analyses how hybridity has been used in three primary ways in the 
statebuilding and peacebuilding literature: descriptively, aspirationally 
and instrumentally. Brown concludes by proposing more dialogical ways 
of seeking to understand peacebuilding that are grounded in ‘processes 
and habits of open-ended exchange’.
Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht’s chapter interrogates the concept of 
hybridity by focusing on the ‘power of local actors to resist the imposition 
of liberal statebuilding processes’. They are particularly interested in 
including ‘the political’ into analyses of hybridity, in order to recognise 
how hybridity during statebuilding and peacebuilding can be ‘moderated 
by the political power of local elites’. They are also concerned that much 
of the hybridity literature ‘reifies and idealises “the local”’, thereby 
overlooking the power structures and political processes of inclusion and 
exclusion that they involve.
Charles Hunt’s chapter analyses the concept of hybridity from the 
perspective of a relational approach that recognises the multilayered 
nature of sociopolitical orders in conflict-affected societies. Using a case 
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study of Liberia, Hunt illustrates the complexity of these societies and 
the importance of analysing the relationships between different providers 
of order, security and justice. He concludes by arguing for a relational 
approach to hybridity based on a ‘performative-based, liminal and 
integrative understanding of hybrid sociopolitical order’.
Miranda Forsyth’s chapter considers whether the concept of hybridity 
should be used normatively as well as descriptively. She proposes that 
hybridity should be developed to ‘answer questions about how legal/
regulatory systems ought to be, as well as describing how they currently 
work’. Forsyth then makes proposals concerning how this might occur, 
identifying three starting points: ‘focus on the values and objectives at 
stake, concentrate on the processes of change, and analyse the relationships 
between and within different legal orders’. She concludes that developing 
the concept along normative lines can ‘facilitate change agents in helping 
to steer hybrid legal orders in positive and emancipatory directions’.
Joanne Wallis’s chapter traces how a sense of humility within 
Western governments and international institutions regarding liberal 
peacebuilding has facilitated the emergence of the concept of hybridity 
in statebuilding and  peacebuilding in order to achieve ‘good enough’ 
outcomes. She considers how hybridity has operated during peacebuilding 
in Timor-Leste and identifies a number of challenges it has faced. She 
concludes by arguing there is evidence that many Timorese desire a role 
for modern liberal state institutions ‘as a response to the inequality, 
exclusions and injustices that can occur under local practices and 
institutions’, and consequently that while the concept of hybridity should 
not be abandoned, building liberal state institutions may retain a place in 
contemporary peacebuilding.
Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones’s chapter takes a more radical stance, 
arguing  that the concept of hybridity is ‘unfit for purpose and must 
be entirely jettisoned’ in the study of statebuilding and peacebuilding. 
They  argue that the hybridity literature has been ‘unable to escape 
binaries based on dichotomised categories of the illiberal-local and 
liberal-international’, which they conclude ‘distorts empirical analysis’. 
Instead, they propose an alternative framework based on a Gramscian 
understanding of the state and other governance institutions as 
‘condensations of social power relations’. They argue that this approach 
helps to recognise the ‘politics of scale’ of ‘hierarchised social, political 
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and economic territorial spaces’, including how power and resources are 
distributed among different scales during statebuilding and peacebuilding 
interventions.
Section two of the book consists of five chapters that engage with the 
concept of hybridity in the postconflict settings of Bougainville, Solomon 
Islands, Timor-Leste and Mozambique respectively, with reference to 
broader processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding in these different 
contexts. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Bougainville, Volker 
Boege’s chapter proposes a relational understanding of hybridisation in 
peacebuilding as a fluid and dynamic process of interaction between ‘local’ 
and ‘international’ actors. His chapter documents the extent to which 
Bougainvillean agency was able to mediate and shape the implementation 
and outcomes of the international peacebuilding agenda. This includes 
the ways in which ‘local’ agency was able to appropriate the resources of 
the latter according to Bougainvillean’s priorities, logic and understanding 
of the islands’ unique political economy. Boege also reflects on the 
impacts of these interactions on the international actors and how these 
contributed to the ‘turn to the local’ in regional peacebuilding practice 
and the emergence of a more reflective discourse around ‘relational 
sensibility’.
Sinclair Dinnen and Matthew Allen use a case study of rural Solomon 
Islands to reflect critically on the value of ‘hybridity’ as a concept for 
understanding and engaging with the complex and ongoing processes of 
state formation—as distinct from statebuilding—underway in this island 
nation. While seeing value in engaging with ‘local’ forms of authority 
and regulation in localities where state presence is weak, Dinnen and 
Allen share many of the concerns raised by critics of ‘the local turn’ in 
peacebuilding and development. They also point out that attempts to 
instrumentalise hybridity are by no means confined to international and 
national-level actors but are also apparent in the strategies of local-level 
actors. Their chapter emphasises the multiple scales at which processes 
of hybridisation take place, with an explicit critique of the privileging 
of ‘the local’ scale in much of the hybridity literature. The authors also 
question assumptions that local-level actors naturally prefer local forms 
of authority and organisation over state and transnational forms. On the 
contrary, they argue that many rural Solomon Islanders are demanding 
greater engagement with Weberian-like institutions that are perceived—
rightly or wrongly—as being more emancipated from what are viewed as 
the corrosive and corrupting influence of local social and power relations.
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Drawing on her research into transitional justice in Timor-Leste, 
Lia Kent’s starting point is the need to pay more attention to the ways in 
which individuals and communities deal with the legacies of the violent 
past outside formal institutional contexts and dispute resolution forums. 
She argues that these subtler actions and practices are critical to ongoing 
processes of reconstructing social life in postconflict Timor-Leste and 
are better understood as part of a process of ‘everyday’ reconciliation 
where those with limited power ‘make do’ with resources, tactics and 
possibilities. In doing so, she seeks to widen the scope of what has hitherto 
been encompassed in analyses of hybrid transitional justice by proposing 
a richer conception that goes beyond a focus on institutions, structures 
and conflict resolution ‘events’ and pays more attention to the ongoing 
process of rebuilding everyday life and renegotiating relationships 
following conflict. Central to Kent’s conception of hybrid transitional 
justice is a relational understanding of individuals as ‘socially constituted’ 
and ‘attached to others’. As she argues, this more dynamic understanding 
is particularly relevant in kinship-based societies such as Timor-Leste, 
where maintaining good relations is not only important to an individual’s 
social standing, but is absolutely critical to sustaining viable social life, 
security and economic survival.
Victor Igreja’s chapter examines what he terms ‘post-hybridity bargaining’ 
and ‘embodied accountability’ in postwar Mozambique, where he has 
undertaken periodic fieldwork over the past two decades. Following the 
country’s protracted and bloody civil war (1976–1992), state authorities 
took no steps to hold the perpetrators of serious acts of violence accountable 
for their actions. Igreja’s focus on ‘post-hybridity bargaining’ examines the 
participation of war survivors, community leaders and spiritual agents 
in struggles for accountability and justice in particular rural localities. 
Sometimes this involves negotiations with individual representatives 
of state authority, such as police officers. At other times, this kind of 
bargaining entails ignoring or manipulating state agents and each other 
in order to pursue personal and more culturally meaningful forms of 
accountability and justice. State authorities similarly shift between taking 
diverse community actors seriously to ignoring and manipulating them, 
and, on occasion, violently abusing them. For Igreja, the continuously 
shifting and unpredictable quality of ‘post-hybridity bargaining’ serves 
to unsettle notions of hybridity that assume a relatively stable state of 
co-existence and overlap between different political orders. Any attempt 
to formalise or render more predictable the outcomes of such fluid and 
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malleable processes of negotiation is fraught with risk, not least given that 
these very qualities are key sources of social innovation and change. In his 
view, policy engagements in this area must themselves be experimental 
in order to have any chance of success.
The last chapter in this section, by James Scambary and Todd Wassel, 
returns the reader to Timor-Leste and the challenges of national and 
international peacebuilding efforts, particularly following serious 
disturbances in Dili in 2006, in such a dynamic social landscape. It draws 
on the practical fieldwork experiences of both authors in Timor-Leste over 
the past ten years. Echoing key strands in the emergent critique of hybrid 
peacebuilding, Scambary and Wassel highlight the limited understanding 
of Timor-Leste’s complex, nonlinear and rapidly changing social systems, 
as well as the highly localised scale and endemic nature of conflict in 
this country. Using a case study approach to trace the evolution of 
peacebuilding efforts since 2006, the authors strike an optimistic note in 
illustrating how recent initiatives have been based on nuanced analyses 
of local forms of authority and organisation and, indeed, different forms 
of hybridity. These efforts have met with some success in reinvigorating 
community networks going beyond preconceived ideas about ‘traditional 
leadership’ and are open to engaging with a variety of other actors including 
clandestine associations, youth groups and church organisations.
The third section consists of two chapters that examine hybridity in 
relation to broader issues of security and politics. Drawing on the canons 
of (Western) war studies, as well as contemporary strategic and security 
studies, Gavin Mount’s chapter adopts a ‘hybrid sensibility’ to explore the 
blurred boundaries between war and peace. His survey of the canonical 
texts shows how a reflexive analysis of dominant binary categories of 
‘war’ and ‘peace’ can be used to elucidate the hybrid dynamics of power, 
legitimacy and identity in conflict-affected societies. A focus on the 
interstitial period between states of war and relative peace demonstrates that 
these conditions exist on a continuum and that both categories are firmly 
anchored in shared notions of the ‘political’. For Mount, the conceptual 
or heuristic value of hybridity in thinking about war and peace relates to 
how it allows analysts to reinscribe rigid boundaries while simultaneously 
revealing significant nuances and overlapping understandings.
Imelda Deinla’s chapter draws on research undertaken by herself and 
colleagues in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, an area of 
the southern Philippines that is well known for its ethnic and religious 
15
INTRODUCTION
divisions and longstanding pattern of conflict. Hybrid justice mechanisms 
have developed in this region as ways of coping with insecurity arising 
from actual and perceived injustices. These mechanisms are drawn 
from a plurality of customary, Islamic and state justice practices and 
work through informal networks. They appear to do so in a relatively 
coordinated way and serve to prevent conflict escalation while providing 
a level of justice and security provision to local populations. As well as 
being locally initiated, innovations are now also evident in respect of some 
national initiatives responding to local demands for more timely, flexible 
and adequate dispute resolution. These forms of hybrid justice emanating 
from national or state-level sources offer insights into how professional 
and culturally attuned justice provision can provide a better alternative 
to locally initiated mechanisms that remain susceptible to capture by 
local elites and discriminatory practices against vulnerable groups such 
as women.
The chapters in the fourth and final section examine hybridity in 
relation to gender. In different ways, each chapter draws attention 
to how hybridised environments can offer both opportunities and 
constraints to women, and highlights the need for analyses of hybridity 
to pay more attention to gendered power relations. The first chapter, by 
Damian Grenfell, draws on long-term fieldwork to examine the thorny 
issue of violence against women in Timor-Leste. Taking as his starting 
point the idea that ‘customary’ and ‘modern’ forms of spatiality co-exist 
in Timor-Leste, Grenfell suggests that while modern space tends to be 
treated as ‘secular, empty, commodifiable, transferrable’, customary 
space is understood very differently, and is characterised by genealogical 
and kinship connections between living people and, in turn, their 
relationship with the ancestors. Critical of the ways in which international 
development agencies ‘render’ Timor-Leste as patriarchal—a move that 
labels the population negatively and deems it in need of ‘modernising’—
Grenfell argues that modern forms of spatiality may be just as gendered as 
customary forms of spatiality. To illustrate his argument, Grenfell shows 
that in Timor-Leste’s capital, Dili, modern modes of production work 
to ‘contain’ women to the private sphere in ways that often exacerbate 
their dependence on intimate partners. He concludes by arguing that the 
interaction and overlap between customary and modern spatialities may 
at times compound women’s experiences of violence rather than enabling 
pathways away from it.
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The next chapter by Nicole George is a study of Fiji, specifically of the 
gendered consequences of the hybridised security environment. George 
focuses on the ways in which the operations of ‘state security agencies 
in Fiji are shaped by, and intertwined with, powerful institutions of 
customary and religious authority’. While at first glance the fusing of state 
and indigenous authority structures might suggest that state policing is 
more locally resonant, George argues that the interplay between ‘bottom-
up’ and ‘top-down’ sites of authority generates its own gendered exclusions 
and restrictions. George deploys Nils Bubant’s concept of ‘vernacular 
security’ to explore how threats to security are framed and legitimised. 
Specifically, she shows how the Methodist faith and custom both ‘sustain 
a sense of distinctive Fijian unity and identity’ and simultaneously give 
rise to ‘fears about Fijians’ ultimate survival and need for vigorous state 
protection of indigenous custom and the centrality of their church’. 
In  this context, women’s identity and behaviour are rigorously policed 
to ensure that gendered norms, which are viewed as foundational to 
the achievement and maintenance of social order, predominate. George 
concludes with a call for more nuanced thinking about the ‘vernacularised 
ontologies of uncertainty and insecurity that are generated in hybridised 
environments’ which, in the Fijian context at least, have resulted in forms 
of policing that are deeply gendered.
The final chapter, by Ceridwen Spark, on Papua New Guinea, offers 
a more optimistic perspective on the potential of hybrid spaces to open 
up possibilities for women. Spark explores the French-owned Duffy 
cafe in Port Moresby, which is frequented by expatriates and well-to-do 
Papuan New Guineans, as a site of hybridity. Spark argues that it would 
be erroneous to see the cafe merely as the embodiment of wealth, privilege 
and consumerism, suggesting that to some extent it has also become 
a site where ‘new sociospatial practices and identities’ are produced that 
challenge the dominant constructions of class and gender in Port Moresby. 
Spark illustrates these dynamics by drawing on photos and commentary 
shared by a Papuan New Guinean woman, ‘Karuka’, who now lives in 
Melbourne, Australia. Through the eyes of Karuka and other women 
interviewed by Spark, we are able to see that Duffy enables some ‘women 
to construct themselves as friends and customers—rather than daughters, 
wives or sisters—and in doing so provides momentary liberation from the 




As the hybridity concept becomes ever more popular among academics 
and policymakers working in the interrelated fields of development, 
security studies and peacebuilding, nuanced reflections on its utility are 
increasingly necessary. A notable strength of the contributions to this 
edited collection is that they are grounded in in-depth knowledge of 
specific local contexts. This enriches the analyses, and allows the messy, 
awkward and dynamic realities of hybridity—the power dynamic, and 
diverse actors, ideas, practices and sites that shape it—to be brought 
into full view. This, in turn, provides rich insights into the possibilities 
and limitations of hybridity as a conceptual tool.






The ‘Hybrid Turn’: Approaches 
and Potentials
M . Anne Brown
Introduction
Hybridity, the hybrid turn and hybrid political orders have become 
increasingly common as terms in debates around peacebuilding, state 
formation, governance and, to some extent, counter-insurgency and 
security in postcolonial states. While circulating in scholarly debate, where 
they are best exemplified in the work of Oliver Richmond,1 Volker Boege, 
Roger Mac Ginty and others, these terms, or approaches associated with 
them, now also appear regularly in policy and practice arenas,2 where they 
have emerged as part of a response to what is seen as the relative failure 
of many international postwar reconstruction, statebuilding and security 
interventions to establish stable, relatively peaceful and well-governed 
states in many postcolonial regions.3 As the word implies, hybridity in the 
first instance is concerned with interaction and change across significant 
difference—in the context of these debates, the difference in question 
relates to the making and experience of political community, in the fullest 
1  There is an extensive opus of work by Oliver Richmond, including, for example, ‘Resistance and 
the Post-liberal Peace’ and A Post-liberal Peace.
2  OECD-DAC, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, 17; World Bank, World 
Development Report 2011.
3  Ramsbotham et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution.
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sense of that term, across time and always engaging questions of power. 
Hybridity offers a way of bringing focus to the struggles, entanglements, 
patterns of occlusion and exclusion, processes of reworking, and ways 
of doing things engendered by the interaction of sometimes profoundly 
different logics of social and political order, sources of legitimacy and 
patterns of collective meaning.
How sociopolitical orders approach significant difference is a longstanding 
and ongoing challenge which has been understood and managed very 
differently across changing historical and sociocultural contexts. This 
discussion of hybridity is part of these wideranging and fundamental 
debates about how we collectively live, and more specifically about the 
desired nature of the state, and it carries implications for these debates. 
Nevertheless, as the later discussion of the emergence of the current 
exchange regarding hybridity indicates, the use of hybridity here has 
a more particular focus and purpose. Here hybridity is a response to the 
standardising drive dominating statebuilding and associated governance 
agendas in international development and peacebuilding contexts.
Varied family trees can be traced for hybridity, from biology to postcolonial 
studies.4 At the same time, ‘hybridity’ is an everyday word with all the 
mutability that common usage brings; in scholarly and policy contexts 
there can be sharply different uses and meanings at work.5 This chapter 
is not endeavouring to patrol the boundaries of a word at play in such 
a range of contexts. Nevertheless, the expression has become significant 
in a spectrum of interrelated debates and practices because references to 
hybridity enable certain kinds of discursive work to occur; they make 
possible certain conceptual insights, linkages and moves; and they open the 
way for particular practices. In the context of international peacebuilding, 
statebuilding and development, there is arguably a desperate need to 
recognise the reality of profound difference both between the sociopolitical 
models predominantly carried by such international endeavours and the 
lived reality of the recipient populations but also within the recipient 
states, to understand and give weight to that difference in new ways, and 
to craft ways of working creatively with and across it. Hybridity could 
thus open the potential for new ways of thinking about relations within 
states, but also across political communities within and among  states. 
4  See, for example, Bhabha, ‘Signs Taken for Wonders’.
5  See, for example, Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political 
Orders’, for a discussion of different approaches.
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The contexts in which references to hybridity and the hybrid turn have 
again gained prominence (touched on later) cast light on some of these 
moves and practices. It is also important to reflect critically on the 
significantly different ways that hybridity can be used, and therefore the 
different kinds of work that the term can be undertaking and the different 
trajectories that work is embedded within. A reference to hybridity does 
not automatically bear the same potential or significance from one use 
to another. This is not only a matter of conceptual clarity, but also of 
following the threads of practical, political and ethical potential and effect.
As a phenomenon, hybridity is not new. There is nothing novel in 
complex, dynamic enmeshments across difference, including friction 
and transformation across struggles for power. Negotiating profound 
difference seems likely to be a fundamental and potentially creative part of 
collective human experience and activity, across millennia of migrations, 
trade, wars, occupations and marriages; it is also often deeply challenging, 
frequently unchosen and repeatedly violent. All sociopolitical formations 
could be understood as ‘hybrid’ in this very general use of the term. 
As  a  broadly theoretical term, postcolonial studies then bring to this 
generic insight a more particular focus on the long history and deeply 
formative ongoing experience and legacy of colonialism, for all parties.6 
Many studies explore the long, complex and often self-contradictory 
collective and individual relations, identities and psyches shaped by 
centuries of colonial interaction. Even while recognising the deformations 
produced by deep structural violence, these accounts, often of resistances 
and radical reappropriations, offer critically important alternatives to 
analyses that produce simply oppressors and victims.7
Contexts of emergence
The uses of hybridity discussed in this chapter emerged more specifically 
in the context of debates around statebuilding, state-strengthening, 
governance and peacebuilding efforts undertaken by international and 
external state agencies. In such debates, the state is not surprisingly 
taken to be the fundamental vehicle for political life, and so for stability, 
governance and prosperity.8 A distinguishing factor in this current usage 
6  Appiah, In My Father’s House; Braithwaite, The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica.
7  Nandy, The Intimate Enemy.
8  Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding.
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of the term, then, is a focus on how the state and political community 
take shape, change and consolidate (or not),9 whether or not ‘the state’ 
features prominently in any particular analysis. The hybrid turn, however, 
arguably marks a shift towards more complex, but perhaps also more 
grounded, notions of what in fact constitutes a working state, in contrast 
to the more technocratic models favoured by statebuilding interventions. 
Hybridity as an analytical approach brings a focus on the state not solely 
from the more common perspective of state institutions, but rather in 
terms of the dense layering of interactions, relations and institutions that 
make up political community and constitute the basis of state formation, 
in which state institutions play key roles.10
Indeed, the hybrid turn more often engages with community, customary 
or more generally societal efforts regarding security, justice, peace, welfare, 
conflict resolution or governance—dynamics that are rarely centre stage 
in international statebuilding agendas. Nor is ‘the state’ assumed to exist 
according to the narrative of the secular, legal-institutional architecture 
forged for it in statebuilding exercises. The world of the unseen—of the 
dead, the sacred, of spirits, ghosts and the powers of nature—can be and 
often is a fundamental part of political community, including of its play 
of power.11 Whether ‘the state’ is understood as the institutional and legal 
framework for regulation, however, or whether it is understood more 
broadly as potentially encompassing the political communities across 
an entire population (living and perhaps also the dead), this complex, 
multivalenced world of sociopolitical life is what the state is part of and 
what it must work with, across and for. For many people in postcolonial 
states, who are both inevitably building on but also struggling with the 
colonial legacy, the encounter with the state is the ongoing effort to craft 
their own working political order, perhaps simply to continue cultivating 
their own place, but in effect to contribute to shaping their own state 
in the context of a dynamic, dangerous and interconnected world. This 
effort involves not only matters of self-rule, security and wellbeing but 
also identity and meaning, and it is always fought out across and as part 
of the power dynamics in play.
9  That is, the hybrid turn focuses on broader processes of ‘state formation’ rather than the 
narrower, more technical focus of ‘statebuilding’ which relies on the essentially technical processes of 
institutional transfer and ‘capacity building’ over short time frames.
10  Grenfell et al., Understanding Community; Wiuff Moe, ‘Hybrid and “Everyday” Political 
Ordering’.
11  Ellis and ter Haar, Worlds of Power; Grenfell, ‘Remembering the Dead’.
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Hybridity in this context then refers to the complex co-existence, exchange 
and entanglement between often incommensurate logics of social, political 
and sacred order in the ongoing process of state formation and shaping 
political community: between, on one hand, the various prevailing values 
and practices of particular peoples and, on the other hand, the various 
norms and practices embedded in the dominant legal-institutional 
models of state operation, neoliberal modes of economic rationality and 
what could loosely be called ‘modern’ social formations and constructions 
of the person. Notions of hybridity thus begin as a pointer to, and a lens 
on, the need to take profound difference as fundamental in the dynamic 
of political order and as embedded in the very structure and working 
life of most postcolonial states (and perhaps increasingly, in all states). 
In this case, difference is not simply a matter of competing interests or 
antagonistic ethnic or religious identities, but refers to what are often 
profoundly different ways of knowing and being in the world. As well as 
some anthropologists and ethnographers, theorists of radical indigeneity 
point to this depth of difference well.12 Nevertheless, this is a difference of 
logics or of ways of knowing—actual empirical institutions, groups and 
even individuals can be deeply shaped by both: hence hybridity. A working 
chief in Ghana might have a masters degree from a British or United 
States university; the head of a government department in Vanuatu can be 
deeply embedded in very traditionally operating kinship networks from 
a remote island; a community and customary leader from Bougainville 
might be trying to forge viable responses to contemporary political 
dilemmas, drawing on customary and parliamentary political dynamics, 
and so forth. While some groups live overwhelmingly in one ‘world’ or 
another, and many activities circulate within one set of meanings, many 
interweave different domains on a daily basis. Identity is never uniform 
or homogenous, and is perhaps always marked by difference with itself.13 
Despite this interweaving, however, negotiating profound difference in 
the context of forging political community or state formation throws 
down fundamental political, practical and ethical dilemmas. It intensifies 
the questions of how we live together across difference, questions that are 
arguably one of the drivers of the enterprise of the modern state, but takes 
them into another register altogether.14 These questions are also relevant 
to a wide range of national contexts.
12  See, for example, Alfred, ‘What Is Radical Imagination?’; Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies.
13  Derrida, Writing and Difference.
14  Tully, Strange Multiplicity.
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One strong initial motivation for talking about hybridity and hybrid 
political orders was the effort to move away from a preoccupation with 
state failure as the framework for analysis of political instability and 
violence in postcolonial states.15 Some of the relatively early uses of the 
term, for example, emerged through research and practice engagements in 
Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste, where a focus 
on state failure or incapacity, while certainly yielding insights, failed to 
capture both the complexity, dynamism, broader resilience and capacity 
of political community and social order, but also significant underlying 
sources of disorder.16 Stepping aside from frameworks of state failure 
is not a rejection of the idea that the architecture of state governance 
can fail (presuming it has ever actually operated) as such, but marks an 
effort to investigate more comprehensively the actual forms of authority, 
legitimacy, order and disorder in play. This involves a more complex and 
open-ended imagination of the state, and opens new perspectives on its 
‘failure’. At a simple but fundamental level, the reference to hybridity is 
a refusal to judge whole regions primarily in relation to their conformity 
or otherwise to an idealised version of the rational-legal state—to models 
of what those in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) states might like to portray themselves officially 
as being. Such narrow grounds of assessment cannot be expected to yield 
a strong understanding of what is at stake in the region concerned, and 
only in very particular circumstances could be the basis for good policy.17
An emphasis on hybridity then entails taking seriously deeply held 
collective values, forms of knowledge and ways of life, in their dynamism, 
struggles and continuities, as part of a living political context. This enables 
sources of order that would in official terms be seen to lie outside state 
institutions to become more clearly visible and open to exploration—not 
predominantly as an anthropological engagement, but as a current political 
exchange. Such exploration does not imply endorsing or condemning 
those forms of order but, rather, requires paying full attention to them. 
In the countries or regions mentioned, everyday security, food security, 
social welfare, conflict management and justice provision are substantially 
underpinned by customary and community forms of order, which may 
15  See, for example, Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour.
16  Boege, ‘Bougainville and the Discovery of Slowness’; Boege et al., ‘State Building Reconsidered’; 
Boege et al., ‘States Emerging from Hybrid Political Orders’; Dinnen, ‘The Solomon Islands 
Intervention’.
17  Brown, ‘Security and Development’; Dinnen and Peake, ‘More than Just Policing’.
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themselves be understood as part of a larger cosmic order.18 In many 
respects, the working sociopolitical order of ‘the state’ exists by virtue of 
villages and customary or kin patterns. Villages, and the political fabric 
which enables them to work, need, then, to come more fully into view, 
not as a signifier of what is parochial or of the past, but as a functioning 
way of contemporary life. Considering hybridity also, however, brings 
more clearly into focus the profound forms of disorder, alienation, 
manipulation and sociopolitical dysfunction that can be generated in 
the context of disjunction and deep ambiguity between prevailing social 
values and official state institutional systems and norms.19
A focus on state failure, by contrast, approaches questions of order and 
disorder through the lens not of the state as political community, but of 
a narrow conception of the state modelled around (in effect) the ideal 
forms of state institutions. This identification of the state with government 
and juridical institutions—an identification that to a significant extent 
conceptually underpins institutional transfer processes20—posits both 
a categorical distinction between state and society, and a fundamental 
uniformity between the values, life-worlds and political vocabulary of 
state and society, and across society. The idea of the state carried by much 
statebuilding embeds an assumption that the narrow, idealised forms of 
state institutions and of the notional public sphere of the liberal state 
are sufficiently grounded on universal reason to be beyond ‘culture’ and 
difference.21 For this fundamental form of intervention and the powerful 
idea of the state that is associated with it, the ideal form of sociopolitical 
life has already been determined and simply awaits implementation. While 
such assumptions may work well enough where the structure and processes 
of state institutions substantially share underlying cultural understandings 
with a broadly homogenous population, they are considerably less effective 
for (the increasing number of ) states where that is not the case.22 Beyond 
programs of education and training, predominant statebuilding and 
peacebuilding narratives offer few tools for working with the relationship 
between government or international institutions and societal networks, 
or for exploring the complex interplay between prevailing cultural norms 
of obligation, accountability and appropriate behaviour with liberal 
18  Grenfell et al., Understanding Community; Hicks, Tetum Ghosts and Kin.
19  Ellis and ter Haar, Worlds of Power.
20  Lamour, Foreign Flowers.
21  Eriksen, ‘State Effects’; Tully, Strange Multiplicity.
22  Dodson, ‘The Human Rights Situation of Indigenous Peoples’.
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rights norms and legal-institutional models of behaviour, or for even 
understanding why such work might be important.23 It is common for 
forms of sociopolitical order that are neither government nor civil society 
(often, although not solely, customary forms) to be seen as in competition 
with, undermining or corrupting state institutions, inherently exploitative 
or violent or simply as too fragmentary to act as viable sources of order. 
Often they are implicitly cast as the ‘dark shadow’ of the past from which 
modern life has progressed and against which it marks its progress. This 
is to rule them out from serious engagement from the start. It can be 
these institutions and networks, however, that actually enable key forms 
of sociopolitical life and in effect underpin the state.24
Notions of hybridity thus support a move away from taking the legal-
institutional, broadly Weberian models of the state as the definitive 
standard of political community, and as the sole source or form of political 
goods such as accountability, participation, legitimacy, justice and ethics. 
They call for more complex understandings of what might constitute 
political order and political community and for processes for defining 
and achieving collective goods and shared understanding across profound 
difference.25
Terminologies and scales
The difference of sociopolitical logics to which hybridity refers is 
sometimes characterised as one between ‘state’ and ‘society’ and sometimes 
as the interaction of ‘international’ and ‘local’ (whether because exchanges 
between international agencies and local people in the context of 
international peacebuilding or statebuilding are the focus of analysis, 
or because the state itself is seen as an internationalising force). Or the 
difference might be understood as one between customary, modern or 
other possible social formations.26 The first two of these characterisations, 
however, have a shorthand quality, and all are more relevant to certain 
situations than others. Categories of society, state, local, national, 
international are fundamental to how contemporary politics is thought; 
they situate each other in a network of constitutive references, arranged 
23  Hohe, ‘The Clash of Paradigms’.
24  Grenfell et al., Understanding Community; McWilliam, ‘Customary Governance in Timor-Leste’.
25  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’.
26  For example, see Grenfell, this volume.
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in vertical hierarchies.27 Perhaps in part because of their fundamental 
nature, such categories are not so stable when pushed empirically or 
theoretically. A state is not simply a ‘domestic’ entity experienced (and to 
varying extents constructed) by those living within a defined territory and 
in principle subject to its laws, institutions and requirements—although 
it is certainly that. As a political and legal form the state is a globalised 
phenomenon and effectively enforced as such—for peoples wishing to 
exercise a particular level of self-rule and sovereignty, or even simply 
security from invasion or domination by violent others, there is as yet no 
alternative to being a state. Even when borders are in effect notional, the 
state is by definition the hinge point of articulation between domestic 
and international, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, by virtue of which these spaces 
are constituted.28 The encounter with the state, and the architecture of 
political, social and economic modes of practice it references, is (albeit to 
varying degrees) an encounter with a globalising drive as much as with 
a ‘domestic’ or national one. The ‘local’ is meanwhile saturated by, and 
interwoven with, international and global influences and forces.
A spectrum of approaches
This chapter distinguishes among three different ways of using notions 
of hybridity as a theoretical tool. A key distinction turns on the question 
of instrumentalisation and therefore on the nature of relationships 
between what could be called the subjects and the objects of the approach 
enabled by notions of hybridity.29 As will become clearer, this focus on 
instrumentalisation and relationship has important epistemological, 
practical, political and ethical dimensions.
The first use of hybridity is as an analytical or descriptive category, broadly 
in line with the orientations set out above. That is, it is not in the first 
instance normative, does not point to something to be aimed for, and 
does not denote a good or a bad state of play in itself. In this usage, 
hybridity simply marks a recognition of the co-existence of diverse sources 
of order (and disorder) within the make-up of political community, 
without judging such co-existence to be inherently negative, and so opens 
a space to investigate the prevailing ecology of relationships.
27  Escobar, Territories of Difference; Ferguson and Gupta, ‘Spatializing States’.
28  Walker, Inside/Outside.
29  See also Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’.
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Research informed by this approach—into questions of everyday security, 
for example—might explore with people in communities, towns and 
across an array of relevant institutions and community positions common 
sources of insecurity, who or what is seen to provide security or to counter 
insecurity and how they go about it, avenues for accountability, patterns 
of exclusion and inclusion, patterns of vulnerability, how providers of 
security might link outwards geographically or institutionally, and so 
on. The answers to such questions often concern social order generated 
by complex networks of groups; they often include customary networks 
as fundamental lines of connection and modes of practice, but can also 
include elements of state institutions and regional governments; they 
might include church or religious groups, but also community-based 
organisations and neighbourhood associations. Such work often focuses 
more on the everyday production of life and less on elites, whether these 
are elites claiming state platforms, or their rivals (e.g. warlords), although 
such figures are certainly key actors and might feature in the chain of 
connections. While the perspectives opened by hybridity as an approach 
can provide sharp insight into dysfunction and violence, one consequence 
of this line of enquiry is that it is possible to discover that rather more 
is working than often appears to be the case.30
This approach is somewhat different from an emphasis on political 
economy. While both might seek to drill deep into the nature of interactions 
among a wide range of players, an emphasis on hybridity might look not 
only at the complex dynamics of power, but also at profoundly different 
understandings of what constitutes power, of what its sources might be, 
and what might operate as checks upon it. Hybridity or the hybrid turn 
involves a much greater recognition of what is sweepingly and reductively 
called ‘culture’ in the generation and circulation of power. As it is 
understood here, the hybrid turn also carries quite particular implications 
for and orientations to practice, even if that is simply the comportment of 
self-reflective research.
While an emphasis on hybridity is not, in this first and fundamental 
approach, normative, it can have significant normative implications, 
as implied earlier. Moreover, these dimensions can be pushed far. 
The key element here is the importance of paying attention, of taking 
people’s own values, beliefs, emotions, practices and self-understanding 
30  See, for example, Boege, ‘Bougainville and the Discovery of Slowness’; Dinnen and Peake, 
‘More than Just Policing’.
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seriously. After  the manner of Simone Weil, attention may be what we 
fundamentally have to offer each other.31 This does not mean accepting 
or endorsing those values, or preclude critiquing them, if that seems 
relevant, but it does require serious engagement. While this certainly 
has significance in a research context, it becomes even more pressing in 
a practice engagement. The critical question becomes one of mutuality 
and dialogic exchange with the normative point including the question 
of how might ‘we’, as researchers, practitioners or ‘intervenors’, engage? 
This shifts focus from being only on ‘others’ elsewhere to the nature of 
the exchange and perhaps the history of the exchange; it thus includes 
ourselves, as reflective researchers and practitioners.32
This shift thus involves self-reflection regarding the nature and impact 
of our individual but also collective agency and actions, including the 
history of actions that we, perhaps unwittingly, represent to those we 
are interacting with; it involves a move away from the ‘delivery’ mode 
that dominates development, and from imagining that ‘our’ work is 
technical and neutral, to an emphasis on participation and the quality of 
relationship. It involves recognising others as interlocutors, as co-creators 
of knowledge and action and demands a capacity to enter into difficult 
conversations and exchange. Perhaps most challenging, it involves 
stepping back from a demand to control. If we are seeking some form of 
change in others, not only do we need to understand (as well as we can) 
people’s sources and forms of practice, we might also need to be open 
to change ourselves—even if that change is primarily in the ability to 
enter into more mutual forms of engagement.33 In this, such modes of 
engagement echo the loosening of those discourses of the state, centralised 
to the sovereign point at which control ultimately resides and from which 
it radiates. The normativity of the hybrid turn in this iteration does not, 
therefore, concern how to achieve hybridity, but how to support the more 
familiar goals of wellbeing, reasonable safety, food security, reduction of 
violence, greater justice and so forth, but doing so in ways that place 
priority on paying attention to the people involved, their own goals, what 
is valued, by whom, the range of views on how it might be achieved, 
and the nature and quality of the exchange.
31  Weil, The First and Last Notebooks.
32  Lederach, The Moral Imagination; Schon, The Reflective Practitioner.
33  Brown, Human Rights and the Borders of Suffering.
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A second use of hybridity, which is more prominent in the peacebuilding 
literature, casts it as something to be aimed at. In practical terms 
this approach emerges from the very reasonable effort to encourage 
international agencies or national elites to give greater recognition or 
weight to widely prevalent forms of sociopolitical order. A subtle shift 
takes place, however, from working with communities’ own approaches 
to (for example) achieve less violent everyday security provision to seeking 
to achieve ‘hybridity’. This approach appears to be the result of setting up 
the argument as a chequerboard of moves in a narrative of development, 
shaped by the logic of the positive dialectic, from which synthesis ideally 
emerges. The emphasis shifts from the process of mutuality to an imagined 
outcome—a newly constructed hybridity. ‘Hybridity’ then becomes 
a conceptual space, and a prefigured, notional or narrative solution to 
a profound, ongoing set of concrete issues about how we live together. 
This is the design of hybrid institutions to which Gearoid Millar refers.34 
It appeals to the desire (or the bureaucratic need) for a ‘form of words’ 
or a repeatable ‘place holder’ able to stand in for concrete responses to 
particular conundrums. Instead of being an orientation and openness to 
complexity, it stands as a solution. Such a solution may be premature 
and reified, however, and so obscure more than it reveals. In practical 
terms it may endanger the challenge and potential of an emphasis on 
hybridity, as the need to recognise and (where relevant) work with the 
grain of complex, dynamic situations.
What I identify as the third approach is the effort to devise hybrid 
solutions, far from the mutuality of exchange, in the distant capitals of 
international agency such as New York or Geneva or even Kabul, in order 
to provide what is hoped will be predictability and uniformity. The focus 
here shifts to questions of control from abstract capitals and to finding 
more effective forms by which places and peoples can be managed so that 
they do not pose problems for those capitals. Hybrid sources of order and 
authority are recognised, but in terms of whether and how they might 
be manipulated. This approach represents a highly instrumentalised form 
of relationship, reminiscent of colonial mechanisms of ‘indirect rule’ 
whereby colonial administrations used local customary systems as a low-
cost means ‘to maintain order … enforce production of cash crops and 
collect taxes’.35 As Richmond and Mac Ginty note, this approach is in line 
34  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
35  Aning and Aubyn, ‘Challenging Conventional Understandings’; Dunn, Timor: A People 
Betrayed, 54.
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‘with a post-Iraq and Afghanistan curtailed liberal interventionism, and is 
also in keeping with neoliberal mores of shifting responsibility and lowering 
intervention costs’.36 Counter-insurgency also provides a developed arena 
of policy and practice that exemplifies this third approach to ‘hybridity’. 
United States counter-insurgency efforts in Somalia, for example, have 
operated under a ‘dual track’ policy of engaging with a wide range of ‘non-
state actors’ opposed to Al Shabaab.37 Similar policies have been adopted 
in Afghanistan in the struggle against the Taliban, and elsewhere. This 
kind of approach to ‘hybridity’ has a very long history.
Instrumental approaches and logics are not in themselves a problem; 
there is no criticism intended here of the effort to achieve outcomes and 
the need for management of people and things in order to do so. Nor is 
any criticism intended of the effort to understand the power dynamics 
of others. The issues at stake in discussions of hybridity, however, entail 
working across, and in a context of, significant difference, often severe 
fragmentation, perhaps violence and highly unequal, coercive power 
dynamics. This establishes a very different context from one of managing 
others where a substantial political or social vocabulary and mechanisms 
of redress are already shared; the presence or otherwise of  such 
contexts of exchange makes a significant difference to the nature of the 
instrumentalisation. The researcher or practitioner could ask how those 
involved at different points in the process are engaged—what is the scope 
for exchange, participation, accountability or even safety? How deeply are 
people objectified, or treated as interlocutors, and is this to engage only 
with the powerful, or with the spectrum of those involved in the issue 
at hand?
Whether or not there are reasons to argue for this instrumentalisation 
and objectification of people under conditions of violent insurgency, 
such an approach constitutes a radically different approach to hybridity. 
A highly instrumentalised use of hybridity may have tactical benefits, 
but is unlikely to be productive in situations where the international 
intervenors are trying to build or achieve something sustainable, such 
as forms of legitimacy that are not essentially coercive. Peacebuilding or 
statebuilding endeavours are often trying to do just this, however. A highly 
instrumentalised approach is unlikely to be able to build broadly based 
trust, or long-term relations which generate some levels of mutual respect, 
36  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 220.
37  US Department of State, 2010, in Wiuff Moe, ‘The “Turn to the Local”’, 132.
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yet it may be in the context of such relations that change regarding violent 
social practices (such as female genital mutilation, for example) are most 
likely to become possible.38
Moreover, it seems likely to be this instrumental third approach to 
hybridity that is most vulnerable to becoming seriously compromised 
through ‘going along’ with deeply violent assertions of power that can pass 
themselves off as an expression of ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’. A contemporary 
example might be the practice of ‘boy play’, where powerful men use 
young boys as sexual slaves in Afghanistan.39 This practice has come to 
international media attention over the past few years, perhaps because 
it has occurred among Afghan military personnel on United States (US) 
bases in Afghanistan. The US military hierarchy, apparently seeking 
not to disrupt relations with its allies, has at best ‘looked the other way’ 
and at worst offered partial protection by sidelining or dismissing those 
US servicemen who have objected.40 ‘Boy play’ emerged from, and has 
been shaped by, prevailing social relations in Afghanistan, as in different 
ways violent paedophilia is present, and frequently ‘overlooked’, in 
countries across Europe, the Anglosphere and elsewhere. It was and is 
also seen across Afghanistan as abhorrent; ‘overlooking’ it does not build 
good relations nor earn respect. The hybrid turn is not a rationale for 
collaboration with deeply violent practices. At its best, it might rather be 
an opportunity to collaboratively reflect on and work with the various 
forms of violence that mark all our cultures.
Dialogue and its implications
As Foucault has pointed out, the ways we understand and experience the 
knowing subject and the processes of knowing, and the ways we understand 
the state, are deeply enmeshed.41 Both are shaped around the figure of 
the sovereign self, the central knower, who sees and shapes the world 
around him. The argument that is at least implicit in notions of hybridity 
is that we need increasingly to explore different practices of statehood 
38  On the basis of field research by the author in 2015, the work of the Carter Center on female 
genital mutilation in Liberia, for example, offers an instance of a long-term, respectful engagement 
that is seeking to shift this entrenched practice, with what appears some success. The Carter Center 
has already contributed to changes in the practice of trial by ordeal in Liberia.
39  Sahak, ‘Afghanistan’s Enslaved Children’.
40  Ibid.
41  Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge.
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and open up richer ways of being a state—ways that cannot be generated 
by or assimilated into prevailing modes and practices of imagining and 
reproducing statehood.42 This is not a matter of abandoning goals 
and principles of participation, accountability, justice, fairness, inclusion, 
safety, respect and so forth, but about acknowledging and working with 
the multiple ways that we are people in the world. Richer ways of talking 
and doing political community may come less from the texts of theorists, 
and more from experimentation and exchanges already taking place on 
the ground, as they are in regions around the world, where towns, villages 
and districts are often struggling to deal with the complex problems 
confronting them. Such exchanges, however, need to be taken seriously 
by national governments, international bodies and scholarship, and to be 
considered and weighed for what they might make possible or illuminate. 
Richer ways of understanding the state as political community (and the 
person as citizen) come also from supporting processes and habits of open-
ended exchange that can emerge as people and institutions seek to deal with 
the challenges of co-existence across very different practices of political 
community. Such processes can emerge in the face of pressing problems 
communities or regions are facing. While crafting practical responses to 
problems can be extremely valuable, an equally valuable outcome of such 
processes can be the gradual creation of habits and networks of exchange 
and listening, the experience of being taken seriously, and the flexibility 
involved in sitting with profoundly different logics, cosmologies and 
ways of engaging in dialogue. For those representing state institutions or 
central elites, it requires letting go of the imperial habits of thought and 
practice43 in which we have been trained, letting go of needing to know 
the outcome beforehand, and being prepared not always to try to control 
outcomes.
This need not constitute a revolution in institutional frameworks 
(although it might), as much as in processes and methods of engagement. 
Nevertheless, it would represent a major change in the ways we understand 
and enact the state, from a centralised ‘empire of uniformity’44 to perhaps 
a network of relations among and across overlapping institutions and 
communities, in which government has important and particular roles. 
This is far from a call for a ‘good enough’ state.45 Rather, it represents the 
42  Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 43.
43  Tully, Strange Multiplicity. The literal quote is ‘imperious habits of thought and behaviour’, 19.
44  Ibid., 58.
45  World Bank, World Development Report 2011.
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effort to gradually craft differently calibrated, more relational and mutual 
ways of knowing the person and political community.46 The challenges 
of crafting linkages and constructive adaption across difference, adaption 
that enables exploring and giving substance to key political goods such 
as justice, accountability, participation and mutual respect, rest not only 
with the usual recipients of international statebuilding efforts, but with 
all of us.
46  See Hunt, this volume, for further discussion of relational approaches.
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Power, Politics and Hybridity
Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht
Introduction
Hybridity and hybrid political orders form part of a body of literature 
that critiques the fragile-state discourse through which the modern state 
is contrasted with traditional or non-state modes of ordering in the global 
South.1 The notion of hybridity proposes an alternative lens that aims 
to move beyond normative notions of fragility and failure and beyond 
dichotomous thinking that articulates states and non-states as discrete and 
independent actors and institutions. Instead, the concepts of hybridity 
and hybrid political orders offer starting points for comprehending the 
processes at work between diverse and competing structures of authority, 
sets of rules, logics of order and claims to power that co-exist, overlap, 
interact and intertwine. The blending of these spheres is the explicit focus 
of the hybridity lens.
Despite its burgeoning popularity, hybridity itself is undertheorised 
and is applied by different scholars to mean a number of things. 
For instance, it has been used as a means of viewing interaction between 
the international and the local,2 to analyse the space of intervention;3 
it has been used descriptively by some scholars and prescriptively by 
1  Wiuff Moe and Albrecht, ‘Hybridity and Simultaneity in the Global South’.
2  Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance.
3  Charbonneau and Sears, ‘Fighting for Liberal Peace in Mali?’.
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others. This chapter regards the development of prescriptive hybridity 
as lacking conceptual clarity and developing approaches that assume 
the international community can construct hybridity through external, 
international program planning.
The emergence of hybridity is really a response to the failure of 
intervention in postconflict environments where complex social, political, 
economic and cultural conditions co-exist with an international approach 
dominated by liberal, Western thinking. Furthermore, the experiences 
also show there are both considerable local variations in the outcomes 
of such interventions, but also difference in degrees of local ownership 
and involvement. Hybridity contains promise within this framework 
by providing a critique of the binaries involved in such interventions, 
notably between international/modern and local/traditional. As such, 
it  is commonly presented as a means of merging these two worlds into 
a mutually created political, social, economic and cultural world where the 
international and the local co-exist and co-produce hybrid political orders.
In addition, these hybrid orders are both locally and internationally 
owned, opening up the possibility of continuing external and international 
intervention and a new prescription for international agencies seeking 
to program and manage. Programming in this area typically assumes 
that hybridity can be planned within projects, to produce ‘hybrid 
programming’ and to make programming better through increasing 
legitimacy and trust. The argument follows that hybridity within political 
systems can improve both of these by using local networks and providers 
with the aim of increasing cooperation and increasing legitimacy, a role 
that is, in fact, very similar to colonial indirect rule.4 Alongside this is 
a desire to equip local actors so they can play a more constructive role 
in statebuilding more broadly through incorporation (absorption?) of 
traditional norms and institutions into the constructing of conventional 
liberal states.5 Hybridity, therefore, attempts to show that violence and the 
alternative governance systems that arise from it are part of an authentic 
and legitimate process of state formation that enjoys greater popular 
legitimacy than the (attempted) international imposition of Weberian 
state systems.6
4  Johnson and Hutchison, ‘Hybridity, Political Order and Legitimacy’.
5  Clements et al., ‘State Building Reconsidered’.
6  Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders.
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Before continuing, we need to provide a short caveat on the international/
local dichotomy. We recognise that in many ways this is problematic, not 
least because national elites and national concerns do play a role within 
both international and local spheres of (political) activity. However, this 
chapter focuses on the interaction between the international and the local, 
recognising that any idea of the ‘national’ aggregates several different 
experiences. At the same time, the term ‘local’ encompasses communal 
and individual experiences of security and justice that we are interested 
in, whereas the overwhelming involvement in the design, application 
and evaluation of development programming is by an ‘international 
community’ of wealthy states and multilateral institutions.
Recognition of ‘the local’ as important in what has been termed ‘the local 
turn in peacebuilding’,7 especially political science, is to be welcomed. It is 
also important to keep in mind that in itself this is not new, and Menkhaus, 
among others, has drawn attention to ‘the obvious but often overlooked 
observation that local communities are not passive in the face of state 
failure and insecurity, but instead adapt in a variety of ways to minimize 
risk and increase predictability in their dangerous environments’.8 
The local turn has shifted the literature towards a far more positive view 
of these societal adaptations and their legitimacy as sources of power, 
even a somewhat romantic notion of local non-state orders as inherently 
positive models of governance. This has in some cases led to reification 
of the local as a defence against the ostensibly hegemonic order of the 
liberal state.9 The work of Richmond,10 for example, moves beyond seeing 
the liberal state itself as being hybrid and towards hybridity as a form of 
resistance and survival to externally imposed ideas. At the same time, he 
uses the concept of everyday peace as a means to move beyond hybridity 
as just a description of two things combined and towards an approach 
that sees hybridity as a set of ‘practices’. As Millar points out, however, 
this does not provide a way out of the core issue of how to establish peace 
without external intervention and international management and control 
of hybridity.11
7  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building’.
8  Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in Somalia’, 75.
9  See, for example, Richmond, A Post-liberal Peace.
10  Ibid.
11  Millar, An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding.
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This chapter interrogates the concept of hybridity by exploring security 
and justice systems across a number of African contexts and how they are 
conditioned by power and politics. As such, the chapter has an explicit 
focus  on the power of local actors to resist the imposition of liberal 
statebuilding processes. It shows that some hybrid structures do provide 
a  means to subvert externally imposed statebuilding but, importantly, 
access  to these approaches is controlled and moderated by the political 
power of local elites. In addition, prescriptive hybridity makes assumptions 
about the nature of local institutions that are not grounded in the 
reality of those institutions themselves. The implication is that much 
current thinking on hybridity reifies and idealises ‘the local’. It assumes 
representation, legitimacy and equilibrium, and underrepresents power 
struggles and political processes of inclusion and exclusion from decision-
making and resource allocation.12
In the following, we make a case for explicitly including the political into 
the notion of hybrid orders. This is because most prescriptive forms of 
hybridity assume that the local can be managed and manipulated without 
acknowledging the political agency of local institutions.
Origins: Hybridity and peacebuilding
Hybridity as a way of conceptualising resistance to liberal statebuilding 
has been an emerging theme within both development and peacebuilding 
literatures. On one hand, hybrid approaches derive from a well-established 
recognition among development scholars and practitioners that 
conventional Weberian state models do not reflect realities on the ground 
and are incompatible with local structures of power.13 On the other hand, 
within the peacebuilding literature it has been recognised that state-centric 
approaches to postconflict reconstruction commonly are exclusionary and 
often do not develop into stable and peaceful situations.14 An additional 
literature on the effects of security and justice reform efforts challenges the 
state-centric approaches of many international agencies, reflected mainly 
within evaluations and case studies.15 They do not necessarily use the 
12  Albrecht and Kyed, Policing and the Politics of Order-Making.
13  See, for example, Hagmann and Péclard, ‘Negotiating Statehood’; Meagher, ‘The Strength 
of Weak States’; and Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government in Somalia’.
14  Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace’; Richmond, A Post-liberal 
Peace.
15  Albrecht et al., Perspectives on Involving Non-state and Customary Actors.
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hybridity label, but convey a similar message of how state institutions and 
other actors interact with traditional leaders and non-state groups more 
generally, suggesting there are some complex empirical challenges to ideas 
of ‘state-centric’ approaches and simple state/non-state dichotomies.16
Many scholars go beyond this, making the assumption that a combination 
of individuals and processes from both the local and the international 
will improve the prospects for peace, moving beyond the institutional gap 
between existing experiences of internationally led statebuilding and local 
realities. However, there is an underlying assumption that there is a direct 
causal relationship between programming and results on the ground that 
can be planned and predicted. In addition, there are a set of assumptions 
about the nature of the local that are rooted in the political agendas of 
peacebuilding and the representation of the local that goes beyond local 
people’s experience of those institutions.17 Finally, there is a tendency 
to assume a ‘static’ quality to many ‘traditional’ authorities and local 
political structures, without recognising that all of these institutions and 
structures are political and evolve as a consequence of internal dynamics, 
but equally through interaction with the outside world, including the 
international system.
Hybridity as a concept contributes to the articulation of the fluidity and 
networked quality of social systems and orders. Mac Ginty provides the 
most institutionally structured analysis of hybridity and, as he points out, 
it is useful for moving analytically beyond romanticised and purist notions 
of ‘pristine systems’, recognising that all social orders by definition are 
‘tainted with the “original sin” of hybridity’.18 This shifts the focus away 
from dichotomous approaches with clear divides between state/non-state 
and international/local to an explicit focus on the political-cum-power 
dynamics and interactions between international and local systems that are 
always already hybrid and represent ‘grey areas’ of interaction. For instance, 
Richards points out that the inclusion of traditional authorities in the 
central government of Somaliland merges external demands and internal 
necessities, but itself produces complex sets of interaction between actors 
that are more unpredictable than formal, bureaucratic state institutions.19
16  Albrecht and Buur, ‘An Uneasy Marriage’; Baker, ‘Beyond the Tarmac Road’.
17  Hirblinger and Simons, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’.
18  Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace’, 398.
19  Richards, ‘Bringing the Outside In’.
HyBRIDITy ON THE GROUND IN PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT
42
Current approaches to policy and, indeed, much scholarly work, take 
a simple starting point as the relationship between state and non-state 
actors. This is hardly surprising given the peacebuilding roots of hybridity 
as it has evolved over the past 10 years in peace and conflict studies,20 
which is at least partly guided by the imperative to recreate or reconstruct 
a functioning state in the face of armed challenges to its sovereignty. Part of 
the issue with this conceptualisation is the lack of clarity about what is 
actually non-state, whether there is a simple dividing line or whether 
non-state actors can be more legitimate than state ones in particular 
circumstances. The example of South Sudan is interesting, in that a non-
state challenge of the Sudanese state in the form of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army 21 eventually became the government of South Sudan 
that gained independence in 2011, and now faces challenges to its own 
authority. What this shows is that the categories of state and non-state are 
fundamentally fluid.
Looking more closely, it can also be observed that some actors, networks 
and institutions are more fixed than others, and some actors, for example, 
can be both state and non-state at the same time. A paramount chief in 
Sierra Leone, for instance, is a traditional authority, but is also defined 
within the constitution and has a formal role. This type of fluidity has 
led scholars like Albrecht, in the case of chiefs in Sierra Leone,22 as well 
as Visoka in the case of Kosovo, to concentrate on processes of hybridity 
rather than hybrid actors. They do this to move away from a notion of 
hybridity that involves taking two separate entities and combining them 
to make a new (hybrid) order.23
Local elites and the politics of resistance
The notion of hybridity as process has led Mac Ginty and others to argue 
that hybridity is largely produced through interactions between the local 
and the international and is a result of active resistance by local people.24 
20  Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace’; Richmond, A Post-liberal 
Peace.
21  The Sudan People’s Liberation Army was renamed South Sudan Defence Forces in May 2017.
22  Albrecht, ‘Hybridisation in a Case of Diamond Theft in Rural Sierra Leone’.
23  Visoka, ‘Three Levels of Hybridisation Practices in Post-conflict Kosovo’.
24  Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance.
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This implies that any analysis must understand the explicit balance between 
alternative sources of legitimacy and authority. Who, for example, has the 
power to resist and in what way? Is all resistance positive and for whom?
The answers to these questions are all political in the sense that all 
hybridity is partly a political choice and partly the result of institutional 
pressures that arise from institutional constraints. A realistic analysis of 
hybridity must, therefore, involve analysis of the empirical dimension 
of domestic politics, or the ‘politics of the everyday’.25 Recent literature 
has begun to examine the nature of these local political interactions and 
their role in shaping, resisting and constraining international projects. 
Pouligny 26 and Autesserre,27 for instance, focus on peacekeeping from 
below, while there is a growing literature on the role of domestic elites 
in taking opportunities to benefit from international intervention, but 
also in developing international approaches to democratic transition.28 
This leaves a number of unresolved issues concerning legitimacy and 
political power at the local level. Part of any analysis of a hybrid system 
therefore has to include a focus on where power lies within such systems, 
who exercises power and how, a dynamic that is not well captured by the 
analytically homogenising effects of prescriptive hybridity approaches.
Accepting Mac Ginty’s premise that hybridity is variable according to 
context, and also the overarching premise that local actors are capable of 
resistance to international intervention, makes the concept of hybridity 
difficult to categorise with one simple theory. Millar also adds another 
important element beyond agency: ‘some areas of social life in any context 
… are inherently resistant to purposeful planning—the ritual and the 
conceptual—but … do not demand wilful action on the part of local 
actors to serve as points of resistance’.29 In other words, there are always 
local political and social structures rooted in belief systems that are going 
to be difficult to manipulate or manage in the context of Western liberal 
intervention. This would include the admission of magical or secret society 
beliefs in court, aspects of cultural practice or even the use of specific 
rituals. Millar identifies four types of hybridity—institutional, practical, 
25  Roberts, ‘Everyday Legitimacy and Postconflict States’; Schroeder and Chappuis, ‘New Perspectives 
on Security Sector Reform’.
26  Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below.
27  Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo.
28  Hensell and Gerdes, ‘Elites and International Actors in Post-war Societies’; Sending, ‘The Effects 
of Peacebuilding’; Tansey, Regime-Building.
29  Millar, An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding, 4.
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ritual and conceptual—that are progressively difficult to manipulate. 
This  conceptual typology is useful to illustrate a spectrum of hybridity 
from institutional/legal elements that can be changed through to belief 
systems that are resistant.30
Of course, these elements themselves do not sit independently of power 
structures at the local level. Belief systems may constrain certain actions 
of chiefs at the local level, for example, but this does not stop chiefs from 
seeking to manipulate them or interpret them in ways that maintain local 
power structures and hierarchies. Indeed, some actors may even gain from 
political disorder or resistance as a source of political power, as well as 
being in a constant state of flux and renegotiation of position.31 In some 
places those in charge of delivering justice may be those most responsible 
for insecurity in the first place,32 or alleged agents of insecurity may be 
providing a particular form of security.33 This means that the concept 
of hybridity may be more useful as a tool to critique liberal approaches 
to peacebuilding than to offer a credible alternative strategy or practical 
approach.34
It could be questioned whether the term hybridity represents a useful 
alternative analytical framework, or whether it is simply a way of describing 
empirical complexity and as such appears to have little practical utility to 
practitioners of statebuilding. Goodfellow and Lindemann35 point out in 
the case of Uganda that the mere co-existence of different institutional 
forms does not by definition mean that a hybrid system emerges. Indeed, 
for them it is the distinction between the Buganda Kingdom and the 
bureaucratic state of Uganda that is partly a source of power for those who 
operate within Buganda.
This does not mean that Buganda and Uganda operate at arms-length 
from each other, but the relationship is not a simple one. Goodfellow and 
Lindemann36 therefore have a point when they suggest substituting ‘hybrid’ 
for ‘complex’ and using hybridity to describe institutional multiplicity.37 
These considerations further negate the concept of hybridity as giving 
30  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
31  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument.
32  Baker, ‘Beyond the Tarmac Road’.
33  Goodhand and Mansfield, ‘Drugs and (Dis)Order’. 
34  Luckham and Kirk, ‘Security in Hybrid Political Contexts’.
35  Goodfellow and Lindemann, ‘The Clash of Institutions’.
36  Ibid.
37  Hesselbein et al., ‘Economic and Political Foundations of State Making in Africa’.
45
2 . POWER, POLITICS AND HyBRIDITy
rise to a single integrated system but also add the idea that an end user 
of security or justice, for example, is faced with a  series of competing 
institutions, each linked and each exhibiting different forms of hybridity. 
The end user may therefore be faced with a series of institutional choices 
each leading to different consequences and with different sources of 
legitimacy, power and agency. In the topography of such an institutional 
landscape, there are choices between different linked, but also potentially 
competing, providers. For example, in Sierra Leone someone seeking 
compensation in a court may look to a chiefdom court first, but then use 
local paralegals to access a district court. This could then lead to formal 
legal proceedings, or alternatively to an improved offer from the chiefdom 
court. This form of ‘justice shopping’ may be empowering to  some 
end users.
This is an important conceptual clarification of an institutional landscape 
that has been continually shaped, partly by local actors and customs, and 
partly by external influences, including resources of the international 
community.38 At the same time, reification of the local through use of 
the label ‘hybridity’ in fact underestimates the flexibility, pragmatism 
and fluidity of many local systems, at least partly by seeing ‘the local’ as 
one thing rather than several different sets of processes. Using hybridity 
as an analytical tool does not allow a distinction to be made between 
what Meagher refers to as ‘constructive’ and ‘corrosive’ elements of 
hybridity.39 Indeed, hybridity has been associated with state making and 
state breaking,40 conflict increase41 and conflict decrease.42 This evidently 
weakens the analytical vigour of hybridity, since an inability to predict 
or differentiate between effects when hybridity is present suggests that 
hybridity itself might not lead to one specific outcome, but may act as 
a mediating factor in underlying state formation that is not predetermined 
but contextual.43
The value of hybridity, then, lies in moving away from binary 
conceptualisations of the world and towards recognition of all governance 
systems as the product of numerous sources of authority that are drawn 
38  Albrecht and Wiuff Moe, ‘The Simultaneity of Authority’.
39  Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States’.
40  Renders and Terlinden, ‘Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order’.
41  Ganson and Wennmann, ‘Operationalising Conflict Prevention as Strong, Resilient Systems’.
42  Williams, Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy.
43  Balthasar, ‘From Hybridity to Standardization’.
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upon simultaneously.44 External influences on those processes, such as 
those involved in justice reform, will change their dynamics and not 
simply replace them. The exercise of power in this case then becomes the 
process of negotiating the relative influences of intervention and resistance 
and it places much power in the hands of those who control processes at 
the local level, including chiefs, local headmen, religious leaders and the 
leaders of other local institutions such as secret societies.45 One of the 
most common institutions exercising power at the local level in Africa 
is the chief. The role and scope of chiefs varies considerably across the 
continent, although most commonly chiefs act as regulators of traditional 
social controls, frequently over access to land or other aspects of social life 
such as marriage.
Drawing on our own fieldwork in Sierra Leone, it is clear that chiefs 
play an important role in everyday politics.46 Chiefs in Sierra Leone 
frequently play the role of ‘opinion formers’ within communities and 
have considerable powers, yet most of these power relationships are 
not established in writing. The role of the chief is thus flexible and not 
always clearly specified, even if there are strong local traditions within 
which chiefs operate. Despite their central role, chiefs remain empirically 
underrepresented in much of the literature on statebuilding, while this 
very literature recognises that capable democratic states must be based 
on shared social values and that this might be achieved by incorporating 
indigenous institutions and norms, while adapting those systems to 
international expectations.47 The nature of the local political system means 
that incorporation, or even harmonisation, into a formal state institutional 
system as espoused by statebuilding, remains extremely difficult, even if it 
is actually desirable at all.48 Chiefs themselves equate their control of local 
justice mechanisms to a source of power rather than a means of dispensing 
justice.49 It is the nature of this approach that is particularly interesting, 
since it is essentially a conservative way of maintaining social cohesion. 
Justice is primarily about the maintenance of social control rather than 
conceptualised as an abstract aspiration or value.
44  Wiuff Moe and Albrecht, ‘Hybridity and Simultaneity in the Global South’.
45  Albrecht, ‘Secrets, Strangers and Order-Making in Rural Sierra Leone’.
46  Albrecht, ‘The Chiefs of Community Policing’; Albrecht, ‘The Hybrid Authority of Sierra Leone’s 
Chiefs’; Jackson, ‘Chiefs, Money and Politicians’; Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards?’.
47  Crook et al., ‘Popular Concepts of Justice and Fairness in Ghana’; Jackson, ‘Chiefs, Money and 
Politicians’.
48  Baker, ‘Beyond the Tarmac Road’; Piot, Remotely Global.
49  Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards?’.
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Importantly, the local regulations within which the chief operates 
comprise a system designed to maintain social cohesion and so the exercise 
of traditional law is about maintaining social control. This has a number 
of effects, including the maintenance of social structures in which an elite 
has a vested interest and where dissent among groups that do not benefit 
from such social conformity (youth, women and other excluded groups) 
takes the form of silence where conformity is taken as consent or absence 
of power conflict. In other words, local justice systems reinforce the social 
systems they are derived from, including providing a mechanism for 
a local elite to reinforce and maintain their own power.
The inclusion of such power at a local level begs questions about the 
predictability of hybrid approaches to intervention, as well as the nature of 
everyday approaches to local structures of peacebuilding and justice. Even 
the concept of justice may be resistant to Western ideas of just outcomes, 
reflecting more the maintenance of particular forms of social hierarchy 
in which some experiences of the everyday are less benign than others. 
Unfortunately the literature to date gives comparatively little attention 
to the politics at play within these relations at the level of everyday 
practice. Indeed, making order is more often than not done with efforts 
to concentrate power and consolidate particular power positions.50
Conclusion
Citizens across Africa seeking justice face a multilayered and fluid set 
of choices. However, those choices are limited by local power structures 
and relations, and specifically self-perpetuating elites. Such elites manage 
what local justice and order mean as an integral part of maintaining and 
reproducing their own power/dominance, with justice having the aim of 
conserving social control and conformity. As such, local justice systems 
become a method of maintaining security for the state, but at the price 
of potentially alienating specific groups or ensuring their continued 
subordination. International reform efforts across Africa have overlooked 
the inherent political dimensions of justice provision, which are deeply 
embedded in informal social structures, including kinship relations and 
secret societies, but which have also been influenced by more recent local 
50  Albrecht and Kyed, Policing and the Politics of Order-Making, 5.
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government reforms and the continuing influence of chiefs. This raises 
questions of whether a hybrid system is emerging or whether there is 
a multiplicity of institutions that co-exist and compete.
Most people need to navigate a complex network of institutions operating 
between a formal state system and resilient local systems at the local level, 
which may or may not be codified or even visible to external observers. 
These institutions constantly change and are subject to a variety of 
controlling bodies that regulate the meaning and enforcement of common 
law. Indeed, even the formal institutions of local and magistrate’s courts 
draw on customary law rather than formal law in many of their cases, and 
this is open to interpretation and influence according to changing local 
customs and agency. Different social structures exercise influence over 
justice processes and outcomes. Local power is at least partly exercised 
through the appointment to courts and through the role of elders within 
villages. This leads to institutional bias within the customary system, 
particularly against women and youth.
This political process at the local level is about preserving power and 
conserving institutions and hierarchies rather than social transformation, 
even if political processes inevitably have a transformative effect. This can 
have significant benefits in environments where social cohesion has been 
destroyed, and in activities that require some form of social development 
following trauma, such as peacebuilding. However, there is an issue here 
of how to treat those who do not conform. In practice these are people 
who are effectively alienated from the benefits of those communities and 
are isolated from political participation and justice. It is these norms 
that may clash with international ideas of human rights, partly because 
international law tends to try individuals for crimes that are perceived to 
hold some degree of individual responsibility, whereas most local systems 
are really about social conformity.
This leads to a dilemma for international support in the justice sector. 
Some argue that international support should place less emphasis on 
formal, Western justice and support the local systems.51 However, there 
are considerable issues with this style of justice. Indeed, abuses of this 
system may have significantly contributed to war in the first place, as was 
51  Baker, ‘Beyond the Tarmac Road’.
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the case in Sierra Leone.52 For the powerless, this means they have no 
effective access to justice, while justice is accessible for those from the 
indigene kinship group or for those who can afford suitable recompense.
The analysis of power at the local level raises questions about who actually 
exercises ownership, since the implication of hybridity is that some local 
owners can be incorporated into broader reform processes, but these will 
tend to be elites who are able to control local power systems rather than 
those who are excluded from those systems. In the short term, this may 
be acceptable—indeed it may be the only choice—but the question for 
international donors must be how far they are willing to provide support 
for those who navigate these systems locally. This is especially the case with 
respect to those who are excluded, as opposed to elite agents who may be 
able to exist in and use the formal system on one level and also control 
a traditional system on another. The question of who resists and why is 
thus partly answered by looking at local elites who are in a position to 
resist in the first place. In turn, the question for donor agencies is whether 
the maintenance of local elites was what they had in mind by introducing 
and operationalising the notion of hybrid orders.




Hybridity Revisited: Relational 
Approaches to Peacebuilding in 
Complex Sociopolitical Orders
Charles T . Hunt1
Introduction
In recent years, hybridity has received a great deal of attention in the 
peacebuilding and development literature. This ‘rediscovery’ of a concept 
with strong roots in critical and postcolonial theory2 has emerged in 
critical peace studies as a compelling lens with which scholars can better 
understand the empirics of sociopolitical order and the forms of peace 
produced through international interventions in conflict-affected states. 
To a growing extent, these formulations are beginning to find their way 
into the documents, frameworks and even practices of the organisations 
who design and implement policy in these areas.3 Notwithstanding its 
appeal and traction, hybridity has come in for a range of critiques regarding 
its content as well as its use in both scholarship and praxis. Some have 
cautioned about the risk of instrumentalisation in practice while others 
have identified potential ethical and political implications associated with 
1  The work for this chapter was supported by a grant under the Australian Development Research 
Awards Scheme (DFAT agreement 66442).
2  Bhabha, The Location of Culture.
3  See, for example, World Bank, World Development Report 2011.
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its (mis)use. Of particular interest here, hybridity has also been subject to 
criticism for its perceived ontological and epistemological biases manifest 
in the persistence of reductive analytical binaries and a preoccupation 
with entities over and above the relationships between them.
This chapter picks up on these critiques, and argues for an augmented 
concept of hybridity that embraces a relational approach to the theory and 
practice of peacebuilding and development. I argue that such an approach 
to understanding and working with conflict-affected societies provides 
a  means to overcome the biases that hybrid approaches can produce. 
The  chapter begins by articulating the nature of hybrid sociopolitical 
order in many conflict-affected societies and outlines the salient criticisms 
directed at the hybridity concept. It then proposes a relational account of 
multilayered sociopolitical order. Drawing on examples from fieldwork 
and research in Liberia, I identify the value that a relational approach 
could bring to the concept of hybridity in understanding and working in 
complex adaptive systems. The final section reflects on how an analytical 
framework informed by these conceptual moves can handle perceived 
deficiencies in hybridity relating to treatment of power relations, dynamics, 
and notions of space and territoriality in conflict-affected societies.
Hybrid sociopolitical orders, binaries 
and blind spots
In keeping with a number of other chapters in this volume,4 I argue that 
empirical pluralism characterises the provision of governance, security and 
justice in the majority of the world’s conflict zones. In postcolonial states 
of sub-Saharan Africa in particular, social order is the product of the work 
of myriad actors who provide critical services and ultimately contribute 
to the formation of political community and social peace. When it comes 
to everyday public safety, dispute resolution and community harmony, 
the institutions of government such as the national police, courts and 
corrections facilities play an important role in this regard. However, they 
are at most only part of the plural security and justice landscape.
4  Such as Boege, Brown, etc.
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What Ostrom calls ‘polycentric governance’ connotes an order (or more 
accurately a system of overlapping/intersecting orders) where these 
government institutions are often complemented by a range of societal 
bodies that are deeply involved in providing for the everyday needs of the 
majority of people.5 This cast of players does not fit neatly into any single 
umbrella category such as Western notions of civil society.6 For instance, 
while this often includes traditional authorities and autochthonous agencies 
such as chieftaincies and councils of elders, it also stretches to incorporate 
providers such as citizen militia groups and private security forces as well as 
less obviously coercive elements such as trade unions, private-sector entities 
and more community-based—occasionally ‘secret’—societies.7
Local populations often favour this collection of actors providing conflict 
management and social services beyond the strict purview of central 
government. This can be for a combination of reasons related to access, 
cost, timeliness and cultural sensitivity. Ultimately, these preferences 
translate into high(er) levels of public familiarity and trust.8 Recent studies 
reinforce the empirical reality that in conflict-affected states security 
and justice needs are addressed through these means for the majority of 
people most of the time.9 While this is often generalised to be a rural or 
‘hinterland’ phenomenon, similar patterns pertain in urban spaces where, 
despite displacement and heterogeneity, authority and legitimacy remain 
multifaceted.
The result is fundamentally different systems of social and political ordering. 
This sits in stark contrast to a Weberian ideal type where ‘the  state’—
narrowly defined—possesses a rational bureaucracy and holds (or at least 
claims) a monopoly on the legitimate recourse to violent means to retain 
order. These multilayered systems operate according to different logics of 
governance whereby legitimacy is derived from a range of sites and the 
construction of authority is a dynamic process.10 This plethora of providers 
inhabits what is, in effect, a hybrid sociopolitical order that emerges from 
the intricate interactions across this assortment of actors.11
5  Ostrom, ‘Polycentricity (Parts 1&2)’.
6  Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 13.
7  Raeymaekers et al., ‘State and Non-state Regulation in African Protracted Crises’, 8.
8  Baker and Scheye, ‘Multi-layered Justice and Security Delivery’, 512.
9  OECD-DAC, ‘Improving Security and Justice Programming’, 22, fn15. See also Albrecht and 
Kyed, ‘Introduction: Non-state and Customary Actors’.
10  Boege, ‘Legitimacy in Hybrid Political Orders’, 10–12; Boege et al., Addressing Legitimacy Issues 
in Fragile Postconflict Situations.
11  Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States.
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In recent years, a growing number of critical peace and security scholars 
have embraced ‘hybridity’, championing its conceptual and explanatory 
potential for informing analysis of conflict-affected societies.12 More 
recently, the language and ideas around hybridity have begun to appear in 
policy documents and programs aimed at building peace and supporting 
development in so-called fragile states.13 However, despite its growing 
popularity, efforts to apply concepts of hybridity to the analysis of these 
settings have met with a number of critiques.14 Among other things, 
the normative intent of hybridity or scholars who promote it has been 
challenged.15 This in turn has precipitated debates in the literature over 
inconsistent and divergent applications and the relative opportunities 
and challenges associated with descriptive, prescriptive and instrumental 
applications of hybridity.16 Notwithstanding the central ethical, political 
and practical dilemmas these debates throw up, a range of criticisms has 
also emerged that relate to the ontological and epistemological orientations 
of hybridity.
First, some scholars have argued that hybridity models perpetuate the 
reification of arbitrary categories. Efforts to understand the plural nature 
of security and justice provision in conflict-affected societies tend to 
categorise providers as ‘one’ or ‘other’ in a coterie of analytical binaries. It is 
common for particular agents to be described as state or non-state, formal 
or informal, traditional or modern, or local or international. Furthermore, 
it is often implicit that these dichotomies map to ideas of actors operating 
in spaces or ways deemed to be licit versus illicit or liberal as opposed to 
illiberal. This is more than a semantic issue as the use of these labels can 
generate significant ethical, political and practical challenges.
12  See, for example, Boege et  al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community’; Mac Ginty, 
International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; Richmond and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace.
13  For example, DFID, Policy Approach to Rule of Law; World Bank, World Development Report 2011.
14  For extended discussion of critiques, see Kent et al., ‘Introduction’, this volume.
15  See, for example, Cassani, ‘Hybrid What? Partial Consensus and Persistent Divergences’; 
Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-linearity’; Heathershaw, ‘Towards Better Theories 
of Peacebuilding’; Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’; Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of 
Hybridity’.
16  See, for example, Brown, this volume; Forsyth, this volume; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 
‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 224–228; Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’; 
Wallis et al., ‘Political Reconciliation in Timor Leste’, 162.
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Proponents argue that hybridity can provide the conceptual framework 
necessary to transcend and do away with analytical binaries.17 For instance, 
Mac Ginty and Richmond argue ‘the concept of hybridity, if used as 
a  post-colonial, post-territorial and post-biological construct, liberates 
us from the dominant policy script of goodies and baddies, states and 
non-states and West and non-West’.18 However, others argue that efforts 
to develop the utility of hybridity in understanding fragile/conflict-
affected societies—particularly where it has appeared in peacebuilding 
and development policies and praxis—have actually served to ‘re-inscribe’ 
these binaries.19 For example, Moreiras argues that despite good intentions 
hybridity literature has a tendency to fall back on problematic binaries to 
describe and understand the roles and influence of the different providers 
involved in the production of order.20 The malignance of this dichotomous 
version of reality can have a number of negative consequences.21
It is true that binary categories are difficult to avoid when analysing 
different types of actors. Indeed, these categorisations can perform 
some useful function when conducting analyses. For example, drawing 
boundaries around different nodes of providers of social order can help in 
the process of identifying relationships between them.22 However, it has 
been argued that one of the downsides of continued use of such analytics 
is uncritically essentialising and/or romanticising actors deemed to be 
autochthonous or local, underplaying the ethical and accountability issues 
associated with their function.23 This approach invariably focuses on what 
qualities and characteristics distinguish providers from each other and 
risks exaggerating the veracity of the dichotomies.24
17  Boege, this volume; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’, 12. See originally Mac 
Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace’; Mac Ginty, 
‘Hybrid Peace: How Does Hybrid Peace Come About?’.
18  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 220.
19  Hameiri and Jones, this volume. See also Heathershaw, ‘Towards Better Theories of 
Peacebuilding’, 277; Laffey and Nadarajah, ‘The Hybridity of Liberal Peace’, 417; Sabaratnam, 
‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’, 261–263.
20  Moreiras, ‘Hybridity and Double Consciousness’.
21  Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding’; Heathershaw, ‘Towards 
Better Theories of Peacebuilding; Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual 
Unpacking of Hybridity’.
22  The author is grateful to the editors for this point.
23  Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding’; Meagher, ‘The Strength 
of Weak States?’; Peterson, ‘“Rule of Law” Initiatives’.
24  See also Ojendal et al., ‘The “Local Turn” in Peacebuilding’; Randazzo, ‘The Paradoxes of the 
“Everyday”’.
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Second, and related to this endurance of analytical binaries, hybridity 
has met with criticism for being problematically reductive in the way it 
accounts for the construction of authority and the production of order. 
For instance, Dirlik states ‘hybridity reduces all complexity to a “statement 
of mixture”’ and goes on to problematise the fact that this leaves out some 
of the specifics of what is being mixed.25 Moreover, by depicting complex 
social order as a ‘mixture’ of agency, a hybridity lens can oversimplify 
or obscure how this ‘mixing’ occurs and exactly how (and what sort of ) 
sociopolitical order emerges. As a result, hybridity has faced criticism for 
being undertheorised,26 failing to reveal power dynamics,27 underplaying 
the perpetuity of change, and being inadequate for handling different 
territorialities/levels of analysis.28 By extension, this critique contends that 
such an approach can also mask the potential for malevolent emergence 
and hybrid outcomes.29 Consequently, it is argued that imprecision may 
limit the utility of hybridity for explaining how (dis)order emerges and 
evolves over time.
These criticisms point to a problematic focus on actors and their features 
at the expense of seeking out how myriad providers are linked, the ways 
in which they relate, and how they are at times intrinsically dependent 
on each other to achieve their objectives. The allegation is therefore that 
hybridity’s analytical imprecision renders the empirical relationships 
between these actors underexamined and often misunderstood.30 Where 
hybridity literature does elevate the relationships between key actors, it 
tends to focus primarily on the interface between the ‘international’ and 
the ‘local’ or Western and non-Western actors.31 The preoccupation in 
the hybridity literature with this particular encounter inhibits a more 
nuanced rendering of the relationships between all providers at multiple 
levels across the system, particularly those between inhabitants in the 
local sphere.32
25  Dirlik, ‘Bringing History Back In’, 106.
26  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 501.
27  Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’, 1078; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’, 
14; see also Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, So What?’; Tanikella, ‘The Politics of Hybridity’.
28  See, for example, critiques of Mac Ginty’s 2011 hybridisation model by, inter alia, Millar.
29  Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’, 1073.
30  Frödin, ‘Dissecting the State’, 271.
31  Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’, 269.
32  Paffenholz, ‘Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding’.
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In order to accurately reflect complex forms of social (dis)order in 
conflict-affected societies our conceptual and analytical tools need to be 
as agile and dynamic as the systems we seek to track and understand. 
However, as a result of the aforementioned shortcomings, current uses 
of the concept of hybridity struggle to apprehend the nuanced, mutable 
and context-specific relationships between a diverse array of providers of 
governance, security and justice. The following section turns to insights 
from complexity theory in order to develop a more relational focus in the 
application of hybridity.
Complex social order and a primacy 
of relationships
The hybrid sociopolitical orders described above display the characteristics 
of a complex social system. According to complexity theory, a social system 
(society) is ‘complex’ if it displays the following features and properties. 
Interacting parts of the system produce intricate interdependence between 
constituent elements. This dictates that the actions of one part of the 
system can impede another or indeed the whole system. The interactions 
are changing and it is the degree of ‘connectivity’ (i.e. interdependence) 
that controls how change occurs through the system. This contingency 
produces feedback processes that can drive or inhibit system change. It is 
through this feedback that properties and behaviours at the system level 
are relayed to their original source and other elements of the system. 
This in turn causes often unpredictable outcomes known as the emergent 
properties—that is, the behavioural patterns of the system as a whole. 
Emergence is therefore contingent on and produced by the myriad of 
possible interrelationships between elements within the system. This 
emergence is difficult to predict based on the characteristics of constituent 
parts and the archetypal feature of a complex system.33
These particular characteristics dictate that change in system-level 
outcomes occurs in three key ways. First, change occurs in a nonlinear 
fashion where outcomes are not directly proportionate to variations in 
the inputs and resources available.34 A multiplicity of influencing factors 
means that causal relationships are difficult to identify and cannot be 
33  Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour.
34  Stacey, Complexity and Creativity in Organizations, 23–28, 65.
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assumed. Second, adaptive agents comprise the complex social system and 
as conscious agents have the ability to ‘know’ and adjust their behaviour 
according to information gleaned and lessons learned. This means that, as 
a result of human agency, complex social systems have an intrinsic capacity 
to self-organise.35 Consequently, and third, they are in a continuous process 
of coevolution in relation to each other as well as to the broader systemic 
environment, reproducing along trajectories that are influenced but never 
fully determined by any one of a large number of factors.36 In this reading 
of the context, it is the relationships between providers of security and 
justice that are constitutive of emergent order. Therefore, to understand 
how hybrid (dis)order emerges requires a more nuanced understanding of 
the type of relationships between providers more than a deep grasp of the 
features of the providers in a complex social system.
In hybrid orders, the whole gamut of providers are interacting and evolving 
in relation to each other. As Albrecht and Kyed have argued, ‘there may 
be full recognition and close collaboration, limited partnership, unofficial 
acceptance, competition and even open hostility’.37 It is these relationships 
that generate the entanglements symptomatic of hybridity and generative 
of emergent sociopolitical order. The next section uses examples from the 
case of Liberia in West Africa to elaborate on the range of relationships 
at play.
Complexity in practice: The case of Liberia
The relationships between the institutions of central government and 
a  range of other providers of security and justice in a hybrid order are 
often explained in terms of competition.38 For instance, Charles Taylor’s 
armed insurrection through the 1990s is perhaps more clearly understood 
as a predatory zero-sum battle with the sovereign government it sought 
to overthrow. However, both were fundamental to providing basic public 
goods and social order (such as it was) in the territories they controlled. 
In this case, a warlord controlling strategic locations and trade routes was 
viewed as a threat by a central state bunkered and restricted to an isolated 
urban capital in Monrovia. The central government’s efforts to extend 
35  Heylighen, The Science of Self-organization and Adaptivity, 4–5.
36  Garnsey and McGlade, Complexity and Co-evolution.
37  Albrecht and Kyed, ‘Justice and Security’, 2.
38  Bayart et al., The Criminalization of the State in Africa.
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its authority over the national sovereign territory also clearly constituted 
a threat to Taylor’s authority. Actors whose authority is contingent on 
different sources and logics can at times directly contest each other for 
political capital and resources.
However, there is invariably a good deal more interdependence 
and cooperation between government and a range of other actors. 
Accommodation here can be both formal and more informal but the 
nature and content of these relationships are vital in the co-production of 
order.39 For example, in rural Liberia, where government institutions do 
not reach or would not be well tolerated, societal bodies such as councils 
of elders or secret societies often provide essential services.40 Chiefs, for 
instance, are commonly seen as a significant authority in the community, 
drawing on customary sources of legitimacy. However, through state-
sponsored customary law they also play a role in the formal dual legal 
system and consequently lend significant support to central government 
in the production of order.41 Furthermore, delineations of statutory and 
customary law or rules are not strictly adhered to in practice. Customary 
courts are constitutionally empowered to handle civil but not criminal 
cases; however, this division of labour is not always adhered to. In effect 
the central government is dependent on community-based actors for 
maintaining everyday social order.
Similarly, vigilantes, citizen militia or ‘community watch groups’ are 
ubiquitous across Liberia.42 While such entities are often understood as 
challenging the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence, they have also 
proven to be a vital source of providing protection and defence of towns 
and communities.43 Moreover, the relationship between the Liberian 
National Police and these groups has ranged from tacit acquiescence 
to formal approval, partnership and even the provision of training and 
material support.
39  Baker, Security in Post-conflict Africa, 32–35.
40  Reports from focus groups and key participant interviews conducted as part of fieldwork for 
author research project ‘Understanding and Working with Local Sources of Peace, Security and 
Justice in West Africa’ (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade). See also 
Jaye, Understanding and Explaining Hybridity.
41  Lubkemann et al., ‘Justice in a Vacuum’.
42  Kantor and Persson, Understanding Vigilantism.
43  Isser et al., Looking for Justice.
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In these cases, entities conventionally thought of as non-state or informal 
can behave in very ‘state-like’ ways. The central government not only 
tolerates their conduct but by outsourcing service provision to them 
affords a certain degree of legitimacy to these actors. In these cases, 
the relationships between state institutions and societal bodies can be 
mutually beneficial. Accurate recognition of this variation in relationships 
across state and non-state providers is critical to analysts and peacebuilders 
for a number of reasons. First, this elaborates the degree of hybridisation 
that has already occurred and led to current conditions. Second, a more 
accurate grasp of cooperation as well as competition between these 
stakeholders feeds understanding of the nature of emergent everyday 
peace and security.
Those providers who do not derive authority directly from the writ of the 
state will also have a diverse range of relationships among them. These, 
too, matter fundamentally to the everyday experiences of (dis)order. For 
instance, in Liberia, the relationships between town, quarter, clan and 
village chiefs can often be discerned through known hierarchies and 
territoriality. However, the way that these same chiefs relate to other elders 
in their community, secret societies such as the Poro, and those who are 
deemed to have access to the ancestral realm (e.g. juju men) is less visible 
but no less important to the way in which order is sustained.44 Similarly, 
in the settlement of disputes at the local level, resolution may depend on 
a network of actors. For instance, a town chief may not be able to pass 
judgement on a dispute unless the witch doctor is able to remove a curse 
from one of the disputants.45 The satisfactory settlement is contingent on 
a range of functional relationships among a number of societal actors.46 
It is the unique way in which theses interactions occur that produces an 
outcome and contributes to emergent order.
During Liberia’s civil war there was a struggle for authority between 
some of the elders and those participating more actively in the fighting. 
In particular, youth who became empowered through membership of 
militia challenged the traditional gerontocratic structures of society.47 This 
obviously had a significant impact on people’s everyday security during 
44  Focus group report from fieldwork in Liberia, Australian Development Research Awards.
45  Herman and Martin-Ortega, ‘Narrowing Gaps in Justice’, 146; Lubkemann et al., ‘Neither State 
nor Custom’. See also Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, 225.
46  Flomoku and Reeves, ‘Formal and Informal Justice in Liberia’.
47  Sawyer, ‘Social Capital, Survival Strategies, and Their Potential for Post-conflict Governance in 
Liberia’.
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the years of conflict. However, to this day, the relations between chiefs, 
elders and ex-combatants—demobilised and reintegrated into society to 
varying degrees—continues to shape the contours of everyday order.48
While Liberia is only a single case and the above discussion is far from 
exhaustive, it bears a strong resemblance to other conflict-affected 
societies in West Africa—neighbouring Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire.49 
Furthermore, these relational dynamics can be seen as emblematic of 
a wider set of postcolonial states emerging from violent conflict where 
peacebuilding efforts have been attempted and met with mixed results. 
Emphasising the importance of relationships between providers may seem 
common sense. However, such recognition eludes extant mainstream 
thinking and praxis around peacebuilding—focused, as it overwhelmingly 
is, on ontological questions of what entities exist and their characteristics 
rather than how all pertinent entities interrelate and co-produce order. 
This risks overlooking the forms of peace that emerge as the result of 
feedback between intertwined providers. Moving beyond a taxonomy 
of providers, it is the nature of the linkages between myriad providers—
irrespective whence they derive their legitimacy or authority—that is 
central to emergent (dis)order. Therefore, in keeping with some recent 
developments in the peacebuilding literature,50 I argue that what is needed 
is a relational approach when articulating hybrid forms of peace and order.
Operationalising a relational approach
Translating and working in line with a relational approach requires new 
and tailored conceptual tools. These can take the form of theoretical but 
also analytical frameworks. One such analytical framework based on 
these ideas has been developed elsewhere by this author.51 The framework 
elaborates on a set of ‘symbiotic relations’ between myriad providers of 
social order. Borrowed from biology, symbiosis refers to the state of entities 
‘living together’. The framework explains three categories. The  first, 
predatory-amenalism, incorporates confrontational relationships between 
providers. The second, commensalism/parasitism, includes relationships 
48  Focus group report from fieldwork in Liberia, Australian Development Research Awards.
49  Fawole and Ukeje, The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa.
50  See, for example, Brigg, ‘Relational Peacebuilding’. See also Gadinger et al., Relational Sensibility 
and the ‘Turn to the Local’.
51  Symbiosis framework developed in Hunt, ‘Beyond the binaries’.
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between providers characterised by sustainable asymmetry. The third, 
mutualism, refers to those relationships that are characterised by mutual 
benefit and ‘complementarity’. These categories capture the ways in which 
relations embody a continuous process of contestation, accommodation or 
outright cooperation in the construction of authority and distribution 
of resources.
The framework categories allow the multiverse of connectivities and 
subtleties of interaction to be more accurately depicted. In doing so, 
this approach offers a corrective to three substantive criticisms of extant 
models of hybridity and hybridisation.52 First, these bonds are not fixed 
nor meant to imply rigidity. On the contrary, the systems of sociality at 
play are dynamical where elements are adapting and evolving in relation 
to each other as a result of ongoing feedback processes. Alliances are 
ephemeral and changeable; history and context matter hugely, such that 
the relationship that applies to particular providers will have multiple 
potential equilibria and the type of relationship is therefore mutable. 
The dynamical nature of the system means that relations are shifting 
and continuously renegotiated—characterised by ongoing processes of 
exchange between and across different elements of the system. The feedback 
intrinsic to these relations renders all actors in coevolutionary processes, 
altered as a result of the interactions and influence on each other such that 
they cannot be static or unchanging. This leads to a conception of hybrid 
order that is emergent, self-organised and a dynamic coevolutionary 
sociopolitical system.
Second, the relations articulated through the framework are imbued with 
power. That is, the bonds between providers reflect the political economy 
of power in conflict-affected societies. It is these relationships that therefore 
shape, empower and at times constrain the extent to which social systems 
are resilient. The construction of authority is embedded in the relationality 
revealed through the framework. Any changes to who is providing 
security and justice services will in turn entrench or redistribute power 
in significant ways. Far from ignoring or trying to obfuscate questions of 
power, this framework tackles the aforementioned criticism of hybridity 
by revealing and integrating rather than concealing and obscuring power 
dynamics. It supports a more nuanced rendering of power but moreover 
creates the space for a potentially profoundly different conceptualisation 
52  See, for example, the critique of Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, in 
Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
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of power. This promises to better reflect how it is mediated, contested and 
ultimately shared in the symbiosis at play. Gaining clarity on the circulation 
of power within the local sphere is a precondition for understanding who 
has the capacity and resources to interact with international actors in order 
to be heard and make claims—potentially shaping outcomes through 
blocking, contaminating or enabling different formations of peace.53 
It is, nevertheless, important to note that those who are not possessed 
of visibility and voice are not necessarily without agency or influence. 
On the contrary, with nonlinear change the norm in complex systems, 
more detailed articulations of power can also inform more convincing 
explanations for unpredictable outcomes and modalities better prepared 
to expect the surprising. This can in turn form a backdrop for subsequent 
analyses of the hybrid forms of peace that emerge as a result of strategies 
and tactics of acceptance, hybridisation, co-optation and resistance by 
locals in the face of international interventions.54
Third, and following from above, the framework enables an approach 
that is not simply about understanding and working with the often-
obscured actors inhabiting the ‘local’ arena. By opening up questions 
of relationality, this approach offers a way of understanding the system 
holistically. This is consonant with the spatial turn in state theory/political 
geography, bringing in the different levels at which politics takes place and 
requiring a certain incorporation of the ‘politics of scale’. The framework 
not only allows for assessments of networked relationality across different 
providers within particular strata but also across providers at different 
levels. This means that the significance of agency in the local arena can 
be understood in the context of provincial and national settings. As with 
the discussion relating to power, this also opens up possibilities for more 
finely grained analysis incorporating stakeholders at the international 
and transnational levels. This multilevel and multidimensional approach 
allows for assessments that ask which, if any, levels and interfaces are most 
significant in the emergence of (dis)order.55
This is all to argue that the plurality of providers of social order and 
the realms they inhabit do not simply co-exist alongside each other or 
only interact through unavoidable overlap. On the contrary, they have 
53  Richmond, ‘The Paradox of Peace and Power’. See also Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking 
of Hybridity’, 17.
54  Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 8–10.
55  For discussion of the relative weight of different interfaces see Debiel and Rinck, ‘Rethinking the 
Local in Peacebuilding’.
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genuinely symbiotic relationships that are constitutive of emergent and 
hybrid order. The everyday exchanges that occur between providers of 
services, and between them and ‘end users’, are actually generative of the 
agency at play and therefore critical to the imaginary of what constitutes 
political community for conflict-affected populations as well as its 
substance and dynamics.
While it is not entirely new to acknowledge the networked nature of 
providers,56 the symbiosis framework discussed here constitutes an 
example of how a relational approach could be realised in tangible ways 
that can further inform theorising and praxis relating to hybridity. Such 
an approach and others like it—grounded in relational understandings 
of the societies on the receiving end of international intervention—offer 
the possibility of redressing the lack of empiricism that besets current 
international efforts to reform and rebuild security and justice sectors 
in developing and conflict-affected contexts. What is critical is that 
these tools and analytical frameworks are promulgated in ways that are 
accessible to researchers and practitioners.
Conclusion
Overall, the analysis described here contributes to the argument for 
a relational approach—for a performative-based, liminal and integrative 
understanding of hybrid sociopolitical order and how this can inform 
peacebuilding theory and practice. While such a shift presents many 
opportunities, it also presents ethical, political and practical challenges for 
research and policy.57 It is therefore important to acknowledge that greater 
understanding of the emergence of everyday order in conflict-affected 
states can be instrumentalised or co-opted by international peacebuilders, 
just as those on the receiving end of their interventions can also divert and 
manipulate the material support brought from the outside. A relational 
approach could also create rationales to support malevolent emergence 
that inadvertently empowers entities and practices that propagate rather 
than transform violent and discriminatory practices.
56  See, for example, Forsyth, ‘Spinning a Conflict Management Web in Vanuatu’.
57  See, for example, Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-linearity’.
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Notwithstanding the challenges, a relational approach promises to enhance 
our understanding of the way in which (dis)order emerges in complex 
social systems affected by conflict. It also provides a way of revealing and 
conceptualising the agency of people affected by conflict and elaborating 
on how their everyday experiences are shaped.58 It furnishes us with a way 
of taking seriously the strengths and weaknesses of those processes in the 
pursuit of peacebuilding objectives. Such an approach requires innovative 
conceptual tools, such as the symbiosis analytical framework discussed 
herein, to realise its potential. Rather than attempting to displace 
hybridity, the relational approach proposed here is intended to extend and 
augment it. The symbiosis framework and other conceptual tools like it 
have the potential to bring additional analytical leverage and shed further 
light on the empirical realities that the hybridity lens already brings to 
our attention. A framework for analysis based on these insights can help 
reveal the nature of the multiplicity of relationships among the range of 
providers of security and justice. It can also point to the significance of 
these relations in the construction of authority and the production of 
emergent (dis)order. This may have the potential to enhance the utility 
of hybridity as a conceptual and analytical tool for both scholars and 
practitioners of peacebuilding. Doing so should help us move beyond 
the deployment of limited and limiting binaries that do not stand up 
to scrutiny, underplay the nuance and variation of the relations between 
providers, and fundamentally miss how (dis)order emerges in the complex 
social systems pertaining in conflict-affected societies. As well as better 
tools, such a relational approach demands more humble, realistic and 
pragmatic expectations from the advocates and agents of peacebuilding 
about what can be achieved and in what time frame. This is in keeping 
with calls for ‘slower and more open processes’ that are ‘dialogical and 
organic’ while ‘patient and sensitive to different temporal sensibilities’.59 
Moves in that direction may also contribute to opening up discourse 
and our imaginaries of political community that can in turn offer ways 
of escaping the teleological visions for the ‘state’ that dominate current 
orthodoxy in peacebuilding.
58  Bleiker, ‘Conclusion—Everyday Struggles for a Hybrid Peace’, 300–303.
59  Comments made, respectively, by Damian Grenfell, Anne Brown and Volker Boege 




Should the Concept of Hybridity 




This chapter explores the question of whether it is possible and useful to 
develop the concept of hybridity to answer questions about how legal/
regulatory systems ought to be, as well as describing how they currently 
work. This was a question that arose many times during the seminar 
series and workshop that this collection is based upon. It also reflects 
a  tension that is often present in interdisciplinary contexts, particularly 
where anthropologists and lawyers are involved as their basic orientation 
(descriptive versus normative) is often so different. This chapter uses 
examples from Melanesia, primarily Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, 
where I have conducted research in the area of law and development 
since 2002.
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Approaches to law through a hybrid 
orientation
There are a number of ways of theorising about law that are shared by many 
who adopt a hybrid approach to law. For the purposes of this chapter, it is 
helpful to sketch these out initially to clarify what is encompassed by such 
an approach, as many different concepts of hybridity exist in the literature.1 
First, the concept of hybridity in the legal context involves a recognition 
that even in Western countries, and certainly and most obviously in 
indigenous communities and postcolonial national states, law also exists 
outside statutes and case law.2 Second, law is seen to be constructed by 
a wide range of institutions, and it is increasingly recognised that even 
individual legal subjects are ‘law inventing’ as well as ‘law abiding’.3 Third, 
there is acknowledgment that multiple legal orders co-exist in different 
overlapping spatial dimensions and typically shape one another through 
ongoing interaction. The relationship between legal orders—which are 
often neither entirely internally coherent nor externally differentiable—
is dynamic, mutually constitutive and mutually dependent. This process 
has been characterised by a variety of different terms—interlegality,4 
interactional law,5 transnational legal orders,6 critical legal pluralism7 
and hybridisation.8 The differences that exist between these different 
approaches is beyond the scope of this chapter. I will refer to a hybrid 
approach which should be taken to encompass the abovementioned 
insights, with the additional benefit of centring focus on the dynamic and 
porous nature of the relationship between legal orders.
These approaches to law unsettle the commonly held view of law as 
being created exclusively by legislatures and courts. However, departing 
from that well-trodden foundation raises a number of difficult questions: 
What is law? (And when does a social norm become law?) Who are the agents 
of law? (And whose voices and needs are privileged and whose are overlooked?) 
1  Many people use the term ‘hybrid’ in a narrow legal sense to refer to hybrid institutions, such as 
village courts in Papua New Guinea. See, for example, Evans et al., ‘The Hybrid Courts of Melanesia’. 
This is not the sense the term is used in this chapter. For more description see Brown, this volume.
2  Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’; Moore, ‘Law and Social Change’.
3  Kleinhans and MacDonald, ‘What Is Critical Legal Pluralism?’
4  Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading’; Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense.
5  van der Burg, The Dynamics of Law and Morality.
6  Halliday and Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders.
7  Kleinhans and MacDonald, ‘What Is Critical Legal Pluralism?’
8  Snyder, ‘Colonialism and Legal Form’.
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What  time periods are involved in bringing about legal change? What 
requirements for legitimacy exist in different legal systems? Where is law 
constructed? The concept of hybridity thus leads us onto uncertain ground, 
with more and more gaps and questions opening up the further one 
travels. Recognising that there are multiple different change agents, all 
operating in a semi-autonomous way, makes any deliberate program of 
positive social change through regulation highly challenging. This is the 
reason for seeking to develop analytical and conceptual methods to assist 
in both explaining the development of hybrid legal orders, and also in 
answering questions about if and how such developments can be steered 
in an emancipatory direction.
Should hybridity be developed to answer 
the ‘ought’ as well as the ‘is’ questions?
This brings us to the important issue of ‘is’ versus ‘ought’ or ‘fact’ versus 
‘norm’ or, as many in the hybridity literature express it, questions 
of ‘descriptive hybridity’ versus ‘instrumental hybridity’.9 The concept of 
hybridity has been widely accepted as being useful for answering the ‘is’ 
question; that is, how is law or regulation done in practice? It encourages 
legal reformers to move away from a positivistic and state-centric 
approach to law as being solely limited to legislation or case law, or, 
for that matter, customary law being conceived of as a coherent system 
of rules.10 For example, applying such a perspective to the issue of the 
regulation of intangible cultural heritage in Vanuatu, I have identified 
that rights are claimed and disputes are managed as a result of a variety 
of regulatory forces, including the need to maintain relationships, fear 
of the supernatural, avoidance of shaming and customary sanctions.11 
A hybrid analytical framework provides a far wider view of regulatory 
forces than a myopic focus on written or unwritten norms, and assists 
in understanding the empirical reality of the various forces at play in the 
relevant social field.
9  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’.
10  I term this customary positivism.
11  Forsyth and Farran, Weaving Intellectual Property Policy in Small Island Developing States.
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Much more contested is whether the concept of hybridity is also relevant 
for answering the ‘ought’ question; that is, how ought hybrid legal 
frameworks operate? This is often referred to as instrumental hybridity; 
I prefer the more value neutral term of normative hybridity. It should be 
noted in passing that in legal jurisprudence there is a history of debates 
over the relationship between empirical facts and normative questions of 
law (for example, the famous debate between Ehrlich and Kelsen),12 and 
so this tension has a long tradition.
A strong critique of instrumental hybridity has emerged quite recently in 
both the law and development and peacebuilding literature.13 This critique 
is in response to the embrace of hybrid approaches by international 
agencies and donors in the past decade, especially in the context of rule of 
law and statebuilding programs in conflict-affected and so-called fragile 
countries where the reach of the state is often limited and lacking in 
legitimacy. Moving away from a narrow state-centric framework has been 
seized upon as offering creative ways to overcome limitations of capacity 
on the part of state actors and to provide existing mechanisms that can 
be used to do the work that state agencies are not able to do.14 In some 
respects, this pragmatic use of hybridity resonates uncomfortably with 
colonial techniques of indirect rule, which involved mechanisms such as 
native courts, district assessors and the enrolling of local chiefs into the 
state justice system.15
Such instrumental approaches to hybridity have been criticised as 
involving ‘jurisprudential technology’, a ‘set of templates and models 
through which the non-state legal orders are regulated and authorized’16 
or ‘hybrid programming’ in the peacebuilding and development fields.17 
These critiques point to the extent to which such approaches ‘give 
license to intervention—giving credence to prescriptive approaches and 
legitimizing top-down technocratic solutions’.18 They are seen to facilitate 
the implementation of Western models in a local disguise, by creating 
institutions that are given a cloak of legitimacy as they purportedly 
comprise elements of both systems. There is also the concern that the 
12  van Klink, ‘Facts and Norms’.
13  See Hameiri and Jones, this volume.
14  Tamanaha et al., Legal Pluralism and Development.
15  Rodman, ‘Men of Influence, Men of Rank’.
16  Porter, ‘Some Implications on the Application of Legal Pluralism to Development Practice’, 168.
17  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 503.
18  Ibid., 511.
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‘turn to the local’ in international engagements—whether peacebuilding, 
statebuilding or development more broadly—facilitates or is in sympathy 
with external neoliberal agendas aimed at subcontracting state functions 
to non-state actors, thereby further hollowing out already weak states.19 
A further difficulty identified by critics is that in the construction of 
institutional hybrids ‘there is a reduction of complex social processes to 
simple rules or norms that mimic formal law’.20 Reflections of this sort 
have led critical peacebuilding scholars such as Mac Ginty and Richmond 
to announce they are ‘sceptical of the possibility of instrumentalizing 
hybridity’ and that attempts to instrumentalise hybridity ‘evades ethical 
questions relating to social and distributive justice’.21 Boege has similarly 
declared that ‘hybrid political orders, hybrid security governance and 
hybrid peace cannot be instrumentally designed, crafted or constructed’.22
There is not the space here to discuss the substantive validity or otherwise 
of these critiques of previous uses of hybridity.23 The point I wish to make 
is that the way in which the concept has been used as an instrument of legal 
reform should not be a reflection on whether it should or could be used 
to answer normative questions about social justice (the ‘ought’ question). 
In other words, previous (for argument’s sake, misguided) instances of 
using the concept in a normative way should not preclude future attempts 
to develop the conceptual insights of hybridity to better answer ‘ought’ 
questions concerning social justice.
There are a number of reasons to support this argument. The first is that 
those arguing against instrumentalised hybridity appear to base their 
argument on the grounds that those ‘doing’ hybridity are always outsiders 
or international actors, characterised as ‘elites intent on modernization 
and marketization’24 and who get ‘local actors to work in the service of 
strategic and liberal internationalist goals’.25 This characterisation ignores 
the broader view of agency that is one of the advances of hybridity; 
namely that regulatory change involves the conscious and unconscious 
interweaving of different aspects of different legal systems at many 
19  Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’.
20  Jayasuriya, ‘Institutional Hybrids and the Rule of Law as a Regulatory Project’, 152–153.
21  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 220.
22  Boege, this volume.
23  It is relevant in assessing such critiques that ‘prescriptive hybridity’ has been anchored in a larger 
critique of ‘the liberal peace’ that has characterised international peacebuilding over the past two decades.
24  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 230.
25  Ibid., 225.
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different levels and is driven by many different actors. As such, it involves 
both internal and external change agents, and often shifting coalitions 
of both,  a  point demonstrated by other chapters in this collection 
(for example, Dinnen and Allen). This is also something that has been 
thoroughly explored and documented by historical anthropology.26 
One has only to look in Melanesia at the various initiatives at a customary 
level—such as the adoption of constitutions and by-laws by chiefly councils, 
the appointment of minute takers and even the creation of uniforms and 
letterhead for non-state justice processes—to see that hybridity is in no 
way limited to outside agents of change.27 It is also incorrect to characterise 
external agents as uniformly driven by neoliberalising motivations and 
internal agents as not; it is abundantly clear that forces for and forces 
against capitalism and neoliberal development models exist along every 
part of the local to global continuum.
Second, in arguing against normative hybridity there is a failure to 
perceive a role for regulation, in the sense of ‘the intentional activity of 
attempting to control, order or influence the behaviour of others’28 or for 
governance, meaning ‘steering the flow of events within a social system’.29 
Richmond distinguishes between a negative hybrid peace, which ‘may 
represent the outsourcing of power and norms from the international 
to the state or society’, and a positive hybrid peace that ‘implies that 
significant legitimacy and agency emerge from the local scale’.30 However, 
they imply that it will largely be a matter of happenstance, context and 
power dynamics that will lead to either one or the other. In other words, 
there is no room for conscious and informed regulatory design in steering 
or influencing movement towards particular hybrid formations (and any 
move in that direction is doomed to failure). I am puzzled by this; hybrid 
arrangements occur at least in part due to various degrees of conscience or 
deliberate reform by a range of actors. It may be that the intentions and 
actions of such change agents are thwarted at times by geopolitical or local 
power dynamics, but this should not rule out the possibility of directed 
positive change all together. It seems a worthwhile endeavour to enquire 
into, and theorise about, what sorts of processes of change and regulatory 
tools bring about what types of hybrid arrangements in which contexts. 
26  Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom.
27  Forsyth, A Bird That Flies with Two Wings.
28  Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, 25.
29  Gunningham, ‘Confronting the Challenge of Energy Governance’, 120.
30  Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’, 51.
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Generating such insights will surely be of relevance for all those engaged 
in reform projects involving hybrid legal orders, and can help to avoid 
the shallow engagement with the concept that has been so problematic. 
In answer to the concerns of Mac Ginty and Richmond, I argue that it is 
precisely through such theorising that ethical questions relating to social 
and distributive justice associated with hybrid legal orders can be asked 
and debated.
A third argument is that the relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is 
itself highly interwoven, making separating the two problematic.31 This 
is supported by Braithwaite and Pettit who argue that we need to work 
harder to make our normative and explanatory theories work better 
together. They contend: 
Any normative theory that works with a category that lacks explanatory 
resonance is likely to be utopian and it will serve our policymaking badly. 
Any explanatory theory that fails to connect with a normative concern 
is likely to be unguided and it will be incapable of serving policymaking 
at all.32 
Developing normative hybridity further will therefore also enhance the 
value of hybridity as an explanatory concept.
How could hybridity be developed to answer 
the ‘ought’ question?
Having set out why it is worthwhile to consider how hybridity can be 
theorised on a normative level, I turn now to the question of how to do so. 
Once we start to think through the many questions involved it is not long 
before we run smack bang into issues of power and privilege. A useful 
theory of hybridity must therefore focus on these at its heart. Other and 
related issues are: Who decides which norms to pursue? Who has the authority 
and the power to bring about change in any legal system? If there are multiple 
legal systems, how can they all be taken into account if each system has only 
a partial perspective and conflicting objectives?
31  For instance, merely describing the existence of other normative systems—even to the extent 
of calling them ‘law’—often creates a layer of additional legitimacy.
32  Braithwaite and Pettit, Not Just Deserts, 161.
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These are all large questions and the aim of this chapter is just to identify 
a few leads in beginning to develop a richer conceptual framework. 
I identify three starting points: focus on the values and objectives at stake, 
concentrate on the processes of change, and analyse the relationships 
between and within different legal orders.
Focus on the values and objectives at stake
Previous attempts to bring about social change using concepts that 
underpin hybridity have heavily focused on questions of structure, 
institutions and instruments (for example, written laws, police officers 
and customary compensation payments). This focus on institutional 
form33 and other more easily identifiable aspects of the regulatory system 
often leads to the overlooking of values or principles that underlie 
different regulatory systems and reform agents. These values are often 
hidden through what Gramsci termed cultural hegemony34 and others 
assumptive normality, the process by which certain values come to be seen 
as ‘natural’ and hence taken for granted. This process has been identified 
by postcolonial scholars in relation to concepts such as human rights, the 
rule of law and development.35
Using hybridity to answer ‘ought’ questions requires explicit identification 
of the values, principles and objectives of any reform project and space 
created for debate over them. It thus brings to the forefront issues that 
often remain hidden in reform projects through generalised references to 
‘rule of law’, ‘capacity building’ and ‘peace’. What is required is a conscious 
reflexivity about the use of such terms, even those that are apparently 
widely accepted, such as ‘justice’. Such a term can involve connotations 
associated with Western ‘justice’ systems, such as the importance of 
individual rights, consistency in judgements, a fair and open trial, 
impartial judges and the right to present a defence. However, in countries 
where I work, such as Vanuatu, these may not be the priorities of conflict 
management; rather, concepts such as the re-establishment of peace and 
harmony in the community and the restoration of relationships are often 
prioritised. The use of the term ‘justice’ may mask these fundamental 
33  See Andrews, The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development.
34  Lears, ‘The Concept of Cultural Hegemony’.
35  Escobar, Encountering Development; Pahuka, Decolonising International Law; Rajagopal, 
International Law from Below.
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differences in agenda, creating the assumption that all systems are reading 
from the same page when in reality there might be considerable divergence 
of opinion in what priorities should be pursued.
It is also important to highlight the tendency to underestimate the difficulty 
that everyone (aid and development practitioners, villagers, government 
officials) has in truly understanding new value systems or ontological 
realities (and in identifying them beneath the institutional form). This is 
often because values and principles are not explicitly articulated in many 
contexts—the focus is more on institutions and programs and processes 
(strengthening the justice system, for example). Many times concepts 
like ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ and ‘victims’ are understood very differently by 
different interest groups but this is often not perceived; a situation I and 
a colleague have elsewhere identified as being the ‘false friends’ problem.36 
This borrows a linguistics concept that describes a situation of striking 
resemblance between two words in two different languages, leading 
speakers of each language to assume, incorrectly, that they understand 
the word’s meaning in the other language. Even more problematically, the 
misunderstanding is hidden by the assumption of understanding.
For instance, in my work on sorcery-related violence in Melanesia, 
I have observed there is fundamental disagreement between international 
and local actors about what ‘problem’ requires regulation, and who the 
‘victims’ of sorcery and witchcraft are. These disagreements are often 
not even realised as those with differing ideologies ‘talk past’ each other. 
For those who do not believe in the existence of sorcery, the ‘problem’ is 
the violence related to sorcery or witchcraft accusations, and the victims 
are those accused of being witches or sorcerers. For those who do believe, 
although there is often concern about sorcery accusation–related violence, 
the ‘problem’ is also (and for some primarily) the harm that sorcerers and 
witches do to their communities, killing and harming innocent people. 
From this perspective, the victims are those people who have been killed 
or hurt through sorcery or witchcraft. This spiritual/rational ontological 
divide is also observed in Boege’s chapter in this volume, where he notes 
that spiritual rehabilitation was critical to the Bougainvilleans but only 
dimly understood by the international peacekeepers.
36  Forsyth and Haggart, ‘The False Friends Problem for Foreign Norm Transplantation in 
Developing Countries’.
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In many ways, this is why issues such as sorcery, treatment of youth and 
gender-based violence are so important: they raise in stark relief these 
differences in value systems that otherwise remain covered over. So while 
such issues may seem to be particularly difficult for hybrid legal orders, 
they may in reality be the relatively low-hanging fruit—far more work 
needs to be done in other contexts in unearthing the different value 
systems because they are more deeply hidden.
It must be stressed that a focus on values and objectives should not 
imply that these are fixed, static or uncontested. The insights of hybridity 
apply equally here: values are in a constant process of adaptation/
mutual permeation and change and often involve power contestations. 
The suggestion here is simply to make these visible in order to facilitate 
more informed debate and include more voices, particularly those which 
are silenced by assumptions about the universality of values. A normative 
approach to hybridity must accept there will be disagreement about which 
norms to pursue and who gets to decide, but this will perhaps be easier 
to negotiate if there is generalised understanding about what is at stake.
Focus on the processes of change
Local-level hybrid arrangements are often seen as being more legitimate, 
authentic and positive than those ‘designed’ or constructed by the state or 
international actors. It is useful to unpack the reasons for this to understand 
if it is just because they are locally driven, or whether there are other 
explanatory processual factors behind this. Such factors may include the 
time span of the change (incremental or sudden), the underlying values in 
new regulatory arrangements, and whether existing power dynamics are 
reinforced and unchallenged. Understanding in detail which processes of 
change have which effects and why will give clearer insights into how 
better outcomes can be achieved through reform activities in hybrid 
legal contexts. It should also avoid lip service being paid to notions of 
‘consultation’, ‘local ownership’ and ‘bottom-up change’.
A much-needed dimension of research in this field is therefore the 
systematic identification of hybridising processes that enable positive/
liberal social change (acknowledging that what is ‘positive’ will always be 
relative and contingent). This will also involve identifying the agents of 
change, the values, implicit and explicit, being promoted and the extent to 
which all parties are in agreement over them, as well as how disagreements 
are managed. It is useful here to include processes that have led to 
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successful hybridisation through conscious reform endeavours, and also 
hybridisations that have been less obviously directed. The  question of 
who or what possesses intentionality and its role and limits in processes 
of change is highly relevant.37 Change impacts upon and is directed 
by structural factors, cultural prejudice and political, economic and 
ideological hegemony, and the extent to which these interplay with 
subjective intention requires further investigation.
My own research suggests positive reform in hybrid legal contexts is 
facilitated by the creation of spaces or forums that allow for active and 
well-informed debates about the objectives of particular reform projects, 
and the values and principles that underlie the desire to change. This 
notion comes from a number of different directions, including both the 
advocates of interculturality within the decolonial movement and from 
Habermas’s concept of communicative action.38 Quijano argues that in 
order to clear the path for ‘new intercultural communication’ there must 
be ‘epistemological decolonization’.39 In other words, he suggests there 
can only be true communication between those from different cultures, 
and hence possessed of different ontologies or world views, if each party 
to the dialogue recognises the partiality of their perspective. Applying this 
notion to a legal context as an illustration, Tobin describes intercultural 
legal pluralism as ‘a world of legal interfaces that cannot be imposed but 
must be negotiated, tested and modulated in response to the realities 
of differing worldviews, value systems and legal visions’.40 Drawing 
these insights together means that such forums need to be places where 
difference is embraced; there is a willingness or incentive to learn; different 
value systems and ontological frameworks are explicitly articulated; each 
party to the dialogue recognises the partiality of their perspective; and 
there is an understanding that behind all regulatory systems are distinct 
logics, rationalities, customs and knowledge that must be taken into 
account. This is illustrated in some community development practices 
such as ‘community conversations’ around HIV in Melanesia.41
37  Latour’s insights that it is not just people who have agency are highly relevant here. See Latour, 
Reassembling the Social.
38  Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action.
39  Quijano, ‘Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality’, 177.
40  Tobin, ‘Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap’, 161.
41  Reid, ‘Re-thinking Human Rights and the HIV Epidemic’. See also Berman, ‘Jurisgenerative 
Constitutionalism’.
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Those making conscious reforms in hybrid spaces need to find ways 
to create such spaces. This is in fact a space that academics can help to 
create through the holding of conferences, particularly in the countries 
where the issues involved are occurring, and including both scholarly 
and non-scholarly participants. One example of this I have been involved 
in was the holding of a series of conferences on the issue of sorcery 
accusation–related violence in Papua New Guinea. These have led to 
the creation of a coalition of local and international change agents and 
the development and passage of a new national policy to address this 
violence.42 The conferences also allowed for the working through of many 
of the difficult ontological issues associated with this area, such as how to 
address the violence while not denying people the right to their customary 
beliefs and practices.
The convening of conferences in a way that successfully creates such spaces 
is vastly more likely to be successful if international and local scholars, 
researchers and activists are able to plan, convene and publish together. 
It also requires proceedings of conferences to be made available and 
accessible (i.e. in plain English or where relevant translated) to those who 
will have practical need of them. This may involve creative approaches, 
such as publishing short summaries online, producing podcasts, holding 
information sessions or radio sessions, or other means. These are all real 
challenges for scholars in Western educational institutions where the 
political economy creates disincentives for these types of engagements, 
for example, pressures to publish single-authored papers in prestigious 
academic journals.
A concomitant part of the creation of such spaces is a recognition that 
no single approach works in every situation and there is intrinsic value in 
the mere fact that there are different ways of doing things. For example, 
a commitment to human rights principles may work wonderfully in 
relation to requiring everyone to be accorded a trial before conviction. 
However, it may end up being liberty depriving in dealing with gender-
based violence in contexts where state agencies are themselves abusers 
of human rights. Other approaches may better ensure safety. There is 
also a need for recognition that notions such as human rights and rule 
of law are not a fixed-package option—people often do ‘pick and mix’ 
to use Helene Kyed’s lovely term,43 in ways that to an outsider may be 
42  Forsyth and Haggart, ‘The False Friends Problem’.
43  At the workshop.
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unexpected, but seem to work in practice. For example, my research into 
dealing with sorcery-related violence in Melanesia indicates that one of 
the most effective ways for local leaders to deflect violence is to stress the 
absence of proof, a concept imported in this form from the state justice 
system.
Focus on relationships between and within different 
legal orders
Finally, there is a need to pay attention to the nature of linkages or 
relationships, formal and informal, between different legal systems 
or regulatory nodes within hybrid legal arrangements.44 As Baker has 
observed, relational ties within a network are crucial to determining 
the ‘strength, cohesion, collaborative intensity and sustainability’45 of the 
network as a whole. Such a statement is equally applicable to hybrid legal 
contexts which can be seen as a variety of network.
Focusing on relationships can involve looking at them both within legal 
orders and between legal orders through a range of different sections 
(in the sense of slicing up a specimen to look at under a microscope). 
This can be looking at all legal orders involved in a particular problem 
(such as domestic violence or intellectual property regulation) or all the 
legal orders involved in a particular geographical location. It can also be 
sliced temporally, to look at a particular moment in time or to take a long 
historical perspective.
Further, rather than stopping at the analytical stage, I am interested in the 
potential that exists to consciously change the nature of these relationships. 
A number of different regulatory theories have been developed in a Western 
context that may have relevance to such a project. Regulatory theories are 
not prescriptive about regulatory design; rather, they articulate insights 
about general principles that can be used in certain contexts to create 
regulatory systems that are more legitimate and less dominated by those 
with power. Below, I set out two that have the potential to be developed 
further in this context.
44  This is a topic on which much legal pluralism literature exists. See, for example, the discussion 
in Berman, ‘Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism’, where he identifies dialectical legal interactions, margins 
of appreciation, subsidiary schemes, hybrid participation arrangements and jurisdictional redundancies.
45  Baker, ‘Linking State and Non-state Security and Justice’, 600.
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The first is responsive regulation, which is based on the empirical insight 
that ensuring compliance with a particular regulatory objective can 
sometimes be achieved with persuasion and education, and sometimes 
requires heavier sanctions. It is based on the idea of a regulatory pyramid 
that gives the cheaper and more respectful options (education, mediation, 
community conversations) a chance to work first, while keeping the 
more costly punitive attempts at control in reserve for those cases where 
persuasion fails.46 Responsive regulation was designed in developed 
economies, but has recently started to be expanded to the developing 
world. In such a context it can be usefully supplemented with a networked 
or nodal governance dimension.47 This means that rather than dealing 
with a particular regulatory problem by itself, the state enrols a range of 
other actors (community organisations, civil society, church organisations, 
other states, United Nations organisations, academic institutions) in 
its efforts to ensure compliance. This is a potentially valuable approach 
in developing countries where the state does not have sufficient justice 
resources and there is a range of non-state actors offering assistance, 
especially in relation to issues such as gender-based violence. The challenge 
is for all the initiatives at work to be developed into an effective regulatory 
pyramid, so they meaningfully support each other. Responsive regulation 
coupled with network governance has clear relevance for situations of 
hybrid legal arrangements. It would need to be adapted further, however, 
to integrate the dynamic and coproducing nature of hybrid legal orders 
and also to deal more explicitly with questions of power, differences in 
ontology and the avoidance of domination.
The second regulatory theory of potential relevance is a conflict web 
concept I have developed48 that draws on network theory,49 nodal 
governance50 and regulatory space metaphors.51 The key features are as 
follows: first, it focuses on identifying, strengthening and, where necessary, 
building mutually supporting linkages between actors and institutions 
actively involved in conflict management (or indeed any other field). 
This avoids the adoption of a hierarchical, state-centralist approach to 
reform and frees up reform initiatives to consider how, for example, state 
46  Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies’, 887.
47  Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets’.
48  Forsyth, ‘Spinning a Conflict Management Web in Vanuatu’.
49  Wellman, ‘Network Analysis: Some Basic Principles’.
50  Shearing and Wood, ‘Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New “Denizens”’.
51  Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space’.
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institutions can be positively influenced by and kept in check by non-
state actors and institutions.52 It also helps to ensure that agents of reform 
(be they state governments or international donors) are not duplicating 
the efforts (or worse, inadvertently undermining the efforts) of another 
reform project.
Second, this framework emphasises the sharing of information about 
what reform initiatives work and why between various state and non-
state actors in the field and also donors, non-government organisations 
and academics. This will foster homegrown adaptation and innovation 
to replace the current tendency to look immediately outside for ideas 
and models. In turn, this is likely to increase the legitimacy of conflict-
management institutions and actors, which has been identified as an 
important issue in statebuilding and reducing conflict and violence.53 
Action learning and reflection are thus central to the framework, meaning 
that those involved in reform should regularly assess the benefits of their 
projects to inform themselves, and others in the web, about how to better 
implement reforms.54
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the concept of hybridity can and should 
be developed to answer questions of how hybrid legal orders ought to be, 
a dimension to the concept termed here normative hybridity. It suggests 
three initial ways forward in developing these elements of the concept; 
namely a focus on the values at stake, a focus on the processes of change, 
and a focus on the relationships between and within different legal orders. 
It also suggests two regulatory theories that may prove useful for further 
developing this concept, noting that these ideas are as yet undeveloped and 
there is a need for further empirical testing and development. Developing 
the concept of hybridity in this way can facilitate change agents in helping 
to steer hybrid legal orders in positive and emancipatory directions.
52  Ibid., 337.
53  World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 84.
54  A collaboration-strengthening pyramid such as suggested by Braithwaite may also assist in this 





Is There Still a Place for 
Liberal Peacebuilding?
Joanne Wallis1
For the past 20 years the concept of liberal peacebuilding has ostensibly 
guided the efforts of Western governments, the United Nations and other 
international institutions to stabilise and rebuild conflict-affect states.2 
Liberal peacebuilding sought to build state institutions that adhere to the 
key tenets of the ‘liberal peace’: democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights, and which provide the conditions for capitalist market economies 
to flourish. The concept was based on the assumption that liberalism 
was inherently attractive and offered the most likely path to peace and 
prosperity. Its authority was buttressed by the claim that promoting liberal 
peace would also end conflict between states, based on the democratic 
peace thesis.3
While critics have argued that the wide variety of contemporary 
peacebuilding interventions have not been exercises of liberal 
peacebuilding,4 and instead interveners have aimed for ‘regulatory stability 
and regional and domestic security’,5 the ‘rhetoric, if not the practice, 
1  The research leading to this chapter was generously funded by Australian Research Council 
Discovery grant DP160104692, ‘Doing State-building Better? Practising Hybridity in Melanesia’.
2  United Nations, An Agenda for Peace.
3  Doyle, ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’.
4  Hameiri, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Peacebuilding’; Zaum, ‘Beyond the “Liberal Peace”’.
5  Chandler, ‘The Uncritical Critique of ‘Liberal Peace’, 148; Hameiri, ‘The Crisis of Liberal 
Peacebuilding’.
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is most firmly liberal and in the Wilsonian tradition’.6 Data from Peace 
Accords Matrix also suggests that ‘liberal ideals have been embedded in the 
vast majority of post-1989 peace accords’.7 Yet, there is remarkably little 
consensus regarding what the liberalism that guides liberal peacebuilding 
actually is, with ‘competing and often contradictory claims’ made about 
its content.8 This has meant that neoliberal peacebuilding has instead been 
implemented, guided by an emphasis on individual autonomy removed 
from basic principles of justice.
(Neo)liberal peacebuilding has not built sustainable peace in most places 
where it was attempted. There are also new ideological challenges to 
Western conceptions of the liberal peace. The first comes from China, 
which, despite resisting the temptation towards liberal political reforms, 
seems to demonstrate that authoritarian capitalism can deliver prosperity. 
The second comes from the new form of transnational political actor 
represented by Da’esh, which raises existential questions about liberal 
peacebuilding; despite the massive efforts to build stable liberal democracies 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iraq now hosts the Da’esh insurgency against 
the fundamental principles of liberalism and the concept of sovereign 
statehood. The third comes from disruptions to the West’s pragmatic 
approaches to international order; after the Arab Spring, Western states 
realised they could no longer credibly support longstanding authoritarian 
allies in the face of popular demands for democracy, but as a consequence 
had to contemplate the possibility of hostile groups taking power. These 
challenges have underlined emerging questions about whether the liberal 
peace, or even liberalism as a political ideology, is inherently attractive in 
all contexts and offers the only path to prosperity, recognition of identity 
or stability.
Accordingly, there is a palpable sense of hubris within Western 
governments, the United Nations and other international institutions, 
which now pursue the more modest goal of ‘good enough’ outcomes 
that may involve ‘combinations of state, private sector, faith-based, 
traditional, and community structures for service delivery’.9 This move 
away from liberal peacebuilding might be interpreted as an instrumental 
lowering of the liberal peace standards sought during peacebuilding, such 
6  Richmond and Mac Ginty, ‘Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?’, 174.
7  Ibid., 177–178; Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 
peaceaccords.nd.edu/about.
8  Bell, ‘What Is Liberalism?’, 687.
9  World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 106.
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as shifting from attempting to hold ‘free and fair’ elections to merely 
holding ‘credible’ ones, in order to reduce the burden on the international 
community of the expense and time required to institutionalise liberal 
democracy during interventions. Yet it also reflects the emergence of the 
concept of hybrid peacebuilding in the academic literature, which seeks 
to negotiate elements of the liberal peace in a local context by advocating 
‘an intersubjective mediation between local and international scales and 
norms, institutions, law, right, needs and interests, depending on both 
power and legitimacy’.10 Ideally, this will generate a ‘positive hybrid peace’, 
‘rooted in accommodation, reconciliation, emancipation, autonomy, 
social justice and a sense of liberation’.11
But, how does the turn away from liberal to hybrid peacebuilding operate 
in practice? Is there still a place for liberal peacebuilding? I seek to answer 
these questions using a case study of Timor-Leste.12
Timor-Leste is a small state with a population of 1.17 million people. 
It was a Portuguese colony from the early eighteenth century to 1974, 
when the Portuguese withdrew and a group of Timorese leaders declared 
independence in November 1975. In December 1975, Indonesia 
invaded the territory and occupied it for 24 years. Various Timorese 
groups opposed the occupation and a long and bloody independence 
struggle followed. That  struggle culminated in the Timorese people 
being given the opportunity to vote on their political future in a United 
Nations–run referendum in August 1999. An overwhelming majority 
(78.5  per  cent) opted for independence, rather than autonomy within 
Indonesia (21.5  per  cent). After the result of the vote was announced 
the Indonesian military and its supporting Timorese militia engaged 
in a  scorched earth campaign in which thousands were killed and 
almost three quarters of buildings and infrastructure were destroyed.13 
An  Australian-led intervention force stabilised the territory, and the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor engaged 
in what was described as a liberal peacebuilding operation to build the 
new state for its independence in May 2002. However, in response 
to challenges that emerged following independence, since 2004 the 
government has attempted to engage with local sociopolitical practices 
10  Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’, 51.
11  Ibid., 60.
12  Fieldwork was conducted in Timor-Leste in 2009, 2010 and 2013. As Timor-Leste is a conflict-
affected state, all interviews are anonymous to protect the confidentiality of interviewees.
13  CAVR, Chega!
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and institutions in certain areas. Although the government’s attempts are 
neither systematic nor coherent, in Timor-Leste what can be described as 
an attempt at hybrid peacebuilding has emerged in relation to areas such 
as decentralisation and justice.14
I begin with a brief outline of hybrid peacebuilding and the questions 
it raises. The core of this chapter is a case study about how hybrid 
peacebuilding has operated in practice in Timor-Leste, with a focus on 
decentralisation and justice. I conclude by arguing there may still be 
a place for liberal peacebuilding in Timor-Leste.
Hybrid peacebuilding
As described in the Introduction, the hybrid peacebuilding literature 
starts from the observation that diverse sociopolitical practices and 
institutions can ‘co-exist, overlap, interact, and intertwine’ in conflict-
affected societies.15 Hybrid peacebuilding is taken to imply more than 
mere co-existence of these practices and institutions;16 they must instead 
merge, integrate or syncretise into a ‘fusion policy’.17 While the literature 
has been criticised for oversimplification by drawing a neat distinction 
between the ‘local’ and ‘liberal’ or ‘international’,18 it does not seek 
to create artificial binaries,19 as ‘hybrid forms are never simply a mix 
of  two otherwise pure forms, but are perennially ongoing processes of 
amalgamation and dissolution’.20
In much of the literature the ‘local’ is taken to refer to ‘customary law and 
indigenous knowledge, as well as traditional societal structures—extended 
families, clans, tribes, religious brotherhoods, village communities—and 
traditional authorities such as village elders, clan chiefs, healers, big men, 
and religious leaders’ that determine ‘the everyday social reality of large 
parts of the population … particularly in rural and remote peripheral 
areas’.21 Although some analyses tend to attribute the local with ‘spatial 
14  Brown and Gusmao, ‘Peacebuilding and Political Hybridity in East Timor’; Wallis, ‘A Liberal–
Local Hybrid Peace Project’.
15  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, 17.
16  Goodfellow and Lindemann, ‘The Clash of Institutions’.
17  Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace’, 406.
18  Björkdahl and Höglund, ‘Precarious Peacebuilding’.
19  Heathershaw, ‘Towards Better Theories of Peacebuilding’.
20  Albrecht and Wiuff Moe, ‘The Simultaneity of Authority’, 5.
21  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, 15.
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characteristics’,22 local practices and institutions need not ‘operate in 
a  geographically and politically defined sub-national and sub-regional 
space’,23 but can also be ‘de-territorialised, networked and constituted by 
people and activity rather than place’.24 This is because the local ‘may 
not be local at all, but transnational or global, based upon relationships 
of kinship, trade, occupation, religion or leisure, mediated by direct 
interaction between mobile bodies, or via various types of media’.25
Criticisms of hybrid peacebuilding
Yet, as the Introduction to this volume notes, the hybrid peacebuilding 
literature has attracted criticism. The aspect of the hybrid peacebuilding 
literature which has attracted the most criticism is its potential to be used 
prescriptively or instrumentally.26 There are warnings that it may be used 
to ‘give license to intervention’ and to legitimise ‘top-down technocratic 
solutions’.27 Indeed, rather than responding to local demands, the shift to 
hybrid or good enough outcomes during peacebuilding is more and more 
driven by international interveners, multinational corporations and aid 
agencies.28
The literature is also concerned that hybrid peacebuilding may have 
perverse consequences, as by emphasising local agency it might only 
provide the ‘illusion of local ownership’.29 This may see the determinants 
of peacebuilding attributed to the local level and overlook broader 
structural challenges,30 such as its often discriminatory and distorting 
political economy.31 Indeed, hybrid peacebuilding may focus too 
heavily on ideational issues and institutions and overlook the influence 
of material factors of social welfare and human security.32 There is also 
a risk that it can be used to legitimate actions by practitioners and 
22  Hirblinger and Simons, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’, 422.
23  Baker, ‘Justice and Security Architecture in Africa’, 29.
24  Mac Ginty, ‘Where Is the Local?’, 841.
25  Hughes et al., ‘The Struggle versus the Song’, 821.
26  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 220.
27  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 511.
28  Meagher et al., Unravelling Public Authority.
29  Björkdahl and Höglund, ‘Precarious Peacebuilding’, 291.
30  Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-linearity’.
31  Hameiri, Regulating Statehood.
32  Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’; Newman, ‘A Human Security Peace-
building Agenda’.
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policymakers focused on the ‘resilience’ of local communities as a ‘cure-all 
status’.33 In this regard, there is the suggestion that international actors 
may instrumentally embrace hybrid peacebuilding because it ‘lessens 
the burden on the state and donors and lessens the burden on reform 
processes’, which highlights concerns that hybrid peacebuilding aimed at 
‘good enough’ outcomes may be used as a cloak for merely attempting to 
institutionalise the liberal peace with lower standards.34 However, it must 
be acknowledged that local actors are sometimes able to either ‘benefit 
from international intervention, or to resist intentional intervention, 
while enacting oppressions of their own’.35
The literature frequently cautions about the need to resist the temptation 
to romanticise the local practices and institutions engaged with during 
hybrid peacebuilding,36 as they often include ‘a range of non-traditional 
and often unsavoury actors, including warlords, militias, gang leaders, 
millenarian religious movements and organized crime’.37 Local practices 
and institutions can also obscure issues of injustice and differential power 
relationships, based on factors such as gender and class.38 This highlights 
the potential dark side of hybridity ‘in which violent and oppressive social 
practices become embedded in officially recognised governance systems’.39 
Local practices and institutions should also not be essentialised; they are 
not immutable relics of the ‘pre-contact’ past, since the cultures in which 
they exist are constantly evolving living organisms.40
Hybrid peacebuilding in Timor-Leste
Although the United Nations claimed it was conducting liberal 
peacebuilding in Timor-Leste, in substance it engaged in neoliberal 
peacebuilding; that is, it focused on building highly centralised 
institutions, limiting public expenditure, creating financial liberalisation 
and reducing the role for the state.41 Consequently, the 80 per cent of 
33  Chandler, ‘Resilience and the “Everyday”’; Mac Ginty, ‘Everyday Peace’, 559.
34  Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Peacebuilding and Critical Forms of Agency’, 334.
35  Hughes et al., ‘The Struggle versus the Song’, 820.
36  Richmond, ‘The Romanticisation of the Local’.
37  Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’, 1080.
38  Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’.
39  Meagher et al., Unravelling Public Authority, 5.
40  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, 15.
41  Wallis, ‘A Liberal–Local Hybrid Peace Project’.
89
5 . IS THERE STILL A PLACE FOR LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING?
Timorese residing in rural areas and living subsistence lifestyles were 
left out of the peacebuilding process and continued to follow local 
sociopolitical practices and institutions centred on their village (suku) 
or hamlet (aldeia). Indeed, a 2002 Asia Foundation survey found that 
61 per cent of respondents favoured their suku chief or traditional leader 
for resolving problems with their neighbours, and 65 per cent favoured 
their suku chief or traditional leader for mediating property disputes, 
while 54  per cent favoured their suku chief as the source of political 
information.42 In recognition of these facts, with the encouragement and 
assistance of international interveners and donors, from 2004 the Timor-
Leste Government began to engage with local practices and institutions 
in certain areas in a process that can be described as hybrid peacebuilding. 
I focus on decentralisation and justice, as these are two of the most notable 
areas in which this has occurred.
Decentralisation
In 2004 the Timor-Leste Government introduced limited administrative 
and political decentralisation. A wide range of political and administrative 
functions were decentralised to the aldeia and suku leaders and suku 
councils,43 which are characterised as ‘community leaders’. As a result of 
this characterisation, aldeia and suku leaders and suku councils are ‘not 
included in the public administration’.44 Therefore, they can access few 
resources, are given limited support and have little influence over higher 
levels of government.45 This has restricted their capacity to exercise their 
mandate and generated a degree of frustration and ‘confusion’ concerning 
their status.46
There are questions about the performance of local leaders. Many suku 
leaders have ‘good coordination with the community’,47 and ‘are very 
active in meeting their responsibilities’.48 However, their capacity to plan 
42  Asia Foundation, Timor Lorosa’e National Survey of Citizen Knowledge.
43  Decree Law on Community Authorities No. 5/2004; Law on Community Leaderships and Their 
Election No. 3/2009.
44  Law on Community Leaderships, section 2(3).
45  Interview with a governance adviser, 18 July 2013; interview with a subdistrict administrator, 
28 August 2013.
46  Interview with a member of civil society (b), 4 September 2013; interview with a governance 
adviser, 18 July 2013; interview with a public servant, 3 September 2013.
47  Interview with a governance adviser, 18 July 2013.
48  Interview with a member of civil society (c), 17 July 2013.
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and implement projects has varied.49 Some suku leaders ‘don’t do a good 
job and many communities complain’,50 others make decisions that favour 
their personal interests,51 and some suku councils fail to meet regularly.52 
A World Bank report even claimed that some local leaders displayed 
‘authoritarian characteristics’.53 These issues may be partly explained by 
the fact that many sukus are large both in terms of geographical size and 
population (the average size is 2,000 to 3,000 people), or are socially 
fractured, which means that it can be difficult and expensive to generate 
societal trust.54 In addition, because local leaders are often selected based 
on traditional power structures and ritual authority, their levels of literacy 
and numeracy can be low, which means that some struggle to manage 
the technical requirements of administrative activities and decentralised 
development projects.55
There are concerns that local sociopolitical practices which influence 
aldeias and sukus can discriminate against women and young people, 
since it is generally elder males who have authority.56 To combat this, 
the suku councils reserve seats for women and young people to ensure 
their participation. However, there are structural and material barriers 
to women taking leadership positions. The small incentive local leaders 
receive can be economically prohibitive for women, as they usually do 
not have an independent source of income and are required to complete 
significant domestic and agricultural work.57 Even when women do take 
a leadership role, it is difficult for them to influence decision-making,58 
partly because local sociopolitical practices often perpetuate a patriarchal 
approach.59
49  Everett and Ragragio, Decentralisation in Timor-Leste; interview with a member of parliament, 
30 September 2010; interview with a suku leader, 28 September 2010; interview with a governance 
adviser, 23 April 2010.
50  Interview with a member of civil society (c), 17 July 2013.
51  Cummins and Maia, Community Experiences of Decentralised Development; interview with 
a member of civil society (c), 17 July 2013; interview with a governance adviser, 18 July 2013.
52  Interview with a member of civil society (a), 4 September 2013; interview with a member of civil 
society (c), 17 July 2013.
53  Butterworth and Dale, Local Governance and Community Development Initiatives, 13.
54  Cummins and Maia, Community Experiences of Decentralised Development.
55  Ibid.
56  Hicks, ‘Adat and the Nation-State’; interview with a women’s leader, 29 April 2010.
57  Cummins, ‘The Problem of Gender Quotas’; interview with a women’s leader, 18 July 2013.
58  Interview with a member of civil society (a), 4 September 2013; interview with a women’s leader, 
18 July 2013.
59  Cummins and Maia, Community Experiences of Decentralised Development; interview with 
a member of civil society (a), 17 July 2013; interview with a member of civil society (c), 17 July 2013.
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In this regard, while introducing elections for local leaders appears to 
have extended democracy to the local level, elections might actually have 
reduced political participation,60 as they occur only every four years and 
suku leaders and councils do not necessarily consult their communities 
in between.61 Moreover, the first round of suku elections in 2005 and 
2006 was highly politicised. The introduction of party politics at the local 
level contributed to friction, hampered the ability of many suku leaders 
and councils to operate, affected the perceived legitimacy of leaders and 
undermined local sociopolitical practices.62 As a result, the 2009 local 
government law prevented political parties from running in the 2009 
suku elections63 and provided that suku councils would be elected as 
‘packages’, rather than as individuals. Yet this change has had unintended 
consequences, as powerful local figures are now said to compile packages 
from their families, which can allow one family to dominate suku affairs, 
leading to the election of people who lack capacity or are inefficient.64 
It has also generated social jealousy and inequalities in the distribution 
of benefits and opportunities.65
The opportunities to use local government positions to dispense benefits 
has been enhanced by the developmental decentralisation introduced 
in 2009,66 which has distributed significant resources, created jobs 
and provided communities with the opportunity to undertake local 
decision-making.67 The quality of these projects has differed, primarily 
due to variable local capacity, poor planning and project choice, lack of 
opportunities for local feedback and at times limited opportunities for 
60  Pereira and Koten, ‘Dynamics of Democracy at the Suku Level’.
61  Interview with a member of civil society (a), 4 September 2013; interview with a member of civil 
society (c), 17 July 2013.
62  Interview with a governance adviser, 18 July 2013; interview with a member of civil society, 
18 July 2013.
63  Law on Community Leaderships, section 21. Anecdotal evidence suggests that parties were 
still active.
64  Interview with an academic, 18 July 2013; Asia Foundation, Reflections on Law No. 3/2009.
65  Interview with a governance adviser, 18 July 2013.
66  Pakote Referendum (Referendum Package) in 2009; Pakote Dezenvolvimentu Desentralizasaun 
(Decentralised Development Package) and Planu Dezenvolvimentu Suku (Suku Development Plan) 
in 2010; Programa Dezenvolvimentu Dezentralizadu (Decentralised Development Programs) in 2011; 
Planeamentu Dezenvolvimentu Integradu Distrital (Integrated District Development Plan) (Decree 
Law on Integrated District Development No. 4/2012) and Programa Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suku 
(National Program for Village Development) (Government Resolution Approving the Establishment 
of a National Mechanism to Accelerate Community Development No. 1/2012; Ministerial Decree on 
Elaboration of District Investment Plan No. 9/2012) in 2012.
67  Interview with a governance adviser, 18 July 2013; interview with an academic, 18 July 2013.
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local input.68 There are also claims that the central government overrides 
the development priorities identified by the sukus, which has led to 
frustration.69 The relatively weak links between the local level and the 
central government also mean there is insufficient oversight of decentralised 
development projects, with claims of collusion and nepotism common.70 
This highlights the danger of hybrid peacebuilding being used as an excuse 
for lowering standards of governance. This has created a perception that 
the government has used developmental decentralisation as ‘a strategy to 
execute the budget, so it can report that it executed well, even though 
there have been no outcomes’.71
Justice
The Timor-Leste Government has also taken steps to decentralise 
activities relating to justice, such as implementing community policing 
and working with local justice mechanisms.72 Yet, there are claims that 
community policing remains ‘a vague ambition rather than an immediate 
priority’ as it is ‘chronically under-resourced’.73 There is also inadequate 
oversight of local justice mechanisms,74 partly because there is no clear 
framework establishing the relationship between state institutions and 
local mechanisms.75 The role of suku leaders when settling disputes is also 
unclear, as is how this role fits with that of state institutions.
In this regard, the recognition of local justice mechanisms has been 
criticised as sending ‘mixed messages’ that may undermine the rule of 
law.76 Local mechanisms co-exist with state justice institutions and 
often enforce customary law rather than state law, which results in legal 
pluralism, whereby ‘two or more legal systems co-exist in the same social 
68  Interview with a member of civil society, 18 July 2013; interview with a suku leader, 3 September 
2013; interview with an academic, 18 July 2013; interview with a governance adviser, 18 July 2013.
69  Interview with a subdistrict administrator, 28 August 2013; interview with a district 
administrator, 29 August 2013; interview with a district administrator, 31 August 2013; interview 
with a district administrator, 1 September 2013; interview with a suku leader, 3 September 2013.
70  Interview with a member of civil society (a), 17 July 2013; interview with a member of civil 
society (c), 17 July 2013.
71  Interview with a member of civil society (a), 17 July 2013.
72  Organic Law of Timor-Leste’s National Police (PNTL) No. 9/2009; Law on Community Leaderships, 
section 11.
73  Belo and Koenig, Institutionalizing Community Policing in Timor-Leste, 1.
74  USAID, Rule of Law in Timor-Leste.
75  Asia Foundation, Timor-Leste Law & Justice Survey 2013.
76  Grenfell, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law in Timor-Leste’, 228.
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field’.77 As the system currently operates it ‘does not serve the rule of 
law because it operates without any of the checks or balances’ as there 
are ‘no formal avenues of appeal and thus minimal accountability and 
transparency’.78 This challenge is exemplified by the fact that people can 
receive customary sanctions under a tara bandu, ‘an agreement among 
the community regulating aspects of behaviour and relationships among 
people, between people and natural resources, and economic life’,79 
and then face punishment under the state system for the same crime.80 
There is also the risk that people may be sanctioned under tara bandu 
for behaviour that does not contravene state law. As a solution, efforts 
could be made to minimise the contradictions between tara bandu and 
state law, so that they can be seen as ‘complementary’.81 Moreover, a draft 
customary law provides for appeals from local mechanisms to state justice 
institutions, which gives people the opportunity to access state law if they 
are dissatisfied with the outcome of the local mechanism.82 This draft law 
has been under development as a partnership between the United Nations 
Development Programme and Timor-Leste Government for several years, 
with little sign that it will be adopted.
The use of customary sanctions raises questions concerning the human 
rights implications of recognising local justice mechanisms. There 
are concerns over the neutrality of local justice decision-makers, the 
consistency of their decision-making and their treatment of women, 
particularly in cases of sexual assault and domestic violence.83 For example, 
a 2008 Asia Foundation survey revealed that 58 per cent of respondents 
disapprove of women being able to speak for themselves in local justice 
mechanisms, although this number had shrunk to 39 per cent in 2013, 
reflecting changing community attitudes.84
This last point highlights the fact that local justice mechanisms should 
not be romanticised, nor should state justice institutions be ‘automatically 
disregarded as imposed, harmful and culturally inappropriate’.85 While 
local mechanisms can provide a ‘check on the inability of state law to 
77  Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’, 870.
78  Grenfell, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law in Timor-Leste’, 307.
79  Brown and Gusmao, ‘Peacebuilding and Political Hybridity’, 67.
80  Belun and The Asia Foundation, Tara Bandu.
81  Interview with an academic, 17 July 2013.
82  Interview with an international justice adviser, 14 May 2010.
83  Hohe and Nixon, Reconciling Justice; UNOHCHR and UNMIT, Facing the Future.
84  Everett, Law and Justice in Timor-Leste; Asia Foundation, Timor-Leste Law & Justice Survey 2013.
85  Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace’, 150.
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grapple with contextual injustices in a local language in which citizens can 
understand the proceedings’, state justice institutions can be ‘a check on 
the failure of traditional justice to guarantee’ liberal human rights.86 There 
is potential for state justice institutions to supervise local mechanisms, 
such as through reviewing whether penalties are proportionate and 
comply with constitutional human rights protections. In this regard, 
there are proposals to empower the provedor de dereitos humanos e justica 
(human rights and justice ombudsman), who is mandated to investigate 
complaints against ‘public bodies’,87 to monitor local mechanisms. 
In  addition, education programs could assist communities adapt to 
the constitutional human rights protections.88 Indeed, the consultation 
process on a draft customary law indicated that, once it was explained 
how local practices conflict with liberal human rights, communities were 
prepared to alter their local practices.89
There is also evidence that many Timorese want state justice institutions 
to play a more active role at the local level. In the 2008 Asia Foundation 
survey 85 per cent of respondents said that they wanted a court official 
to help settle disputes, which was echoed by 80 per cent of respondents 
when asked the same question in 2013.90 Consequently, reflecting the 
government’s turn to the local, pilot mobile courts that hold hearings at 
the local level now function in four districts, although the quality of justice 
they deliver has been questioned.91 In a 2013 Asia Foundation survey, 
96 per cent of respondents also recorded a high level of confidence in the 
effectiveness of the police force (Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste; PNTL).92 
Indeed, there is an increasing preference to the PNTL for violent crimes; 
in 2008, 91 per cent of respondents agreed that someone who kills another 
person should go to jail, while only 5 per cent favoured the traditional 
remedy of compensation.93 Similarly, if threatened by a gang, 51 per cent 
would request assistance from the PNTL, 21 per cent from the suku leader 
and 13 per cent from the suku council or elder.94
86  Braithwaite et al., Networked Governance of Freedom and Tyranny, 218.
87  Constitution, section 27.
88  Grenfell, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law’.
89  Interview with an international justice adviser, 14 May 2010.
90  Everett, Law and Justice in Timor-Leste.
91  IPAC, Justice at the Crossroads.
92  Asia Foundation, Timor-Leste Law & Justice Survey 2013.
93  Wassel and Rajalingam, A Survey of Community-Police Perceptions; Everett, Law and Justice in 
Timor-Leste.
94  Wassel and Rajalingam, A Survey of Community-Police Perceptions.
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The above discussion raises a number of questions about how 
hybrid peacebuilding has operated in Timor-Leste. The Timor-Leste 
Government appears to have instrumentally engaged in decentralisation 
to local institutions in order to lessen the burden of certain political, 
administrative, developmental and justice functions. Yet this transfer is not 
accompanied by sufficient linkages between the central government and 
local level, or the development of capacity and resources at the local level, 
in order for local leaders to perform their roles. Although the government 
has adopted policies which seek to engage with local practices and 
institutions, it also frequently acts as a spoiler to these hybrid frameworks, 
particularly by ignoring or undermining local decision-making in relation 
to decentralised development projects. This highlights the danger that 
governments or international peacebuilders use the language of hybrid 
peacebuilding either as a cloak for shifting the burden of state functions 
to the local level, or as an excuse for lowering the standards of governance. 
There are also concerns that local institutions can be discriminatory or 
undemocratic, which underscores the risk that an uncritical emphasis 
on local agency can obscure issues of injustice and differential power 
relationships, particularly the marginalisation of women. Problems with 
the implementation of developmental decentralisation also highlight 
the risk that emphasising local agency might see the determinants of the 
success of peacebuilding attributed to the local level, which may overlook 
broader structural problems.
Space for liberal peacebuilding 
in Timor-Leste?
Despite these challenges, hybrid peacebuilding in Timor-Leste has 
increased opportunities for political participation and the delivery of public 
goods at the local level. Therefore, the Timor-Leste case suggests that, by 
foregrounding the importance of local agency, hybrid peacebuilding offers 
an important correction to the top-down, technocratic approach that has 
characterised neoliberal peacebuilding.
However, there is emerging evidence that many Timorese desire a role for 
modern liberal state institutions as a response to the inequality, exclusions 
and injustices that can occur under local practices and institutions. While 
local sociopolitical practices and institutions remain influential in Timor-
Leste, it may be that they were an attractive alternative to Timorese 
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in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 referendum and in the first 
decade of independence, not because state institutions were inherently 
illegitimate, but because they were highly centralised, under-resourced 
and lacked capacity. The effectiveness and reach of state institutions is 
slowly improving, which has increased their legitimacy and attractiveness. 
However, calls by Timorese for state institutions to play an increased 
role in their lives should not necessarily be interpreted as implying that 
those institutions are unproblematic. Instead, they might indicate a desire 
for those institutions to work more effectively and to be more locally 
legitimate.
An advocate of hybrid peacebuilding might argue that Timor-Leste has 
only achieved a negative hybrid peace, which rests ‘mainly on hybrid 
forms of politics which reify existing power structures and hierarchies’ 
and leans ‘too far towards the preferences of internationals, state elites 
or global capital’.95 Indeed, it does appear that the government has 
instrumentally engaged with local practices and institutions in relation 
to decentralisation and justice, which has undermined the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of its attempt at hybrid peacebuilding.
However, for many Timorese at least some aspects of the liberal state seem 
genuinely attractive, which suggests that building state liberal institutions 
may retain a place in contemporary peacebuilding. Therefore, the 
assumption that populations prefer their local practices and institutions 
to those of a liberal state may not necessarily hold in the long term, nor 
may the assumption that populations favour the fusion of local and state 
practices and institutions envisaged by hybrid peacebuilding. Instead, 
much will depend on how the government engages with local practices 
and institutions. Alternatively, it may be that people are more concerned 
with having effective and legitimate institutions that will meet their needs, 
than about whether these institutions are local, liberal or hybrid.
Two challenges have contributed to liberal peacebuilding falling from 
favour. First, in much of the academic and policy literature liberalism has 
been ‘used promiscuously to explain a broad range of often contradictory 
policy perspectives and practices across very differing circumstances 
and with very differing outcomes’.96 Indeed, even in the political theory 
literature there is remarkably little consensus regarding what liberalism 
95  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 230.
96  Chandler, ‘The Uncritical Critique of “Liberal Peace”’, 145.
97
5 . IS THERE STILL A PLACE FOR LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING?
actually is. This has created space for what has essentially been neoliberal 
peacebuilding, guided by an emphasis on individual autonomy removed 
from basic principles of justice, to be described as liberal peacebuilding. 
Neoliberal peacebuilding has strayed far from most understandings of 
liberalism, which recognise that individuals may have conflicting—as well 
as common—interests and therefore need to be offered the protection of 
basic principles of justice.97
Second, while the failures of neoliberal peacebuilding have led Western 
states and international institutions to conclude that people do not want 
liberalism, what it actually means is that people do not want the shallow, 
ineffective, distant and corrupt governments that neoliberal peacebuilding 
has built. Instead, the liberal needs to be restored to peacebuilding, with 
peacebuilding guided by the liberal principle of popular sovereignty, 
which implies that people should consent to the manner in which their 
political unit is governed, including deciding the extent to which it reflects 
liberal and local principles and incorporates state and local institutions, 
in the form of a ‘social contract’.98 Existing political and legal pluralism 
should neither be rejected as uncivilised nor accepted uncritically, but 
instead brought into critical dialogues in discussions of how society will 
be organised. Therefore, liberal norms can be ‘renegotiated in context, 
producing hybridity’.99 Elsewhere I have argued that a participatory 
constitution-making process can provide an opportunity for this 
negotiation to take place.100 That is not the only forum in which this can 
occur, as there can be multiple opportunities for people to exercise their 
popular sovereignty during peacebuilding, such as during transitional 
justice processes and elections for their new institutions.
Critics may accuse me of advocating ‘hybridity for liberal peace’101 or say 
that I am trapped in a ‘paradox of liberalism’ that ‘sees the liberal peace 
as oppressive but the only true source of emancipation’.102 My response 
has two parts: first, I question what alternatives these critics propose 
in order to achieve truly emancipatory peace; to date no one has made 
a sustained attempt to make such a proposal in either theoretical or 
97  Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
98  Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings.
99  Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’, 56.
100  Wallis, Constitution Making During State Building.
101  Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’.
102  Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’.
HyBRIDITy ON THE GROUND IN PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT
98
empirical terms.103 Second, I question why critics assume that many 
conflict-affected populations will not see a place for—and indeed may 
even favour—liberal state institutions. Although liberalism has its roots 
in Europe, the idea that individuals have political autonomy and that 
government should be based on a population’s consent in order to be 
legitimate is not necessarily attractive only to Europeans. It seems to 
me that much of the critical literature is not really critical of liberalism 
per  se, but of how liberalism has purportedly been implemented by 
neoliberal peacebuilding interventions as occurred initially in Timor-
Leste. By advocating for mediation between the local and liberal, hybrid 
peacebuilding provides ways to limit the neocolonial and negative power 
dynamics that commonly arise during neoliberal peacebuilding.
In conclusion, my case study of Timor-Leste reveals that many of the 
critiques of hybrid peacebuilding have merit. This does not mean that 
we should abandon hybrid peacebuilding, which offers an important 
correction to neoliberal peacebuilding by foregrounding the importance 
of local agency. However, the assumption that populations prefer their 
local practices and institutions to those of the state may not hold in the 
long term, nor may the assumption that populations favour the fusion 
of local and state practices and institutions. Instead, my research in 
Timor-Leste suggests that liberalism may retain a place in contemporary 
peacebuilding.
103  Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’.
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Against Hybridity in the Study of 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones1
Introduction
In recent years, ‘hybridity’ has emerged as a fashionable concept, 
primarily used for describing the outcomes of the interaction between 
international interveners and target societies. Several related literatures 
have grown rapidly, focusing on hybrid peace, hybrid governance and 
hybrid political orders. Its popularisation is part of a wider ‘local turn’ 
in the study and practice of intervention, with attention shifting from 
the refinement or critique of interveners’ ideas and modalities towards 
examining how recipients’ ideas, culture, institutions and agency shape 
intervention outcomes.2 This refocusing stemmed from the evident failure 
of most peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions to attain their 
desired political and governance ends, or even pacify target societies.
1  The research leading to this chapter was generously funded by an Australian Research Council 
Discovery Project, grant DP130102273, ‘The Politics of Public Administration Reform: Capacity 
Development and Ideological Contestation in International State-building’. Shahar Hameiri would 
also like to thank the organisers of the ‘Interrogating Hybridity’ workshop, The Australian National 
University, 2–4 December 2015, for inviting him to attend, as well as the workshop’s participants for 
their comments on an earlier draft. The authors would like to thank Ryan Smith for his assistance 
in copyediting the manuscript, as well as Anna Chapman and Melissa Johnston for their research 
assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.
2  Hughes et al., ‘The Struggle versus the Song’; Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in 
Peace Building’; World Bank, World Development Report 2011.
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This research agenda is far superior to the earlier, narrow preoccupation 
with interveners’ official agendas. Doubtless, we cannot understand or 
normatively evaluate the widely divergent outcomes of international 
interventions without considering how the interveners and intervened-
upon interact. The concept of hybridity, however, is a highly problematic 
approach to this objective and, in our view, it should be replaced by 
better frameworks. Hybridity does not accurately describe the effects 
of international interventions on local politics, so it cannot explain 
their uneven outcomes or serve as a basis for normative evaluation. 
Despite incessant proclamations to the contrary by hybridity scholars, 
and several recent efforts to nuance the concept, hybridity intrinsically 
dichotomises and reifies ‘local/traditional’ and ‘international/liberal’ 
ideal-typical assemblages of institutions, actors and practices. Conflicts 
between these binary assemblages are seen to generate hybrid orders. This 
approach is descriptively inaccurate insofar as some ‘locals’ support some 
‘international’ peacebuilding and statebuilding intervention agendas, 
while others resist. Nor do ‘internationals’ always promote ‘liberal’ 
agendas while ‘locals’ favour ‘traditional’ ones. Although recognised by 
some hybridity scholars, these complex realities are impossible to address 
coherently within an inherently dichotomising framework. Moreover, 
merely locating intervention outcomes on a ‘local–international’ 
spectrum, as the hybridity scholarship tends to do, does not explain why 
particular modes of governance emerge or whose specific interests they 
serve. Hence, hybridity’s analytical purchase is very limited.
In this chapter, we first show how hybridity scholarship is unable to escape 
binaries based on dichotomised categories of the illiberal-local and liberal-
international, despite considerable efforts to do so. We then demonstrate 
why the binary view produced through the concept of hybridity distorts 
empirical analysis. We conclude by outlining an alternative framework 
that overcomes hybridity’s fatal flaws.
Hybridity: Trapped in binaries
In the peacebuilding literature, ‘hybridity’ denotes how:
local actors attempt to respond to, resist and ultimately reshape peace 
initiatives through interactions with international actors and institutions 
… hybrid forms of peace arise when the strategies, institutions and norms 
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of international, largely liberal-democratic peacebuilding interventions 
collide with the everyday practices and agencies of local actors affected 
by conflict.3
Hybridity is thus ‘a state of affairs in which liberal and illiberal norms, 
institutions, and actors coexist’.4 It emerges because of a ‘gap’,5 
or  ‘agonism’6 between the agendas of ‘liberal’ international interveners 
and those of ‘non-liberal’ target societies.
Hybridity is used both to describe intervention outcomes, and to 
prescribe the incorporation of local priorities into peacebuilding and 
statebuilding interventions to achieve success.7 Scholars often suggest that 
‘hybrid’ outcomes, being more locally legitimate, create greater stability.8 
For  some, hybridity is even potentially ‘emancipatory’, though critical 
scholars increasingly doubt that interveners can simply harness local 
agency towards predictable or desirable ends, or should seek to do so.9
Before its adoption in peacebuilding, hybridity was already widely used 
in cultural and postcolonial studies, where extensive criticism created an 
‘anti-hybridity backlash’.10 Peacebuilding scholars therefore attempted to 
avoid well-recognised pitfalls with the concept, particularly accusations 
that it depends upon, and thus reifies, prior, ‘pure’ social categories 
and identities. They thus strongly deny that hybridity essentialises or 
dichotomises the ‘international’/’local’ distinction, or romanticises ‘local’ 
institutions and norms. For example, Boege, Brown and Clements state: 
there are no clear-cut boundaries between the realm of the exogenous 
‘modern’ and the endogenous ‘customary’; instead processes of 
assimilation, articulation, transformation and/or adoption are at the 
interface of the global/exogenous and the local/indigenous.11 
3  Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 8, 33.
4  Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, 22; Boege et  al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile 
States’; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance.
5  Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, 23.
6  Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 26.
7  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 501.
8  Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, 35; Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’; 
Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention’; Kumar and De la Haye, ‘Hybrid Peacemaking’.
9  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’; Millar, 
‘Disaggregating Hybridity’; Visoka, ‘Three Levels of Hybridisation Practices’.
10  Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, So What?’.
11  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, 15.
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Hybridity scholars repeatedly disavow binaries like ‘local/international’, 
‘Western/non-Western’ or ‘modern/customary’, emphasising their 
interaction instead.12 Similarly, they claim that the ‘local’ is ‘neither 
monolithic nor necessarily incompatible with liberal norms’.13
However, as Heathershaw rightly notes, despite being ‘caveated to 
the point of defensiveness’, in practice, hybridity accounts still rely ‘on the 
bifurcation between ideal-types of local-indigenous and international-
liberal’.14 To demonstrate this we focus closely on the work of Roger Mac 
Ginty,15 who has gone furthest of all hybridity scholars in denying that 
hybridity reifies binary categories. He argues:
Hybridity is taken as the composite forms of social thinking and practice 
that emerge as the result of the interaction of different groups, practices, 
and worldviews. It is not the grafting together of two separate entities to 
create a third entity. Instead, it is assumed that norms and practices are 
the result of prior hybridisation. This helps move us away from notions 
of discrete categories that are somehow pristine and insulated from social 
negotiation and interaction over the millennia.16
For Mac Ginty, every actor—whether local actor or international 
statebuilder—is always ‘already hybridised’; ‘[f ]urther hybridisation [then] 
ensues as (the already hybrid) local and international interact, conflict 
and cooperate’.17 This conceptualisation supposedly ‘frees [analysts] from 
the static thinking of binaries’.18
In practice, however, as Heathershaw highlights, Mac Ginty actually 
reinstates other dichotomous (binary) categories when establishing his 
analytical framework.19 In the statement just quoted, outcomes result from 
how the ‘local and international’ interface—a binary. Likewise, in the 
framework that guides his case studies, Mac Ginty states that hybridised 
peacebuilding outcomes reflect tensions between two sets of forces: 
(1) the ‘compliance’ and ‘incentivising powers’ of ‘liberal peace agents’ and 
12  Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’, 12; see also Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace’, 397.
13  Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, 23; Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace 
Building’; Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 11.
14  Heathershaw, ‘Towards Better Theories of Peacebuilding’, 277; see also Hirblinger and Simons, 
‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’, 424.
15  Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance.
16  Ibid., Introduction.
17  Ibid.
18  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 223.
19  Heathershaw, ‘Towards Better Theories of Peacebuilding’.
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(2)  the ability of ‘local actors, networks and structures’ to ‘resist, ignore, 
or adapt liberal peace interventions’ and ‘present and maintain alternative 
forms of peacebuilding’.20 Thus, the outcome is a struggle between the 
‘liberal’ interveners and the ‘locals’—another dichotomy. Likewise in 
his theorisation of hybridity, Mac Ginty states: ‘hybrid spaces and forms 
develop as external and internal agents, ideas, and processes interact, and 
new meanings are attached to existing entities’—another dichotomy, this 
time between ‘external’ and ‘internal’.21 Mac Ginty immediately insists 
(again) on ‘prior hybridisation’, such that ‘internationally sponsored and 
resourced peace interventions’ cannot simply be labelled ‘“external”, 
“exogenous”, “international”, or “western”’; and yet he has clearly just used 
one of these labels himself.22 Even in his most recent work with Oliver 
Richmond, binaries abound: ‘liberal peacemaking’ versus ‘stubborn locals’, 
‘the modern and traditional’, ‘the formal and informal’, ‘the “local” and the 
“social”’ versus ‘top-down forms of power (the state or the international)’, 
‘subaltern subjects’ versus ‘external actors’ and so on.23 Thus, while Mac 
Ginty tries to evade the criticism that his concepts are dichotomised by 
invoking ‘prior hybridity’, this merely provides the cover to continue using 
those exact same dichotomous categories. He apparently recognises the 
contradiction between insisting on prior hybridisation yet continuing to 
use these dichotomous categories, but simply declines to resolve it: 
If … everything and everyone is a hybrid, then concepts such as 
endogenous and exogenous, indigenous and international risk losing their 
currency. The stance adopted in this book is to recognise the shortcomings 
of concepts and language but to move on.24
Mac Ginty further states that, notwithstanding his apparent rejection 
of dichotomies and insistence on ‘prior hybridisation’, we can still 
recognise that ‘some actors, societies, and processes are more hybridised 
than others … it is possible to identify degrees of hybridisation’.25 It is 
this emphasis on ‘degrees’ or ‘levels’ that apparently avoids dichotomous 
thinking. Yet, if we accept Mac Ginty’s caveat that everything is already 
hybridised, and there are no pure categories, how can anything ever be 
identified as ‘more’ hybridised than something else? In reality, assessing 
20  Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, Chapter 3.
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid.
23  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 222, 223, 230.
24  Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, Chapter 3.
25  Ibid.
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the ‘degree of hybridisation’ always involves identifying some point on 
a spectrum between two binaries. Thus, Mac Ginty suggests, some ‘local’ 
actors, like national governments, might become ‘more’ hybridised than 
others, as  their actions come to ‘reflect the mores of the external peace 
champions’.26 How do we know they are ‘more hybridised’ than other 
‘local’ actors? We observe how far they move away from one pole (the ‘local’) 
towards the other pole (the ‘external’). Similarly, ‘it is possible to think 
of some actors and norms as being more locally constituted than others 
(a “local local” as opposed to an “international local” that is patterned by 
global forces)’.27 How do we know whether a ‘local’ actor/norm is ‘more 
local’? Because they are closer to the ‘local’ end of the spectrum than the 
‘international/global’ end.
Mac Ginty’s problem here is intrinsic to the concept of hybridity itself. 
By definition, hybridisation is the mixing of two (or possibly more) distinct 
entities in order to produce something new. Even if those entities are 
themselves also the product of prior hybridisation, there is simply nothing 
capable of being ‘hybridised’ unless at least two distinct things previously 
exist. Notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, then, hybridity as 
a concept is inherently ‘based on the existence of two oppositional and 
apparently dialectically related forces’.28 As Visoka writes (citing Canclini, 
whose definition is frequently used by hybridity scholars):
hybridisation should be seen as a process whereby ‘discrete structures or 
practices, previously existing in separate form, are combined to generate 
new structures, objects and practices’ [emphasis added].29
Accordingly, assessing the degree of hybridity, as Mac Ginty proposes, must 
always rest upon the degree to which entity x has moved away from its 
original form by adopting some aspects of entity y. Consider Mac Ginty’s 
statement:
hybridisation helps visualise the dynamics in societies undergoing liberal 
interventionism as a series of balances (for example, a balance between 
mainly internal and mainly external thinking on how to organise the 




28  Heathershaw, ‘Towards Better Theories of Peacebuilding’, 277.
29  Visoka, ‘Three Levels of Hybridisation Practices’, 25.
30  Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, Chapter 3.
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In fact this visualisation clearly relies entirely on dichotomous categories 
(here, ‘internal’ and ‘external’) that a society is supposedly ‘balancing’ 
between. Despite Mac Ginty’s endless caveats and contortions, it is clearly 
impossible to escape the need for ‘absolutist’ and ‘binary’ categories while 
using the concept of hybridity: it is hardwired into the concept’s DNA.
Why it matters: The distortion 
of empirical analysis
The inability of even hybridity’s most sophisticated theorists to evade its 
intrinsically dichotomising approach has seriously negative consequences 
for how peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions are described and 
their outcomes explained or evaluated. Hybridity encourages analysts to 
draw binary, dichotomising contrasts between ‘local’ and ‘international’ 
actors and to explain outcomes as stemming from conflict and cooperation 
between these two forces. This considerably distorts empirical reality, 
which simply does not fit into such binary frameworks. What we instead 
observe is different forces, located across multiple territorial scales, 
promoting, contesting or rejecting different governance interventions 
depending on their interests and agendas.
The easiest way to apprehend the problems of hybridity for empirical 
analysis is to consider the problem scholars have specifying ‘the local’ half 
of their equation. Sometimes, ‘local’ means everything not-international, 
with scholars lumping entire target societies together, as in formulations 
focusing on the ‘“contact zone” … between local and external’31 or 
‘the melding of the “international” with the “local”’.32 Elsewhere, however, 
‘local’ seems to denote something more subnational, as in dichotomous 
presentations of ‘non-state indigenous societal structures and [externally] 
introduced state structures’.33 Here, ‘local’ means ‘traditional, indigenous 
and customary’,34 denoting social relations ‘at an individual or communal 
level rather than at the national level’.35
31  Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’, 11.
32  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 502.
33  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, 17.
34  Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace’, 391.
35  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 502.
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Neither definition is satisfactory. The first approach clearly cannot account 
for the presence, in every target state, of some groups that collaborate with 
international actors and support their projects. This is what leads to such 
awkward and unhelpful formulations as ‘local local’ and ‘international 
local’ that seek to recognise the existence of ‘local’ collaboration with 
intervention, yet remain straitjacketed by dichotomising categories. 
However, the second approach is no better, because it arbitrarily locates 
resistance at a subnational level, where ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ supposedly 
hold sway, while assuming that the ‘national’ level is amenable to 
intervention. Whatever definition is adopted, then, hybridity compels the 
analyst to homogenise whichever group is defined as ‘local’ (‘traditional’, 
‘customary’, etc.) and set it in opposition to that which is ‘international’ 
(‘modern’, ‘liberal’, ‘Western’, etc.) as an explanation for why a particular 
intervention encountered difficulties. This produces crude generalisations 
about how ‘local’ actors think and behave that seriously distort reality.36
Consider Millar’s treatment of Sierra Leone. Millar defines hybridity as 
‘the melding of the “international” with the “local”’.37 He recognises, 
though, that national elites play a role in interventions, and prefers the 
term ‘local’ to ‘national’ as it allegedly permits the disaggregation of 
‘local’ actors. Millar is also sensitive to Mac Ginty’s ‘prior hybridisation’, 
describing how many revered, supposedly traditional practices in Sierra 
Leone were previously externally introduced. Nonetheless, Millar explains 
difficulties encountered by Western-led efforts to demobilise child soldiers 
by invoking ‘the concept of “childhood” in Sierra Leone’, stating that 
‘local concepts’ are ‘defined quite differently from [those in] the West’.38 
In practice, then, Millar does not really disaggregate ‘the local’, but makes 
sweeping claims about how all Sierra Leoneans (and indeed all Westerners) 
view childhood. Millar admits that some militias may have used these 
notions strategically to recruit children, but does not explore this. Armed 
groups simply thrived because they met the locally defined ‘needs of 
… young people and provided them … with something they deeply 
wanted’.39 This absurd claim fails to explain why thousands of children 
had to be abducted, drugged or brutalised into joining militias. In reality, 
it was the erosion of ‘traditional’ kinship structures (and  associated 
family control over youths), induced by economic and political crises, 
36  Hirblinger and Simons, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’.
37  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 502.
38  Ibid., 507–508.
39  Ibid., 508–509.
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that paved the way for child soldiering.40 Most importantly, Millar fails 
to investigate or even identify any Sierra Leonean resistance to these 
notions about childhood, or their use by militias. As Shepley shows, while 
militias certainly exploited cultural norms to recruit children, most Sierra 
Leoneans were ‘dismayed’ by child soldiering, and many children were 
press-ganged only when their resisting parents were threatened, tortured 
or killed.41 However, in Millar’s account, the need—imposed by hybridity 
as an organising concept—to explain outcomes with reference to a local/
international dichotomy leads Sierra Leoneans to be falsely homogenised.
The reality that, in every target society, some actors will support some 
aspects of intervention while others resist is never adequately captured 
by a spatial definition of ‘the local’, whether this encompasses the entire 
society or just those residing (presumably) in rural areas. Henrizi critiques 
the first approach through a case study of Iraq.42 Contrary to hybridity 
approaches that restrict ‘local’ agency to resistance of ‘the international’, 
Henrizi shows how Iraqi women’s non-government organisations 
selectively embraced international peacebuilders’ gender programs after 
2003 to resist the restoration of highly patriarchal social relations sought 
by many Iraqi men—who have, contrariwise, resisted this intervention.43 
Similar complexity exceeds the dichotomising grasp of the hybridity 
framework in Visoka’s essay on Kosovo.44 Typically, Visoka defines 
hybridisation as interaction ‘between local and international agents’, 
reflecting the ‘disconnect between the Western liberal agenda and local 
indigenous practices, needs and interests’.45 As usual, dichotomies abound: 
local/international, Western-liberal/local-indigenous. Ironically, however, 
Kosovo’s reality simply does not fit into these binary categories. Visoka 
discovers ‘local’ people resisting both ‘local and international governance’ 
[emphasis added].46 A Kosovar social movement, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje 
(which opposed compromise with the Serbian minority), and Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) veterans demanding legal immunity and welfare 
payments, challenged both the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and 
the KLA regime. Similarly, ‘local’ people are observed engaging in tax 
dodging and informal economic activity, defying other ‘locals’ trying 
40  Zack-Williams, ‘Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone’.
41  Shepley, ‘The Social and Cultural Context of Child Soldiering in Sierra Leone’.
42  Henrizi, ‘Building Peace in Hybrid Spaces’.
43  Ibid.
44  Visoka, ‘Three Levels of Hybridisation Practices’.
45  Ibid., 24.
46  Ibid., 29.
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to make the formal economy function. Clearly, the conflicts shaping 
intervention outcomes are too complex to be reduced to the dichotomies 
imposed by hybridity. As Visoka belatedly admits, outcomes are instead 
‘shaped by multiple actors interacting at different societal levels’.47
An even clearer indication of this comes from Hirblinger and Simons’ 
study  of peacebuilding in Burundi and South Sudan.48 These authors 
rightly attack the simplistic depiction of ‘the local’ in hybridity studies, 
showing that ‘the local’ cannot be objectively identified. Rather, what 
counts as ‘the local’—what actors, practices, institutions and so on are 
considered ‘legitimate’—is a discursive construct that is contested by 
different actors.49 In Burundi, for example, Hirblinger and Simons show 
how some international statebuilders promoted the decentralisation 
of conflict resolution to ‘traditional’, ‘local’ institutions called 
‘Bashingantahe’, but this was resisted by the national government, which 
instead promoted ‘modern’, local ‘hill councils’, recruiting a rival set 
of local collaborators.50 This was because the Bashingantahe were seen 
as instruments and bulwarks of the previous regime, whereas the new 
government wished to cultivate its own local power bases. This example 
shows there is no clear or necessary divide between the local/traditional/
customary and the international/modern/liberal, however one defines 
them. Certain international actors allied with certain ‘local’, apparently 
‘traditional’, actors (the Bashingantahe, which had previously been 
co-opted into a modern system of rule), while elites at a national scale 
allied with rival ‘local’ forces, promoting an apparently more ‘modern’ and 
‘liberal’ mode of governance. The real cleavage here was not ‘local’ versus 
‘international’ but rather involved two coalitions of actors, comprising 
groups located at multiple territorial scales, struggling over which mode 
and scale of governance should prevail, and whose interests would be 
privileged thereby.
East Timor presents yet more evidence of these complex, inter-scalar 
alliances and dynamics. This again defies the territory’s dichotomised 
depiction by hybridity scholars, who widely attribute the failures of the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) to 
a ‘clash of paradigms’ between liberal-international statebuilders and the 
47  Ibid., 33.
48  Hirblinger and Simons, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’.
49  See also Randazzo, ‘The Paradoxes of the “Everyday”’.
50  Hirblinger and Simons, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’, 430–434.
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‘tribal-traditional’ Timorese, producing an ‘empty shell’ state.51 Since, 
supposedly, most villagers’ ‘only experience [is] of customary governance’, 
they rejected the nation-state imposed by internationals, producing 
a  ‘major “gap” between government decision-makers and … people in 
the villages’.52 For example, the World Bank’s Community Empowerment 
Project (CEP), implemented during UNTAET’s rule, sought to establish 
local elected councils empowered to disburse small development budgets. 
These excluded traditional village elders but guaranteed women and 
youth representation. Hybridity scholars claim CEP failed miserably 
because, being based on international-liberal principles, it ‘lack[ed] … 
local legitimacy’ and ‘could not compete with the authority exercised by 
[customary] leaders’.53 In reality, far from being uniformly rejected by 
tradition-bound ‘locals’, CEP was enthusiastically embraced by many 
women and youths as a way of wresting power and control from male 
elders.54 It was also supported by Conselho Nacional da Resistencia 
Timorense leaders, who were keen to sideline local chiefs. Yet, it was 
opposed by UNTAET and, unsurprisingly, by village elders.55 Thus, we 
see two multi-scalar alliances contesting postconflict governance in East 
Timor: one comprising some internationals, some national actors and 
some village-level actors; and another comprising some internationals and 
some village-level actors.
The reasons behind these configurations are relatively simple but are 
obscured by dichotomisation imposed by hybridity analysis. Contrary 
to claims that ‘local’ Timorese uniformly respected traditional elders 
and customary law, Cummins notes that Timorese village life had been 
radically transformed by colonialism and capitalism, such that several key 
groups—notably women, youths and national political leaders—reject 
traditional attitudes.56 However, because Cummins is hidebound by the 
hybridity framework, she is nonetheless compelled to homogenise the 
Timorese in explaining outcomes, as the above citations of her work show. 
Thus, she insists that lisan is ‘central to people’s lives’, ‘every’ Timorese 
51  Grenfell, ‘Governance, Violence and Crises in Timor-Leste’; Hohe, ‘The Clash of Paradigms’; 
Lemay-Hébert, ‘The “Empty-Shell” Approach’.
52  Cummins, Local Governance in Timor-Leste, 34, 38.
53  Ibid., 35–36. See also Ospina and Hohe, ‘Traditional Power Structures and the Community 
Empowerment Project and Local Governance Project’.
54  Ospina and Hohe, ‘Traditional Power Structures’, 16, 93, 109, 115, 117–120, 138–142, 153.
55  Totilo, ‘Development in the Shadows’, 76–83.
56  Cummins, Local Governance in Timor-Leste, 48, 57, 85–91, 110–111.
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favours its retention and ‘in general, customary authorities are well-
respected and their roles are actively relied upon’, even though her own 
findings undermine such claims.57
Such self-contradictions are not generated by misunderstanding or 
inadequate research; they are imposed by the hybridity framework, 
which drives analysts to group actors, institutions and values into two 
homogenised, opposing camps with crude, inaccurate, spatial labels. 
This framework clearly struggles to accurately describe the forces 
contesting statebuilding and peacebuilding projects so it cannot hope to 
adequately explain their outcomes, let alone guide normative evaluation 
of international interventions.
Conclusion: What is the alternative?
This chapter has shown that hybridity, despite repeated caveating and 
refinement, remains intrinsically bound by binaries, mainly between 
the illiberal-local and liberal-international, which fatally compromises 
its utility in describing and explaining the outcomes of intervention—
its purported objective. The concept, therefore, is unfit for purpose and 
must be entirely jettisoned by scholars of peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
Fortunately, a good alternative is available. Given space constraints, 
we cannot fully develop it here, but only present its broad outlines.58
A first step is to jettison ‘hybridity’ in favour of a Gramscian understanding 
of the state and other governance institutions as condensations of 
social  power relations.59 Institutions distribute power, resources and 
political opportunities. Consequently, they are endlessly contested by 
sociopolitical forces—classes and class fragments; state-based groupings; 
distributional coalitions; ethnic, religious and regional groups; forces based 
in international agencies and overseas; and so on. These groups struggle 
over power, resources and ideational goals, seeking to mould institutions to 
favour themselves and their allies. What emerges in practice is a contingent 
outcome of this struggle. Typically, leading groups must make material and 
ideological concessions to subordinate groups to stabilise their hegemony 
or domination. Accordingly, institutions reflect an uneven compromise 
57  Ibid., 44, 47, 104.
58  The approach is elaborated in Hameiri and Jones, ‘Beyond Hybridity to the Politics of Scale’.
59  Jessop, State Power; Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism.
111
6 . AGAINST HyBRIDITy IN THE STUDy OF PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING
between different forces. Thus, even when international statebuilders 
are materially preponderant, what emerges is still a result of struggle, 
accommodation and compromise.60 This is arguably what ‘hybridity’ has 
unsuccessfully sought to capture. A Gramscian approach is superior since 
it has no need to reify binary categories or insist on analysing outcomes as 
an accommodation between two poles. It admits as many different parties 
to a conflict as there exist. It does not inaccurately lump together actors 
into ‘local’ or ‘international’ or any other reductive category but insists on 
studying the real sociopolitical coalitions that coalesce around particular 
governance projects.
This approach deals with the particular, spatialised nature of struggles 
around peacebuilding and statebuilding by incorporating a ‘politics 
of scale’ approach, as urged by Hirblinger and Simons.61 This provides 
a  far more sophisticated way of grasping what is at stake in struggles 
invoking ‘the local’. In political geography, ‘scale’ denotes hierarchised 
social, political and economic territorial spaces, each denoting ‘the arena 
and moment, both discursively and materially, where sociospatial power 
relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated’.62 
Scale matters in peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions because 
interveners inevitably seek to reallocate power and resources among 
different scales, for example, embedding international disciplines into 
a centralised national state,63 or decentralising power to subnational, 
state-based or ‘traditional’ agencies.64 A ‘politics of scale’, then, refers to 
struggles to define the power exercised and resources controlled at different 
territorial tiers and by associated governance institutions. In analysing this 
contestation, crucially, political geographers do not reify or dichotomise 
scales and associated sets of actors, unlike hybridity scholars. For example, 
‘locals’ do not automatically prefer ‘local’ modes of governance, and 
indeed what counts as ‘local’ is always open to contestation. Scales are 
not fixed or pre-given but are rather ‘the product of economic, political 
and social activities and relationships; as such, they are as changeable 
as these relationships themselves’.65 Thus, we avoid dichotomies like 
‘local’ and ‘international’ altogether, foregrounding instead specific 
60  Hameiri, Regulating Statehood; Jones, ‘State Theory and Statebuilding’.
61  Hirblinger and Simons, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’.
62  Swyngedouw, ‘Neither Global nor Local’, 140.
63  Hameiri, Regulating Statehood.
64  Hirblinger and Simons, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’.
65  Smith, ‘Remaking Scale’, 228.
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sociopolitical groups whose orientation to specific intervention projects 
varies according  to their particular interests, agendas and strategies. 
Where a  given scaled mode of governance is potentially favourable to 
a particular group, the intervention will likely be supported or adapted; 
where an intervention is deleterious, it will likely be resisted. Accordingly, 
different ‘locals’, even those co-located in a given spatial setting—in the 
same village, for example—will potentially have very different attitudes to 
specific intervention projects, generating complex, multi-scalar alliances 
and contestation. These produce variegated outcomes for international 
intervention, depending on the particular project examined and the 
relative strength of the coalitions assembling in each case.
Our preferred framework may not be adopted by everyone. Yet all scholars 
of international intervention should certainly cease refining frameworks 
stemming from the flawed concept of hybridity, and instead shift their 
attention to other, more fruitful, avenues.
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This chapter builds its argument on a relational understanding of 
hybridity, focusing on hybridisation—of peace, governance, security, 
sociopolitical order—as an ongoing process of becoming through mixing, 
reconverting, leaching and blending. The concept of hybridisation tries to 
capture the fluid, dynamic, emergent and relational quality of the reality 
it is meant to grasp.1 Talking about the process of hybridisation allows us 
to shift attention from fixed entities to relations.2 Let us be reminded 
that protagonists of the hybridity approach initially introduced the term 
into the scholarly debate about peacebuilding not least with the aim of 
overcoming reductive dichotomies, to open space for reflection about 
enmeshment, permeation, interpenetration, liminality, entanglement, 
fluidity, slippage, ambiguity, in-betweenness, dynamics and relations, 
with the shift away from binaries as ‘the primary appeal of hybridity and 
hybridisation’.3
1  See Hunt, this volume.
2  This in turn allows us to respond to the critique that the hybridity approach merely perpetuates 
thinking in dichotomies and distinct entities. For the latest iteration of this critique see Hameiri and 
Jones, this volume.
3  Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’, 12.
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So, although this chapter’s title can be read as again reifying entities—
‘the  local/s’ and ‘the international/s’—the terms ‘hybridisation’ and 
‘interface’, which also figure in the title, signal a relational understanding of 
the issues at stake.4 I shall nevertheless start by indeed talking about ‘locals’ 
and ‘internationals’: in the Bougainville peace process there are actors who 
present themselves as, and are perceived as, ‘locals’ and ‘internationals’. 
These two ‘camps’ are highly diverse in themselves, of course, with all kinds 
of internal differences and frictions. But for purposes of tracing processes 
of peace formation it is worthwhile paying special attention to the local–
international interface. It is of particular significance, shaping the actual 
processes and their outcomes substantially, because the actors involved in 
peace formation position themselves as ‘local’ or ‘international’, and from 
this position define ‘the other’ and engage with this other when trying to 
‘build peace’.5 Peacebuilding therefore is itself imbued with behaviour, 
actions, norms, interests that stem from this positioning. There are of 
course other differentiations that matter for peace formation: between 
male and female, rural and urban, young and old and between classes and 
language or other social and political groups. It is no doubt important 
to take these and their specific interests and agendas into account in 
comprehensive analyses of peace formation. Nevertheless, I think a case 
can be made for a particular focus on the local–international interface as 
I’m trying to demonstrate with this short piece on Bougainville. I will 
show how in Bougainville local actors affect the implementation of the 
internationals’ predetermined peacebuilding agenda through various 
forms of agency, and how they appropriate international agendas and 
resources for their own purposes, according to their own functional logic 
and political economy.6
4  For different types of relational approaches in (the study of ) peacebuilding see Brigg, ‘Relational 
Peacebuilding’. Brigg opts for a ‘thick relationality’ approach which ‘reverses the prevailing priority 
of entity over relation in mainstream social science to focus attention on how entities continually 
arise or  emerge through relations and processes’ (61). In this chapter, I follow the more modest 
path of ‘thin relationality’, which ‘draws attention to underappreciated relations among entities’ and 
‘reaffirms the centrality of relationships of all types to peacebuilding’ (66). Hunt, this volume, also 
builds a case for an ontology of relationships.
5  Of course, actors present themselves and are seen also along other delineating categories, 
for  example, as ‘woman’ or ‘Australian’ or ‘NGO’ or ‘UN’. But the identification as ‘local’ or 
‘international’ is always present and effectual: a local woman, an international from Australia (or from 
the UN), a local (or an international) NGO.
6  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building’; Richmond, A Post-liberal Peace; 
Richmond and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace.
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Local–international relations and interactions hybridise processes of 
peace formation. This plays out in the locale, taking the form of ongoing 
processes of interchange, entanglement, permeation, reassemblage and 
reconfiguration, which involve a host of local and international actors 
and institutions.7 In this understanding, the local ‘becomes a verb as well 
as a  noun or a simple descriptor of place. It is interpreted in its own 
right, and not as a mere adjunct to the somehow more important levels 
of analysis such as the state, the region or the metropolis’.8 In other 
words, the locale (in this case Bougainville) is conceptualised not just as 
another ‘level’ or a ‘place’, but a site of societal contestation—including 
contestation about what is and who is ‘local’.
In the following, I’ll present some aspects of how this plays out in the 
Bougainville case.
Internationals and locals in Bougainville
Peace formation on Bougainville is in its 17th year, with a critical new 
phase ahead, namely preparations for and conduct of a referendum on 
independence, most probably in 2019. In general, Bougainville is seen 
as a peacebuilding success story (so far), both by external observers and 
stakeholders directly involved in the peace process. And it is generally 
acknowledged that international intervention—which compared to 
other endeavours was a ‘light intervention’—played a modest, but 
indispensable role.9
New Zealand supported the commencement of the peace process by offering 
facilitation services, providing logistical assistance, hosting the initial 
rounds of peace talks and negotiations, and creating a warm atmosphere 
for negotiators.10 With the consent of the conflict parties, neighbouring 
7  Albrecht and Wiuff Moe, ‘The Simultaneity of Authority’; Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local 
Turn in Peace Building’.
8  Mac Ginty, ‘Where Is the Local?’, 848. In this understanding, the local is not separate from 
the international, and vice versa. International actors thread themselves into the local fabric, they 
operate from their own local positions, and their actions have to be channelled through a couple of 
interlinked localities; local actors and activities make their presence felt and have an impact in the 
international realm. The locality includes local–international relations; it is not static and territorially 
bound, but a dynamic and de-territorialised network. On the spatial dimension of these processes 
of interchange see Hameiri and Jones as well as Dinnen and Allen, this volume.
9  Regan, Light Intervention.
10  Braithwaite et al., Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment, 46–49.
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states and the United Nations (UN) conducted a peacebuilding mission 
on Bougainville. The UN sent a small contingent, first known as the UN 
Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB, August 1998 to 2004) and then 
as the UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB, 2004 to June 
2005). Its symbolic value, demonstrating the international community’s 
commitment, its contribution to the weapons disposal process and its 
role as mediator in negotiations between conflict parties, were significant. 
Not least, the UN provided the external interveners with international 
legitimacy.11 A regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), which later 
became the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), arrived on the island in 
late 1997 and stayed until June 2003. It was followed by a small, entirely 
civilian Bougainville Transitional Team until December 2003.
The TMG/PMG was an unarmed force of both military and civilian 
personnel comprising men and women from Australia, New Zealand, 
Fiji and Vanuatu. New Zealand led the TMG and Australia led the 
PMG, with Australia providing the bulk of personnel and resources.12 
The TMG/PMG’s mandate was to support the peace process ‘through 
logistics, monitoring, verification, mediation and confidence building’.13
Later, after the stabilisation of the security situation on the ground, 
a considerable number of foreign development agencies, international non-
government organisations (INGOs) and UN programs and institutions 
became active on Bougainville in support of reconstruction, rehabilitation 
and peacebuilding. Australia’s development agency was and is the biggest 
of these external players. Others involved are the aid agencies of Japan, 
New Zealand and the United States, the European Union, the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as well as several UN agencies: 
UNDP, UNHCR, UN Women and UNICEF. Save the Children, World 
Vision and Oxfam are among the INGOs present. Currently it looks as 
if this international engagement will increase even further in the near 
future, with the impending referendum on independence.
11  Regan, ‘The Bougainville Intervention’, 202.
12  For a comprehensive account of the TMG and PMG see Adams, Peace on Bougainville; 
Braithwaite et al., Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment; Breen, The Good Neighbour; Regan, 
Light Intervention; Wehner and Denoon, Without a Gun.
13  Australian Civil-Military Centre, Partnering for Peace, 20.
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So here you have the camp of the ‘internationals’. It is self-evidently 
highly diverse.14 The Bougainvilleans, the ‘locals’, however, see these 
institutions and actors as outsiders, foreigners, strangers, internationals, 
expats—and these actors themselves know that they are seen that way, 
and they define themselves as such. They came in from the outside 
(or some of them actually operate from the outside) and they will leave 
and go ‘home’ (wherever that may be) sooner or later—or they have gone 
already (the PMG, the UNOMB); and others may come in, for example, 
for preparation and conduct of the independence referendum.
On the other hand, the internationals are not just ‘outsiders’, as they get 
more or less enmeshed in local networks. It is obvious that internationals 
on peacebuilding support missions can operate only by entering the 
locality; and by being present in the locale they become part of its social 
fabric. While most of the internationals stay for relatively short periods of 
time (months), some (a few) are around for longer (years), and this affects 
their status as ‘internationals’ or ‘outsiders’. They become ‘localised’ to 
a  degree, entangled in local configurations and with local actors. This 
affects their way of being and operating not only in the local context, but 
also in the context of the external entity that they come from and are part 
of, be it an international organisation, a sending state or an INGO.
Let’s turn to the locals. Like the internationals, the locals are far from being 
homogenous, neatly delineated or static: among the locals are differences 
of power, age, gender, political affiliation, social status and so on. Some 
are ‘local’ in a pan-Bougainville context (for example, as members of the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government), some are ‘local’ in a spatially 
rather narrowly circumscribed context, for example, as inhabitants of 
a village in the mountains of central Bougainville. Connections that link 
the local(s) with the world beyond the locale are plenty; quite a number 
of locals frequently move across borders, regions and roles. Nevertheless, 
a  significant marker of being ‘local’ in the Bougainville context is the 
14  Disentangling ‘the internationals’ not only means differentiating between different types of 
international actors and their different approaches to, and roles in, peacebuilding (for example, the UN 
and its various arms and agencies, regional organisations, international financial institutions, INGOs). 
Nor does it only mean differentiating between intervening countries (Australia – New Zealand), 
or between military and civilian personnel, but also between the different layers of international 
institutions, from the metropolitan ‘headquarters’ through the ‘base camp’ in the country where the 
intervention takes place to the ‘bush offices’ in the field (Schlichte and Veit, ‘Coupled Arenas’). Actors 
at these different levels engage differently with the local(s), and this impacts on, and is processed within, 
the international institutions with regard to understanding, conceptualising and implementing their 
peacebuilding mission. Available space constrains further discussion of this topic here.
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sense of belonging—to a specific place and a group of people bound by 
kinship ties, shared customs and culture, with a deep connection to ‘land’ 
(with  ‘land’ being not just a material/physical reality, but imbued with 
cultural, spiritual and metaphysical qualities) who think of themselves 
as locals and are perceived as such by outsiders. ‘Outsiders’ can mean 
‘internationals’ (from overseas), or people from other parts of Papua New 
Guinea, or people from the other side of the mountain range, depending 
on context.
Nonetheless, the locals cannot be conceptualised as merely local apart 
from the international. In Bougainville these days you can find locals who 
have worked for an INGO or for a UN agency for longer periods of time; 
they remain locals, embedded in, and loyal to, their kinship networks, 
while at the same time taking on the rationale and agenda of ‘their’ INGO 
or UN agency, becoming ‘internationalised’ and ‘liberalised’ to a certain 
extent. This affects their way of being and operating not only in their 
professional ‘international’ environment, but also in the context of the 
locale they come from.
But then you also have the ‘local locals’ as Oliver Richmond has called 
them,15 among them most notably customary leaders of communities and 
social groups, such as chiefs, elders, prophets, healers. In the dominant 
liberal peace discourse, these actors are either not seen at all because 
they do not fit into the Western liberal format of ‘state’, ‘civil society’ 
or ‘business/economy’, or they are labelled as ‘traditional’, implying they 
are ‘anachronistic’, ‘illiberal’, ‘undemocratic’ or ‘just cultural’, that is, 
unfit or irrelevant for peacebuilding. In fact, they play important roles 
in processes of peace formation and formation of political community. 
This is particularly so in Bougainville where ‘kastom’ is still strong and 
‘traditional’ leaders—chiefs, elders—are very much in charge of dispute 
resolution and governance in the context of rural communities.
The local/international interface
In contrast to many other peacebuilding interventions around the globe, 
the extent and content of the activities of the internationals who came in 
to support peacebuilding could be largely controlled by the leadership of 
the Bougainville conflict parties. They were successful in their insistence 
15  Richmond, ‘A Pedagogy of Peacebuilding’, 116.
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on  having an unarmed intervention, despite initial concerns of the 
interveners, who felt uneasy about going into a volatile postconflict 
situation unarmed. This arrangement meant that the interveners 
were dependent on the locals for their security and protection. The 
locals developed strong feelings of responsibility for the safety of their 
international ‘guests’ (and,  in fact, TMG/PMG personnel were hardly 
ever threatened and never attacked).16 This arrangement provided a rather 
robust security guarantee for the internationals. On the other hand, 
it affected the power relations between the internationals and the locals in 
the latter’s favour.17
The presence of the internationals opened a secure space for former 
enemies to come together. The internationals played an important role 
in initiating conversations between the conflict parties and keeping 
conversations going, even in critical stages of the peace process.18 Hence it 
was not only the internationals’ mandate in a narrow sense—to ‘monitor’ 
(TMG/PMG), to ‘observe’ (UNOMB)—that made their contribution to 
peacebuilding so valuable, but the reassurances for the locals that came 
with the internationals’ presence, based on a plethora of activities and 
collateral goods that reached well beyond the formal mandate.
Actually, the ‘way the intervention developed was not so much a matter 
of  careful planning, but rather a product of complex interactions of 
numerous often distinct interests among both international and local 
actors’.19 In the following I’ll try to give a glimpse of these ‘complex 
interactions’ (which were not confined to the realm of just ‘interests’).
The intervention set out with the conventional liberal peacebuilding 
agenda, but it turned out that this did not align neatly with local 
understandings and practices. This holds true not least regarding the 
conceptualisation of peace itself. One peace monitor says:
16  Regan, Light Intervention, 69. In hindsight, the Australian side concedes that ‘the arrangements 
under which local parties would provide security to unarmed monitors worked well. An unanticipated 
benefit was that it also encouraged the members of the Truce and Peace Monitoring Groups to place 
greater importance on building good relationships with local leaders and communities so as to 
prevent misunderstandings that might result in threats of violence against the operation’ (Australian 
Civil-Military Centre, Partnering for Peace, 34).
17  Regan, Light Intervention, 156.
18  Braithwaite, ‘Partial Truth and Reconciliation in the Longue Durée’.
19  Regan, Light Intervention, 162–163.
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I began to realize that my understanding of ‘peace’ was too narrow to 
encompass its much more complex meaning for many Bougainvilleans. 
We peace monitors tended to define peace in terms of the formal truce and 
cease-fire agreements … We went to villages with copies of the Burnham, 
Lincoln and Arawa agreements … We poorly grasped that peace meant 
dealing with … less tangible elements … On a more complex level, 
which I only glimpsed, Bougainvilleans seemed committed to ‘spiritual 
rehabilitation’. Calls for ‘spiritual rehabilitation’ were linked to attempts 
to articulate the kind of society that they wanted to build.20
The last sentence indicates how misleading liberal peacebuilding notions 
of ‘local culture’ as apolitical are, and it hints at the fundamental political 
significance of culture, emotion and spirituality.
The difference in understanding ‘peace’ played out in various dimensions 
of the local–international exchange, particularly in areas that are easily 
discredited as ‘soft’ and ‘non-essential’ by internationals. To mention 
just three:
First, the spiritual aspect. Another peace monitor reported: ‘I experienced 
one healing ceremony, two crusades and a number of discussions with 
women who had just talked with Jesus’.21 For internationals coming from 
a Western secular, presumably enlightened and rational, background, 
it is difficult to earnestly engage with the spiritual, to actually become 
open to emotional and spiritual sensation and intuition and appreciate 
the role of myth and ritual for peacebuilding—not to speak of magic, 
sorcery and witchcraft. On Bougainville, however, God, the spirits of the 
ancestors and the unborn, the holy bushes and trees and the totem animals 
of the clans, who are embedded in networks that transcend the culture–
nature divide and the human–non-human divide, are ‘actors’ in their own 
right, with the capacity to make a difference in the visible world (which 
for Western internationals by and large is the only ‘real’ world, while for 
locals it is intrinsically connected to the invisible world). Accordingly, 
peace cannot be conceptualised without taking this non-human, invisible 
dimension of the world into account. The Ni-Vanuatu, the Fiji i-Taukei 
and the Maori in the New Zealand contingent had far fewer problems 
engaging with the spiritual dimensions than did the white Australians and 
New Zealanders.
20  Ruiz-Avila, ‘Peace Monitoring in Wakunai’, 98–99.
21  Parry, ‘Peace Monitoring in Wakunai’, 106.
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Second, ‘gender issues’. A female monitor explains that the mission ‘risked 
missing the boat with a key peace process resource—the women. We had 
applied our European attitudes to Bougainville and had not realized the 
role that women had customarily played’.22 This observation refers to the 
fact that most Bougainville communities are matrilineal, which translates 
into a rather powerful social status for women, and that women played 
crucial roles in the transition from war to peace in the local contexts. 
Engaging with the women led to significant recalibration of exchanges 
between interveners and locals. Given that male and female spheres are to 
a large extent separate in Bougainville society, male peace monitors were 
not capable of building the relationships that their female colleagues 
were able to forge.
Third, different conceptualisations of time. On Bougainville, as in other 
international peacebuilding interventions, the external actors tried to 
impose their own (tight) time frames. But at the end of the day they 
had to adjust to ‘Melanesian time’. The Australian military commander 
of the PMG, for example, makes the point that ‘Canberra’ (that is, 
the Australian Government) presented the PMG with over-ambitious 
timetables. He  says: ‘But I learned that Melanesian clocks differ from 
other timepieces … I  quickly adapted to the Melanesian approach … 
[and] although there was significant early pressure from Canberra to speed 
up the process, I learned that it had to progress at the pace’ of the locals.23 
Nevertheless, ‘many in the Australian system did not really understand 
why the peace process moved at what, to them, seemed a frustratingly slow 
pace’.24 On the ground, the locals disapproved with the rushed approach 
initially taken by PMG patrols. As a result, ‘over time patrols spent longer 
in villages … Patrols took the time to listen to stories, appreciating the 
world of villagers and creating empathy and trust’.25
The focus on process and long time frames also shaped the ‘high-level’ 
political peacebuilding process, the negotiations conducted in its course 
and the process of disarmament and demobilisation. This is very much in 
line with local customary principles and methods of peacebuilding. At the 
same time it poses a major challenge for the international actors, whose 
mindset is determined by the notion of achieving ‘outcomes’ and getting 
22  Castell, ‘Opening Doors’, 121.
23  Osborn, ‘Role of the Military Commander’, 52–53.
24  Regan, Light Intervention, 79.
25  Breen, ‘Coordinating Monitoring and Defence Support’, 47.
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things done as quickly as possible. Overall, the locals largely succeeded in 
maintaining their pace of doing things and adjusting the international’s 
planned timetables to local needs and customs.
These examples demonstrate that everyday processes of local–international 
exchange resulted in the recalibrations of relationships and involved the 
active renegotiation of the content and strategies of the peace intervention. 
In this way, the intervention was hybridised due to the agency of the 
locals who transformed the liberal peace agenda according to their norms, 
interests and ways of doing.26 It can be argued that this was an outcome 
of the internationals’ relative weakness, and at the same time a strategy 
of the internationals to regain and reconfigure control and power in 
the international–local relationship. For example, making adjustments 
regarding ‘gender sensitivity’ can be seen as appreciation of formerly 
marginalised voices and as an expression of a more participatory and 
inclusive approach. But it also can be seen as a means to fill a gap in the 
intervention so as to reconfigure and expand the interveners’ control and 
power. When presenting the success of the PMG to the outside world, 
the male political and military leadership of the intervention managed to 
bolster its image by stressing the female component, but this was originally 
not in the plan. In fact, it was initially met with widespread ignorance 
and even some resistance in the context of the military as a dominantly 
masculine hierarchical organisation. Only in the everyday exchange with 
the locals did the gender dimension emerge as a factor of major political 
significance.
In a similar vein, the participation of personnel from Fiji and Vanuatu 
(and a strong Maori component in the New Zealand contingent) can 
be seen as an expression of the acknowledgement of the significance 
of cultural context and of cultural sensitivity, but it also can be seen as 
a clever tactical move to increase the acceptability of the TMG/PMG to 
the locals.27 In an official assessment of peacebuilding interventions from 
2012, an Australian Government document reads: ‘Australia recognizes 
that its personnel rarely match the cultural skills, understanding of 
context  and appropriateness of approach of our Pacific Island partners 
in regional settings’.28
26  The other side of this hybridisation is of course the transformation of local norms and ways of 
doing in the course of engaging with the protagonists of the liberal peace agenda. Space does not allow 
elaboration of this point.
27  Regan, ‘The Bougainville Intervention’, 193.
28  Australian Civil-Military Centre, Partnering for Peace, 43.
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Or take the aspect of religion/spirituality. Engaging with this dimension 
was not planned for either. However, sitting through five-hour-long 
church services, for example, or bringing in more padres (the so-called 
‘God  squad’),29 changed the character of the international–local 
interaction. The internationals realised how useful this was for building 
relationships with the devout locals. It was not necessarily an indication 
that locals and internationals actually had a common understanding of 
the significance of religion and spirituality.
Or, again, the time factor. The PMG commander in the quote above 
speaks about the difference between ‘Melanesian clocks’ and ‘other 
timepieces’. This way of talking implies a shared universal concept of 
time as linear and measurable. A different cultural understanding of time, 
however, can have profound impacts on peacebuilding, for example, if 
past events of linear clock time (the time of the internationals) are still 
‘present’. In Bougainville the spirits of the dead fighters of the war are 
still fighting today, because their bodies were not laid to rest according to 
the appropriate customary burial and reconciliation ceremonies. For many 
Bougainvilleans this is a major obstacle to achieving peace. There can 
only be peace once the bodies have been retrieved and buried according 
to custom. Time is not a universal given—it is something different for 
peacekeepers, villagers in the mountains of Bougainville, politicians in 
Canberra or at UN headquarters in New York. Being forced not to rush 
things and allow for more time to get things done is valuable in itself but 
might not dig deep enough.
So, even though in the course of everyday interaction with the locals 
the internationals’ peacebuilding agenda changed, one cannot escape the 
impression that the internationals’ engagement with local understandings 
of peace(building) remained within their own cultural and epistemological 
comfort zone, with ‘the other’, the local ways of being, doing and knowing 
(conflict, peace, culture etc.) merely seen to challenge and/or enrich 
liberal ways. The power of the internationals to set the paradigm within 
which peace is to be understood and seen as meaningful and legitimate 
remained unabated. On the other hand, it also has to be acknowledged 
that the local–international exchanges instigated self-reflection processes 
in the internationals’ camp and led to a renegotiation of the liberal 
peacebuilding agenda, resulting in outcomes more conducive to the 
29  Mortlock, ‘A Good Thing to Do’, 78.
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locals’ interests, needs, norms and understanding of peace. The seemingly 
all-powerful liberal peace approach was re-articulated by its ‘recipients’ on 
the ground, who turned out to be not simply grateful and abiding subjects 
of external agendas and strategies, but powerful actors in their own right, 
maintaining autonomy and agency, neither merely adopting the liberal 
peace agenda nor resisting it totally. The result is hybrid peace formation.
The too-often misused phrase ‘local ownership’ has substance in the 
Bougainville case, with local ownership taken by the locals rather than 
‘granted’ and ‘nurtured’ by the internationals.30 One aspect of the locals’ 
agency that rarely attracts attention is that they were very smart in utilising 
the capacities provided by the internationals for purposes that at first sight 
were diverting resources from the ‘real’ peacebuilding tasks. For instance, 
transport by PMG helicopter was extensively used by chiefs and others 
to get them to and from meetings; villagers made comprehensive use of 
the PMG medical facilities or used the paper of the leaflets, flyers and 
newsletters distributed by the PMG for rolling their bush tobacco. So it 
was not only the ‘core business’ prescribed by the liberal peacebuilding 
agenda (supervise the ceasefire, assist in weapons disposal, etc.) which 
made the intervention useful for the locals, but also the ‘collateral goods’ 
that its presence provided—surely a distinct form of ‘under the radar’ 
local ownership.31
Of course, there were also changes on the side of the locals. Local 
understandings of peace, governance and legitimacy change due to the 
interaction with others/outsiders who have different understandings. 
Locals not only exploit the presence of the internationals, opportunistically 
adjusting to the peacebuilding and good governance talk in an instrumental 
manner so as to gain access to resources, but they (some, not all) genuinely 
change behaviours, practices and values; locals partially and selectively 
accepted, adopted and adapted to liberal attitudes and norms—they 
were more or less ‘liberalised’. These processes also are expressions of the 
hybridisation of peace formation.
30  Krogstad, ‘Local Ownership as Dependence Management’.
31  Ibid.
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Conclusion
The Bougainville case demonstrates how in the everyday local–
international exchange peace formation emerges as hybridised, with 
outcomes that are neither liberal nor illiberal/indigenous, but hybrid 
(that  is, preserving elements of both the liberal and the local and at 
the same time transforming it into another quality). The realm of such 
hybrid peace formation is the locale/the locality, which is co-created 
and shared by a variety of interacting local and international actors and 
institutions, hybrid and emergent in itself. And in the context of the 
locale, the boundaries of ‘the international’ and ‘the local’ become porous 
and blurred or, as Laura McLeod puts it, ‘the categorization of “local” and 
“international” is one with inherent slippage, and hybridity is a concept 
capturing this very slippage while still allowing an exploration of the 
interactions between local and international actors’.32
A final word on the practical political implications of all this: the 
encounters  in  Bougainville have contributed to a debate among 
internationals at home (in this case, in Australia and New Zealand) 
about the need to rethink and recalibrate one’s own understandings 
of the international–local interface in peacebuilding.33 This has, for 
example, triggered reassessments of the relationship between customary 
and statutory law, restorative and punitive justice, or state and non-
state providers of security. Hence it can be posited that the Bougainville 
experience in the long run contributed to the ‘turn to the local’ and to the 
emergence of a discourse on ‘relational sensibility’ among international 
peacebuilders. This more recent interest in the local, hybridity and 
relationality in policy circles is evidence that there is merit in studying 
and talking about international–local relations in processes of peace 
formation also for practical political purposes. If one has the ambition 
to use one’s research to change politics for the better, in other words, 
if one wants to do policy-relevant research, one has to engage with the 
sphere of international organisations, governments, INGOs and other 
political forces which are—as ‘internationals’—pursuing what they call 
‘postconflict peacebuilding’. There can be no doubt that the findings of 
32  McLeod, ‘A Feminist Approach to Hybridity’, 51.
33  See, for example, Australian Civil-Military Centre, Partnering for Peace, as an official document 
that is touched by the spirit of relational sensibility, cultural sensitivity and acknowledgement of local 
cultural context. For a scholarly discussion of this emerging trend see Hughes et al., Forging New 
Conventional Wisdom Beyond International Policing.
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such research can be used—misused, as the researcher would say—for 
purposes that, and by actors whom, the researcher does not agree with; 
this also has happened to the hybridity approach, now that it has crossed 
into the policy world as Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty put 
it in their latest piece on this topic.34 The ‘hybrid turn’ in the world of 
actual politics is open in both directions: it can potentially lead to more 
emancipatory peacebuilding practices beyond the liberal peace approach 
(as the best case), or to a refinement of counterinsurgency strategies (as the 
worst case) as Afghanistan, for example, shows.35
Although the latter trend gives reason for serious concern, the good news 
is that hybrid political orders, hybrid security governance and hybrid 
peace cannot be instrumentally designed, crafted or constructed. Any 
endeavours of internationals will always be nothing but (more or less 
benign or malign) elements in a complex and fluid web of relationships 
and interactions in a much broader mix of processes of peace formation 
and the emergence of political community.
34  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’. We have to 
keep in mind, though, there is still a huge gap between the scholarly debate and political practice. 
Criticism of the ‘local’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘relational’ turns in peacebuilding as pursued mainly for 
instrumental or rhetorical reasons remains valid (Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in 
Peace Building’, 771). On the ‘significantly different ways that hybridity can be used’ see Brown, this 
volume.
35  Albrecht and Moe, ‘The Simultaneity of Authority’; Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy 
of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’.
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Reflections on Hybridity 
as an Analytical Lens on 
State Formation: The Case 
of Solomon Islands
Sinclair Dinnen and Matthew Allen
Introduction
In this chapter we draw on a case study of rural Solomon Islands to reflect 
critically on the value of the concept of ‘hybridity’ in understanding 
processes of social, economic and political change underway in this small 
but socially complex archipelagic Pacific island nation. In foregrounding 
these processes of change, we draw attention in particular to the inherent 
tension between contemporary understandings of statebuilding, on 
one hand, and state formation, on the other.1 The former, which tend 
to dominate policy discussions and some areas of academic debate, are 
often framed in terms of linear, technical and largely ahistorical projects, 
with a significant focus on the role of international actors. The latter 
has its antecedents in historical studies of the emergence of the post-
Westphalian state and generally views state formation as a predominantly 
organic, contingent and highly contested process. Our analysis of change 
1  Allen and Dinnen, ‘Solomon Islands in Transition?’, 393–394.
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in Solomon Islands adopts a state formation lens and in this chapter we 
specifically ask what the concept of hybridity might contribute to our 
understanding of this process.
Hybridity has been used recently in Solomon Islands with reference to the 
pluralistic social and regulatory environment that prevails at ‘local’2 levels 
in rural areas, where ‘traditional’3 and state forms of authority overlap and 
intersect. As an idea, hybridity serves to highlight the myriad interactions 
between different institutional forms and value systems that cumulatively 
shape the character of everyday regulation and ordering at these local levels, 
particularly in terms of dispute resolution and community governance.4
While this usage seeks to describe how social regulation actually works 
for predominantly rural populations living in areas of limited statehood, 
the concept of hybridity has also attracted growing attention among 
policy and development actors in recent years with a more instrumental 
interest in improving service delivery to dispersed populations in parts of 
the global South, particularly in respect of justice and security provision.5 
In this regard, the main focus has been on how to improve the linkages 
and alignment between ‘local’ community-based mechanisms and the 
encompassing administrative and regulatory systems of the modern state. 
This interest has arisen most prominently in relation to international 
engagements with so-called fragile and conflict-affected states. The latter, 
which would include Solomon Islands, are characterised by the weakness 
of their formal institutions, constrained fiscal circumstances and, often, 
the social complexity and conspicuous level of normative pluralism 
found in many postcolonial settings. In such cases, external interveners 
are urged to extend their engagement beyond state actors to include, 
for example, ‘traditional’ and religious leaders, as integral to the larger 
statebuilding project.6
2  We use inverted commas here to signal the problematic treatment of this term/category—and 
the concept of scale more broadly—in much of the hybridity literature, a critique that we develop in 
a later section of the chapter.
3  We also use inverted commas here to acknowledge the problematic usage of the notion 
‘traditional’ in much of the literature, often misleadingly implying a category that is bounded, static 
and oppositional to ‘modern’.
4  See, for example, Allen et  al., Justice Delivered Locally; Dinnen and Haley, Evaluation of the 
Community Officer Project in Solomon Islands; Evans et al., ‘The Hybrid Courts of Melanesia’.
5  See Luckham and Kirk, ‘Security in Hybrid Political Contexts’; World Bank, World Development 
Report 2011.
6  Smits and Wright, Engagement with Non-state Actors in Fragile States.
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We certainly see merit in attempts to address particular problems—such 
as high rates of family and sexual violence or chronic levels of substance 
abuse—through engagement with these ‘local’ systems of authority and 
regulation in places like Solomon Islands and have made recommendations 
to this effect in our research on justice delivery in that country’s rural 
provinces.7 At the same time, we also share many of the concerns raised 
by critics of ‘the local turn’ in peacebuilding and development,8 including 
in respect of the uncritical embrace of more instrumentalised forms of 
hybridity—what we have dubbed ‘designer hybridity’—as a novel and 
innovative approach by external interveners to institutional reform. In the 
grounded case study that follows we elaborate on some of these concerns 
and, in doing so, make a number of points that connect with the broader 
themes—history, power and scale—of the workshop which provided the 
genesis for this edited collection.9
In the first place, we note that attempts to create linkages between 
different social orders and institutional forms have a long history in 
Solomon Islands, including through the experience of the indirect 
administration introduced initially by British colonial authorities, and 
that this longer history has had a significant influence on contemporary 
efforts to promote hybridity. Second, we note that such attempts have by 
no means been confined to international or national-level actors seeking 
to instrumentalise top-down processes of domination or reform but 
are also apparent in the actions of local actors seeking to connect and 
negotiate with the latter. These local agendas for hybridity have also been 
profoundly shaped by longer histories of interaction with external actors 
and processes, as have the local social orders that are driving them.
Third, and as pointed out by many others,10 these interactions are 
invariably infused and mediated through existing power relations and 
contests, serving particular interests and neglecting or militating against 
others. Related to this, our fourth point draws attention to the scalar 
dimensions of these processes of hybridisation and the need to move 
beyond the crude scalar binaries (such as ‘local–supranational’ or ‘local–
liberal’) that have characterised much of the hybridity literature in order 
to adequately engage with the hierarchies of power that animate them. 
7  See, for example, Allen et al., Justice Delivered Locally.
8  Björkdahl and Höglund, ‘Precarious Peacebuilding’; Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’; 
Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking Of Hybridity’.
9  See the Introduction to this volume for more information.
10  For example, Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’.
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We acknowledge that some of our own work has been guilty on this 
count, although we have previously flagged scale as a problematic concept 
in the hybridity literature.11 What we are seeking to do here through 
emphasising the importance of scalar analysis is to draw attention not 
only to the subnational scales of social and political organisation that are 
frequently overlooked in the hybridity discourse, such as the scale of the 
island province in the case of Solomon Islands and other archipelagic 
territories, but also to the various ways in which power has been rescaled, 
and new scales produced, in the context of successive phases of political 
economic struggle.
The final point from our research in Solomon Islands, and one that we 
have made previously,12 questions the assumption in much of the existing 
literature that local-level actors have a natural preference for local forms of 
authority, organisation and regulation over those of state and transnational 
forms. Instead, we have found a strong desire among many of our 
Solomon Islander interlocutors for greater engagement with Weberian-like 
institutions that are perceived—whether rightly or wrongly—as being more 
emancipated from corrosive and corrupting dimensions of contemporary 
social and power relations. While neotraditional institutions such as those 
associated with chiefly authority continue to enjoy widespread legitimacy, 
the apparent demand for Weberian institutions, especially police and 
courts, is, in large part, based on a growing recognition among Solomon 
Islanders of the increasing frailty and politicisation of these ‘local’ 
institutions in the face of contemporary change.13
These five points can be distilled down to what we see as three critical 
limitations to the analytical value of hybridity as a lens with which to view 
the process of state formation; limitations, we suggest, that have resonance 
well beyond Solomon Islands. First, hybridity’s crude approach to scale 
is blind to the vertical power dynamics that are becoming increasingly 
animated by globalised processes of political and economic change. 
Second, it is not only national and supranational actors that may attempt 
to instrumentalise hybridity; a raft of subnational actors may also engage 
with such agendas both discursively and materially. Third, it is wrong to 
assume that the ‘local’ is always synonymous with the ‘non-state’ or the 
‘traditional’. In elucidating these limitations with reference to our case 
study from Solomon Islands, we also demonstrate the indispensability 
11  Dinnen and Allen, ‘State Absence and State Formation in Solomon Islands’.
12  Ibid.
13  See Wallis, this volume.
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of attention to history and power relations to any robust analysis of state 
formation. In this sense, history and power relations provide crosscutting, 
or encompassing, themes for our reflection upon the limits of hybridity 
as an analytical lens on state formation.
The first section of our chapter introduces the Solomon Islands case 
study, paying particular attention to the historical and geographical 
complexities of state formation in this archipelagic and socially diverse 
postcolonial and postconflict nation-state. We also define what we 
mean by the politics of scale and map out the (hierarchically ordered) 
scales of political and social organisation that we suggest are essential to 
any adequate and historically grounded analysis of state formation in 
the Solomons context. We  then turn to the three main arguments we 
introduced above, providing brief sections on hybridity and the politics 
of scale, ‘local’ agendas for instrumentalist hybridity, and agency and the 
growing ‘local’ demand for emancipated institutions. In our concluding 
section we suggest that the three limitations to hybridity that we 
elucidate are by no means terminal. On the contrary, we see much that is 
analytically useful in the concept of hybridity for understanding processes 
of state formation. Indeed, the data we draw upon in this brief reflection 
demonstrates the value of descriptive hybridity as a methodological tool 
in the tradition of grounded ethnographic research. By drawing attention 
to the three limitations expounded here it is our intention that future 
hybridity research and practice might explicitly engage with them, thereby 
enriching and advancing the hybridity project and its—albeit qualified—
utility as an analytical lens on state formation.
Understanding the complexities of state 
formation in Solomon Islands
These islands, lying 1,800 kilometres off Australia’s north-east coast, 
possess the extraordinary ethnolinguistic diversity that is characteristic of 
Melanesia, with 80 languages spoken by a population of around 600,000 
people. Rates of urbanisation are low, with most people living in rural 
hamlets and villages where contemporary forms of ‘community’ are based 
on complex interplays of kinship and exchange relations, ‘traditional’ 
and neo-‘traditional’ governance structures, friendships, membership 
of Christian churches and myriad claims to customary land of which 
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genealogical descent is only one. Intense social diversity, geographical 
fragmentation and a widely dispersed population have long problematised 
the extension of centralised authority.
Commencing with colonisation by Great Britain, successive forces 
both external and internal have shaped the nature of the state and its 
interactions with society. These have included projects of pacification, 
missionisation, labour commodification, direct and indirect rule, 
institutional modernisation, globalised natural resource capitalism, 
patronage, structural adjustment and, most recently, a major liberal 
peacebuilding intervention in the form of the Australian-led Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). First deployed in 
2003 and finally withdrawn in mid-2017, RAMSI came about largely 
in response to a period of violent internal conflict known locally as the 
‘ethnic tension’. The tension involved a complex interaction of historical 
factors, motivations and actors at different geographical scales and was, in 
fact, like many other recent conflicts, the manifestation of multiple local 
conflicts that mutated and escalated over time.14 However, for concerned 
Australian policymakers in the early 2000s, it was viewed primarily 
through the global lens of ‘state failure’ and the threat this ostensibly 
posed to Australian and regional security.15
While central government could be said to have effectively collapsed 
during the tension period, changing relations between the political centre 
and rural periphery since independence meant that the state was already 
widely perceived as absent from rural areas before the outbreak of the 
tension in 1998.16 However, while this narrative of state withdrawal is 
embraced by many rural Solomon Islanders it remains a contested one. 
Even if the state is interpreted primarily in terms of service delivery 
and development,17 the depiction of its uniform and linear retreat from 
rural regions demands qualification because there has, in fact, been an 
expansion of some government services, notably health and education, 
in the postcolonial period. Fourteen years of substantial investment by 
RAMSI has also seen improvements in this regard. Significantly, there 
are also compelling political economy grounds for contesting the state-
withdrawal narrative. These relate to the exponential expansion of 
14  Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”’.
15  Fry and Kabutaulaka, ‘Political Legitimacy and State-building Intervention in the Pacific’.
16  Herlihy, ‘Always We Are Last’; McDougall, ‘Sub-national Governance in Post-RAMSI Solomon 
Islands’.
17  Bierschenck and de Sardan, ‘Studying the Dynamics of African Bureaucracies’.
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discretionary constituency development funds (known as CDFs) at the 
disposal of individual national members of parliament such that these 
now dwarf national grants to provincial governments.
For some observers, the latter development is indicative of a fundamental 
reordering of power that has taken place in Solomon Islands over the 
past few decades.18 However, this reordering could also be seen as a form 
of rescaling: the consolidation of power in the hands of national-level 
political elites. This has involved the progressive evisceration of the middle 
(provincial) and local levels of government. In the case of the former, 
the division of responsibilities between provincial and national tiers has 
always been unclear, while provincial administrations have been subjected 
to perennial underfunding from the political centre.19 The system of local-
level government was effectively dismantled when the former area councils 
were officially suspended in 1998 as a consequence of both domestically 
and internationally driven structural adjustment programs against the 
larger backdrop of the Asian financial crisis.
Building upon and, in many ways, exacerbating historical patterns of 
uneven development introduced initially under colonialism, globalised 
extractive resource capitalism, in the form of the logging industry and 
a more recent intensification in mining activity, has also been a powerful 
animator of rescaling and reordering. The nexus between the notoriously 
corrupt logging sector and the larger pattern of political patronage that 
has shaped political development in the post-independence period has 
been well documented.20 As has been the case in neighbouring Papua 
New Guinea, including in its Autonomous Region of Bougainville, the 
encounter with extractive resource capitalism has produced ‘customary 
landownership’ as a new and potent scale in both horizontal and vertical 
power struggles, especially over economic benefits, at the same time that 
it has animated the island province as scale for collective political action 
in benefit-sharing struggles.21
We suggest that despite its significant engagement over 14 years, RAMSI 
left many of these political economy dynamics alone and, in doing so, may 
have inadvertently served to reinforce and accentuate them by reifying 
18  Craig and Porter, ‘Political Settlement in Solomon Islands’.
19  Cox and Morrison, ‘Solomon Islands Provincial Governance Information Paper’.
20  Bennett, Pacific Forest; Dauvergne, ‘Corporate Power in the Forests of Solomon Islands’; 
Kabutaulaka, ‘Rumble in the Jungle’.
21  Allen, ‘Melanesia’s Violent Environments’; Filer, ‘Compensation, Rent and Power in Papua New 
Guinea’.
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and reinforcing the national scale as the key locus of political power. 
In this sense RAMSI was, in effect, if not necessarily by design, aligned 
with a rescaling of power under CDFs that was already taking place 
before the intervention, a point that has been made by Hameiri.22 While 
it would be unfair to hold the regional mission responsible—its objectives 
were altogether more modest—the fact remains that this substantial 
liberal intervention did little to shift the existing political economy of 
natural resource extraction. It also left unchallenged the exclusionary and 
dysfunctional political settlement that provides the setting for continuing 
grievances, including many that contributed to the original conflict. 
In this respect, Craig and Porter have demonstrated how the clientelism 
that continues to characterise relations between Solomon Islands’ political 
and economic elites has had a profoundly corrosive impact on policy 
processes and contributes to enduring instability.23
At this juncture it is necessary to define what we mean by ‘the politics of 
scale’. Briefly, drawing upon work in political and economic geography, 
we see scale as socially produced and constantly reconfigured through 
sociopolitical struggle.24 Relationality and hierarchy are key defining 
characteristics of scale, though, importantly, these hierarchies can be 
reconfigured and scale, in this sense, is not fixed. Lastly, scalar politics 
are deployed regularly in political power struggles, both as ‘tactics’ by less 
powerful social groups and as ‘strategies’ by elites, to draw on Michel 
de Certeau’s distinction.25 In the case of Solomon Islands, we see the 
following scales as pertinent to an analysis of the politics of scale:
• Very local. The village level and, even below that, the kinship group, 
clan or tribe.
• Regional/sub-island. For example, geographically circumscribed social 
movements such as the Christian Fellow Church in parts of Western 
Province.26 This scale might be conterminous with language boundaries 
and/or national constituencies.
22  Hameiri, ‘Public Administration Reform and the Politics of Scale’.
23  Craig and Porter, ‘Political Settlement in Solomon Islands’.
24  Brenner, ‘The Limits to Scale?’; Smith, Uneven Development, 160–178; Swyngedouw, ‘Neither 
Global nor Local’.
25  See Kent, this volume. For de Certeau, ‘strategies’—typically employed by elites—usually involve 
official plans and defined frameworks for achieving desired goals, while ‘tactics’ are the more flexible 
approaches tailored to immediate contexts likely to be used by less powerful groups. De Certeau, 
The Practice of Everyday Life.
26  Hviding, ‘Re-placing the State in the Western Solomon Islands’.
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• Provincial/island. Most provinces (subnational jurisdictions) in 
Solomon Islands are geographically conterminous with a large island 
and the island province, due to its unique territorial qualities, is an 
especially potent, though problematic, scale for collective political 
action through the mobilisation of island-wide identities.
• National. The scale at which political power is being increasingly 
concentrated through the growth of CDFs and various forms of rent 
seeking.
• Supranational. This scale is critically important in the case of Solomon 
Islands because of the recent RAMSI intervention, the economic 
dominance of globalised extractive resource capitalism, and the legacies 
of earlier (colonial period) forms of intervention and statebuilding.
Hybridity and the politics of scale
Building upon an earlier article,27 we contrast our analysis of state 
formation against existing scholarship on Solomon Islands that has tended 
to privilege the ascription of agency at one particular scale: either the 
very local or sub-island (taking the form of detailed ethnographic analyses 
of particular communities or social movements);28 the national (such as 
the political settlement interpretations with a focus on national elites);29 
or the supranational (in the form of analysis that sees supranational actors 
as the primary driver of change in Solomon Islands).30 Without detracting 
from the insights provided by these studies, our objective here is to bring 
an explicitly multi-scalar sensibility to bear on both processes of state 
formation and the analytical utility of hybridity for understanding them. 
This requires the facility to navigate between scales.
As mentioned in the introduction, much of the hybrid peace literature 
operates within a crude spatial ontology in which the ‘local’ appears as 
an extremely fuzzy and imprecise category that is primarily constructed 
in opposition to the supranational and/or the liberal. This clumsy scalar 
binary leads to much definitional slippage: in some instances the ‘local’ 
appears to refer to what we have identified above as the very local scale; in 
others it seems to refer to the national scale; and in yet others, it is taken 
27  Dinnen and Allen, ‘State Absence and State Formation in Solomon Islands’.
28  For example, Timmer, ‘Kastom and Theocracy’.
29  For example, Craig and Porter, ‘Political Settlement in Solomon Islands’.
30  For example, Hameiri, ‘State Building or Crisis Management?’.
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to mean everything that is not supranational and/or liberal. Moreover, 
hybridity’s scalar binary is also blind to the inherent dynamism of the 
politics of scale: it is unable to account for the reconfiguration of existing 
scales, and the production of new ones, that has occurred during different 
historical phases of political and economic struggle. Another aspect of 
the politics of this construction is how ‘the local’ is often represented in 
a manner that renders it as remote, marginal or ‘marked by absence’.31 
This construction can, in turn, have consequences in terms of the ways 
in which policymakers approach particular locations.
We have already noted that CDFs can be usefully interpreted as a rescaling 
of power and that the advent of extractive resource industries has 
produced customary landownership as a new scale of political economic 
contestation at the same time that it has animated benefit-sharing 
tensions between the national and provincial scales. We are reminded 
that Solomon Islands has a long history of these sorts of scalar dynamics. 
The introduction of capitalist social relations under colonialism, especially 
in the form of international and domestic plantation labour trades, and 
subsequent patterns of uneven capitalist penetration (in conjunction with 
colonial cartographies that territorialised large islands into subnational 
jurisdictions for the administrative convenience of colonial authorities) 
has produced and reproduced the island province as a potent scale in 
political economic power struggles.
These politics of scale have found expression in longstanding tensions 
and debates about political devolution and decentralisation, and were 
an important factor in the origins of the ‘ethnic tension’.32 Set against 
the long haul of state formation, the tensions between national and 
subnational scales remain an important area of continuity as witnessed by 
an enduring agenda for constitutional change and the proposed adoption 
of a federal system of government that would see not only devolution 
of functions and powers subnationally, but also the formalisation of 
the many and varied subnational projects of instrumentalist hybridity 
that will be discussed below. The draft constitution contains significant 
scope for local accommodation, inflection and agency—provinces and 
‘community governments’ will have considerable scope to do their own 
31  See, for example, Gupta and Ferguson, Culture, Power, Place. We are grateful to a reviewer of our 
draft chapter for pointing this out and introducing us to the relevant literature.
32  The issue of centre–periphery relations (that is, between Honiara and the rest of the country) has 
been a critical fault line in Solomon Islands politics since decolonisation. See, for example, Larmour 
and Qalo, Decentralisation in the South Pacific.
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thing.33 Hybridity, in this sense, remains a useful lens for looking at these 
national/subnational tensions but only after its unsophisticated and 
defective approach to critical spatial/scalar dimensions has been remedied. 
Put bluntly, hybridity’s crude scalar binary runs the risk of glossing over, 
or simply failing to see, critically important political contestation and 
dynamism between the national and multiple subnational scales that we 
have identified. Nor is hybridity alert to the production of new, previously 
unimaginable, scales of political economic struggle.
‘Local’ agendas for instrumentalist hybridity
This brings us to our second critique of the hybridity literature as it 
has been applied to the theory and practice of peace building and 
statebuilding. That is, the assumption that instrumentalist agendas 
for hybridity are the exclusive domain of actors at the supranational or 
national scales. The growing critique of instrumentalised or ‘designer’ 
hybridity in the critical peacebuilding literature is largely directed at 
the international actors involved in these interventions and questions the 
practicality, efficacy and ethics of such endeavours, including the high 
risks of unintended consequences.34 While the recent RAMSI mission 
was almost exclusively focused on building/rebuilding the central agencies 
of state (and rightly criticised for this narrow focus), our work in rural 
Solomon Islands indicates there are extensive efforts being directed 
towards forms of instrumentalised hybridity at the very local, sub-island 
and provincial scales—particularly in areas of dispute resolution, policing 
and governance. What this research clearly demonstrates is that it is not 
only supranational actors that have been actively pursuing instrumentalist 
hybridity agendas.
A number of points have emerged in our analysis of these subnationally 
driven agendas for hybrid institutions. The first is the sheer range of 
subnational actors who are engaged in instrumentalised hybridity and 
the diverse forms that these innovative activities assume.35 They include 
extensive experimentation in informal governance arrangements at 
the very local level including a proliferation of village ‘committees’, 
33  ‘Constitution of the Federated Democratic Republic of Solomon Islands’, 2nd draft, 6 May 2014.
34  See, for example, Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking 
of Hybridity’.
35  Allen et al., Justice Delivered Locally, 69–78.
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‘councils’ and ‘associations’. ‘Traditional’, predominantly male, leaders 
or ‘chiefs’ continue to have a prominent role in these local structures, 
but there is also evidence of participation by representatives of other 
groups, including women, youth and churches. Another manifestation 
lies in the proclamation of elaborate, often written, community ‘rules’, 
‘laws’, ‘by-laws’, ‘ordinances’ and, in some cases, constitutions. Some of 
this activity may involve mimicry of state forms aimed at enhancing the 
visibility and legibility of local structures to actors at other scales such 
as governments and donors,36 with the hope of initiating productive 
relations with them. There is also a strong element of self-help and local 
problem solving that is largely substitutive in the absence of tangible 
and effective linkages to more encompassing administrative and service 
delivery systems.
Experimentation is also evident at the provincial scale, with a number of 
provinces actively exploring ways of improving downward linkages with 
structures at the most local levels. These have been influenced by the wider 
and longstanding debates about constitutional reform and federalism, as 
well as by pressure from rural communities for improved service delivery 
and local development opportunities. The hybrid character of these 
provincial initiatives is evident in deliberate attempts to integrate state, 
church and ‘traditional’ forms of authority into provincial or island-wide 
governance models, as with Isabel’s well-known ‘tripod’ system.37 These 
locally and provincially driven efforts to reconfigure what are already 
hybridised governance arrangements also serve to blur the distinction 
between ‘descriptive’ and ‘instrumentalised’ hybridity that recurs in the 
broader literature.38
Following on from above is our observation that these contemporary 
examples of experimentation with hybrid governance at local and 
provincial levels have themselves been profoundly shaped by a much 
longer colonial and postcolonial history of hybridisation across different 
institutional forms, value systems and types of social ordering.39 
The  clearest historical example of instrumentalised hybridity was the 
introduction of ‘indirect rule’ by the British colonial authorities, working 
through ‘chiefs’, ‘headmen’ and various local intermediaries, as well as 
36  McDougall, ‘Customary Authority and State Withdrawal in Solomon Islands’.
37  Baines, ‘Beneath the State’.
38  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
39  McDougall, ‘Customary Authority and State Withdrawal in Solomon Islands’.
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through the establishment of ‘native courts’ to administer ‘customary law’. 
Syncretism between ‘introduced’ Christianity and local normative systems 
is evident in the long history of missionisation. Christianity, kastom and 
state forms have also been interwoven in the social movements that 
have appeared throughout Solomon Islands modern history, often as 
explicit alternatives to the social and political ordering of the colonial 
and postcolonial state. These movements, including Maasina Rule in 
Malaita,40 the Moro Movement in Guadalcanal41 and, more recently, 
the Christian Fellowship in parts of Western Province,42 represented an 
early form of re-territorialisation and deployed kastom as an ideology of 
resistance. The  Western ‘breakaway’ movement during decolonisation 
and, as noted in our rural research, the current phenomena of ‘colonial 
nostalgia’ and ‘state withdrawal’ similarly serve to highlight the historical 
and hybrid aspects of political contestation within and between different 
scalar levels.43
The critical question, as we see it, is not so much about the 
instrumentalisation of hybridity per se, as it is about the actors and 
interests promoting these agendas and, specifically, who stands to 
benefit—and who stands to lose—from their advocacy and realisation. 
In short, analytical focus should be upon the power relations that animate 
the pursuit and shape the outcomes of these instrumentalised approaches 
to hybridity and the manner in which they play out at different scales. 
In the case of Solomon Islands, this remains an important priority for 
continuing and future research.
Agency and the growing ‘local’ demand 
for emancipated institutions
In our earlier article44 we were critical of some aspects of the ‘local 
turn’ literature, notably for the assumption that the local level would 
automatically  privilege ‘local’ over ‘national’ or ‘supranational’ 
forms (an  assumption that has, in turn, generated a critique of ‘the 
40  Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom.
41  Davenport and Çoker, ‘The Moro Movement of Guadalcanal’.
42  Hviding, ‘Re-placing the State in the Western Solomon Islands’.
43  Allen et al., Justice Delivered Locally.
44  Dinnen and Allen, ‘State Absence and State Formation in Solomon Islands’.
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romanticisation of the local’).45 The more complex picture that emerged 
from the research we reported in that paper was the desire at all subnational 
scales for statebuilding with a strong local inflection and degree of local 
autonomy, on one hand, and a strong desire for aspects of Weberian or 
liberal statehood, particularly in relation to the management of newer 
forms of conflict stresses, on the other. Rather than being mutually 
exclusive, these simultaneous demands for local autonomy and an explicit 
acknowledgement of a particular role for certain institutions of liberal 
statehood indicated a strong desire for more effective articulation between 
local and state regulatory systems that would enhance the effectiveness 
of both, as well as the alignment between them.
The views expressed by rural villagers recognised the increasing frailties of 
local institutions and structures in the face of contemporary globalisation 
and, in particular, the socially disintegrative and frequently violent effects 
of resource extraction. The attraction of certain aspects of Weberian or 
liberal statehood at local levels was expressed in the preference for RAMSI 
(that is, international) police over the Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force, in the desire for local non-state actors to be backed by the ‘shadow 
of the law’, as well as in the mimicry of state forms intended to attract 
external recognition and engagement, and in the widespread nostalgia 
for an older system of indirect rule that was believed to have effectively 
connected the legitimacy of local leaders with the functional authority of 
the state. As in other cases of ‘colonial nostalgia’, the underlying sentiment 
rests more on discontent with the ethnographic present than with any 
real desire to return to the colonial past.46 While the historical veracity 
on which this nostalgia is based is certainly open to question, it reflects 
a contemporary situation where local elites or ‘chiefs’, as well as many 
police units operating in rural areas, are all too often deeply compromised 
in the current political economy through their entanglements with 
logging and other commercial extractive operations. This situation again 
highlights the significance of the underlying power relations informing 
the configuration and outcomes of hybrid forms of regulation in practice.
Another dimension of the frequently encountered nostalgia for the colonial 
system of indirect rule is the perception that colonial institutions, such 
as that of the district officer, were impartial and effectively impervious 
to potentially corrupting social relations, especially those that drove, 
45  Richmond, ‘De-romanticising the Local, De-mystifying the International’.
46  Bissell, ‘Engaging Colonial Nostalgia’.
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and continue to drive, loyalty to one’s own kinship or language group 
(commonly expressed in contemporary parlance as wantokism). Our 
research demonstrates that RAMSI police are seen in a similar light: they 
are perceived as being immune from the social and political economic 
relations that can imperil the partiality of local police.47 In this manner, 
we once again see the importance of history in informing and framing 
contemporary discourses around regulation and institutional development 
more broadly. Moreover, despite the growing recognition among rural 
Solomon Islanders of the frailties of their local institutions, such as those 
associated with ‘chiefs’, these institutions continue to enjoy a significant 
degree of legitimacy as reflected in widespread calls to empower ‘chiefs’ 
and link them into formal governance and law and order structures.
Conclusion
This brief reflection on the analytical utility of the concept of hybridity as 
a lens on state formation has drawn upon a case study of Solomon Islands 
to highlight three deficiencies with the concept: its clumsy and problematic 
treatment of scale, its tendency to see projects of instrumental hybridity 
as the exclusive purview of national and supranational actors, and its 
assumption that ‘local’ actors will automatically privilege the ‘traditional’ 
over the ‘liberal’. In concluding, we suggest that if these deficiencies 
are explicitly recognised and addressed, hybridity remains a useful lens, 
among others, to bring to bear upon processes of state formation. This 
point is perhaps best illustrated with reference to the politics of scale. 
Other contributors to this volume have suggested that hybridity be 
dispensed with entirely in favour of a scalar understanding of institutional 
change in the context of political and economic contestation.48 However, 
our view is that this would simply substitute one form of methodological 
and theoretical, and perhaps ontological, privileging with another.
We are very sympathetic to the proposition that new scales are produced, 
and existing scales reconfigured, in the course of political economic 
struggle. Indeed we have argued that the politics of scale is a salient lacuna in 
the literature on hybridity and statebuilding and peacebuilding. However, 
we  have also demonstrated in the case of Solomon Islands that these 
47  Dinnen and Allen, ‘Paradoxes of Postcolonial Police-Building’.
48  See Hameiri and Jones, this volume.
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scalar dynamics have critical social and cultural inflections. This applies, 
for example, to the emergence of customary landownership as a scale in 
the contentious politics of extractive resource industries, to the types of 
institutions that have emerged at the scale of the island province, and 
even to the rescaling of power that has occurred with the advent and rapid 
growth of CDFs. In this sense neither scale nor hybridity are, on their 
own, sufficient to achieve interpretive and analytical rigour. In concert, 
however, these lenses may start to provide a more robust perspective on 
state formation, even more so when the other limitations to hybridity that 
we have highlighted—especially its problematic treatment of agency—
are explicitly addressed. And, of course, with agency comes questions 
of structure, contingency, history and power relations. In the final analysis, 
then, all of these things matter if we are to develop solid understandings 
of processes of state formation in highly complex postcolonial and 
postconflict settings. Hybridity, in this sense, is not a panacea.
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Engaging with ‘The Everyday’: 
Towards a More Dynamic 




Just as critical peacebuilding scholars are increasingly engaging with the 
concept of hybridity, so too are scholars working in the closely related 
field of transitional justice,1 which is concerned with the mechanisms 
and practices used by states, communities and individuals to address the 
legacies of violent conflict. A clear manifestation of this is the growing 
number of studies that consider the potential of local or customary 
dispute resolution practices to help deliver justice to victims and promote 
reconciliation. In Timor-Leste, for instance, the local dispute resolution 
practice known as nahe biti (literally, ‘stretching the mat’) has received 
a great deal of scholarly attention, particularly since aspects of this practice 
were incorporated into the nationwide community reconciliation process 
that was implemented by the Commission for Reception, Truth  and 
1  Transitional justice is a rapidly expanding field of scholarship and practice. It is concerned with 
a broad range of measures such as criminal trials, truth commissions, reparations policies, institutional 
reform, lustration (the vetting of public officials), memorialisation and reforms to police, prisons and 
the judiciary.
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Reconciliation.2 There has been similar interest in the Sierra Leone 
Truth Commission, which was authorised to involve traditional and 
religious leaders in its hearings, and Rwanda’s gacaca courts, which saw 
the transformation of local dispute resolution practices into a nationwide 
system for resolving cases of serious crimes.3
While I recognise the value of these analyses, the starting point of this 
chapter is that more attention is needed to the ways in which individuals 
and communities deal with the legacies of conflict outside formal 
institutional contexts and dispute resolution forums. I draw here on my 
observations of Timor-Leste, where the legacies of the 24-year Indonesian 
occupation continue to reverberate and where people often appear to be 
negotiating them through subtle actions, practices and tactics that do not 
involve direct forms of confrontation between perpetrators and victims.4 
In this chapter, I aim to draw out some of these practices and tactics that, 
I suggest, are critical to the ongoing process of reconstructing social life 
in the wake of the occupation, and which might be understood as part of 
a process of ongoing, ‘everyday’ reconciliation. I use the term ‘everyday 
reconciliation’ to describe the ways in which individuals, families and 
communities are seeking to resume patterns of communication, exchange 
and sociality, resist threats to their existence and wellbeing, and exert 
a  degree of control over their lives. Building on my observations of 
the Timor-Leste context, I explore the potential of the concept of the 
everyday—and everyday reconciliation—to widen the scope of what 
tends to be encompassed in analyses of hybrid transitional justice.
In essence, what I am proposing here is the need for a richer, more 
dynamic, conception of hybrid transitional justice that goes beyond 
a focus on institutions, structures and dispute resolution ‘events’ and 
pays more attention to the ongoing process of rebuilding everyday life, 
and renegotiating relationships, in the wake of conflict. Central to this 
2  For example, see Braithwaite et al., ‘Transitional Justice and Reconciliation’; Kent, ‘Community 
Views of Justice and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste’; Larke, ‘“… And the Truth Shall Set You Free”’; 
Zifcak, ‘Restorative Justice in Timor-Leste’.
3  Waldorf, ‘Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity’, 3–4. This interest dovetails with developments in 
the policy sphere. For example, two key United Nations reports acknowledged the significance of 
indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice. These were the 2004 report of then UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, titled The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
conflict Societies, and the 2011 report of the same name by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon.
4  This process included a truth commission—the Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation—and a ‘hybrid’ or internationalised tribunal known as the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes that prosecuted cases of ‘serious crimes’.
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conception is the recognition (that has long been a feature of feminist 
thinking and the work of anthropologists) that individuals are not 
isolated, independent, entities but are ‘socially constituted bodies, 
attached to others’.5 The dynamic conception of hybrid transitional 
justice that I propose is informed, then, by a relational understanding of 
selves as integrally connected to others. This understanding is particularly 
salient in the context of kinship-based societies, where maintaining good 
relations with one’s kin is not only important to one’s social standing, but 
is also essential to viable social life, security and economic survival.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. Part one provides a brief discussion 
of the concept of the everyday as it is being used within the peacebuilding 
literature before considering why, despite some take-up, it remains relatively 
neglected within the transitional justice scholarship. Part two draws out 
several practices and tactics of everyday reconciliation in Timor-Leste and 
explores their significance with reference to Audra Mitchell’s concepts of 
‘worldbuilding’ and ‘threatworks’.6 The third part offers some thoughts on 
how greater attention to the everyday could enrich scholarship on hybrid 
transitional justice. What I aim to emphasise here is not that the current 
interest in local dispute resolution practices should be abandoned, but 
that, by situating these practices in the realm of the everyday, it is possible 
to imagine transitional justice as a far richer—more dynamic, ongoing 
and relational—process. What should also become clear is that, while my 
understandings of the everyday are informed by the insights of critical 
peacebuilding scholars, many of whom highlight the everyday as a site of 
resistance, I argue that more attention is needed to the everyday as a site 
where those with limited power ‘make do’ with the resources, tactics and 
possibilities at hand.
Peacebuilding, transitional justice 
and the everyday
The term ‘everyday’ evokes the quotidian, the routine, the familiar, a sense 
of ordinariness, repetition and stability.7 Yet, for conflict-affected societies, 
these aspects of everyday life cannot necessarily be taken for granted. 
5  Butler, Precarious Life, 20. See also Robbins, ‘Recognition, Reciprocity, and Justice’.
6  Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control’, 1623.
7  Alcala and Baines ‘Editorial Note’, 387.
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Rather than being a space of security and comfort, the everyday might 
appear as ‘bristling with dangers’.8 These realities call for an understanding 
of the everyday as dynamic rather than stable, as a ‘lively space in which 
emotions, interactions, tensions, power struggles, tactics of domination 
and resistance and small and big ceremonial routine events occur’.9 They 
also suggest the need for a recognition of the significant effort or labour 
that is required by those living in conflict-affected societies to achieve 
some measure of stability and routine in everyday life.10
In recent years, critical peacebuilding scholars have begun to engage 
with the everyday in this dynamic sense of the word, as part of a broader 
critique of, and response to, the limitations of liberal peacebuilding.11 
Particularly illuminating are the insights of Audra Mitchell, who describes 
the everyday as the ‘set of experiences, practices and interpretations 
through which people engage with the daily challenges of occupying, 
preserving, altering and sustaining the plural worlds that they occupy’.12 
Such practices, which Mitchell describes as ‘worldbuilding’,13 tend to 
be oriented towards the meeting of daily challenges, such as interacting 
with or caring for family members, friends and community, working, 
and exchanging goods.14 They may include the celebration of traditional 
holidays or the resumption of patterns of communication and exchange.15 
They also comprise ‘threatworks’, a set of ‘practices, institutions and 
customs’ that are used by a range of different actors to ‘exchange, 
acknowledge, evade, manoeuvre, contest and otherwise resist’ perceived 
threats to their existence.16 Examples of threatworks include the erection 
of barriers or walls or the ostracism or segregation of particular members 
of the community.17 As Mitchell notes, threatworks are perceived by the 
actors involved as integral to maintaining their quality of life and some 
8  Das, ‘What Does Ordinary Ethics Look Like?’.
9  Alcala and Baines, ‘Editorial Note’, 387.
10  See Ross, Raw Life, New Hope, 70. See also Das, Life and Words.
11  See, for example, Mac Ginty ‘Everyday Peace: Bottom-Up and Local Agency in Conflict-Affected 
Societies’; Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control’, 1623; Richmond, ‘A Post-liberal Peace’, 557; Richmond and 
Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 1.
12  Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control’, 1624.
13  Mitchell uses the term ‘world’ not to refer to the ‘terrestrial earth but rather to refer to the unique 
spaces in which human groups create and sustain their collective lives, interacting with their material 
environment’. Ibid, 1624.
14  Mitchell ‘Quality/Control’, 1625.
15  Ibid.
16  Ibid., 1641.
17  Ibid.
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form of control over it.18 Threatworks also have an important relationship 
to violence, in many cases playing a role in preventing and controlling 
cycles of violence.19
The work of Michel de Certeau exerts a prominent influence in this 
scholarship, in particular, his 1984 book, The Practice of Everyday Life.20 
Here, de Certeau highlights the ways in which seemingly ordinary 
practices such as walking and dwelling can be central to the ways that 
individuals navigate societal control of their actions. De Certeau describes 
these practices as ‘tactics’ through which individuals attempt to carve 
out spaces for themselves while taking into account the institutions of 
power.21 This term is an attempt to capture the way in which, despite 
official plans, goals and visions, individuals can create alternative visions, 
contest these plans or negotiate around them, by using the subtle, flexible 
and resourceful tactics at their disposal.22 Central to de Certeau’s work is 
the distinction between ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’. While strategies imply 
‘concerted action, enabled by rules, order and control over production, 
towards desired goals’, tactics ‘have a quality of flexibility to the immediate 
contexts’.23 Tactics tend to be subtle and small, and are often shifting 
and transient as they must ‘seize on the wing the possibilities that offer 
themselves at any given moment’.24 What this distinction makes clear, 
then, is that strategies are the domain of the powerful, while tactics are 
the art of the less powerful.25
Building on de Certeau’s insights, much of the scholarship on everyday 
peace is interested in the everyday as a site of resistance to liberal 
interventions and/or as an alternative site of knowledge for peacebuilding.26 
Understood in this way, the everyday, like the closely related concept of 
hybridity, provides an important corrective to the ‘technocratic turn’ that 
characterises the study and practice of peacebuilding, by bringing to the 
fore the role of local knowledge and agency in grounding the legitimacy of 
18  Ibid.
19  Ibid., 1642.
20  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life.
21  Ibid, xi.
22  Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 16.
23  Ross, Raw Life, New Hope, 124.
24  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 37. See also Vinthagen and Johansson, ‘“Everyday 
Resistance”’, 17.
25  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 37.
26  See Richmond, ‘A Post-liberal Peace’, 571.
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the peace.27 This scholarship is also increasingly attuned to what Mitchell 
refers to as ‘deep ambiguity of everyday life’.28 What she means by this is 
that there is a growing recognition that the everyday is not only a ‘space of 
resistance, agency, transcendence and the enhancement of life’ but is also 
vulnerable to control, domination and manipulation by powerful external 
actors, both domestic and international.29
Another increasingly recognised set of ambiguities relates to the 
acknowledgement of the everyday both as a source of agency, meaning, 
security and belonging and as a site where inequalities and hierarchies can 
be reinforced, and where violence can be ‘embraced and reproduced’.30 
This recognition is informed by a growing awareness of the diffuse, 
dispersed, complex and plural ways in which power operates and the extent 
to which any society is infused by multiple systems of hierarchy.31 This, in 
turn, is fostering greater awareness of the ways in which ‘individuals can 
be simultaneously positioned as powerful and powerless’ in the context 
of different relational configurations.32
As the fields of critical peacebuilding and transitional justice increasingly 
intersect, it is not surprising that transitional justice scholars are also 
engaging with the concept of the everyday. Among the first to use the 
concept were South African scholars, who deployed the everyday as 
a  critical tool to explore the ways in which discourses and practices of 
justice and reconciliation had silenced and de-historicised structural 
violence.33 Many were inspired by the work of Njabulo Nbebele, whose 
1984 series of essays, The Rediscovery of the Ordinary, called on South 
African writers to reorient their focus away from the ‘spectacular’ and 
monstrous aspects of life under apartheid to the ‘ordinary’.34 Heeding 
this call, these scholars began to illustrate the ways in which everyday life 
in South Africa remains marked by the racism, poverty and inequalities 
of the apartheid era, despite the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s 
efforts to mark a definitive break between the past and the present.
27  Mac Ginty, ‘Everyday Peace’, 551.
28  Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control’, 1630.
29  Ibid., 1630, 1632.
30  Alcala and Baines, ‘Editorial Note’, 388.
31  Vinthagen and Johansson, ‘“Everyday Resistance”’, 14, 26, 31.
32  Ibid., 31.
33  See Gready, The Era of Transitional Justice; Grunebaum, Memorializing the Past; Ross, Bearing 
Witness.
34  Nbebele, ‘The Rediscovery of the Ordinary’.
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Beyond the South African context, an increasing number of transitional 
justice scholars are calling for more attention to everyday reconciliation or 
social repair. Among them are Alcala and Baines, who describe everyday 
social repair as:
the myriad ways in which people pursue mundane activities and practices 
to restore the basic fabrics of meaningful social relations, negotiate or 
recreate protective mechanisms and provide some sense of continuity 
in their lives and sense of self in relation to others.35
In contrast to the conventional way in which the concept of reconciliation 
is treated in the transitional justice scholarship—to refer to ‘resolution, 
remission or relief ’36—scholars interested in everyday reconciliation 
recognise the open-ended, partial and situated nature of this ongoing 
process.37 To put this slightly differently, reconciliation is viewed in 
agonistic terms; it is seen as a ‘difficult, restless and unceasing negotiation’38 
rather than as a ‘linear movement towards a harmonious end’.39 This 
open-ended conception allows for a consideration of the everyday ways 
in which adversaries interact without necessarily being motivated by 
a commitment to forgiveness. It also enables attention to the structural 
inequalities and constraints that impede the ability of those living in so-
called ‘postconflict’ societies to draw a bright line between the past and 
the present. Collectively, this scholarship helps to capture the dynamic 
dimensions of reconciliation, and its precarious, nonlinear nature.
Despite this burgeoning interest, the everyday remains a relatively 
neglected concept in the transitional justice scholarship, even among 
those scholars interested in hybridity. One of the reasons for this is that 
transitional justice scholars and practitioners (like their peacebuilding 
counterparts) remain preoccupied with prescriptive as opposed to 
descriptive approaches to hybridity.40 There is, for instance, a tendency 
for scholars to be concerned with how local practices and rituals with 
sociocultural significance might be incorporated into—and enhance the 
legitimacy of—national-level transitional justice processes.41 While such 
35  Alcala and Baines, ‘Editorial Note’, 386.
36  Williams, ‘Reproducing Everyday Peace in North India’, 233; see also Ring, Zenana.
37  Eastmond, ‘Introduction: Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Everyday Life’, 3.
38  Norval, ‘Memory, Identity and the (Im)possibility of Reconciliation’, 251.
39  Eastmond, ‘Introduction’, 5–10.
40  The terms ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ hybridity were coined by Gearoid Millar. See Millar, 
‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
41  Baines, ‘Spirits and Social Reconstruction after Mass Violence’, 416–417.
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efforts are valid, and important, what they tend to miss is close attention 
to the ways in which local practices and strategies unfold in their own 
right,42 may vary markedly across different social and geographic settings 
and continuously evolve in response to changing contexts, circumstances 
and dynamics.
Perhaps the key reason for the neglect of the everyday is that the transitional 
justice field remains dominated by legal and political science scholars who 
are focused on institutions and are interested in normative questions. 
This leads to a gravitation towards local practices that are recognisably 
‘law like’, such as customary dispute resolution practices,43 that appear 
to be oriented towards the ‘resolution’ of conflict. What tends to be left 
out of the analysis is the range of seemingly mundane ongoing everyday 
practices, negotiations and activities that may seem, at first blush, to have 
little to do with dispute resolution.
Contributing to this bias is the fact that customary dispute resolution 
practices are far easier for scholars to ‘see’ than everyday reconciliation 
tactics, which are by their nature fluid, shifting and subtle, and as 
such inherently difficult to study. As Mac Ginty notes, sophisticated 
methodological tools are required to capture something that ‘passes by, 
passes through’.44 What is more, accessing the domain of the everyday 
can be difficult, and requires long-term engagement with research sites 
and language competence. It can also be ethically fraught, particularly 
if researchers seek to expose precarious coping strategies to public 
view. All  of  this serves to highlight the myriad practical, ethical and 
methodological challenges to studying the everyday.
Everyday reconciliation in Timor-Leste
The dynamic, social and relational dimensions of everyday reconciliation 
are starkly apparent in Timor-Leste. While it is now 15 years since the 
nation gained its formal independence and 10  years since the formal 
transitional justice mechanisms established by the United Nations (UN) 
reached the end of their formal mandates, the effects of the Indonesian 
42  Ibid.
43  Waldorf, ‘Local Transitional Justice’, 158.
44  Mac Ginty, ‘Everyday Peace: Bottom-Up and Local Agency’, 550, quoting Seigworth and 
Gardiner, ‘Rethinking Everyday Life’, 140.
153
9 . ENGAGING WITH ‘THE EVERyDAy’
occupation continue to reverberate in everyday life for many East 
Timorese. An obvious barrier to ‘closure’ is the continuing impunity of 
senior members of the Indonesian military; despite some prosecutions 
of East Timorese perpetrators, those living in Indonesia were out of the 
jurisdiction of the UN-sponsored Special Panels for Serious Crimes and 
remain out of reach of Timor-Leste’s fledgling domestic legal system. 
Compounding these difficulties is the fact that the transitional justice 
mechanisms had short-term mandates, a limited temporal focus (the post-
referendum 1999 violence), and were oriented towards a particular set 
of identities and relationships (that is, the relationship between ‘victims’ 
and ‘perpetrators’). This has restricted their ability to address many of 
the complicated and enduring legacies of distrust and betrayal that have 
seeped into local communities and families.
These legacies of distrust are a reflection, in part, of the multiple roles 
many East Timorese played within the coercive context of the 24-year 
Indonesian occupation, which included, at different times, forms of both 
resistance and collaboration. It is well known that during the occupation the 
heavily militarised Indonesian state co-opted individuals into its security 
and administrative apparatus at all levels and developed an intricate systems 
of spies and informers, fostering fear and suspicion.45 In this coercive 
and corrosive context, neighbours and family members often denounced 
others as belonging to the resistance in part to protect themselves from 
being similarly denounced or as part of a dynamic of revenge/settling 
scores in relation to much older conflicts. Others infiltrated the military in 
order to assist the resistance.46 Many ‘played both sides’, at times working 
for the resistance and at other times collaborating with the regime, in an 
effort to ‘enhance their own power’ or in a desperate attempt to protect 
themselves and their relatives from harm.47 Elizabeth Drexler refers to 
these complex legacies as ‘fatal knowledges’, ‘the particular knowledge 
that people have of past betrayal and complicity’.48 Fatal knowledges, she 
suggests, ‘are not inert facts but rather dynamic performances of knowing 
or not knowing’.49 They might be seen as embodied knowledge of the past 
45  See Robinson, ‘If You Leave Us Here We Will Die’; see also Larke ‘“… And the Truth Shall Set 
You Free”’.
46  Drexler, ‘Fatal Knowledges’, 76.
47  Ibid., 75.
48  Ibid., 92.
49  Ibid., 92.
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that can, at any time, be re-animated in the present.50 In this sense, they 
continue to pose powerful obstacles to peoples’ efforts to rebuild ordinary 
lives and re-establish relationships.
Against this backdrop, people do the best they can to engage in forms 
of everyday reconciliation that might help to improve their lives, their 
economic circumstances and their relationships with their extended 
families and communities. These practices, negotiations, rituals and 
acts of everyday reconciliation resonate with Mitchell’s concepts of 
‘worldbuilding’ and ‘threatworks’ in that they are indicative of the ways 
in which individuals, families and communities are seeking to resume 
patterns of communication, exchange and sociality, as well as resist threats 
to their existence and exert a degree of control over their lives.
One example of an everyday reconciliation tactic can be seen in the ways 
in which those living in both rural and urban communities have been 
slowly reintegrating those who had fled, or were forced, across the border 
to Indonesian West Timor after the 1999 referendum. Around 200,000 
East Timorese people are thought to have been displaced from Timor-
Leste at that time, many at the behest of pro-Indonesian East Timorese 
militia groups. These groups, which had been armed and trained by the 
Indonesian military, wreaked a trail of destruction after the referendum, 
looting and burning houses, and killing more than 1,000 people.
During the period of UN administration of the territory, a formal 
repatriation program was initiated by the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in East Timor, in coordination with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for 
Migration, and refugee returns peaked just prior to Timor-Leste gaining 
formal independence in May 2002.51 Since then, a ‘small but steady 
stream’ of East Timorese continue to informally and voluntarily return 
to their home.52 Due to a complex mix of factors, including the state’s 
need to focus on building diplomatic relations with Indonesia, and the 
fact that these East Timorese are no longer classified as refugees but are 
recognised as new citizens of Indonesia, those seeking to return receive 
50  See Das, ‘What Does Ordinary Ethics Look Like?’, 2.
51  Myat Thu, ‘Displacement and Informal Repatriation in a Rural Timorese Village’, 255.
52  Ibid.
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little or no assistance from the state.53 As a consequence, many return 
illegally, offering bribes to border patrol officers or taking risky paths 
along jalan tikus (goat tracks) to avoid the attention of the authorities.54
Given their extended absence from their communities, perceptions of 
their dubious pro-Indonesian associations, and the significant financial, 
social and political implications55 that are entailed in uprooting lives once 
again, it is common for potential returnees to make multiple visits to their 
communities over a period of years before definitively returning. During 
these visits, people participate in family rituals such as weddings and 
funerals, and investigate the status of their land and their prospects for 
economic survival. Their embodied presence in their communities seems 
to act as a form of communication in itself—a sign that they have not cut 
links with their homeland—and as a ‘testing of the waters’ as to whether 
their return would be welcomed.
In the small number of communities I have visited where returnees have 
recently arrived, a number of informal practices are occurring, which 
are suggestive of the ways in which dispersed families are seeking to 
re-establish ties. For instance, the participation of families in everyday 
activities such as church services, and the resumption of farming, appears 
to be a sign that they are welcomed, or at least tolerated. Other signs 
of welcome include the donation by village chiefs of rice and other 
provisions to returnees, and assistance by members of extended families 
in the rebuilding of the returnees’ houses or uma luliks (sacred houses). 
Ritualised practices, involving the slaughter of animals and family feasts, 
are also taking place at uma luliks and at returnees’ homes. These practices 
indicate the significance, for returnees, of remaking ties not only with living 
kin but with the ancestors, and the land with which they are integrally 
connected. Collectively, these practices demonstrate how returnees and 
their extended families seek to re-establish webs of connection and repair 
frayed kinship networks.
53  According to the International Crisis Group, those who chose not to participate in formal 
repatriation programs by 2002 were registered as Indonesian citizens. International Crisis Group, 
Timor-Leste: Reconciliation and Return from Indonesia, 3.
54  Myat Thu, ‘Displacement and Informal Repatriation’, 256.
55  For instance, returnees must relinquish their Indonesian citizenship upon returning to Timor-
Leste.
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Closely related to practices of reintegration are practices of social exclusion 
and shunning. It is interesting to observe that, just as some families are 
returning from West Timor, many others are not. While it is difficult to 
obtain firm figures, some suggest that the population of East Timorese in 
West Timor currently sits at around 100,000 people.56 Damaledo refers 
to members of this group as those who are ‘guilty by association’ because, 
while the majority were not members of pro-Indonesian militia groups, 
the Indonesian police force or the military, they comprise family members 
and relatives of militias and the Indonesian security forces, and thus are 
vulnerable to incrimination.57
Some East Timorese who do seek to return are not welcomed. A prominent 
example is the case of Martinus Bere, a former member of a Suai-based 
militia group who was indicted by UN serious crimes investigators 
for his  role in the Suai Church Massacre in 1999 and charged with 
crimes against humanity. Bere, who had been living beyond the court’s 
jurisdiction in West Timor since 1999, sought, in 2009, to return to his 
community to attend a family funeral. Some reports suggested that, after 
being recognised by members of his local community, he was detained 
and beaten before being handed over to the East Timorese police. Other, 
less prominent, examples of eviction have also occurred. For instance, 
a group of people who sought to return to their village in Same in 2014 
was reportedly driven out of their community because of their connections 
to local militia groups.
These forms of ‘rough justice’ and social exclusion—which resonate 
with Mitchell’s concept of threatworks—mesh uneasily with Timor-
Leste’s national legal framework.58 Yet, in a context in which political 
decision-makers do not always adhere to the formal law,59 communities 
create their own forms of regulation that help to police the boundaries 
of community and keep perceived threats at bay. These everyday rules 
remain largely unspoken and are shifting and fluid. They are also imbued 
with the asymmetrical, hierarchical and gendered power relationships 
56  International Crisis Group, Timor-Leste: Reconciliation and Return from Indonesia, 3.
57  Damaledo, ‘From Refugee to Citizen’, 24.
58  According to this framework, those who are the subject of an indictment order by UN serious 
crimes processes for their role in 1999-related serious crimes should be prosecuted by the Timorese 
courts.
59  In relation to Martinus Bere, for instance, soon after Bere’s transfer to Becora prison to await 
trial, he was released back into Indonesian territory, following the intervention of the prime minister 
and president. This occurred on 30  August, the day of the tenth anniversary of the referendum. 
See CIGI, Security Sector Reform Monitor: Timor-Leste.
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of life in a kinship-based society. For instance, practices of eviction or 
inclusion appear to be based on a complex blend of factors that includes, 
among other things, local knowledge of a person’s past ‘mistakes’ (in the 
form of violent crime or community betrayal), their perceived resistance 
credentials, and their relationships to others in the community, including 
their status. Those who are members of powerful families seem to have 
more community protection than those with less power, while those who 
are perceived to have played important roles in the resistance movement 
also appear to have significant social capital (even in cases where they have 
committed crimes).60
Another way in which people are negotiating the legacies of the conflict 
is through the subtle avoidance of, or silence about, certain conflict-
related topics. Two topics remain particularly sensitive and difficult 
to speak of in public life. One is the issue of East Timorese ‘collaboration’ 
with the Indonesian regime. The second is the issue of sexual violence 
against women. The experiences of women who, during the Indonesian 
occupation, were coerced into long-term sexual relationships with 
members of the Indonesian military raise the spectre of both kinds of 
‘unspeakability’. Not only were these women subjected to sexual violence 
but they are also perceived as collaborators due to becoming ‘military 
wives’. These women’s experiences also bring to the fore complex kinds 
of ‘fatal knowledges’; specifically, they highlight the extent to which 
local leaders and women’s own families were at times complicit in their 
‘marriages’, sacrificing them in exchange for the security of the village 
or family. For all of these reasons, public discussion of their experiences 
remains taboo and some of these women have not spoken about this 
aspect of their pasts even to their own families and children.61
Viewing these women’s silences through the lens of the everyday allows 
for a consideration of their multiple meanings. It also enables attention 
to the ways in which, at different times and in the context of different 
relational configurations, women might elevate one tactic over another. 
60  To give two brief examples, I was informed by an observer of the same case that those who had 
sought to return were not members of a powerful liurai (royal) family and, as a consequence, had little 
community protection or support. By contrast, a community in Los Palos had seemingly reintegrated 
a militia member who, after having served a small portion of his 33-year jail sentence for crimes against 
humanity, had been pardoned. Part of the reason for the community’s acceptance of this person seems 
to relate to high status and his resistance credentials; specifically, he had been involved in the FALINTIL 
resistance (before switching sides) and was also a member of a powerful liurai family.
61  See Kent, ‘Narratives of Suffering and Endurance’.
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For instance, on one reading, it is possible to understand the women’s 
silence as a consequence of ongoing structural violence and discrimination, 
which makes it difficult for them to speak for fear of shame, humiliation 
and ostracism. In this sense, it is a reflection of the women’s limited social 
capital in a context where their survival is fundamentally dependent on the 
maintenance of reciprocal family and kinship relationships. On another 
reading, the women might be understood to be exercising a constrained 
form of agency. Their silence in certain social contexts enables them to 
fulfil their maternal obligations by building better lives for their children. 
It also helps them to protect their own reputations (and the reputations 
of other women), carve out a degree of social acceptability, and maintain 
essential social and political relationships with their extended kin. In this 
sense, it might be understood, at least in part, as a silence of ‘civility’ 
and a silence of ‘pragmatism’.62 It is a form of everyday reconciliation 
that is partly informed by a shared recognition that speaking about the 
past might be counterproductive and possibly dangerous to themselves 
and others.
Towards a more dynamic conception 
of hybrid transitional justice
As the examples drawn from Timor-Leste suggest, attending to practices 
of everyday reconciliation might help to enrich scholarship on hybrid 
transitional justice in a number of ways. In the broadest sense, the value 
of the concept of the everyday—like the concept of hybridity—lies in 
its ability to bring about a reorientation of our analytical lens away from 
elite, institutions and one-size-fits-all formulas towards the ways in which 
communities are experimenting with ways of living together. While not 
suggesting that there is no place for prescriptive hybridity, a focus on the 
everyday helps to reveal that formal, institutional initiatives—with their 
limited time frames, mandates and geopolitical constraints upon their 
work—will go only so far towards responding to peoples’ everyday needs 
and concerns. The contours of these concerns often revolve around the 
complex dynamics of building and sustaining relationships, ensuring 
economic survival, caring for family, maintaining some form of control 
over the quality of life and warding off perceived threats.
62  Kent, ‘Sounds of Silence’.
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The lens of the everyday also allows for a shift away from the binary 
categories that infuse transitional justice discourse and practice, including 
the categories of victim and perpetrator. By attending to everyday 
negotiations and interactions, it becomes clear that these static identities 
break down and a more complex and fluid set of identities and social 
relationships emerges. I would go so far as to argue that engaging with 
these complexities is essential given the nature of modern conflict. It is 
no longer possible, in many conflicts, to disentangle the ‘home front’ 
from the ‘war front’. Additionally, the impact of conflict is increasingly 
seen in the form of a low-level, ongoing, chronic form of violence.63 
Because of this, many people are implicated in what Primo Levi has aptly 
termed a ‘gray zone’ of mutual betrayal and complicity.64 All of this means 
that a focus on the rigid dichotomies of civilians/combatants, victims/
perpetrators—and indeed conflict/peace—is increasingly untenable, and 
makes it imperative to consider how complex forms of ‘fatal knowledge’ 
complicate efforts to rebuild.
Attending to the everyday also highlights that efforts at reconciliation are 
ongoing. What emerges from the Timor-Leste context at least is that there 
is no straightforward rupture between the conflict and the postconflict 
period. For many East Timorese, the reality of postconflict life is marked 
as much by continuity as change, particularly when it comes to questions 
of structural violence, economic opportunities and ‘fatal knowledges’ of 
community betrayal. While tentative forms of closure and resolution may 
be possible, it seems that people remain engaged in a dialogue with the 
past rather than making a complete break with it. Through the lens of 
the everyday it is possible to move beyond a focus on resolution and to 
contextualise one-off ‘events’ (such as dispute resolution practices) within 
a broader context. This is a context in which people deploy a range of 
fluid, shifting practices and tactics in both formalised and less-formalised 
settings and within different kinds of relationships, and where an ultimate 
form of ‘resolution’ may not be imaginable.
There is of course a danger that the concept of the everyday, like 
the concept  of hybridity, sets up its own set of binaries. For instance, 
the everyday is often associated with ‘local’ actors who operate in a different 
63  See Turcot DiFruscia, ‘Listening to Voices’, 137–138.
64  Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois describe Levi’s ‘gray zone’ as ‘a morally ambiguous space of 
mutual betrayal and complicity with the enemy’. See Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, ‘Introduction’, 
10, discussing Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved.
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sphere from the national/international actors. Mitchell reminds us, 
however, that the everyday is not a ‘level of human organization’ but rather 
‘dimension of human experience’.65 In other words, a range of actors—
both ‘local’ and ‘international’—engage in practices of worldbuilding. 
The spheres of the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ are, moreover, overlapping 
and co-constitutive. In relation to the Timor-Leste context, for instance, 
the everyday reconciliation tactics of ordinary Timorese are necessarily 
entangled with, and constrained by, broader structural and geopolitical 
dynamics. Local tactics of silence and inclusion/exclusion need to be 
understood as a response, in part, to the impoverished possibilities of the 
globalised transitional justice template and the power dynamics that often 
infuse its practices. They speak, in part, to the unwillingness of powerful 
states to pursue the prosecution of senior members of the Indonesian 
military and the efforts of the Timorese Government, in this context, 
to pursue a strong relationship with its former occupier and powerful 
neighbour.66
Moreover, as the examples drawn from Timor-Leste bear out, the everyday 
is marked by deep ambiguities. It should not be romanticised or viewed 
as a repository of shared values. While the everyday provides a source of 
meaning, security and belonging for many people, it is also a site where 
violence is enacted, and inequalities and hierarchies reinforced. This 
violence is not only imposed by powerful outside forces, but is reproduced 
within communities, whose members are inevitably configured in 
asymmetrical relations of power with one another. All of this means 
that, just as questions are asked about the normative assumptions of, and 
power dynamics underpinning, liberal transitional justice discourse, they 
also need to be asked about the everyday. For instance, whose version of 
everyday reconciliation is being imagined? Whose interests does it serve? 
What practices of power does it disguise?67
Finally and relatedly, while there is an emphasis in the peacebuilding 
literature on the everyday as a site of creativity, resistance and potentially, 
of emancipation, the everyday emerging from the brief examples drawn 
65  Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control’, 1625.
66  They also underscore the limitations of a focus on ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’. Not only has 
this focus been unable to attend to complex legacies of betrayal and distrust, but it has neglected 
the broader injustices of occupation and exploitation that continue to have ramifications in peoples’ 
everyday lives.
67  Williams, ‘Reproducing Everyday Peace in North India’, 245, puts forward these questions 
in regard to everyday peace.
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from Timor-Leste speaks more to the ways in which those with limited 
power ‘make do’ with the resources, tactics and possibilities at hand. 
De Certeau’s distinction between ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ is salient here, 
as it is a reminder of the degree to which impoverished communities 
have limited scope to engage in long-term planning for their lives and, 
because of this, tend to ‘navigate the everyday tactically rather than 
strategically’.68 This is not to suggest that agency and creativity is absent, 
but to recognise that the tactics, actions and practices in which people 
engage are often immediately responsive to the context at hand. They 
have a fluid, shifting quality, may not be planned or organised, and 
cannot necessarily be predicted in advance. All of this seems to call for 
peacebuilding and transitional justice scholars to develop more nuanced 
and complex conceptions of human agency that go beyond a focus on 
creativity and resistance.69
Conclusion
Studying the everyday raises thorny methodological, ethical and practical 
challenges. Without wishing to minimise these, what I hope to have 
established here is simply that more attention is needed to the range of 
successful and less successful ways in which people seek to rebuild their 
everyday lives in the aftermath of protracted conflict. Insufficient attention 
is currently given to these complexities within analyses of hybridity in 
the transitional justice literature. What I find useful about the concept 
of the everyday is that it provides a critical tool with which to examine 
the unique, diverse and unexpected nature of everyday tactics while also 
making visible the broader geopolitical context, the power dynamics at 
different scales and the patterns of inequality that inevitably shape and 
constrain those tactics. Perhaps more so than the concept of hybridity, 
the everyday also helps make a shift beyond formal, institutional spheres 
towards a focus on the ways in which ordinary citizens in conflict-affected 
societies navigate and negotiate the realities of life.70 In essence, what I am 
arguing is for transitional justice scholars to embrace a rich, fluid and 
relational conception of hybridity, one in which the everyday occupies 
a central place.
68  Ross, Raw Life, New Hope, 124.
69  I borrow this idea from Veena Das. See Turcot DiFruscia, ‘Listening to Voices’, 138.





and Embodied Accountability 




Students of anthropologies of Africa would have frequently heard the 
everyday expression, ‘one leg does not dance alone’. Many Africans often 
like to reiterate the collective nature of their endeavours, even if this is not 
always the case, so that, to return to the proverb, the origin and durability, 
type and size, and gender and colour of the second leg does not matter, 
so long as the dance can be performed. The late Terence Ranger designated 
this sense of practical reasoning to face diverse life events as ‘creative and 
resilient pluralism’, which is embedded in histories of contradiction and 
contestation through appropriation and innovation. He suggested that 
such practical sense ‘helps to explain the remarkable adaptability of 
African societies and individuals during changes of colonial capitalism’.1 
The implications of this adaptive capacity should also include how 
Africans shaped the actions of colonial officials and their policies, to the 
extent that the exiguous state bureaucracy that the European colonisers 
1  Ranger, ‘The Local and Global in Southern African Religious History’, 73.
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attempted to implement sometimes emerged out of ‘ongoing negotiations 
and compromises with Africans and among themselves’.2 The processes 
of negotiation, notwithstanding colonial violence, led colonial officials to 
subtly consume powers generated in the marginal worlds of the colonies 
so that they sometimes acted by violently persecuting and punishing 
alleged witches, which colonial laws had denied ontological reality.3 
In other contexts, the colonised were instructed to codify their ‘customs’, 
yet unlike the colonisers who regarded custom as ‘ahistorical, static 
and to some degree unchangeable’, the Malaitans (Solomon Islands), 
for instance, regarded their own created kastom as ‘dynamic, flexible, 
and rapidly changing’.4
If I take these ethnohistorical analyses seriously, there are no strong 
reasons to dwell on hybridity given that the contacts among the colonised 
and between the colonised and colonial state agents and missionaries was 
never preceded by a state of being ‘pure’.5 Instead, my focus is on what 
I term post-hybridity bargaining whereby in Mozambique war survivors, 
community leaders and spiritual agents sometimes negotiate with 
state authorities the terms of their relations. Occasionally they ignore, 
gamble with or manipulate one another and state authorities for securing 
personal and culturally meaningful forms of accountability. In turn, state 
authorities also shift between taking diverse community agents seriously 
to ignoring, manipulating or exerting violence upon them as part of 
their attempts to shun accountability. The bricolage arrangements that 
shape these relations are not permanent, neither can they be predicted. 
Therefore, the focus should be on the politics of rebuilding social life in 
communities in conflict by analysing the shifting qualities of alliances 
made by diverse individuals and institutional and non-institutional 
groups, contingent modes of struggle and various meanings of violence. 
This type of comprehensive analysis unseats the current focus of hybridity 
which hastily assumes a permanent state of co-existing and overlapping 
political orders, predictable in their modus operandi.
My analysis is based on nearly two decades of intermittent research 
conducted in diverse locations in Mozambique, a country that was 
involved in a protracted civil war from 1976 to 1992. State authorities 
2  Spear, ‘Neo-traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’, 26.
3  Fields, Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa; Luongo, Witchcraft and Colonial Rule; 
Mesaki, ‘Witchcraft and the Law’.
4  Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom, 6–7.
5  Stockhammer, ‘Questioning Hybridity’.
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have over time denied justice for serious offences perpetrated during 
the war. However, my systematic focus is on the centre of the country, 
which since 2013 has been exposed to a new military conflict between 
the Frelimo Government and the armed wing of the Renamo party. For 
almost two decades, I conducted research in Gorongosa, a rural district 
with a predominantly agriculture-based economy.6 The majority of 
people speak ‘Chi-Gorongose’, and a minority also speak Portuguese. 
The region features political, legal and religious pluralism through the 
evolving presence of various local cultural groups, Christian and Muslim 
denominations, formal civil society organisations and state institutions.
The politics of hybridity in marginal worlds
Contemporary political analysts and policymakers have long attempted 
to explain the configurations of modern state institutions and political 
and economic orders in numerous non-Western societies around the 
world. Given enduring political instability, weak implementation of 
state institutions in national territories, and state incapacity to generate 
meaningful order, halt the impacts of cyclical famine and better control 
the spread of preventable diseases and violence, some analysts have 
labelled these states as fragile or failed states.7 These labels have generated 
further responses among academics that have either reinforced them 
by exploring the array of causes that sustain state fragility or contested 
them by advancing alternative explanations to the seeming state failure. 
Of  interest in this analysis is the notion of hybridity, which has taken 
the form of hybrid political orders,8 and hybrid state perspectives and the 
paradigm of the transplanted state.9
Proponents of the ‘hybrid political orders’ concept developed it to 
counter top-down approaches to statebuilding.10 At the centre of these 
approaches are beliefs that statebuilding around the world should be 
modelled along the  discipline of the modern Western state and that 
prevailing fragile and failed states in marginal worlds constitute obstacles 
for peace and development. Alternatively, bottom-up approaches are 
6  Igreja et al., ‘Agricultural Cycle and the Prevalence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’.
7  François and Sud, ‘Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States’.
8  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’; Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and 
Political Community’.
9  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.
10  Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community’.
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highlighted in order to account for local resources, agents and dynamics 
involved in the production of hybrid political orders.11 It is suggested that 
in hybrid political orders, ‘diverse and competing claims to power and 
logics of order coexist, overlap and intertwine, namely the logic of the 
“formal” state, of traditional “informal” societal order and of globalization 
and associated social fragmentation (which is present in ethnic, tribal, 
religious forms)’.12 This basic application of the notion of hybridity is 
useful in its attempts to tame the universal modelling and appetites of 
the proponents of the Weberian state. The problems with, and limits of, 
hybridity are highlighted by those scholars who have taken a genealogical 
approach to this concept as well as an ethnohistorical analysis of the 
encounters of Western European colonial officials and missionaries with 
social institutions and actors in non-Western worlds. Additionally, the 
limits are exposed when the concept is used to advance explanations of 
all peacebuilding and accountability processes around the world. In such 
attempts, the unpredictability, contradictions and limits of state and non-
state actors and approaches and the struggle that traverses the rusting 
and essentialisation of boundaries tend to be overlooked for the sake of 
identifying two seemingly clear-cut camps—namely, state institutions and 
non-state actors—which coalesce to produce a putative state of hybridity.
The late Patrick Chabal and his collaborator Jean-Pascal Daloz 
acknowledged that Africa experienced major sociopolitical transformations 
during the colonial expansion, as well as continuities in political practice 
from the pre- to the postcolonial period.13 Yet they argued that the 
European state apparatus that was transplanted to colonial Africa was 
different from that existing in the metropolis and it had distinct purposes. 
The historical analysis of colonial investment in most of the colonial 
worlds did not go ‘beyond what was required to maintain order and 
a steady supply of plantation laborers and to collect taxes’.14 For example, 
the institutionalisation of property rights was absent from the colonial 
projects of statebuilding in much of Africa and Asia.15 Thus the notion 
of hybridity, which suggests an encounter between ‘genuinely different 
societal sources that follow different logics’16 and some subsequent 
11  Ibid.; Brown et al., ‘Challenging Statebuilding as Peacebuilding’.
12  Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community’, 606.
13  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.
14  Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom, 5; Chabal and Daloz, 
Africa Works, 12.
15  Doyle, ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, 465.
16  Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community’, 606.
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transformation evolving out of this encounter and post-encounter 
dynamics makes little sense. The ideal type of the bureaucratic state 
‘essentially remained a myth of the colonial mission’17 and can hardly 
account for some kind of meaningful hybrid outcome.
Thus, ‘the paradigm of the hybrid state cannot be taken at face value since 
the very colonial state which was re-appropriated and re-shaped after 
independence hardly qualified as a modern Western institution in the first 
place. The colonial state was but superficially akin to its Western model.’18 
Colonial officials manipulated local values and organisation logics for 
maximising the exploitation of the colonies; in their turn, local elites also 
employed the diffuse colonial ideas of institutionalisation to protect their 
sources of power and advance their interests.19 Furthermore, while there 
has been a major tendency to neglect accounting for the role of women 
in these colonial and postcolonial political struggles, recent historical 
reanalysis based on archive materials,20 and feminist analysis,21 has 
contributed to shifting the current imbalances in women’s contribution 
to world history and politics of making and breaking boundaries.22
Post-hybridity bargaining
The notion that ‘a person is never complete’ is a popular saying in 
Gorongosa as in many parts of Africa. The implications of this recognition 
is that many people in Gorongosa and around Africa keep inventing new 
techniques and medicines not to create a sense of completeness. Instead, 
these new but ephemeral creations are instrumental to reveal the various 
sources of incompleteness, and women often figure prominently in 
these revelations.23 Unfortunately, these cultural realities and historical 
developments have not figured in the analysis of the advocators of 
hybridity. Yet it is indisputable that the notion of hybridity has gained 
popular currency. It has allowed an easy and rapid circulation of 
17  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 12.
18  Ibid., 13.
19  Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom; Fields, Revival and 
Rebellion; Luongo, Witchcraft and Colonial Rule; Mesaki, ‘Witchcraft and the Law in Tanzania’; Pels, 
A Politics of Presence.
20  Thornton, ‘Legitimacy and Political Power’; Vilhena, Gungunhana.
21  Nye, Feminism and Modern Philosophy.
22  Argenti-Pillen, Masking Terror; Igreja and Dias-Lambranca, ‘The Thursdays as They Live’.
23  Igreja, ‘Negotiating Order in Postwar Mozambique’.
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knowledge of statecraft in certain sectors of higher academia as well as 
among policymakers of foreign affairs in industrialised nations interested, 
perhaps, in finding ‘scientific’ labels and justifications for taxpayers’ 
money invested in those seemingly hybrid politics in marginal worlds. 
In this regard, I do not intend to further ruminate about the missed 
opportunities among scholars of hybridity. Instead, I suggest a move 
towards post-hybridity bargaining to acknowledge the flash popularity of 
the hybridity turn, but above all to properly account for the multifaceted 
outlook of power struggles that have unfolded in the production of 
embodied accountability for serious offences committed during the civil 
war in Mozambique.
Plunging in post-hybridity ventures is necessary because none of the 
various participants that I have analysed make enduring claims of 
representing distinct and permanent values that clash, conquer and 
subdue others’ values.24 Instead, the reality of the various participants and 
structures evolves in a context of floating boundaries, which has been 
variously acknowledged through the proverbs ‘a person is never complete’, 
‘one leg does not dance alone’ and by a state police officer, who once told 
me during a conversation about witchcraft: ‘As a police officer I do not 
believe [in witchcraft], but as a human being I believe’.25 The notion that 
in one regime (witchcraft) a person (police) can be immune to submission 
and exert domination over others as well as be consumed with fear and 
paralysis (human being) cannot be captured by the notion of hybridity. 
Human beings mix and enforce boundaries as part of diverse struggles, 
which depend on what is at stake in each instance. From this perspective, 
some of the details about the struggles for accountability that I consider 
here may be specific to Mozambique, yet also demonstrate broader 
features of global struggles for justice. Internationally, there have been 
recurrent discussions over how to address culpability in contexts of serious 
offences. Over the past 30 years, national and international institutions 
have deployed legal mechanisms to allow witnesses to give testimonies 
of serious offences committed during repressive dictatorships and wars.26 
However, there is often a sense of incompleteness surrounding these official 
practices; for many war survivors in Mozambique, and more broadly in 
24  Igreja, ‘Testimonies of Suffering and Recasting the Meanings of Memories of Violence in Post-war 
Mozambique’.
25  Igreja, ‘Memories of Violence, Cultural Transformations of Cannibals, and Indigenous State-
Building in Post-conflict Mozambique’, 787.
26  Hayner, Unspeakable Truths.
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sub-Saharan Africa, justice and wellbeing and injustice and illness are 
related, such that addressing injustice and illness entails confronting 
not only the visible and quantifiable dimensions of evil but also the 
mechanisms and agents believed to be involved in its perpetuation.27
Imaginaries of violence in colonial 
and postcolonial Mozambique
The colonisation of Mozambique by the Portuguese colonial regime 
occurred through military, political-economic, legal and religious 
means. Portuguese colonial officials manipulated some of the traditional 
authorities known as regulo that led to the deployment of some of them 
as village collaborators of the colonisers. Regulo is the common name 
for the position of the highest chief in a village. The name regulo was 
created by the  Portuguese colonialists but it survived the postcolonial 
metamorphosis in Mozambique. Yet some local leaders resisted while 
others were co-opted and still others joined Portuguese officials for their 
own self-interest, to acquire more power and defeat their local rivals. It is 
noteworthy that the mother of Ngungunhane, the feared emperor of the 
Gaza Empire (1824–1895), plotted with Mouzinho de Albuquerque, 
captain of the Portuguese cavalry in colonial Mozambique, to remove her 
son from power as he had become erratic and staged violent acts and 
killed many of his own people without clear imperial purposes.28
In central Mozambique, people’s memories of colonisation usually 
focus on some of the actions of the Portuguese administrators and the 
cipaios, who were a group of African men used by the colonial officials as 
policemen to violently coerce the local populations into paying the hut 
tax and force them into labour camps.29 These cipaios mimicked some 
aspects of African magic by adopting nicknames that evoked cultural 
imagery and ritual violence in order to legitimise colonial power.30 
The cipaios instilled fear in people, who were also ambivalent about the 
cipaios’ violence. This was partly because of the ritualised nature of some 
27  Igreja, ‘Intersections of Sensorial Perception and Imagination in Divination Practices in Post-war 
Mozambique’.
28  Vilhena, Gungunhana.
29  Carvalho, A Guerra que Portugal Quis Esquecer; cf. Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the 
Origins of Malaitan Kastom.
30  Igreja and Skaar, ‘“A Conflict Does Not Rot”’.
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of the violence and because of the cipaios’ determination and sense of 
responsibility and loyalty to their colonial masters during the fulfilment 
of their duties. The cipaios persecuted individuals who failed to pay the 
hut tax and fugitives accused of committing serious offences and brought 
them to the colonial administrator who rendered official justice himself, 
instead of ‘a magistrate sitting in a court of law’ as was the case in Europe.31 
In spite of working for the colonisers, the cipaios’ sense of commitment and 
courage lured the local populations which culminated in the integration 
of the figure of the cipaio into the category of spirits named mucipai 
(plural of cipaio in Chi-Gorongose language) in the apparatus of local 
healers. Mucipai resisted the erosion of time and are the spirits that help 
healers to search for clients in a rather similar logic of the cipaio who used 
to uncompromisingly hunt his prey.
In 1962 the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique; Frelimo) was founded to wage a war for independence 
against the Portuguese. The country attained independence in June 1975 
at the height of the Cold War. As in other socialist-inspired revolutions, 
the Mozambican state officials appeared versed in so-called ‘scientific 
socialism’; they banned various religious and cultural practices and 
arrested and executed individuals believed to be involved in ‘obscurantist 
practices’ and regarded as ‘enemies of the people’.32 The legacies of the 
colonial rivalries among various nationalist groups in tandem with the 
postcolonial revolutionary excesses and the politics of the Cold War gave 
birth to a civil war (1976–1992) that pitted the Frelimo Government 
against the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana; Renamo).
It has been estimated that one million people died and four million 
became internally displaced persons and refugees. Both armies fought 
for the control of populations in order to sustain the war. People under 
government control lived in communal villages, whereas people in Renamo 
areas lived in madembes (old residences). Renamo took advantage of the 
resentment harboured by the local leaders and their people and allowed 
local leaders, healers and Christian churches to operate in their zones of 
control. Throughout the country were numerous reports of abductions of 
men and women, and children were used as soldiers; there were frequent 
31  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 12.
32  Igreja, ‘Frelimo’s Political Ruling through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique’; 
West, Kupilikula.
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reports of forced marriage of young girls, and sexual violence against 
women.33 Some parents compelled their young children (boys and girls) 
to hasten marriage as a potential protection against humiliation and loss 
resulting from rape, while other young girls did ku toera mabota (‘go after 
the boots’, meaning soldiers, to flirt with them) to survive.34
Cultural and religious rituals were as much implicated in the making of 
war as of peace.35 During the early years of the civil war, Renamo soldiers 
used piça wega (burn yourself ). After assaulting a communal village, the 
soldiers compelled the people to remove valuable objects (related to magic) 
from inside their huts and then forced them to set their huts on fire. 
This was to prevent the soldiers and the villagers from being persecuted 
and afflicted by magical spells. Burning the huts was a violent act and 
dispossessed the people, but the burning took into account people’s magical 
and religious traditions. The recognition of magic and the necessity to act 
accordingly also revealed the soldiers’ sense of fear in relation to the power 
of local traditions. Such a posture conferred a measure of legitimacy to the 
broader purpose of the war on the side of Renamo.
The civil war was aggravated by periods of severe drought and ensuing 
famine, particularly in 1987–1988 and 1990–1992, which claimed many 
lives. At the war’s end, war survivors attempted to forgive and forget and 
move on without accountability. Yet forgetfulness was not always possible 
as war survivors were compelled through cultural processes to address 
their deeply unsettled divisions as a basis for a life in common.36
Peace agreement: Spaces of autonomy 
and amnesty law
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
at the end of the 1980s the Frelimo Government engaged in regime 
change. It adopted a democratic constitution in 1990, which expanded 
citizens’ rights by recognising cultural and religious pluralism, freedom 
of  expression, economic liberalisation and a multi-party democratic 
system. Through two years (1990–1992) of brokered negotiations, 
33  Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story; Schafer, Soldiers at Peace.
34  Igreja, ‘Media and Legacies of War’.
35  Lubkemann, Culture in Chaos.
36  Igreja, ‘Cultural Disruption and the Care of Infants in Post-war Mozambique’.
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Renamo was swayed to recognise the legitimacy of state institutions under 
Frelimo rule and the Acordo Geral de Paz (General Peace Agreement), 
consisting of seven protocols, was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. 
The Frelimo Government agreed to attribute a space of autonomy for the 
traditional structures of governance, which created a dual ruling regime 
and was sealed in Protocol V ‘On Guarantees’ of the peace agreement.
Protocol V of the General Peace Agreement created pluralist and 
decentralised spaces whereby war survivors could engage in serious, albeit 
unpredictable, struggles for a whole range of rights including, although 
not stipulated, accountability for wartime offences. Yet 10 days following 
the signature of the peace agreement, the Frelimo Government passed 
an unconditional amnesty law (Law 15/92) exempting everyone involved 
in  the civil war from criminal prosecution.37 The amnesty law was 
followed by legal reforms that were publicly intended to create democratic 
institutions and practices based on scientific methods.38 Of particular 
relevance for this analysis was the development of legal provisions that 
granted further autonomy to community leaders,39 namely the Decree 
Law 15/2000 of the Autoridade Comunitária (Community Authority), 
which legally recognised various community leaders.40 Within this 
context various civil society organisations were legally formalised such as 
one of traditional healers, known as Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais 
de Moçambique. Yet over time when the Frelimo Government realised 
that it was no longer harvesting the dividends of decentralised politics 
through control of politics at community level, the party cadres legally 
reverted to centralised modes of ruling.41
Pluralist social orders and embodied 
accountability
The state amnesty law did not manage to silence war survivors nor 
put a lid on struggles for accountability in postconflict Mozambique 
because of the pluralist nature of perceptions and practices of social 
orders, disorders, wellbeing and illness, justice and injustice. Ironically, 
37  Hayner, Unspeakable Truths; Igreja, ‘Amnesty Law’.
38  Igreja, ‘Memories of Violence’, 780.
39  Igreja and Skaar, ‘“A Conflict Does Not Rot”’.
40  Kyed, ‘The Politics of Legal Pluralism’; West, Kupilikula.
41  Igreja, ‘Politics of Memory, Decentralisation and Recentralisation in Mozambique’.
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the Frelimo Government and main opposition party, Renamo, were 
also not successful in their vows to forget the past and focus solely on 
development. The newly created multi-party parliament was established 
in 1995 and mirrored a melting pot of diverse and hastily digested 
institutional influences and practices of the colonial minimalist state 
structures, Frelimo’s postcolonial revolutionary enthusiasm and excesses, 
and the civil war techniques of psychological warfare. As the new multi-
party parliament initiated activities, both parties broke the silence and 
used memories as weapons that denied one another political legitimacy.42 
Yet when parliamentary discussions focus on salaries and other member 
privileges, both Frelimo and Renamo parties speak in unison, and regard 
one another as brothers. This behaviour provides further evidence of how 
the divisions and symbiosis are not permanent.
At the community level and in war-torn regions such as Gorongosa, 
struggles for justice were manifested through protracted family conflicts 
and severe bodily symptoms triggered by the spirits of the dead, which 
returned to the realm of the living to disturb the alleged perpetrators and 
their kin.43 In this regard, accountability is an embodied phenomenon, in 
the sense that it is inseparable from the lived experiences of war survivors, 
their relatives and postwar generations. Embodied accountability means 
that alleged perpetrators and their victims become tied through the 
suffering that shatters their bodies and everyday lives, thereby compelling 
both perpetrator and victim and their kin to act in the pursuit of truth 
and justice.44 The victim seeks justice in local cultural terms, whereas 
the alleged perpetrator seeks resolution because he or she lives with 
a  reputation of embodying tserusso. Tserusso means that the individual 
is often suspected of being an evil person. Such a reputation amounts 
to a form of social incarceration. The imprisoned person is known to be 
enveloped in a world of tchidimadima (mystery), which severely limits the 
person’s pursuit of a life of communality and dignity. Since persons are 
not understood as autonomous individuals, ‘but as nodes in systems of 
relationships’,45 serious violations also affect the wellbeing of the kin group 
of the alleged perpetrator, so that certain forms of guilt are also collective. 
Thus, in this sociocultural setting, health and illness is inextricably linked 
to the sense of justice and injustice, and certain experiences of illness and 
42  Igreja, ‘Memories as Weapons’.
43  Cf. Mueggler, The Age of Wild Ghosts.
44  Igreja, ‘Legacies of War, Healing, Justice and Social Transformation in Mozambique’.
45  Ferguson, ‘Declarations of Dependence’, 226.
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injustice are expressed in ways that escape the control of the suffering 
person and kin group. From this perspective, it is useful to think in terms 
of post-hybridity bargaining because it is not possible to predict when 
the embodied accountability will be placed en demarche for everyone to 
see and act accordingly. While it is known that embodied accountability 
can be expressed through the mediation of spirits of the dead in male 
and female bodies (although more prominently female bodies), still it is 
impossible to know beforehand which alliances (or no alliances) will be 
mobilised among community leaders, Christian and Islamic leaders, state 
police and judicial courts in order to attempt a resolution for war-related 
unresolved conflicts.46
In this region, the spirits are regarded as persons with their own volition,47 
and their rules are regarded as possessing autonomy from and power 
over the living. This conception evokes forms of personhood, whereby 
agency and subjectivity are also attributed to spiritual and natural agents, 
and these are continuously negotiated with the living.48 The rules of the 
spirits and the changing customs of the living determine the seriousness 
of a breach and the type of resolution that should be followed. The most 
serious offences occur when people die from unjust death triggered by 
physical violence, extreme negligence or refusal to provide care. Such 
cases are considered as serious offences and unforgivable unless there is 
resolution. The rule is micero ai vundi—a conflict does not rot or disappear 
until it has been redressed.49
Gamba spirits, embodied accountability 
and post-hybridity bargaining
In the past two decades, I have had the opportunity to witness diverse 
struggles for accountability. The majority of accountability cases I came 
across were related to serious offences perpetrated during the civil war. 
Following the civil war, gamba (plural magamba) spirits came to take over 
processes of war-related accountability. Gamba refers to spirits of male 
46  Igreja, ‘Traditional Courts and the Struggle against State Impunity for Civil Wartime Offences 
in Mozambique’.
47  Boddy, Wombs and Alien Spirits; Kwon, Ghosts of War in Vietnam; Lambek, Knowledge and 
Practice in Mayotte; Masquelier, Prayer Has Spoiled Everything.
48  Igreja, ‘The Politics of Peace, Justice and Healing in Post-war Mozambique’.
49  Igreja and Skaar, ‘“A Conflict Does Not Rot”’.
175
10 . POST-HyBRIDITy BARGAINING AND EMBODIED ACCOUNTABILITy IN COMMUNITIES
soldiers who died during the civil war. Following the war, gamba spirits 
became vengeful and demanded justice for wartime violations. These spirits 
also evolve to use the bodies of some of their hosts, particularly women, 
to work as gamba healers.50 In this regard, women have become central to 
processes of coming to terms with the diverse legacies of a modern warfare 
as it was waged in the country’s war theatres. Gamba spirits bear witness to 
some of the grisly events that unfolded in the context of tripartite relations 
involving soldiers, families and communities. These spirits prefer to speak 
through the bodies of the alleged wrongdoers or their relatives, and this is 
manifested through altered state of consciousness, which paves the way for 
voicing indictments against alleged perpetrators. Following gamba spirit 
possession episodes, the spirit’s host gets post-facto amnesia (unable  to 
recall what happened). Gamba spirits refuse the attempts of the local people 
and central government authorities to discreetly appease them; they want 
accountability through public indictments and deliberations to denounce 
the culprits of serious offences perpetrated during the civil war. If such 
performances are not offered, the host is doomed to suffer. The continuity 
of torment is part of the local ethic of reciprocity, which holds that 
conflicts stemming from serious injuries leading to death continue unless 
they are appropriately redressed. Specifically, during possession, gamba 
spirits publicly re-enact war-related events, make indictments and, while 
doing so, are violent towards the host’s patri-kin. To the audience these 
performances evoke war memories that had been hidden and for the host/
patient these performances evince severe suffering.
While it is known that present circumstances, often involving ongoing 
social suffering and interpersonal conflicts, can trigger serious disputes 
about violent events from the civil war, these circumstances do not 
determine whether disputes will escalate into open conflict centred on 
accusations of wartime offences. The manifestation of open conflicts, 
often mediated by gamba spirits, can mean that the parties involved 
failed to reach a compromise which could have entailed staging public 
performances of acknowledgement of wrongdoing.51 Depending on the 
severity of the problem and in case one of the parties refuses to collaborate, 
the plaintiffs can increase their bargaining power by consulting a healer, 
community court, religious authorities or the offices of the state police 
and judicial court.52
50  Igreja, ‘Mozambique’.
51  Igreja, ‘“Why Are There So Many Drums Playing until Dawn?”’.
52  Igreja and Racin, ‘The Politics of Spirits, Justice, and Social Transformation in Mozambique’.
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It is noteworthy that some litigants take their war-related disputes, albeit 
often masked in idioms involving spirits or witchcraft, to the police or 
judicial court when, in principle, these institutions are driven by secular 
projects and it is known they have no legal mandate to deal with such 
cases, given the amnesty law. Comparative analysis can shed some light 
on these conundrums. Peter Pels has suggested that since the earlier days 
of contact between European administrators and missionaries and the 
Waluguru people (Tanzania), the former regarded magical acts as religious, 
whereas the Waluguru regarded spirits and witchcraft as ‘something to be 
countered by secular means and they failed to see why missionaries had 
to interfere, and government was loath to cooperate, in a secular measure 
for the common good’.53
When war survivors engage with the police and the justice sector in 
Mozambique, they enshroud their war-related disputes in the language 
of spirits in order to circumvent the amnesty law. State officials (district 
level) know that the amnesty law impedes both the police and the people 
from evoking serious offences of that era. Yet when the conflict appears 
enshrouded in the ‘invisible realm’,54 the police can refer the case to healers. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate course of action is contingent upon the police 
officer in charge of the police station when the problem is brought to their 
loose jurisdiction. Depending on the discretion of the officer in charge, 
there is a likelihood that a kind of handwritten subpoena is issued to 
compel one of the defendants to show up, either in the consultation yard 
of the healer or in the community court.55 Occasionally, the police officer 
can wink at the litigants and indicate that he/she is thirsty or lacking 
credit on his/her mobile phone, which means that, should the plaintiff 
pay the officer a discreetly negotiated fee on the spot, the officer can 
accelerate family reunion to try out a resolution by bringing with him/her 
the weight of the bureaucratic state structure (through wearing the police 
uniform and carrying the AK-47 weapon) to bear on the defendant who 
has refused to collaborate with family members. Still, on other occasions, 
the state official can embody state fragilities and find himself or herself 
trapped in beliefs of spirits and witchcraft both as a police officer and 
as a  human being, thereby becoming personally interested in the case. 
53  Pels, A Politics of Presence, 245.
54  Stroeken, Moral Power; West, Kupilikula; Wiegink, ‘Why Did the Soldiers Not Go Home?’.
55  Igreja, ‘The Politics of Peace’.
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Thus, the officer can show up later, out of uniform, at the healing session 
to gain further knowledge that can be instrumental to allegedly defend 
himself and the state.56
Additionally, depending on the gravity of what is at stake, the police 
commander can request the services of healers to cleanse the police station 
and vaccinate willing police officers with magical potions, given the 
putative pollution left by alleged witches who had been arrested and held 
in the police prison cells.57 Occasionally, the activities of state officials 
can expand to involve the district administrator, as was reported in 
the Ibo district of Cabo Delgado province in north Mozambique with 
a  predominantly Muslim population. The local administrator granted 
support to Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique to 
engage in compulsory homestead surveillance actions to detect alleged 
witches and punish them appropriately.58 One of those alleged witches 
was  a  maulana (a Muslim man revered for his religious learning or 
piety), who claimed that the healers invaded his house, shaved his hair 
and grabbed his Koran under the justification that they were searching 
for witchcraft.
Despite these alliances between state officials and healers, when state 
officials need a public sacrifice in order to expand broad base support and 
convey a sense of strength and control of intimate district life, they can 
arrest healers under the justification that they violate state laws by using 
excessive force and violence against alleged witches. In turn, healers can 
initiate a public defamation against the police under the justification that 
the police do not know what is required to subdue witches and maintain 
social order in their communities.59 Lastly, sometimes war survivors 
approach the police in ways that both acknowledge and rebuff their 
existence by reverting to a kind of radical metaphysics that seemingly 
makes it difficult for secular-driven mindsets to break the boundaries 
of inner logics. For example, I once participated in the resolution of 
a serious conflict involving a maternal grandfather and grandson, which 
led to a criminal offence perpetrated by the young man that almost killed 
his grandfather. After first aid was performed at the district hospital, 
the nurses referred the case to the police given that in principle only the 
56  Igreja, ‘Justice and Reconciliation in the Aftermath of the Civil War in Gorongosa’.
57  Igreja, ‘Memories of Violence’.
58  Canalmoz newspaper, Maputo, 15 April 2013.
59  Igreja, ‘Memories of Violence’.
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police have jurisdiction over serious physical injuries. When the litigants 
presented the case in the police station, they informed the police officer 
that the old man had been beaten by a spirit. The officer said ‘the spirit 
might have been very strong to cause such a serious injury’. He transferred 
the case without enquiring how a spirit could have actually inflicted the 
physical wounds the victim had in one of his ribs. Given the gravity of 
the case, which the police have sole prerogative to deal with, it is seemingly 
incomprehensible why the police officer gave full autonomy to the people 
involved by not raising questions to clarify how a spirit could have caused 
those bleeding wounds. The victim, who could hardly speak to present 
his version of the events, saw his grandson walking free from the police 
station, and they headed to the healer’s association for follow-ups.
This example elucidates that, in the relations between state agents and 
the people and among the people themselves, there are no permanent 
boundaries nor stable bricolages. These relations can be better understood 
when viewed through the lens of bargaining practices for a convenient 
order. This means that in these power contests, sometimes each side 
interpenetrates whereas at other times they raise their boundaries to 
cogently claim spaces of differentiation and autonomy, so that neither 
the interpenetration nor the sense of differentiation become a permanent 
state of affairs. Sometimes the people bond to increase their bargaining 
power. This was the case with the gamba spirits, which allowed many 
war survivors to attain personal and culturally inspired forms of justice.60 
Other times, the same people manipulate one another while establishing 
alliances with state actors (administrator, police and judiciary) to pursue 
personal interests. In turn, state actors also selectively make and break 
alliances to pursue personal and alleged state plans.
Conclusion
In closing, the notion of post-hybridity bargaining draws attention 
to the analysis of a more complex set of relations involving spirits, 
people and various state institutions and actors. These relations are 
not unidimensional  given that the various participants acknowledge 
their multiple identities as in the case of the police officer who is also 
60  Igreja et al., ‘Gamba Spirits, Gender Relations, and Healing in Post-Civil War Gorongosa, 
Mozambique’.
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a human being; a leg that cannot dance alone therefore always searches 
for a  complementary one; a person who is never complete thus always 
reverts to other persons, animals and nature more broadly, not to 
capture some sense of completeness but to reveal the sources of this 
incompleteness. In this regard, these notions and the practices they entail 
cannot be bounded by the notion of hybridity and the sense of stability 
that hybridity evokes. Post-hybridity focuses on the ongoing fashion and 
refashion of social life according to what really matters for the people in 
a given predicament.
From a policy perspective there is little doubt that the implications 
of the  processes I have described and analysed here are marred with 
complexities. While acknowledging the intricate role played by diverse 
local structures, agents and resources is an important step, it is nevertheless 
not simply a matter of hastily financing them with the expectation that 
these agents and processes can become formalised and predictable. 
The conundrum is that unpredictability and malleability are key sources 
of innovation and social change. In this way, policymaking initiatives 
should include ways of empowering existing resources and agents without 
attempting to block their creative drive. From the perspective of post-
hybridity bargaining, policy initiatives need to be experimental in most 
communities in conflict. For example, one experimental policy area could 
focus on specifically acknowledging the central role played by women 
in accountability processes for some of the serious offences committed 
during the civil war in Mozambique;61 another policy area could promote 
the organisation of women in ways that boost and spread accountability 
practices to other areas of social and political life such as marital practices, 
domestic violence, corruption in community and state institutions, and 
educational sector and economic entrepreneurship.




Hybrid Peacebuilding in Hybrid 
Communities: A Case Study 
of East Timor
James Scambary and Todd Wassel
Introduction
East Timor achieved independence in 1999 after 24 years of brutal 
Indonesian military occupation and more than 400 years of Portuguese 
colonial rule. With the aid of an international peacekeeping force, a United 
Nations (UN) mission installed an interim administration that set about 
preparing East Timor for self-governance. However, while its new-found 
freedom was much celebrated, persistent tensions, rather than unity and 
peace, came to characterise East Timor’s society in the post-independence 
period. These tensions reached a peak in what is now popularly referred to 
as the ‘Crisis’. From April to June 2006, a rapid series of events resulted 
in the unravelling of the six-year UN statebuilding project. National-
level political tensions and divisions within the security services served as 
a catalyst for a wider communal conflict on a national scale, which was to 
last for nearly two years.
In response, a comprehensive, national-level donor and government effort 
was rolled out to address the perceived causes of this conflict, and get 
internally displaced people back into their communities. These largely 
generic, top-down responses included an intensive community mediation 
campaign and a raft of programs to improve educational and employment 
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opportunities. Nonetheless, sporadic communal conflict persisted and, by 
early 2009, began to increase in both urban and rural areas. Clearly, the 
sources of violence were more complex and deeply rooted than thought. 
Longer-term approaches were needed with more local ownership, which 
would in turn require more hybrid strategies to engage with traditional 
social structures. As Leonardsson and Rudd,1 and others in this publication 
contend, there is, however, considerable conceptual ambiguity around the 
concepts of both hybridity and local ownership, with the term ‘local’, for 
example, being employed to denote an entire country. This ambiguity 
is reflected in both theory and practice on peacebuilding in East Timor, 
where the understanding and use of hybridity has only slowly evolved 
with a latent appreciation of the highly localised scale and complex nature 
of conflict.
Hybridity is not new to the East Timor context. A range of government 
and international non-government organisation (INGO) and donor-
driven initiatives have engaged some aspect of hybridity in order to 
secure local ownership since the early independence era.2 In addition, the 
role of traditional authorities in community mediation and security is 
enshrined by Law No. 3/2009, which sets out the responsibilities of suku 
(village) councils.3 Since 2006, however, hybridity has become a standard 
component of the mix of approaches to development and peacebuilding 
by government and international development agencies. Much of this is, 
though, as described by Millar, top-down and internationally created and 
administered hybridity.4 How hybridity is used by external actors rests 
on an often idealised, or misconstrued understanding of what constitutes 
traditional, and what is local. As de Coning notes, the ability of external 
agents to gain knowledge of the complex and nonlinear social systems 
often involved in the peacebuilding context is inherently limited.5 In East 
Timor, attempts at hybrid peacebuilding by both international and 
government agencies have frequently failed to reflect the heterogeneous 
and dynamic nature of East Timor’s society, and the changes it has 
undergone during the past three decades. These attempts have also, until 
quite recently, failed to understand the very localised scale and endemic 
nature of conflict in East Timor. As a consequence, outcomes have been 
often temporary at best.
1  Leonardsson and Rudd, ‘The “Local Turn” in Peacebuilding’.
2  See, for example, Hohe, ‘Local Governance after Conflict’.
3  See Asia Foundation, Reflections on Law No. 3/2009.
4  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
5  de Coning, ‘Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local’.
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This chapter adopts a case-study approach, drawing on the practical field 
experiences of both authors over the past decade, to trace the evolution of 
peacebuilding approaches in East Timor from 2006. It will analyse how 
both the state and international actors have used hybridity in tandem with 
changing and more complex understandings of both the nature of conflict 
and of communities. We argue that to be successful and sustainable in the 
long term, peacebuilding approaches need a much deeper understanding 
of societal dynamics, but also need to adopt a more flexible, nuanced 
and contemporary view of what constitutes ‘traditional’ and ‘local’, and 
recognise that there is more than one variety of hybridity.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section addresses 
the changing nature and understandings of conflict in East Timor, and 
early attempts at peacebuilding. The next section questions some of the 
underlying assumptions of these attempts by describing the impact of 
the Indonesian occupation on traditional social structures and some 
of the fundamental changes East Timor’s society has undergone since 
independence. We then proceed to analyse the implications of these 
changes for current peacebuilding approaches. We conclude with 
a discussion of how more recent and more innovative peacebuilding and 
policing initiatives, both local and international, have acknowledged some 
of these complexities and attempted to engage with them.
The post-independence period
East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia in a UN-sponsored 
referendum on 30  August 1999. By this time, the violence of the 
Indonesian-occupation era and the struggle for independence had claimed 
the lives of approximately 205,000 people.6 The violence did not end there. 
Almost immediately after the vote, Indonesian troops and their proxy 
militias began a nationwide campaign of murder, violence and systematic 
destruction of property leading to around 1,200–1,500 deaths and the 
loss of as much as 85 per cent of East Timor’s infrastructure.7
Following the restoration of order, the UN Security Council mandated 
the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Administration 
of East Timor (UNTAET) to manage East Timor’s transition to 
independence. UNTAET’s responsibilities were comprehensive, ranging 
6  CAVR, Chega!, 2.
7  Robinson, East Timor 1999, 4.
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from humanitarian assistance through to building the foundations of 
a new democratic state, including setting up administrative and judicial 
institutions and the various functions of government.
Despite the euphoria of independence, tensions soon began to surface. 
One major source of instability arose from the demobilisation process for 
the former resistance force, Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de 
Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor; 
FALINTIL), and the subsequent recruitment process for the national 
army, the FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) and 
the national police, the Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste (PNTL). Many 
resistance veterans missed out on jobs in what they regarded as a flawed 
and secretive process. Angered by their exclusion, and by the fact that 300 
former East Timorese members of the Indonesian police force had been 
recruited into the PNTL, they began to mobilise and engage in often 
violent demonstrations and attacks on police posts.8
Another source of instability, with no apparent relation to any of these 
issues, was outbursts of communal conflict involving martial arts 
groups—there are between 15 and 20 of these groups in East Timor. 
While there are few reliable statistics kept on this period, data from the 
Ministry of Interior indicate that, between 2002 and 2004, registered 
cases increased from seven to 37, spreading from four districts in 2002 
to 11 of 13 districts in 2004.9 The figures also give no indication of the 
seriousness of the clashes. A riot in March 2001, for example, ostensibly 
between rival martial arts groups, almost entirely destroyed two villages in 
Viqueque District in the east of the country.10
While generally glossed as martial arts group violence, there are close 
symmetries between membership of these groups and of descent groups, 
village boundaries and political-party allegiances. Therefore, martial arts 
group violence is more often than not a manifestation of deeper communal 
tensions driven by a range of factors, particularly land disputes, but often 
of a longstanding historical nature.11 Despite the alarming frequency and 
scale of this subnational conflict, however, any mention of such conflict 
was largely confined to a few press articles, or buried in donor reports.12
8  Shoesmith, ‘Timor-Leste’, 250.
9  Ostergaard, East Timor Youth Social Analysis Mapping and Youth Institutional Assessment, 23.
10  United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, Media Monitoring, Dili, 17 March 2001.
11  Scambary, ‘Anatomy of a Conflict’.
12  See, for example, Brown et al., Conflict Assessment: East Timor.
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Peacebuilding approaches in East Timor have until recently been 
largely reactive, and shaped by changing understandings—or 
misunderstandings—of the nature of conflict. Conflict was largely 
understood in the immediate post-independence period in terms of the 
war of resistance against Indonesian occupation—as something that 
happened in the past. Beyond the Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade 
e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste (Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation in East Timor; CAVR),13 which focused on investigating 
crimes committed from 1974 to 1999 and resolving resultant communal 
tensions, there were few, if any, government or donor programs or 
institutions tasked with conflict resolution or mediation, or even major 
programs specifically addressing youth needs. This all changed after 2006.
On 28 April 2006, a protest by a group of sacked soldiers—known as 
the ‘Petitioners’ for their list of demands presented to the government—
descended into a riot leading to a series of confrontations between the 
police and army. These confrontations sparked a wider communal conflict 
which initially assumed the appearance of a regional east versus west 
divide.14 Most accounts of this period have focused on events from April 
to June 2006,15 yet the conflict lasted for another 18 months. Once the 
politically driven east–west nature of the conflict ended in October 2006, 
the violence took on a very different, and seemingly random dynamic. 
Conflict continued in the capital, Dili, but erupted in a number of rural 
areas, particularly in regions that had suffered from endemic violence 
since independence, and in many cases, long before. There was no 
discernible overarching political or ethnic narrative for this violence; it 
now had a distinctly local nature, pitting family against family and village 
against village, driven by a host of factors including disputed land claims, 
payback killings and other historical grievances. This type of sporadic, 
low-level, highly localised conflict has continued to characterise post-
Crisis violence.
13  The commission was set up under UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/10 (www.un.org/en/peace 
keeping/missions/past/etimor/untaetR/Reg10e.pdf). CAVR provides an early example of an interesting 
mix of hybridity. It was run by an all-Timorese commission, with assistance from international staff, 
but also dealt with customary village-based systems, supporting over 1,400 community reconciliation 
processes (Braithwaite, ‘Evaluating the Timor-Leste Peace Operation’, 292).
14  The west in East Timor is considered to be the 10 districts to the west of Dili and the east is the 
three districts to the east of Dili. See Kammen, ‘Subordinating Timor’, for a detailed discussion of this 
cleavage.
15  See, for example, Kingsbury, ‘East Timor’s Political Crisis’; Sahin, ‘Building the State in Timor-
Leste’.
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Nonetheless, informed by the dubious twin assumptions of this four-
month time line and that the violence was due to ethnic tensions and 
youth alienation—a product of rural–urban drift—the government 
and  international donors rolled out a range of national-level vocational 
training and employment schemes. These initiatives were based on 
a rather optimistic faith in the redemptive influence of work and 
education on ‘delinquent’ youth. At the same time, the United Nations 
Development Programme and the International Organization for 
Migration supported government efforts to return internally displaced 
people to their communities through a process of community mediation 
and compensation to victims, in order to rebuild community trust 
and cohesion.16
Despite all these efforts, conflict persisted and began to recur with 
increasing  frequency and scale. In the latter half of 2011, a series of 
highly publicised outbreaks resulted in about six deaths and over 100 
houses being burned down, leading to the rather futile banning by the 
government of martial arts group training, on 22  December 2011.17 
Alarmed by this upsurge in violence, the government embarked on 
an intensive community reconciliation program, coordinated by the 
Ministry of Social Solidarity, which sent mediation teams out to conflict 
hotspots in Dili and rural areas. A number of INGO programs were also 
implemented in urban areas of Dili from 2006 to 2010 to engage with 
the different antagonists such as martials arts groups and violence-afflicted 
communities.
While some used prescriptive methods simply pulled off the rack from 
a completely different international context such as Bosnia, many used 
what could be broadly described as a hybrid approach. They enlisted village 
chiefs to mobilise communities to attend meetings and to represent their 
communities in mediation sessions. Traditional rituals such as tara bandu 
were used to encourage communities to foreswear violence and commit 
to peace.18 These different programs met with mixed success at best. 
Quite frequently, conflict broke out only a week or two after a supposedly 
binding tara bandu ceremony took place. In some cases, no community 
members at all showed up to mediation sessions.
16  RDTL, ‘Simu Malu and Fila Fali’.
17  East Timor Subscriber News, 13 January 2012.
18  Tara bandu ceremonies are traditionally employed in natural resource preservation, whereby 
communities swear under a sacred oath—often accompanied by animal sacrifice—not to eat 
particular foods or cut down particular plants or trees.
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Hybrid communities
As Mac Ginty and Richmond claim, some policy approaches to hybridity 
can be described as ‘a shallow latching onto an apparently “trendy” 
concept’.19 As they argue, artificially created hybrids, manufactured 
as part of a top-down peacebuilding intervention, can lead to sham 
processes.20 Hybrid approaches to peacebuilding—as stated—are not 
new in East Timor, although their implementation has been somewhat 
ad hoc. According to McWilliam et al., tara bandu ceremonies have been 
employed by international agencies such as the World Bank since 2003.21 
But while government and INGO willingness to engage with traditional 
forms of authority is encouraging, these approaches are too often marred by 
inadequate understandings of the heterogeneous and fluid nature of many 
communities and local conflicts, and so are rarely more than temporarily 
effective. Part of the reason for this is that they are often premised on an 
idealised notion of ‘tradition’, a common set of assumptions about the 
legitimacy of traditional authority, and the demographic and territorial 
integrity and cohesiveness of Timorese society.
As Boege argues, tradition, or ‘custom’, is in a constant flux. It changes 
over time and adapts to new circumstances, particularly when exposed 
to external modernising influences.22 East Timor has undergone major 
demographic changes since independence, with significant implications 
for traditional social structures. The country is divided into districts, 
subdistricts, sukus (villages) and aldeias (hamlets)—aldeias being the more 
traditional of the two latter entities. According to Traube, the Portuguese 
imposed the territorial-based administrative system of sukus over 
a genealogically based system, so that many Timorese do not recognise 
sukus, or at least only relate to them as a purely geographic distinction.23 
Each aldeia and suku is headed by a chefe or chief, and a suku council 
composed of the chefe aldeias and the chefe suku, together with five 
other members. While these roles are now elected, in many cases the 
positions are filled by traditional leaders who therefore bear both modern 
administrative and traditional authority.
19  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 225.
20  Ibid., 233.
21  McWilliam et al., ‘Lulik Encounters and Cultural Frictions in East Timor’, 314.
22  Boege, ‘Potential and Limits of Traditional Approaches in Peacebuilding’, 437.
23  Traube, ‘Unpaid Wages’, 20.
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Descent groups are geographically centred on the physical structure of 
a sacred house, or uma lulik, a term that is also synonymous with descent 
group and ancestral landholdings. The kinship system, as embodied by 
descent group, is the cornerstone of the Timorese social order. Traditional 
leaders at the head of such families are still the main source of mediation 
and local justice. They also act as a conduit between the government 
and their communities, facilitating government programs and projects 
at a suku level. This role is also enshrined in law and the constitution.24 
It is a reasonable assumption, then, to believe that if you engage with 
a traditional leader, you are also engaging with the wider community 
delineated by suku or aldeia boundaries.
Even in rural areas, such assumptions are problematic. The legacy of 
displacement and forced resettlement under the Indonesian occupation 
has led to an often tense co-existence between original inhabitants and 
family groups resettled on their land. In many cases this has led to conflict. 
As described by Fitzpatrick et al. in their case study of land disputes in 
Ainaro Municipality in the central mountains of the country, for example, 
there are about six significant former ‘transit’ or ‘concentration’ centres 
for displaced persons from Ainaro and surrounding areas.25 These are 
also regular conflict flashpoints as the original occupants reassert their 
claim to the land and attempt to force the settlers back to their original 
landholdings, in a pattern common to a number of conflicts around the 
country.
The issue of demographic fragmentation is particularly pronounced 
in urban contexts. Dili has experienced exponential growth since 
independence. Forced resettlement and displacement under the 
Indonesian occupation and post-independence in-migration from rural 
districts has boosted Dili’s population to more than eight times its 1974 
pre-Indonesian invasion size of less than 30,000.26 While there have been 
a number of waves of migration, following different phases of the armed 
resistance against the Indonesian occupation, most of the growth has been 
since independence. According to the 2010 census, from 1999, Dili’s 
population grew from 100,715 to around 252,884 and as much as half of 
this growth is due to migration from rural areas.27
24  Everett, Law and Justice in Timor-Leste.
25  Fitzpatrick et al., Property and Social Resilience in Times of Conflict, 227.
26  Ranck, ‘Recent Rural–Urban Migration to Dili, Portuguese Timor’.
27  RDTL, 2010 Population Census.
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Then there is circular migration, which considerably swells the population 
of Dili in regular annual cycles. There are five to six significant temporary 
population movements per year in East Timor. In addition to population 
movements out of Dili, in August and September students arrive in 
Dili from the districts to register for school and university. There are 
other seasonal movements too, such as people coming in to Dili to sell 
agricultural produce—which many do on a daily basis.28
Migration patterns into Dili follow global chain migration patterns,29 
whereby one family establishes a base and then ‘sponsors’ others from 
the extended family and home aldeia, helping them find housing and 
even employment. This means that enclaves of the rural aldeia of origin 
and extended family are established alongside enclaves of other migrant 
groups, creating a patchwork of different descent groups. In rural areas, an 
aldeia is essentially a family unit, but this principle largely holds true for 
established urban aldeias (although there is considerable variation), with 
one larger family dominating but with a number of smaller enclaves of 
other descent groups from other sukus or districts.30
Those areas composed of former Indonesian housing are different 
again. These new neighbourhoods were created almost overnight, when 
rural migrants rushed to occupy vacant Indonesian civil service and 
military housing. They are essentially squatter communities, or informal 
settlements, although many residents have formal or semi-formal claims 
to ownership. The cosmopolitan nature of these aldeias gives them 
a  very different dynamic to the clan-centric traditional aldeias of the 
rural hinterland, or the still somewhat heterogeneous but older, more 
established aldeias in Dili.31
These informal settlements also have a highly transitory nature. A 2010 
World Bank study found that at least 36 per cent of the inhabitants of 
one such neighbourhood had been there five years or less, and about 
18 per cent had been there two years or less.32 Such frequent population 
movements make this a highly fluid social environment. Social dynamics 
therefore vary from aldeia to aldeia.
28  Scambary, ‘Conflict and Resilience’, 1942.
29  Choldin, ‘Kinship Networks in the Migration Process’, 164.
30  Scambary, ‘Conflict and Resilience’, 1938.
31  Ibid., 1940.
32  World Bank, Violence in the City.
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A recent World Bank report also described informal bairros or clusters 
of settlements within each aldeia, or within a suku.33 One of these, for 
example, was centred on the chefe suku’s residence, comprising almost half 
of all the settlements in that aldeia, while others were situated along the 
main road. Some areas were more spread out or even uninhabited; some 
were well served by roads and public transport, while others were more 
isolated or even completely cut off. The report also described a number of 
different communities within different aldeias within this suku, including 
political, clandestine and religious groupings.34 Each of these groupings 
will have leaders who constitute alternatives to formal authority and 
structures such as chefe sukus or suku councils.
Figure 11.1: Linguistic group distribution per aldeia in Perumnas informal 
settlement, Dili
Source: The Australian National University, College of Asia & the Pacific.
Apart from varying population density and a diversity of ethnolinguistic 
and descent groups (Figure  11.1), there are also contrasting class and 
occupational differences. Some suburbs are predominantly composed of 
civil servants, while others may be dominated by highly transient market 
33  Muizarajs et al., Programa Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suku Research and Evaluation Program.
34  Ibid.
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traders or shopkeepers—who in some cases are predominantly foreigners, 
such as Indonesians and mainland Chinese. Each of these constitute 
communities in themselves.
Questions of legitimacy, localism 
and contested hybridity
These factors have significant implications for hybrid approaches as well 
as more conventional approaches to peacebuilding. As a 2010 World 
Bank survey found, while traditional authorities were the main sources 
of security, there were often highly ambivalent attitudes towards them 
among their residents, varying considerably with each village.35 There are 
a number of reasons for this.
One reason is that during the communal violence of 2006–2007, village 
chiefs alienated sections of their communities in many cases through 
sectarian behaviour such as involvement in or endorsement of arson, 
looting and intimidation (there are numerous cases around Dili and 
nationally of traditional leaders also being martial arts group or gang 
leaders). Conversely, traditional leaders have sometimes gained respect 
across kinship and linguistic boundaries, either through neutrality, 
protecting victims or through playing a mediation role.
Another reason, however, is that as settlement patterns in hybrid urban 
neighbourhoods are highly fragmented, these can also be reflected in the 
dynamics of traditional leadership. Given that traditional authority stems 
from family lineage, the ad hoc, patchwork nature of these neighbourhoods 
makes it highly unlikely that any of the village chiefs represent their whole 
village in the way that they might in a conventional, rural village. Even 
when a leader comes from the same district and speaks the same language 
as their community, this does not guarantee authority. While in many 
more established aldeias, residents have accepted the authority of leaders 
from other descent groups over time, in the newer aldeias, it is unlikely 
that a chefe aldeia will have authority over any group other than their own 
descent group. In some aldeias, where one descent group predominates, 
for example, the chefe aldeia will have more authority, but some chefe de 
aldeias may only represent an enclave of their aldeia—a cluster of a dozen 
35  World Bank, Violence in the City.
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houses in one case. As stated earlier, cyclical and permanent rural–urban 
migration can also change the demographic status over time, so that one 
group may decline in numbers while another grows, which may lead to 
the undermining of chefe de aldeia authority.
In some instances, particular linguistic groups may be more scattered 
than others and may have no formal or traditional leadership at all. 
In the Dili suku of Bairro Pite, an area particularly hard hit by violence 
in 2006–2007, one resident from the Lospalos subdistrict in the eastern 
part of East Timor reported that despite being violently evicted from their 
houses in 2006 by many of their neighbours, because her community is 
scattered in pockets over four aldeias, they had never been involved in any 
peace process, as they do not have a formal leader. To further underscore 
the pitfalls of crudely employing hybrid approaches to peacebuilding, the 
same resident claimed that initially her community was represented at 
an INGO-sponsored peace process by the same chefe de aldeia who had 
looted her house during the 2006 violence.36
In such a heterogeneous environment then, the use of ‘traditional’ rituals 
like tara bandu is also highly problematic. The Lospalos resident cited 
above, for example, claimed that while she and her community voted for 
a widely respected chefe de aldeia from the western part of the country 
and allowed him to represent them in civil matters, this chefe de aldeia 
could not represent them in the case of a tara bandu ceremony, given 
that this ceremony draws on ancestral sanctions to enforce obedience. 
Only traditional leaders at the head of descent groups can conduct these 
ceremonies and they are only applicable to people from these descent 
groups.
In addition, as well as extended family groups, there are more than 
35 language groups in East Timor. While these language groups may 
share many traits in common with other groups, as Hohe points out, 
there are a variety of complex traditional dispute resolution and justice 
mechanisms  in East Timor, varying with each linguistic group and 
with the nature of the dispute or crime.37 As such, tara bandu is not 
common to all linguistic groups. According to McWilliam et al., the post-
independence appropriation of the concept of tara bandu has effectively 
36  Interview with Lospalos-born resident of Bairro Pite, Melbourne, 16 March 2010.
37  Hohe, ‘The Clash of Paradigms’.
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hijacked a diverse range of traditions and reformed them into a different 
and more homogenous regulatory practice, in which the state is centrally 
involved. As they contend:
With this newly confected tara bandu, international development 
organisations as well as the government could press their conservationism 
and ‘rule of law’ upon the rural people. National NGOs, beholden to 
donors, followed suit. All development stakeholders participated in the 
idea that tara bandu was the essence of Timorese law.38
The constant process of rural–urban migration, as described earlier, poses 
significant problems for ceremonies based on assumptions of static, settled 
communities. People from outside who enter the area regulated by a tara 
bandu are not bound by its sanctions. Indeed, communities interviewed 
for a 2011 report on an urban peacebuilding project complained about 
newcomers from the districts entering their aldeias and fracturing 
painstakingly negotiated reconciliation processes.39
Such heterogeneity and the fluid nature of conflict also means that the 
source of conflict or tensions can be misidentified, such as through 
attempts to mediate long-extinct 2006 east versus west tensions instead 
of a more recent 2007 murder, or mediation efforts directed at the wrong 
communities.40 As Boege notes, in segmentary societies, the legitimacy 
of the recourse to violence and the capacity to use it is vested in every 
segmentary unit of the society, which means that the potential for violence 
is widely dispersed.41 As described earlier, symmetries or interlinkages 
between descent groups, martial arts groups and political-party allegiance 
mean that tensions between any of these entities can become mutually 
generative. In a sense, these can be described as hybrid conflicts—they 
can be generated by many different causes at the same time, and take 
multiple forms. Many disputes in 2006 glossed as martial arts violence, or 
as electoral/political violence in 2007, had a purely local aspect to them. 
Sometimes it was about pre-marital pregnancies, fights over perceived 
slights at wedding parties, disputes over a girl or, in one case, an extortion 
attempt on a bus driver.42 Sometimes the dispute was related to a conflict 
originating in a rural village. Given overlapping patterns of circular rural–
38  McWilliam et al., ‘Lulik Encounters and Cultural Frictions’.
39  Catholic Relief Services, ‘Laletek Program Final Evaluation’.
40  Interview with resident of Moris Ba Dame village, Bairro Pite, 16 March 2010.
41  Boege, ‘Potential and Limits of Traditional Approaches in Peacebuilding’, 438.
42  Interviews with UN Political Affairs, Dili, 24 July 2006; Belun conflict resolution team member, 
Dili, 24 October 2006; INGO conflict monitoring team member, Dili, 21 January 2008.
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urban migration, martial arts group, gang, family and political affiliations, 
these personal disputes erupted into much wider conflagrations that 
transcended static notions of localism.
This, in turn, has implications for scale—an important factor to consider 
in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Nearly all the conflict of 2007, 
and since then, has been at the aldeia level, and yet most peace processes 
in the aftermath of the 2007 violence were aimed at the suku level. In one 
2009 peace process, for example, the putatively opposing suku leaders 
gathered together were actually close friends or relatives.43 The conflict was 
between sections of each community, not the entire suku. As mentioned 
previously, the violence was sometimes perpetrated by community leaders 
against sections of their own community. Also, conflict maps completed 
for a 2010–2011 Catholic Relief Services urban conflict resolution project 
found that conflict tended to recur at particular crossroads or junctures, 
indicating the highly localised scale of most conflict and providing 
important clues as to who the antagonist groups were.44
Equally importantly, given that communal tensions may manifest 
in different forms at different times and places, thereby masking the 
original root of the conflict, the history of these conflicts needs to be 
more thoroughly investigated. Therefore, even if all the antagonist groups 
shared the same rituals and all appropriate traditional leaders were present 
to sanction the ceremony, it might still be a futile exercise if the underlying 
dynamics are ignored.
Recent developments
Such complexities are, however, beginning to be acknowledged in donor 
and INGO discourse. It is now increasingly recognised that more care 
must be taken in the use of rituals such as tara bandu, and that incorrect 
application of the procedures, such as not having the appropriate 
traditional authorities present, can seriously undermine the legitimacy of 
the process. As a report by Belun and the Asia Foundation noted, for tara 
bandu to be successful in an urban context, it was vital to ‘know the map 
43  Interview with Bairro Pite mediation ceremony participant, Dili, 16 March 2010.
44  Catholic Relief Services, ‘Laletek Program Final Evaluation’.
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of Dili’, including knowing which communities are based in which areas 
and the nature of their historical and present-day interactions.45 The same 
could be said for rural areas too.
With the realisation that conflict is more complex and entrenched 
than previously thought, and equally as problematic in rural as urban 
areas, two parallel government departments were set up with donor 
assistance. One of these is the Department of Peacebuilding and Social 
Cohesion, within the Ministry of Social Solidarity, and the other is the 
Department of Community Conflict Prevention, located within the 
Ministry of the Interior (formerly the Secretariat of State for Security). 
With representatives placed at a district level, the main remit of these 
two agencies  is the  strengthening of conflict resolution capacity and 
mechanisms at the community level. While there are many problems with 
these bodies—which face challenges similar to all government departments 
such as resourcing and coordination with Dili-based management—
nonetheless, their creation is an important recognition that communal 
conflict requires a longer-term, community-based approach.
Between 2010 and 2011, Catholic Relief Services ran a two-year 
peacebuilding project in 22 conflict-prone aldeias in Dili.46 At the very 
beginning of the project were two key departures from past practice. 
The first was that they did their homework on each community. They 
conducted an in-depth three-month baseline survey to identify not just 
the key fault lines in each community, but also the power dynamics among 
local leaders that prevented effective resolution. A common practice in 
donor and government programs is to work through chefe de aldeias and 
chefe de sukus. Apart from reinforcing patriarchal power structures, these 
predominantly male leaders frequently contact or include only their own 
family members in projects, effectively disenfranchising large sectors of 
the community. Recognising that these leaders were often the problem 
rather than the solution, Catholic Relief Services also used alternative 
actors such as local youth groups and even gang leaders to engage and 
mobilise their communities. The second departure was that participation 
was voluntary. Only communities requesting assistance would participate, 
and they had to demonstrate a willingness to resolve conflict themselves. 
Moreover, nobody was paid to attend meetings, as had been the previous 
45  Belun and The Asia Foundation, Tara Bandu, 24.
46  Co-author James Scambary conducted the mid-term and final evaluations of this project.
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pattern by donors and also government departments—the notorious 
per diem payments that are now widely regarded as an entitlement for 
participation in any project.
Implementation of the project also differed from previous approaches in 
a number of other important ways. Recognising that conflict was hybrid 
and  multi-level, the project itself rolled out multiple and sequenced 
activities to target these different levels and gradually shift people’s attitudes 
towards reconciliation. Rather than treat gang leaders or members as 
‘spoilers’, as they are so often referred to, it recognised that they are often 
just the vectors of community tensions and included them in the process, 
even giving them leadership roles.47 The project was run in partnership 
with the Catholic Church Dili Diocese Justice and Peace Commission, 
which lent further legitimacy to the project in a country where Catholicism 
is practised in tandem with traditional animist belief systems. In the case 
of one particularly intractable dispute, nuns accompanied Catholic Relief 
Services project workers in visits to the homes of the key antagonists, 
breaking the deadlock as a result. Five years later, approximately 18 out of 
the 22 communities continue to be largely free from conflict.48
After the divisions of 2006, substantial attention and funding has also been 
directed at policing, particularly in the area of formal institutional reform. 
While some gains have been made, there has been a gradual realisation 
that with ongoing management and resourcing problems, as per many 
government public services, and with the remote and difficult terrain of 
many rural areas, the police will always struggle to fulfil their mandate 
without the cooperation of the community. The Asia Foundation49 has 
been running a community policing project focused on the intersection 
between state security and community practices as a means to increase 
community safety and security. The main aspects of the program focused 
on setting up 123 community policing councils (CPCs) in 11 of 13 
municipalities between 2012 and 2016. The CPCs bring together elected 
community members drawn from local and traditional authorities and 
ofisial polisia suku, or village police officers, in regular meetings to discuss 
and resolve suku security issues. The community members are typically 
from former clandestine resistance structures such as women’s, veterans’ 
and youth groups. Of equal importance, the CPCs aim to help community 
47  Catholic Relief Services, ‘Laletek Program Final Evaluation’.
48  Based on analysis of press reports and a field visit in 2015.
49  Co-author Todd Wassel was director, Security and Safety Program, and now deputy country 
representative, of the Asia Foundation, East Timor.
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members know and trust police officers, in a historical context where the 
state has been largely absent from community life and where the formal 
police have often been associated with domination, and therefore regarded 
with suspicion.
With enthusiastic support at senior levels of the PNTL command, 
indications so far are that the program has been a qualified success. 
Compared with 2008, data show there has been a significant change in 
justice-seeking behaviours by the population during the period CPCs 
have started. The 2015 Asia Foundation survey found that three out 
of four victims of crimes ended up at the police for assistance in 2015. 
The key difference in the recent survey is that the police are present in the 
majority of all successful resolutions at the community level, providing 
a wide variety of functions. These include ensuring security and adding 
legitimacy, to directly participating in the mediations and negotiations. 
The police are now just one stop along the justice-seeking path, with 76 per 
cent of all victims ending up at the community for conflict resolution.50
A local non-government organisation, Belun, with international 
support, has also been running a quietly effective peacebuilding project. 
The  Conflict Prevention and Referral Network, through a district-
based network of trained volunteers, compiles information on violent 
incidents—which are published in Belun’s ‘Early Warning, Early 
Response’ monthly reports—and conducts mediation. Network members 
are drawn from traditional and local authorities, women’s groups, veterans 
and members of the PNTL.
Some of these creations emanate from the PNTL itself. One of these is 
a hybrid form of auxiliary policing known as security volunteers, which are 
part of a government-led initiative to embed police within communities. 
The security-volunteer initiative, driven by two district PNTL 
commanders, has been trialled in two particularly conflict-prone regions in 
East Timor—Viqueque and Liquisa. The security volunteers are intended 
to link the PNTL to remote rural areas, enhancing PNTL responsiveness to 
conflict, crime and accidents, and also to enhance local-level ownership of 
community security. These security volunteers are tasked with monitoring 
local-level crime and violence, which includes both communal conflict 
and gender-based violence. Their actual terms of reference are somewhat 
improvised and are an uncomfortable fit with more conventional ideas 
50  Wassel and Rajalingam, A Survey of Community-Police Perceptions.
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of human rights and policing—security volunteers have been known to 
physically ‘arrest’ people, tie them up and wait for the police or in other 
cases take them to the police station themselves.51 Nonetheless, while 
there is a range of other contributing factors, according to interviews with 
local peacebuilding actors,52 and judging by the considerable reduction of 
violent incidents in these two regions in press reports, these pilot programs 
have almost certainly contributed to a reduction in the intensity and 
frequency of violent incidents in Viqueque and Liquisa, as well as increased 
engagement by the police with communities.53
Some initiatives are driven by particular communities, and this is an 
increasing occurrence. In the district of Ermera in 2012, a district-
wide tara bandu was held which set out regulations governing a wide 
set of public behaviours. This was in response to widespread community 
concern over the cost of lavish ceremonies including weddings and 
funerals and a variety of rituals, and a recognition that such occasions 
were also a common source of violence. Consequently, parents sometimes 
had difficulty with school expenses and even experienced food shortages. 
The local police commander has also trialled the use of traditional 
elders, known as kablehan, in a peacebuilding and community policing 
role. Kablehan traditionally mediate tara bandu ceremonies related to 
environmental conservation, and enforce sanctions. This role appears 
to be evolving, however, to include community mediation or conflict 
resolution, and even to resolve paternity suits and theft cases.54
A number of other highly localised community initiatives have also sprung 
up. One of these, for example, also based in Ermera District, is composed of 
about 21 members of the millenarian group Colimau 2000. Colimau 2000 
was a key actor in the 2006–2007 violence, and although little understood, 
it is widely feared. With some training from the Catholic Church–run Justice 
and Peace Commission in Dili, this group has conducted conflict resolution 
sessions between local informal security groups, including Colimau 2000 
and local martial arts groups. They also claim to play a preventive role by 
countering rumours that lead to conflict.55
51  Asia Foundation, The Proliferation of Security Providers.
52  As part of research for the report by the Asia Foundation, The Proliferation of Security Providers.
53  Both commanders have since been transferred, so it remains to be seen if the new commanders 
will continue to drive these programs. Belo and Rajalingam, Local Leadership of Community Policing 
Practices; Wassel and Rajalingam, A Survey of Community-Police Perceptions; Asia Foundation, 
The Proliferation of Security Providers.
54  Asia Foundation, The Proliferation of Security Providers.
55  Ibid.
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Conclusion
As Mac Ginty and Richmond contend:
hybridity is a condition that occurs, in large part, contextually; it 
is a  constant process of negotiation as multiple sources of power in 
a society compete, coalesce, seep into each other and engage in mimicry, 
domination or accommodation.
…
It is from contextual and mediated, local, state and international 
legitimacy that a localized process of ‘peace formation’ arises. This means 
bottom-up rather than merely top-down empowerment [of ] local and 
marginal actors, communities and individuals.56
These more recent donor-driven and locally initiated programs are not 
new in incorporating hybrid approaches. But as described above, many 
earlier efforts foundered on idealised notions of the value of traditional 
forms of leadership, locality, social organisation and structure. As we have 
seen, traditional community leaders have been politicised and mobilised 
in the name of sectarian violence in many areas. In localities suffering 
from endemic conflict over the past decade or so, these leaders and 
community structures clearly have been unable, or unwilling, to play an 
effective mediation role.
More recent initiatives have, however, sought to reinvigorate these 
community networks and, for the moment at least, have resulted in peace 
returning for a prolonged period to areas that had previously suffered 
from chronic conflict. Part of the reason for their success is improved local 
ownership, but also testifies to the more nuanced approach adopted to 
working with hybridity that acknowledges that times have changed. This 
approach recognises that there are a variety of other actors such as former 
clandestine networks, youth groups and even the church that are equally 
integral to engaging communities—that there is more than one type of 
hybridity. This does not mean that everything is perfect—there have been 
a number of violent confrontations between the police and communities 
in the past two to three years, and communal conflict continues to 
occur—but, overall, these developments provide hope for the future.
56  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 220, 231.









We are all hybrids. Our polities, societies, and economies are the result 
of a long process of hybridisation.1
Introduction
It is intuitive to view peace and war as inherently opposite categories. 
Peace is routinely defined as the freedom from organised collective 
violence, or as the ‘absence of war’. Conversely, war is generally conceived 
either in Clausewitzian terms as organised violence to achieve political 
ends or as a moral or legal condition defining the permissible limits of 
organised violence.2 And yet, one of the founding tenets of contemporary 
peace and conflict studies has been to reject this binary ‘negative’ concept 
of peace as merely the ‘absence of war’ by asserting a positive concept 
of peace that refers to consensual values and the ‘integration of human 
society’.3 The enduring aspiration of how to achieve peace can be summed 
up with the phrase ‘peace through peaceful means’. While the field has 
remained normatively grounded on sustaining a prohibition on the resort 
to violence—peace through peaceful means—it has also grappled with 
1  Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance.
2  See Metz and Cuccia, Defining War for the 21st Century.
3  Galtung, ‘An Editorial’, 2. For an extensive analysis of modern peace studies, see Galtung, 
Theories of Peace.
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questions of how, how much or in what way, military force ought to be 
deployed in contemporary challenges such as humanitarian interventions, 
complex emergencies and stabilising postconflict societies.4 Strategic and 
security studies have also been grappling with a widening (issues) and 
deepening (agency) security agenda which has opened up questions about 
the utility of force to respond to so-called non-conventional threats and 
in responding to non-state actors. Both fields of scholarship have utilised 
the concept of hybridity in their efforts to understand the blurred lines 
between peace, war and across a range of challenges in contemporary 
world politics.
In trying to frame different notions of hybridity, contributors to this 
volume  have differentiated between descriptive, prescriptive, analytical, 
normative and instrumental understandings or uses of hybridity.5 
In broad terms, hybridity has been characterised as arising from a process 
of mixing or blending, ‘an integration of two or more systems producing 
something different … where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’.6 
Both its etymological origins (Greek, Hybris: violation of nature; Latin, 
Hybrida: offspring, mongrel) and links with ‘controversial pseudoscientific 
theories’ have been problematically associated with imperialism and 
racialism. Notably, in the contemporary vernacular, the term has acquired 
more positive overtones (such as the environmentally friendly ‘hybrid 
car’). These positive uses of the term have also had a longstanding usage 
in botany (‘hybrid rose’) or animal husbandry (‘the mating of a wild boar 
with a tame sow’). The notion of hybridity used here retains some of 
this lineage and acknowledges the concept has elements of enhancement 
built into it, but still recalls less savoury meanings of the term. I also 
want to cautiously retain the idea that hybrid outcomes can be viewed as 
an offspring because it serves a purpose of revealing concepts that have 
been discarded or neglected. Two things should be obvious here: even 
‘descriptive’ uses of the term are likely to have some normative agency 
seeking to manipulate, observe or evaluate the hybrid output, and we 
should not imagine that modern uses of the term are any less positional.
4  Lawler, ‘Peace Research, War, and the Problem of Focus’.
5  Brown, this volume; Forsyth, this volume.
6  From the initial brief sent to participants of the 2015 workshop.
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One of the six themes identified by the editors of this volume7 was the 
notion that hybridity has been used to reinscribe binaries of spatiality 
(local/global), temporality (traditional/modern) and governance 
(coloniser/colonised, state/tribal). Hybridity opens up space to recognise 
how the interactions between these categories are themselves bound up 
with the ‘dynamics of power, agency and identity’.8 Seeking to understand 
how these (already) hybrid interactions are continuously renegotiated has 
been viewed as being central to the human condition; one that negotiates 
subject–object relations and is manifested ‘through crises of identity or 
changing relationships’.9 While analysis of violence and violent practices 
are inherent throughout peacebuilding scholarship, it would appear that 
questions relating to the blurred boundaries between war and peace 
require further consideration.
The following analysis will apply a ‘hybrid sensibility’ as a heuristic tool 
to consider how the peace/war binary might be reinscribed. It begins with 
a review of canonical texts that inform peace and war studies and asks two 
questions: ‘how has war been understood in peace theory?’ and ‘how has 
peace been understood in war studies?’ It then considers contemporary 
peace and conflict empirical research to show how a focus on hybridity 
helps to understand how the major trend of conflict recurrence is related 
to the interstitial period between the ending of war and the negotiations 
of peace.
Hybrid concepts of war in foundational 
peace texts
Augustine is widely regarded as a founding figure of the just war tradition, 
but he also made important contributions by introducing the concept of 
jus post bellum and was an early proponent of a universal peace understood 
as the ‘harmonic interaction of individuals with each other’.10 The central 
focus of Augustine’s work was to understand the conditions through 
which Christians could endure their existence in the City of Man in such 
7  Kent et al., ‘Introduction’, this volume.
8  Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’, 52.
9  Bassetti, ‘Hybridity’.
10  Recent reflections on St Augustine by Zwitter and Hoelzl have argued that he should not be 
thought of as a founding just war theorist but a founding figure of the just peace tradition. Zwitter 
and Hoelzl, ‘Augustine on War and Peace’.
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a way that might prepare them for their ascendency to the City of God. 
This meant pursuing a life that was moral and just, even when engaging 
in practices as transgressive as fighting a war. From his theological 
perspective, the profane world was full of strife and disappointment. Even 
in a condition of relative peace, Augustine warned of the dangers of sin 
and political manoeuvring:
For every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by 
making peace. For even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in 
which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed 
into a peace that suits them better … even robbers take care to maintain 
peace with their comrades, that they may with greater effect and greater 
safety invade the peace of other men [emphasis added].11
The notion that war is waged for peace illustrates a form of conceptual 
hybridity, but Augustine’s observations about agency and interest in the 
peace that follows is an inherently political insight demonstrating how 
he can be read as a key influence for contemporary hybrid postconflict 
analysis.
Contemporary just war theorists such as Michael Walzer have recalled 
and restated jus post bellum to remind military planners of the moral 
obligations that come with the transitional period from war to peace.12 
In his Law of Peoples, John Rawls also insists that at the end of a war, 
‘the enemy society is to be granted an autonomous well-ordered regime 
of its own’.13 More astutely, he recognised how ‘statesmen’ must take into 
account the way that the dispositions and grievances of a war can generate 
resentment in the host community:
The way a war is fought and the deeds done in ending it live on in the 
historical memory of societies and may or may not set the stage for future 
war. It is always the duty of statesmanship to take this longer view.14
If we now turn to Immanuel Kant as a foundational thinker of universal 
peace, we might also explore how, if at all, he conceived of war. Kant is 
most famous in modern peace studies for arguing that peace should not 
merely be understood negatively as the ‘absence of war’ but as a positive 
conceptual category. In Perpetual Peace, he developed the philosophical 
11  Augustine, De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos.
12  Walzer, Arguing about War.
13  Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 122.
14  Ibid., 96.
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case for the republic (or democratic) peace thesis and for a cosmopolitan 
world order. At his most utopian, Kant envisaged the abolition of standing 
armies and spies. Nevertheless, even in such a profoundly ‘categorical’ and 
normative work, there are signs of hybridity. We need look no further 
than the ‘First Preliminary Article’, which states:
No peace treaty is valid if it was made with mental reservations that could 
lead to a future war.15
Kant’s ‘mental reservations’ reveal how the formal process of making 
peace can itself be a potential cause of future war. In the modern era, one 
need only think of the ruptures and resentment encoded in famous peace 
treaties from Versailles, the Arusha Accords or the Dayton Agreement to 
see how formal conflict resolution structures can serve to calcify grievances 
and resentment which may be at least partly used to rationalise the next 
wave of violence.
Brian Orend has recently applied a Kantian cosmopolitan framework to 
the question of justice after conflict and arrived at a number of principles 
that he feels ought to peacefully guide the transition from war to peace.16 
More controversially, Roger Scruton asserted there were ‘good Kantian 
reasons’ for the ‘civilised world’ to ‘take pre-emptive measures’ in the Iraq 
war.17 A decade later, Scruton declared that Iraq was a ‘write-off’ because 
liberal principles had not, and perhaps would never, take hold. He argued 
that the 2003 Iraq war failed because it was formed on two fundamentally 
naive assumptions:
First, that democracy is the default position in politics, and secondly that 
you can achieve democracy even where there is no genuine nation state … 
What makes a democrat possible? The answer is: the nation. When you 
and I define our loyalty in national terms, we can put aside all differences 
of religion, tribe and ethnicity, and submit to a shared system of law.18
Dynamics of power, legitimacy and identity are revealed in this hybrid 
reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. Kantian observation about peace 
treaties forewarns about how failing to apply moral philosophy to formal 
peace negotiations can become the seeds of grievance for future war and 
15  Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals.
16  The principles are: proportionality and publicity; rights vindication; discrimination; punishment 
#1 (leaders), #2 (soldiers); compensation; and rehabilitation (Orend, ‘Justice after War’, 55–56; 
see also Orend, War and International Justice).
17  Scruton, ‘Immanuel Kant and the Iraq War’.
18  Scruton, ‘Why Iraq Is a Write-Off’. See also Schmidt, Rethinking Democracy Promotion.
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organised violence. It highlights how interstitial periods of transition 
from war to peace are often the most challenging and volatile. While 
Kantian cosmopolitanism (especially in Scruton’s interpretation) can 
be accused of imposing ethnocentric ‘civilising’ liberal state structures 
in interventions such as Iraq, what is revealed through the application 
of Kantian philosophy is the renegotiation of cultural identity during 
periods of conflict transformation. As James Gow observed in his analysis 
of the Balkan wars:
A critical challenge to legitimacy at a governmental level is not so serious as 
a challenge at the community level where the very existence of a political 
community, such as the Yugoslav state, is brought into question.19
The above analysis has brought us to a curious twist. At the cosmopolitan 
‘international’ level, the tacit conditions for war following a peace 
settlement reside in the neglect of, or failure to implement, core liberal 
principles. But, the ‘mental reservations’ that appear to be most responsible 
for perpetual conflict reside in the stubbornness of tribal or ethnic loyalties 
and authority. For Scruton, the failure to form a national identity lies at 
the heart of naive liberal interventions. It follows that externally imposed 
coercive liberal ‘nation-building’ projects have been the central target of 
criticism in the current hybrid peacekeeping literature.
Hybrid notions of peace in foundational 
war texts
Turning now to foundational texts on war, we may begin with Thomas 
Hobbes as the pre-eminent theorist on the state of nature being 
a  condition of war of all against all. Hobbes’s philosophy asserts that 
the human condition is governed by a restless desire for power in us 
all and the condition of fear that this creates in others. The purpose of 
a commonwealth (or leviathan) is to assuage these fears among its citizens. 
Hobbes’s views on the state of nature need not be recited except that 
we appear to have persistently forgotten how the passage ends:
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common 
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called 
war; and such a war as is of every man against every man … so the nature 
19  Gow, Legitimacy and the Military.
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of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition 
thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other 
time is PEACE [emphasis added].20
Even though Hobbes was writing amid a protracted civil war, his 
notion of war of every man against every man was hypothetical and, 
most intriguingly, understood as an ontological ‘disposition thereto’ or 
a state of mind. The commonwealth is assigned the responsibility to 
provide the normal condition of peace at all other times and it would 
appear that Hobbes also understood that the process of reconstituting 
a commonwealth required complex negotiations of power, legitimacy and 
identity. Central to this task was the ability for the state to command 
a  historical narrative of possession and belonging. In this regard, his 
analysis concerning the dissolution of commonwealths is astonishingly 
prescient and relevant for contemporary postconflict analysis.
That they [states] will all of them justifie the War, by which their power 
was first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their Right dependeth … 
Therefore I put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the Death 
of any State, that the Conquerers require not onely a Submission of 
mens actions to them for the future, but also an approbation of their 
actions past; when there is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose 
beginnings can be justified.21
While the above emphasis on Hobbes’s vision of peace may seem tenuous 
for some, our neglect of his theory of the peaceful condition of normal 
political life means that we have also tended to overlook other nuances in 
his philosophy that have attracted considerable critical attention in recent 
international political theory.
In The Empire of Security,22 William Bain reminded us that Hobbes 
provided one of the most succinct and pertinent conceptions of security 
when he declared: the safety of the people is the supreme law.23 Bain goes on 
to explain that the term ‘safety’ has critical and contemporary relevance 
and should be differentiated from cruder notions of mere survival: ‘not the 
sole preservation of life in what condition soever, but in order to its 
20  Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, 
ch. 13.
21  Ibid., bk 29.
22  Bain, The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People.
23  Hobbes, De Cive (The Citizen), bk 13.2.
HyBRIDITy ON THE GROUND IN PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT
210
happiness’.24 More interestingly for our purposes of searching for a hybrid 
sensibility is how Hobbes conceives of ‘the people’ as ‘not one civill Person, 
namely the City it selfe which governs, but the multitude of subjects 
which are governed’.25 In part, Hobbes is distinguishing the citizenry from 
his notion of the leviathan as an embodied political actor. But the above 
statement may also refer to a wider sense of the ‘people’ which includes 
all of those who reside under the aegis of the commonwealth. We might, 
for instance, imagine he is contemplating the challenge of living together 
after the experience of a civil war.
Another major re-examination of the Hobbesian legacy asserts that the 
persistent misrepresentation of Hobbes has created a significant distortion 
in how international relations understands itself. Reassessing Hobbes is 
a necessary step in helping international relations move past crude notions 
of state centrism.
International theory can be understood as a field of politics rather than just 
the study of the inter-state clash of national interests in a balance of power. 
Hobbes is self-consciously aware of the intimate connection between 
sovereignty and what we would now call politics … He establishes his 
conception of sovereignty—the greatest accomplishment of the artifice of 
men—precisely as a solution to politics.26
Recent reinterpretations of Hobbes provide an opportunity to view this 
profoundly influential work in new ways. One aspect that must be borne 
out when viewing Hobbes as a theorist advocating the ‘safety of the people’ 
is that he was writing amid such violence. This is perhaps symptomatic 
of Western liberal philosophy whereby ‘modern liberalism begins by 
forgetting the English revolution’.27 Hobbes’s aspiration to find a solution 
to the problem of human nature, as he saw it, was precisely to understand 
the dynamics of power, agency and identity during a tumultuous period 
of civil war and postconflict transformation.
At first glance, it may seem ambitious to search for a theory of peace 
in Clausewitz’s seminal work, On War.28 In addition to his most famous 
aphorisms considered below, he also stated ‘to secure peace is to prepare 
for war’. Basil Liddel Hart also accused Clausewitz of making policy 
24  Ibid., bk 8.4.
25  Ibid., bk 13.3.
26  Prokhovnik and Slomp, International Political Theory after Hobbes, 189.
27  Feltham, Anatomy of Failure.
28  Clausewitz, On War.
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the slave of strategy and in doing so ‘looked only to the end of war, not 
beyond war to the subsequent peace’.29 More recently, Gideon Rose has 
taken a different view, perhaps not of Clausewitz, but of how his work 
might inform analyses of these transitional periods. In How Wars End, 
Rose documented the failure of successive United States administrations 
to satisfactorily manage the conclusion of six wars spanning the twentieth 
and early twenty-first century.30 Central to his argument is what he calls 
the ‘Clausewitzian challenge’:
Wars actually have two equally important aspects. One is negative, or 
coercive; this is the part about fighting, about beating up the bad guys. 
The other is positive, and is all about politics. And this is the part that, 
as in Iraq, is usually overlooked or misunderstood.31
When we think about this notion of the ‘other means’ in Clausewitz, 
we can discern that he has firm ideas about the nature of what might 
constitute normal political life. Like Hobbes, Clausewitz concludes 
his aphorism with an indication that we might all share a consensual 
understanding of the everyday or the ‘normal’ means of political life.32 
What Rose found in his application of the political meaning of war in 
Clausewitz was a fixation in United States military and political leadership 
to win the war combined with a persistent failure to build the peace. 
The mindset and institutional momentum were entirely oriented towards 
the former at the expense of the latter:
Both the planners and the commander had been schooled to see fighting 
as the realm of war and thus attached lesser importance to post-war issues. 
No officer in the headquarters was prepared to argue for actions that would 
siphon resources from the war fighting effort, when the fighting had not 
yet begun … Who could blame them? The business of the military is war 
and war is fighting … Only a fool would propose hurting the war fighting 
effort to address post-war conditions that might or might not occur.33
29  Howard, ‘The Influence of Clausewitz’, 39–40.
30  Rose, How Wars End.
31  Ibid. Clausewitz’s two concepts of war were: (1) an act of force to compel our enemy to do our 
will and (2) nothing but a continuation of policy by other means. Clausewitz, On War, bk 1.1, 24.
32  This is not to say that we find a pluralist and vernacular understanding of everyday experience 
of security and politics in Clausewitz. For a contemporary hybrid analysis of this see Luckman and 
Kirk, ‘Understanding Security in the Vernacular’.
33  United States military planner Lieutenant Colonel Steven Petersen. Cited in Rose, How Wars 
End, ch. 1.
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It is routinely observed that strategic failures are often attributable to the 
phenomenon of commanders still trying to ‘fight the last war’. What 
Rose showed was that successive United States administrations failed to 
win the last peace. Clausewitz continues to exert enormous influence over 
contemporary war studies. Contemporary Clausewitzians acknowledge that 
while the character of war will always be susceptible to change with political, 
economic, social and technological shifts, the essential nature of war as 
violent, instrumental and political remains constant.34 Even within this 
traditionalist mode of war studies, we can discern profoundly constitutive, 
dynamic and hybrid understandings of the relationship between war and 
political legitimacy. For instance, postcolonial theorists Tarak Barkawi 
and Shane Brighton call for the decentring of war, describing how:
the changing character of war concerns relations between the 
transformation of polities and societies through war and the effects of those 
transformations on war itself … war disrupts knowledge (and  thereby 
generates the need for new knowledge) and how this process of disruption 
and generation has direct consequence for political authority … the 
formulation ‘war in society’ … attending to the co-constitutive character 
of war and society relations in world politics.35
More radical scholars have also returned to war studies to reclaim 
the ground, especially as an embodied and deeply social experience. 
Acknowledging that she has ‘no stomach for war’, postmodern feminist 
Christine Sylvester nevertheless insists that it should be examined from 
a critical perspective because:
war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people’s 
physical, emotional, and social experiences, not only down from ‘high 
politics’ … [and] bodies, always contested identities, can become 
bewildering in their multiplicities and overlapping identities during war.36
In using Clausewitz’s enduring notion of war as a continuation of policy or 
politics, we arrive at a point on our hybrid journey where the most famous 
theorist of war has provided one of the most enduring insights into the 
possibilities of peace. Following Rose’s analysis, Clausewitz reminds us 
that the failure to think through the implications of rebuilding consensual 
and pluralist political communities is likely to lead to conflict recurrence. 
Contemporary war studies is extending this notion of politics by other 
34  Strachan and Scheipers, The Changing Character of War.
35  Barkawi and Brighton, ‘Conclusion: Absent War Studies?’, 525f.
36  Sylvester, War as Experience, 2, 117.
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means into co-constitutive epistemological and social understandings 
of war (and peace). The ‘experiential turn’ in international relations has set 
its sights on the conventional intellectual terrain of war studies precisely 
because it seeks to reveal the emotional and embodied experiences of 
people, especially those who are most seriously affected and marginalised, 
by the practices of modern warfare.
Conflict dynamics and recurrence
The above ruminations on philosophical arguments suggest that 
binary categories of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ have always been viewed critically 
and that  notions of hybridity are quite discernible in formulations 
such as Augustine’s caution about the ‘invasion of peace’ or Kant’s 
‘tacit conditions’ of war. Hybridity encourages a focus on the dynamics 
of power, legitimacy and identity in ‘conflict affected’ societies. Whereas 
Clausewitz had established the idea that war was a continuation of politics 
by other means, hybrid approaches to peace recalibrate that aphorism to 
reveal how the interstitial space between war and peace is also inherently 
anchored to the ‘political’.
Current empirical research on the trends of armed conflict also reveals 
that the dominant trend over the past decade especially has been the 
high rate of recurrence of armed conflict. Leading providers of armed 
conflict data such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program confirm that the 
dominant trend over the past few decades has been that most conflicts 
are not new but recurring.37 In other words, the empirical evidence of 
conflict recurrence demonstrates that wars are not only the continuation 
of policy by other means, but are tending to occur because peace processes 
are regularly breaking down.
Analysing this data through the lens of hybridity encourages us to think 
more critically about the limitations of top-down approaches to conflict 
resolution and management. Conflict transformation theory has explored 
the idea of negative transformations understood as the potentially violent 
outcomes of peace resolution, settlement or management processes.38 
Notions of critical realism or what we might call a strategic understanding 
37  See Gates et al., ‘Conflict Recurrence’; Hewitt, ‘Trends in Global Conflict’ and Melander et al., 
‘Organized Violence’.
38  See Ramsbotham et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution; Ryan, The Transformation of Violent 
Intercommunal Conflict.
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of peace have also challenged the rigid categorical binary between war 
and peace.39 Critical peacebuilding scholars have also examined notions of 
negative and positive hybridity and shown how these generate significant 
dilemmas.40 Empirically, this intellectual movement in hybrid peace has 
encouraged more research from the point of view of localised people 
caught up in the everyday challenges of transformation. Mac Ginty and 
Richmond observe that internationally prescribed peace agreements fail 
because they do not engage with ‘the local’:
Attempts at making peace agreements around the world are normally 
negotiated in Western bubbles (geographically in the West or within 
a ‘green zone’ in the conflict environment), according to Northern 
rationalities, with few local elites involved who have a controversial claim 
to represent local constituencies.41
To understand the emotional and social dynamics of conflict recurrence, 
qualitative research that documents feelings of frustration and grievance 
has produced powerful insights into the dilemmas of transformation.42 
Conceptually, new arguments are emerging through this analysis. 
One example is Mary Kaldor and Sabine Selchow’s Subterranean Politics in 
Europe, which documented ‘ripples of discomfort in established institutions, 
challenging dominant ways of thinking and unsettling normal assumptions 
about how politics is done’.43 Kaldor’s recent commentary on identity and 
war has also lead to an incisive observation about ‘sectarian’ identity:
Sectarian identity is an outcome of war rather than being a deep-rooted 
legacy of the past that can lead to war, even though such identities build 
on (selective) memory and culture. The implication of this proposition is 
that war should be interpreted less as an external contest of will between 
two sides but rather as a one-sided and/or parallel effort to construct 
unidimensional political identities as a basis for power. Power derived 
from identity so constructed is likely to be authoritarian and repressive.44
Empirical research deploying notions of hybrid peace is often strongly 
focused on the operational and agency level. As Richmond puts it, hybrid 
peace refers to ‘the politics of peacemaking and the dynamics of power, 
39  Piiparinen, The Transformation of UN Conflict Management.
40  Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’.
41  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building’, 763–764.
42  Brown and Gusmao, ‘Peacebuilding and Political Hybridity’; Wallis, ‘A Liberal–Local Hybrid 
Peace Project’.
43  Kaldor and Selchow, Subterranean Politics in Europe, 8.
44  Kaldor, ‘Identity and War’, 345.
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agency and identity’.45 This has produced important analysis challenging 
the effectiveness of peacebuilding operations and seeking to understand 
conflict transformation from the ground up. Some of the more interesting 
conceptual arguments to emerge from these studies return to the central 
themes identified in the earlier discussion of the canon. It has a future-
oriented goal and seeks to grapple with the challenges of negotiating 
legitimacy under stressful conditions of political community reformation. 
As Brown and Gusmao put it:
peacebuilding works toward the restoration or reconstitution of political 
community, in the most fundamental and inclusive sense, in the face of 
a legacy or the ongoing reality of violent conflict … Political hybridity 
is the co-existence of introduced Western (generally liberal institutional) 
models of governance and local governance practices, rooted in place and 
culture, and enjoying widespread social legitimacy [emphasis added].46
Trying to make sense of the interaction between international ideas, 
agendas and practices and various forms of local response, resistance and 
reinterpretation is a major empirical challenge for analysts of hybridity 
in postconflict societies. Normative assumptions about ‘restoration’, 
for example, need to be carefully scrutinised because they may provide 
political support for conditions that caused earlier conflicts. As the 
problem of conflict recurrence continues to bedevil policymakers at 
the  global level, more careful consideration and dialogue with a wider 
array of local actors have been demonstrably successful.47 It will not be 
the case that all local responses are viewed favourably. Indeed, as Kaldor 
and others have shown, the international community is liable to grow 
increasingly anxious about local practices of resistance, especially those 
that are deemed to pose serious threats to global security.
Conclusion
Projects of making or building peace are not merely concerned with 
settlement or restoration of previous power relations. They are also 
crucially about more dynamic practices such as reconstitution and many 
other things. In order for ‘normal’ political life to return, decisions must be 
45  Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’, 52.
46  Brown and Gusmao, ‘Peacebuilding and Political Hybridity’, 61, 62.
47  See Boege, ‘Vying for Legitimacy in Post-conflict Situations’; Regan, ‘Lessons from a Successful 
Peace Process in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea’.
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made to support ‘everyday’ life. People need to eat, be housed, hopefully 
get to school and find employment. Postconflict societies are in this sense 
anything but ‘still’; they are busy and complicated. Political decisions must 
also address issues of opportunity and equality. Perceived or real biases, 
resentment, grievances and rights must be managed in the political space. 
Many of these decisions do not occur at the level of government, but at the 
level of the home or the village. Some disputes may be addressed through 
traditional mechanisms such as tribal councils. Goods and services may be 
more readily available through illicit entrepreneurs.
Observers of postconflict societies have sought a new lexicon to make sense 
of these complex transitional forms of political and social life. Hybrid 
analysis is drawn towards these alternative governance and agency stories 
and is likely to rebound critically on top-down, static, linear structures 
often attributed to ‘international’ institutions or the ‘governmental’ 
viewpoint. Hybridity should also be alert to the way that empowering 
local agency dynamics might generate pernicious outcomes.
Questions of legitimacy are all the more important and acute in 
postconflict societies because political life is being remade. A postconflict 
scenario is tumultuous not only because it is a statebuilding activity, but 
crucially a nation-building one. Conflict may reignite because questions 
of power, agency and identity are unresolved. Perhaps there were portions 
of the community that sought advantage or opportunities to invade the 
peace of others? Perhaps the formal agreements incorporated elements 
that systematically disadvantaged some members of the community? 
Perhaps the hybrid political order had not adhered to the supreme law 
of ensuring the safety of all the people (not just the citizens and elite)? 
Or maybe the elite were focused only on winning the war and failed to 
fulfil their responsibilities to continue and restore normal political life?
As a conceptual or heuristic tool, hybridity allows analysts to reinscribe 
rigid binaries to reveal nuances and overlapping understandings. Peace 
and war are difficult to define but they are not static and perhaps not 
usefully understood as pure categorical opposites. A brief review of the 
canon reveals that peace/war exist on a continuum that is conceptually 
anchored to the ‘political’.
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(In)Security and Hybrid Justice 
Systems in Mindanao, Philippines
Imelda Deinla
Introduction
Hybridity is often conflated with the fragile state or the ‘absence’ of the 
state in a conflict environment.1 The emergence of hybrid institutions is 
also explained primarily in terms of the lack of capacity and legitimacy 
of state organs and its personnel or in the condition of a power vacuum.2 
A sense of power disequilibrium or societal imbalance and disarray inheres 
from this presumption. Hybridity, however, serves a function that sustains 
conflict resilience and at the same time address immediate justice needs. 
Hybrids arise to provide a state of equilibrium and to provide order in 
an otherwise messy condition—while also contributing to the messiness. 
My study of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), 
Philippines, points to how hybrid justice mechanisms have developed to 
cope with insecurity arising from actual and perceived injustices in the 
community.3
1  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’; Boege et al., On Hybrid Political 
Orders; Clements et al., ‘State Building Reconsidered’.
2  Ibid.
3  This article is part of a broader study on plural justice, women and peacebuilding in ARMM 
through an Australian Development Research Award Scheme grant. Data collection was undertaken 
from 2014 to 2016 by conducting a justice provider survey (using qualitative methods of interviews 
and focus group discussions) and a justice user survey (using more quantitative, face-to-face survey 
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In this region where almost 90 per cent of the population are Muslims 
with a long history of resistance to colonialism and central state authority, 
hybrid justice mechanisms are drawn from a panoply of customary, 
Islamic and state legal practices and personnel.4 Hybrid mechanisms 
operate through informal and formal networks to deliver ‘justice’ and 
secure the community from further escalation of violence arising from 
retribution. While most hybrids are local innovations and assured by 
the predominance of, or coalition of, local power holders, local–national 
innovation has also emerged in responding to local demands for speed, 
flexibility and adequacy of remedies and outcomes. Some form of state-
led hybridity has also emerged and offers some insights on enhancing the 
delivery of effective and relevant justice services through professional and 
culturally attuned justice personnel. This may provide a counterbalance 
to other forms of hybrids that capitalise on power asymmetry and 
discriminatory practices.
Statebuilding, hybrid legal order and justice
The term ‘hybrid political order’ is a fairly recent conceptual tool to 
describe a condition where ‘diverse and competing authority structures, 
sets of rules, logics of order, and claims of power co-exist, overlap, 
interact, and intertwine’.5 Hybridity can be observed in many plural 
and multi-ethnic environments but it is in conflict and postconflict 
regimes that hybrid political orders are expressed more concretely. This 
has given academics, policymakers and development workers a better 
understanding of the complex and multilayered nature of rules and 
norms that operate in conflict-affected environments. An appreciation 
of hybridity has increasingly become relevant in peacebuilding and 
development programming by a range of actors. It has become a useful 
approach to describe a state of flux, nonlinear movement of change and 
instruments in selected areas in Mindanao). All interviews and focus group discussions are anonymised 
to protect the identity of respondents. Special thanks to Professor Veronica Taylor, co-investigator in 
this project, and local partners: Dr Acram Latiph, Araceli Habaradas, Amanah Busran Lao, Alamira 
Alonto, National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, Office of the Court Administrator Supreme 
Court of the Philippines, Nisa ul Haq Bangsamoro, Teduray Lambiangan Women’s Organization and 
Public Attorney’s Office for support in data collection. Opinions expressed in this article are the sole 
responsibility of the author.
4  See Deinla and Taylor, ‘Towards Peace’.
5  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, 17.
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spheres of influence, the crisscrossing of actors in various domains aside 
from highlighting the non-exclusivity and non-privilege of state authority 
as a source of law, order and security.6
Hybridity has also challenged conventional views about the process of 
statebuilding, particularly in conflict-affected regions. The conventional 
perspective makes an association between hybridity and a weak or fragile 
state. It follows from this assumption that dispersion of authority or 
power structures may not be conducive to building sustainable peace and 
development. This view takes an opposite or less enthusiastic appreciation 
for the role of hybrid and other informal institutions in building 
sustainable peace and strengthening state institutions.7 Objections are 
centred on their ad hoc flexible nature, persistence of discriminatory 
practices and the tendency of certain arrangements to privilege, and thus 
exclude, a particular class of people over other groups. For instance, an 
‘exclusive’ hybrid political order limits key political functions to a small 
group of elites who have control or monopoly of power. On the other 
hand, and showing case studies of different hybrid sites, several authors 
put forward an argument that makes the case for hybrid structures. 
They argue that being derived from or being mediated by historically 
and organically grown institutions such as kinship-based and traditional 
informal institutions, hybrids are in fact valuable owing to their strong 
social embeddedness and local legitimacy.8
The main enquiry for this chapter is to re-examine statebuilding processes 
and hybridity, and their relationship with the provision of justice in 
a  conflict-affected area. The World Bank Development Report 2011 
points to ‘injustice’ as one of the major causes of conflict and vulnerability 
of the state system.9 Why has conflict, particularly what is termed ‘low-
intensity’ conflict, endured for decades? In this condition, the state 
remains—though obscurely—and state institutions continue to provide 
a modicum of public goods to the people. In areas where conflict and 
the cycle of violence have persisted, the terms ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ 
6  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’; Boege et al., On Hybrid Political 
Orders; Boege et  al., ‘States Emerging from Hybrid Political Orders’; Kraushaar and Lambach, 
‘Hybrid Political Orders’; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace’.
7  See, for example, Fritz and Rocha Menocal ‘(Re)building Developmental States’; Ghani et al., 
‘An Agenda for State Building in the Twenty-First Century’.
8  See, for example, Boege et al., States Emerging from Hybrid Political Orders; Clements et al., ‘State 
Building Reconsidered’; Höglund and Orjuela, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance and Illiberal Peacebuilding 
in Sri Lanka’; Wiuff Moe, ‘Hybrid and “Everyday” Political Ordering’.
9  World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 7, 82.
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may not be mutually exclusive, while a dichotomy between a weak and 
strong state  may be an oversimplification. By examining the nature 
and operation of a hybrid justice system in Mindanao, I will show the high 
degree of entanglement between society and the state that has allowed for 
a condition of ‘stability’ and sustained and reinforced both traditional 
and modern bases of authority. This is the condition of equilibrium 
among different competing authorities in state and non-state sectors that 
is also reflected in the development of a hybrid legal order—and justice 
system—in Mindanao.
A corollary question in this chapter is: how viable are hybrid justice 
mechanisms in securing sustainable justice? Inherent in hybrids is 
their ability to manage or cope with instability, stress or break in social 
relations.10 While hybrids provide ‘solutions’, they also have a propensity 
to ‘normalise’ relations between opposing authorities and in the day-to-
day interactions of communities. Using local traditions and available 
resources—but often underpinned by local drivers, primarily the local 
elites—hybrids rebalance the stresses and disequilibrium caused by 
disruptions, breaks, tensions and threats to ‘social order’. In tackling this 
issue, I will show the paradox of justice in Mindanao and why the cycle 
of violence and injustice prevails despite an explosion of various justice 
mechanisms that all claim to respond effectively to the justice needs of the 
people. This research has identified a proliferation of avenues where people 
in the community run to in order to seek redress for their justice issues. 
In varying ways and means, different justice providers render services that 
seek to satisfy the justice needs of individuals and families affected by 
disputes. What ‘justice’ means in Mindanao, and other contexts, may 
differ from Western liberal values that are centred on a fair and public 
trial being presided over by an impartial and impersonal judge rendering 
decisions backed by the state’s coercive mechanisms. In this region, the 
participation of the affected parties and their families in discussing the 
offences and remedies, provision of security, payment of blood money and 
reconciliation are desired justice outcomes that are highly preferable over 
public trial and court judgement. And yet, many forms of injustice recur 
as frequently as they are resolved or adjudicated in many forums.
10  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, 18.
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A key point here is that the issue is not so much whether hybrid reality 
needs to be taken account of but on how much or how far existing hybrid 
arrangements are to be part of future institutional and legal order. How 
do we use our knowledge of hybrid justice orders in informing or shaping 
a justice architecture that responds effectively to the cycle of injustice?
(In)security, conflict and hybridity
A starting point for this chapter is to see injustice as a by-product of 
unresolved or recurring conflicts in society. Systemic issues in the political, 
economic and cultural spheres—all interlinked—shape the forms 
and dynamics of conflicts. As many studies in Mindanao have shown, 
disputes have many dimensions, new forms of conflicts are created and 
existing ones become even more complex.11 The recurrence of conflicts 
further influences structural issues and the way conflicts are addressed. 
The escalation of conflict—particularly the intensified use of violence—
drives rapid hybridisation especially in dealing with the most destructive 
consequences of violent conflict and in providing security and stability. 
Figure 13.1 illustrates the enduring relationship of conflicts and hybrid 
justice mechanisms.
In this research, I see the role of a hybrid justice system in performing 
this rebalancing role by providing ‘immediate justice needs’ (primarily 
compensation in the form of blood money) and security (often in the 
form of counter/contra violence against perpetrators) to ‘justice seekers’. 
Thus the state has much to owe hybridisation for its survival in the same 
(or  similar) manner as traditional forms of authority. Hybridisation, 
however, often involves compromise and convenience in a situation 
of dispersed authority and conflict. The lack of a critical and more 
deliberative form of hybridisation results in entrenching an ‘exclusivist’ 
hybrid political order of local powerful families or clans. It fosters the 
emergence of alternative forms of justice mechanisms that promise ‘more 
effective and swift’ delivery of justice but run counter to fundamental 
human rights standards. Hybridisation has also shown disproportionate 
or inconsistent treatment of offences or issues involving women.
11  See, for example, Abinales, Making Mindanao; Lara and Schoofs, Out of the Shadows; Quimpo, 
‘Back to War in Mindanao’; Torres, Rido.
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Figure 13.1: The relationship of conflict and hybrid justice mechanisms
Source: Author’s work .
In this chapter, I show how the interaction of conflict and local power 
dynamics has become the main trigger for hybridisation—on state, 
non-state and often the coalescing of the two sites that results in the 
dissolution of the binaries. Local actors perform a range of roles that do 
not distinguish between private, public, state and non-state functions, 
although these binaries or categories are often used by the actors 
themselves. In my research I deploy the term ‘justice providers’—those who 
perform justice services such as by adjudication, mediation, negotiation 
and provision of remedies to parties, although they themselves can be 
both providers and users, even at the same time. In ways, these hybrid 
entities identify themselves as ‘non-state, informal, or traditional’ to 
differentiate themselves from entities created by the state or those that are 
not expressly, but in many ways, tacitly, recognised by the state. Users also 
recognise these binaries, and do so without realising or acknowledging 
that these ‘informal, traditional mechanisms’ are highly formalised and 
have appropriated elements of what they call the state formal system.
By engaging in a critical examination of how hybrids evolve, this may 
also allow us to determine the occurrence of ‘hybrid capture’. This 
is a  condition  where particular interests dominate both process and 
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outcomes for their own advantage or gain, to exclude some groups, or 
pursue their agenda. But even with this ‘capture’ we cannot also deny the 
agency of the users—or simply those who avail themselves of the remedies 
or outcomes offered by these service providers. Forum shopping has long 
been recognised as a feature of the existence and co-existence of different 
legal orders and norms, and is, if not equally, a main driving force for 
innovation and competition, or the process of continuous hybridisation.12
Hybrid justice and security in Mindanao
The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is a multi-
ethnic region that easily lends to a highly plural and hybrid, legal order. 
There are at least 13 identified Muslim and non-Muslim ethnolinguistic 
groups.13 The largest ethnic groupings in terms of their population size 
are the Maguindanaoan (Maguindanao), Maranao (Lanao del Sur) and 
Tausug (island provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi).14 The Muslim 
population is estimated to be 90  per cent of the total population of 
3,256,123 million people, while the rest comprise Christians and other 
smaller Islamised and non-Islamised ethnic groups.15 The region is 
composed of five provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu 
and Tawi-Tawi), formed out of a plebiscite conducted in 1989 and later 
in 2001 after Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054) was passed into law. 
RA 9054 incorporated the agreement in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement 
between the Philippine Government and the then-dominant Muslim 
insurgency group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which 
called for the expansion of areas covered by autonomy.
Understanding the term ‘justice’ in Mindanao has to start from an 
understanding of the multilayered nature of conflict in the region and 
what is being demanded for the resolution of these conflicts. First, there is 
conflict between the state and the Moros arising from ‘historical injustice’ 
of colonisation, the formation of the Philippine state that deprived them 
of their claim for self-determination, and their marginalisation from 
12  See Deinla and Taylor, ‘Towards Peace’, 27; Holbrook, ‘Legal Hybridity in the Philippines’, 449; 
Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism’, 389.
13  Asian Development Bank, Indigenous and Ethnic Minorities and Poverty Reduction, 4.
14  See Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, 59–61; Hooker, ‘Muhammadan Law and Islamic Law’, 163; 
Jundam, Tunggal Hulah-Duwa Sarah, 10; Tan, Decolonization and Filipino Muslim Identity, 2–4.
15  Based on population census as of 1 May 2010, Philippine Statistics Authority, Philippine 
Standard Geographic Code, nap.psa.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/regview.asp?region=15
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central authority in terms of participation in political and economic 
affairs.16 Justice in this light is seen to require a recognition of the Muslim 
peoples’ right to self-determination including their way of life and justice. 
Thus the first peace negotiation involving the MNLF heralded the 
establishment of the Shari’ah court system in Mindanao with the passage 
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.17
Since the formation of the Philippine state, the region has been plagued 
with an unabated cycle of violence that was heightened with the 
declaration of martial law in 1972.18 Peace negotiations have been carried 
out by successive governments, with the exception of the administration 
of Joseph Estrada that waged an ‘all-out’ war in Mindanao in the early 
2000s. In this period, more than half a million people were displaced 
from their homes. Since the 1970s, it is estimated that more than 120,000 
people have died resulting from or as an incidence of conflict.19 Peace 
agreements were signed first with the MNLF and recently with the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group that was established in 
the late 1970s to fight for secessionism. The MILF negotiated with the 
Philippine Government for greater autonomy during Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo’s administration but it was during the outgoing presidency of 
Benigno Aquino Jr that produced a near-culminating comprehensive 
peace settlement.20 In this latter peace agreement, a Comprehensive 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro was forged between the government and 
MILF that would have paved the way for the creation of the Bangsamoro 
entity that will exercise greater autonomy.
However, subnational conflicts are endemic in the region and are causing 
as much violence and crime as the insurgency war. The five provinces in 
ARMM have one of the highest incidences of crime in the country on 
a  per population basis.21 The impact of this enduring conflict is seen 
16  See Abinales, Making Mindanao; Bertrand, ‘Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines’; 
Quimpo, ‘Back to War’; Quimpo, ‘Mindanao’.
17  Embodied in Presidential Decree No. 1083 (1977); see also Mastura, ‘Legal Pluralism in the 
Philippines’, 463–465.
18  Abinales, Making Mindanao; Kreuzer, Violence as a Means of Control and Domination in the 
Southern Philippines; Quimpo, ‘Back to War’.
19  Schiavo-Campo and Judd, ‘The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines’, 5.
20  The peace settlement, in particular the passage of the bill on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, was 
halted and derailed in the aftermath of the Mamasapano massacre on 25 January 2015 that resulted 
in the deaths of 44 policemen.
21  International Alert, ‘Violence in the Bangsamoro and Southern Mindanao’; data for 2008–2013 
gathered in this research from the Philippine National Police.
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in  the deprivation and marginalisation in the social and economic life 
of the people in the region. All of the ARMM provinces are consistently 
in the bottom 10 of the poorest provinces in the Philippines.22 Insurgency 
and subnational conflicts also have a reciprocal relationship which fuels 
and sustains all types of violence and conflict.23 Inadequate state security, 
proliferation of firearms, the presence of different armed groups including 
private armies and terror and crime groups, and the weak functioning 
of the  state justice system all contribute to a climate of violence 
and impunity.24
Underlying conflicts in Mindanao is the phenomenon of rido, a form 
of clan feuding that is rooted in the sociocultural fabric of society.25 
Honour or maratabat—and its reverse, shame—is a paramount value in 
traditional societies in Mindanao; putting a clan’s honour on the line has 
dire consequences for those who tarnish or undermine it.26 Individual 
honour, or shame, is a collective trait and responsibility such that an 
infraction against a person is treated as one against their family and clan. 
Rido can be triggered by major disputes such as political and economic 
competition, land disputes and violence committed to a person.27 It can also 
be precipitated by minor or petty issues. Interviews conducted reveal that 
all forms of issues are susceptible to rido. Some of the stories narrated were 
over disagreements on dowry and guardianship, offending family members 
by showing affection to a woman, and non-payment of debts. Rido is 
a form of dispute settlement where disputes are settled by exacting a ‘score’ 
against the opposing family or clan. Until the number of hits or fatalities 
are almost parity, the dispute is not considered ripe for settlement. While 
rido is generally seen as negative and destructive, it is widely exercised across 
Muslim, indigenous and Christian populations in Mindanao. My research 
also reveals that many favour rido as essential in order to settle disputes 
despite its destructive impact on the family and the community.28 As the 
following discussion demonstrates, rido is the force behind the dynamic 
hybridisation of the justice architecture in Mindanao.
22  UNDP, ‘Human Development Index Highlights Inequality’.
23  On conflict morphing see International Alert, Rebellion, Political Violence and Shadow Crimes 
in the Bangsamoro, 28.
24  See Lara and Schoofs, Out of the Shadows.
25  Torres, Rido: Clan Feuding, 11–13.
26  Durante et al., ‘Management of Clan Conflict and Rido amoung the Tausug, Magindanao, 
Maranao, Sama, and Yakan Tribes’, 105; Torres, Rido, 20–22.
27  Torres, Rido, 16–17; also interviews conducted among justice providers; there is increasing 
competition over illegal economic activities such as drugs trade.
28  Justice user survey, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur province, September 2015.
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Hybrid justice and security in ARMM
The plural and hybrid justice architecture in ARMM is a by-product 
of its own historical development, the process of state–society formation 
and interaction, and of the persistence of conflicts. These three forces 
developed and continue to shape laws, norms and mechanisms that 
respond to problems or issues that community members face in their day-
to-day lives. The ‘everyday life’ of residents in a conflict or postconflict 
area differs, however, from those living away from a condition of daily 
threats of violence and armed conflict. Often, broader social justice issues 
such as political exclusion and competition, economic inequality, poverty, 
access to education and health services, and land conflicts underlie many 
crimes or socially unacceptable behaviour that disrupt peace and drive 
further conflict in the community. For example, small crimes handled in 
secular courts in conflict-ridden areas involve thefts in shopping centres, 
money scams and non-payment of debts or loans that reflect on the dire 
economic condition of many people. In the aftermath of the siege of 
Zamboanga City by a faction of MNLF combatants, civil court judges 
reported high incidences of shoplifting of infant formula milk.29 These 
types of cases impose a heavy burden on women, who not only face the 
challenge of providing for the basic needs of their families but are also 
subject to various suits in civil courts.30
The continuation of traditional authority and norms that survived waves 
of  Western colonisation has ensured that state formation in this region 
is uneven, complex and fraught with difficulties. While the process 
of statebuilding disrupted the further evolution of nascent state-like 
authority which had been based on the authority of the sultan and datu 
(village chief ),  traditional authority, through cooperation, negotiation or 
co-optation, ensured that the Philippine state is a constant presence in 
the  region. The state, and its structures, has created winners and losers 
in the process, including by introducing a new arena for competition among 
families or clans. The state as a source of formal-legal power, patronage and of 
economic and resource opportunities provides incentives for fierce and often 
coercive contestation among contending elites and other authorities vying 
for power.31 In return, local state officials ensure the omnipresence of the 
29  Interview with civil court judges, April 2014.
30  Interview with civil court judges, April 2014. According to interviews, breaches of contracts and 
non-payment of loans are usually the responsibility of women in the household.
31  Abinales, Making Mindanao, 188; Caballero-Anthony, ‘The Philippines in Southeast Asia’, 
7–13; McCoy, An Anarchy of Families.
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state and provide local ‘stability’. Results of the justice user survey reveal that 
73 per cent of respondents feel ‘secure’ in their community.32 Local state 
elites in Mindanao, as elsewhere in the Philippines, have enjoyed autonomy 
from the state and even from the insurgency groups given their possession 
of state authority, resources and means of coercion.33
The most violent and destructive forms of rido—and the most difficult 
to resolve—have been fought over electoral contests and economic 
competition or rivalry.34 Rido, which usually happens between ethnic 
groups, has also become more vicious with this new layer of contestation. 
While women and children are generally spared from reprisals, spates 
of rido involving electoral competition in recent years have seen several 
children, elderly and women killed or brutalised.35 For these types of 
rido, the cycle of violence continues for years or decades even if there 
is cessation of hostilities and settlement of the dispute.36 It needs to be 
stressed that violence involving women—whether Muslim, indigenous 
or Christian—is borne out of this complex relationship of tradition, 
politics, economics and conflict that make women more vulnerable to 
physical, sexual, economic and emotional violence. For example, women 
public schoolteachers, regardless of their ethnicity, have become targets 
of panggoyod (forcible abduction for marriage) in the island province of 
Sulu due to the income they can bring to the family, or targets of physical 
violence for fulfilling their duties as election officials.37
The interlocking nature of conflicts in Mindanao therefore lends itself 
to multiple and complex processes of dispute resolution and justice 
outcomes. A hybrid justice system is a necessary consequence of the 
complex dynamics of history, politics and conflict that serves to provide 
32  The justice user survey, conducted in July 2016 in ARMM, had 544 respondents: 39.5 per cent 
male, 57 per cent female and 3.5 per cent ‘no response’. The survey was conducted in collaboration 
with the National Commission of Muslim Filipinos.
33  Abinales, Making Mindanao, 18; Caballero-Anthony, ‘The Philippines in Southeast Asia’, 11; 
Kreuzer, Philippine Governance’; Lara and Champain, Inclusive Peace in Muslim Mindanao, 22.
34  Durante et al., ‘Management of Clan Conflict’, 106–109; Lara and Champain, Inclusive Peace, 
15; Lara and Schoofs, Out of the Shadows, 29–30; Torres, Rido, 16–17; qualitative interviews with 
justice providers. Economic competition happens in either legitimate or illicit businesses such as 
drugs, trafficking and gun smuggling.
35  The Ampatuan massacre in 2010 had women raped before being killed and mutilated while the 
rido ambush on 28 July 2014 in Sulu happened on the occasion of Eid-al-Fitr.
36  Based on interviews, some descendants would re-open rido to exact revenge. One story involved 
the son of a murdered man who killed his father’s killer years later after settlement of rido.
37  Based on interview from respondents from Sulu; see also Alipala, ‘Abducted Teacher Rescued 
by Soldiers in Sulu’; Fernandez, ‘2 Teachers Killed, 2 Hurt in Cotabato City’.
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a stabilising platform for contending authorities in the region. There are 
at least three layers of authority in ARMM: the state, the local or village 
authority, and the family or clan.38 All three have their own laws, rules 
and norms; each claiming their boundaries, competing to expand their 
power and authority, but also in the process of cooperating and deploying 
resources from each other. This is the state of equilibrium in the region 
that maintains order but also sustains the cycle of violence. This hybridity 
is fluid, ad hoc and composed of multiple actors who crisscross and 
penetrate various domains of justice provision.
My research has identified at least 16 mechanisms where people can bring 
their problems or issues for resolution and seek redress for the wrongs—
actual or perceived—they suffer from (Table 13.1). For the purpose of 
ease in categorisation, although this is by no means a strict classification, 
I outline four categories of justice provider in the region. It needs to be 
clarified that justice services or justice needs are the preferred terms to 
how people understand and describe ‘justice’ rather than the normative 
ideas of fairness and due process that are usually associated with formal-
legal justice. Hence, the term ‘justice provider’ is used to denote a more 
expansive list of actors and mechanisms that deliver justice services 
to those who need them.
Table 13.1 shows the existence of a hybrid justice system, the creation of 
new hybrid mechanisms and the hybridisation of existing mechanisms 
of justice. The four categories listed are a combination of actor-based 
classification and where the service provision is taking place. The state 
court system covers state-provided civil courts, Shari’ah courts, public 
prosecutors and public defenders. Its proceedings are mostly done within 
court or official premises and follow prescribed procedures and formalities. 
Non–state based courts are organised by non-state groups, in particular 
the insurgent groups within their areas of control or influence (that is, the 
MILF, MNLF and People’s Court); the proceedings in these courts are 
also conducted in a formalised manner and in accordance with some rules 
to ensure due process for the parties and to gather evidence.39
38  Kreuzer, Political Clans and Violence; Adam et al., ‘Hybrid Systems of Conflict Management and 
Community-Level Efforts to Improve Local Security in Mindanao’.
39  See Stephens, ‘Islamic Law in the Philippines’, 22–23; author’s interviews with MILF Shari’ah 
court judges and People’s Court cadres.
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Local state-based and civil society hybrids are those established by local 
executives and operated mainly through local state structures as well as 
those developed by local non-government organisations with the support 
of international development organisations.40 Similar to non-state courts, 
this type of justice mechanism, with the exception of the katarungang 
pambarangay, is a recent phenomenon that developed from local initiatives 
to cope with difficulties in dispensing justice in a multi-ethnic community 
mired in conflict.41 The formation of the Provincial Peace and Order 
Council and the Municipal Peace and Order Council in various places 
in ARMM has coincided with the increasing power of local executives as 
they started to receive automatic revenue appropriations from the central 
government in the late 1990s when the Local Government Code was 
passed to provide fiscal autonomy to local government units. Known as 
internal revenue allocation or ‘IRA’, this fund is intended for the delivery of 
basic government services but has been a source of corruption, patronage 
and dependence of local government units on central government 
authority.42 This fund has also been used by local executives in the region 
in dispensing their roles as justice providers, whether in the katarungang 
pambarangay, Municipal Peace and Order Council or Provincial Peace 
and Order Council, in raising funds for blood money and in defraying 
costs and remuneration for some personnel involved in settling disputes.43 
Local executives have given ‘allowances’ to state civil court judges assigned 
in their areas.44 As local executives also gain more control over police in 
their areas of authority, they are able to deploy ‘coercive power’ of arrest 
and enforcement of decisions or settlement. The combination of state 
authority and resources, traditional authority or indigenous means of 
settling disputes, and flexibility in the process of dispute settlement has 
made this ‘hybrid group’ increasingly popular among the population.
The need for security, as an immediate justice outcome, shows the power 
dimension in the delivery of what constitutes an ‘effective’ justice service 
in a conflict environment. Almost all providers of justice interviewed were 
unanimous in pointing to the provision of security—for themselves, for 
40  Such as the Asia Foundation’s support for the Quick Response Teams.
41  Interviews with local community-based justice providers, November 2015.
42  See Santos, ‘Not a Lot to Allot’.
43  Interviews with community-based justice providers.
44  Interviews with civil court judges and state Shari’ah court judges. It appears that civil court 
judges receive more support from local executives than their Shari’ah counterparts and that Shari’ah 
judges assigned in Christian-dominated local councils receive more support than those in Muslim-
dominated local councils.
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the parties and their families—during the process of conflict settlement 
as indispensable in settling disputes.45 As practically all issues, rivalry 
and misunderstanding can precipitate a rido, the first task for the 
justice provider is to ensure that no violence ensues or if it did occur 
that a ‘ceasefire’ is worked out among the clans.46 Speed in resolving the 
conflict is thus a necessary complement to security provision. Bringing 
the parties to agree to settle the dispute is a complex process that requires 
the justice provider to trace common lineages or relationship between 
the disputing clans.47 Security, speed, flexibility and participation of 
the parties are identified as essential in the process of justice delivery in 
ARMM and are synonymous with justice itself. The payment of blood 
money is the culmination of the process of mediation and negotiation 
that takes place among the justice provider, the disputing parties and their 
families or clans. In most cases, the justice provider is also asked to help 
in raising blood money and oftentimes ends up contributing their own 
resources for this purpose.48 A feast, called kanduli in some areas, is often 
held to celebrate the reconciliation of clans involved in the dispute.
Hybridisation takes place in all four categories and levels of justice services, 
driven by the necessity for the ‘justice essentials’ described above. Even in 
the state court system, hybridisation is taking place, albeit informally and 
sometimes with or without official sanction. For instance, state Shari’ah 
court judges have resorted to the ‘traditional method’ of settling disputes 
or run the risk of becoming ‘irrelevant’.49 This mediation effort, which 
takes place outside the court, is not recognised as ‘judicial duties’ by the 
Supreme Court. In fact it is prohibited. Out-of-court settlement is the 
preferred option among justice users and this is shown in the declining 
number of cases being adjudicated in both civil and state Shari’ah 
court systems.50 On the other hand, the public defender’s office, the 
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), has formally instituted a ‘pre-litigation 
conference’ process to allow PAO lawyers to mediate or settle disputes 
among the parties. The PAO in ARMM, which has many young Muslim 
45  Various interviews with justice providers in ARMM, conducted from 2013 to 2015.
46  Various interviews with justice providers involved with settling rido, conducted from 2014 
to 2015.
47  See, for example, Menkhaus, ‘Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia’, 
186–187.
48  Many of those interviewed who have had experience in resolving a rido revealed this has become 
a huge responsibility for them to ensure that adequate blood money is raised and often contribute 
their own money, animals and property for the settlement and kanduli.
49  Interview with state Shari’ah judges.
50  Court data obtained from the Supreme Court for 2008–2013.
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women lawyers as personnel, is also conducting information and outreach 
programs to communities. During interviews, some lawyers revealed 
that they combine traditional knowledge and secular rules in arriving at 
solutions to problems.51 Surveys conducted in this research found that, 
among users in ARMM, PAO lawyers are trusted and well respected by 
the community and the courts.52
Hybridity also reflects the rise of non-traditional actors involved and the 
methods by which disputes are resolved. Trust is a vital attribute that 
the justice user looks for in a justice provider.53 This means trust that the 
justice provider can provide security and deliver the best outcomes for 
the party and their family in the most expeditious manner. A high degree 
of enforcement is also correlated with trust of the person delivering the 
service. It is not surprising therefore that users of the hybrid justice system 
overwhelmingly chose ‘family/clans’ as the most sought after provider of 
justice and also with the highest trust preference.54 Elders or leaders of the 
clan are constituted, individually or as a group, to approach the disputing 
parties and their families and conduct informal mediation. A high degree 
of enforcement is also an attribute of rebel Shari’ah courts, which possess 
the ability to dispatch armed personnel for enforcement. For instance, in 
Lanao del Sur, a commander’s court boasts of an effective justice service 
through its uncompromising approach in seeking out the perpetrators 
and rehabilitation approach combined with physical punishment and 
learning Qur’anic teachings and virtues. It claims that families have even 
voluntarily entrusted their children for drug rehabilitation.55
An increasing trend towards dispute resolution by local state executives 
such as elected village head chiefs and municipal, provincial and regional 
state officials shows how power is harnessed in delivering justice to the 
community. Next to clan-based justice, the second-most preferred 
groups of justice providers are the katarungang pambarangay, or village 
council mediation, composed of elected local village chiefs and the 
mayors. Katarungang pambarangay is a creation by law that is based on 
51  Interview with PAO lawyers, Community Legal Aid providers survey.
52  Justice user survey conducted in selected areas in the five provinces of ARMM in October 2015 
and June 2016.
53  Results of qualitative interviews and of the user survey.
54  Result of survey in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur and interviews with government employees 
in ARMM.
55  Interview with rebel Shari’ah court personnel, February 2015. This group operates a prison 
dug out from the ground where ‘offenders’ and drug users are held for some time until rehabilitation 
is completed.
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traditional methods of mediation and dispenses the need for lawyers.56 
It is mandated to conduct mediation and to provide the avenue for an 
‘amicable settlement’ between the parties to the conflict; its jurisdiction 
is limited to small criminal or civil matters. In ARMM, katarungang 
pambarangays have evolved into solving serious crimes or issues in the 
community such as murder, rido and rape. Village officials have become 
involved in providing security for the parties and in raising blood money. 
Some of them use state court methods such as issuing a ‘warrant of arrest’ 
or ‘subpoena’. One account also mentions that it provides a facility for 
temporary detention of the parties involved in the dispute in order to 
prevent the escalation of further violence or to keep the person safe from 
retribution from the other party or clan.57
Conclusion: Towards a sustainable justice?
The existence of a hybrid justice system operating within and outside the 
state system reflects the complexity of conflict and power dynamics in 
Muslim Mindanao. It shows how the development of hybrid political 
order—and that of hybrid justice mechanisms—parallels the process of 
statebuilding in the region. This is characterised by a state highly dependent 
on local power structures and dispersion of power among local power 
holders. The state—and corresponding legal hybridity—has ensured a 
fluid co-existence of traditional and state authorities. This means that the 
state has not disappeared but functions through clan-based authority. This 
is demonstrated in how justice provision works through clans and the 
development of new hybrids that harness the resources and power of both 
state and traditional authorities.
The delivery of holistic or comprehensive justice services has become 
an important attribute of newly developed hybrid mechanisms in 
Mindanao. The segmentation of different pillars of justice, each working 
separately and with their own set of personnel, works to disadvantage 
state formal mechanisms of justice which need to observe pre-agreed rules 
and separation of justice functions from apprehension of wrongdoers, 
to prosecution, judicial determination and enforcement. Hybrid justice 
providers fill a crucial role in delivering prompt and effective justice to an 
56  Provided under Presidential Decree No. 1508 and later amended by Republic Act No. 7160 
(Local Government Code of 1991).
57  Interview with justice provider, Community Legal Aid.
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environment where conflict dynamics are complex. The delivery of justice 
and security provision are intertwined functions that require flexibility of 
rules, coordination of multiple actors and authoritative capacity of the 
justice provider. As shown in this chapter, an effective justice provider 
is one who possesses multiple authorities and can deploy adequate 
resources to meet the justice demands of parties. While justice provision 
is a demonstration and source of power by local elites, and susceptible to 
hybrid capture, it needs to be recognised that the delivery of justice is an 
essential public service to which hybrid and non-state justice mechanisms 
provide a significant contribution.
Do hybrid justice mechanisms better serve the justice interests of people 
in multi-ethnic and conflicted areas? We have seen in Mindanao that hybrid 
justice mechanisms are providing security and a more holistic approach 
to justice which the state court system is unable to provide. The case in 
ARMM shows that these mechanisms are, however, power dependent and 
their legitimacy is based primarily on the resources and coercive power 
that can be deployed to be effective. Their seats of authority are also highly 
contested and a source of violent conflict among competing clans, and 
the rules may not be applied to all, especially when the conflict involves 
more powerful parties. We have also seen that the state court system is 
undergoing hybridisation in the way it responds to demands for flexibility 
and speed in resolving issues by undertaking mediation and settlement 
functions.
Except for the Public Attorney’s Office, there is reticence on the part of 
state authorities to officially sanction a more flexible approach to dispute 
settlement. As non-court state hybrids and non-state adjudication 
become more popular, there is a danger that state court processes may 
be rendered irrelevant, as they are now underutilised. The uncoordinated 
process of hybridisation and lack of deliberation may also serve to foster 
competition among various justice providers and deliver disparate and 
competing outcomes. This engenders heightened forum shopping and for 
parties to dictate the terms and process of proceedings, as is already 
happening.58 A  hybrid justice system that is ruled by the dynamics of 
conflict, rather than normative ideas of justice, can deliver only palliative 
outcomes and does not work to deter crimes and conflicts. The complex 
dynamics of conflict in ARMM also show the need for sustainable hybrid 
justice mechanisms to connect to the realisation of social justice.
58  Interviews with various justice providers and justice users in ARMM.





Inside and Out: Violence 




Violence in Timor-Leste has been a continuous point of analytical 
inquiry, not least given the consequences of Portuguese colonialism, 
Indonesian occupation and the civil strife that ebbed and flowed in the 
new republic from 2006 to 2008. Since independence, efforts to reduce 
violence against women have been constant, even if much of this has 
been in the form of advocacy competing with other post-independence 
agendas. Despite innumerable programs and associated research, all 
available evidence suggests that violence against women is not abating. 
According to the Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey published 
in 2010, 38 per  cent of women in Timor-Leste aged 15 to 49 have 
experienced physical violence.2 The 2016 study Understanding Violence 
against Women and Children in Timor-Leste found that 59 per cent of 
ever-married women aged 15 to 49 had experienced physical and/or 
1  My appreciation to colleagues both in Timor-Leste and Australia, not least those who contributed 
to research for the ‘Beyond Fragility and Inequity, The Economic Dimensions of Domestic Violence 
in Timor-Leste’ project, which provided several ideas further developed here.
2  National Statistics Directorate, Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey, 229.
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sexual violence by a male intimate partner at least once, though a large 
majority (81 per cent) had experienced intimate partner violence many 
times.3 Entrenched patriarchies and gender inequity remain central to 
this problem, and responding to these in the context of what is referred 
to here as a ‘hybrid order’ adds variously to the challenges of addressing 
this violence.
The key argument of this chapter is that violence against women and the 
interventions to prevent it shape and are shaped by different forms of 
space within a hybrid order. This is just one of the possible conceptual 
deployments of hybridity in a site such as Timor-Leste where customary 
social relations have continued to play a significant role in patterns of 
social integration and political life.4 As a concept, hybridity creates space 
for analysis of different forms of sociality that do not clearly sit within 
the domain of what may be described as ‘modern’. Rather than seeing 
the world through the narrow and flat lens of modernity—for instance, 
via state-centric approaches—it draws analysis towards an examination 
of constituent elements that in turn contribute to understanding the 
character and complexity of everyday sociality.
The first two sections of this chapter provide an initial discussion of 
hybridity, setting out the constituent elements focused on here as the 
modern and the customary, and in turn discussing how these relate to 
spatiality. Building on this, the third section argues there is a tendency 
for exogenous forces—such as donors, non-government organisations, aid 
agencies and academics—to ‘render’ East Timorese society as patriarchal, 
establishing a point of difference that in turn justifies the shape of 
interventions. The fourth and fifth sections shift the focus to the control 
of space where women are subjected to a kind of ‘double sovereignty’. 
In the context of Timor-Leste, the ‘double’ refers to the fact that women 
are constrained across both modern and customary spatialities, with 
sovereignty used to denote the control over space, in this instance masculine 
control expressed through patriarchal power that effectively limits the 
mobility of women. This approach to sovereignty is not to be confused 
with liberal notions of popular or individual sovereignty but, rather, is an 
adaptation of a Weberian notion of control over a particular territorial 
formation and the relationship to violence. While this form of sovereignty 
is often discussed as part of debates on globalisation where it is understood 
3  Asia Foundation, Understanding Violence against Women and Children in Timor-Leste.
4  Wallis, ‘A Liberal–Local Hybrid Peace Project in Action?’.
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as ‘the extension and institutionalization of control and authority within 
a spatial field’, here sovereignty is used to describe the control of space 
within ‘petit polities’ that exist quite apart from the nation-state system.5 
As power is concentrated in masculine identities, sovereign control is 
expressed via men over different kinds of space, limiting pathways for help 
and support for women who are experiencing abuse. Underpinning each 
of the arguments in this chapter is a concern that modernity, especially in 
the context of a hybrid order, does not necessarily provide a pathway for 
women to reduce the risk and experience of abuse.
Hybridity and Timor-Leste
Not without some irony the concept of ‘hybridity’ has largely shed its 
association with its racist heritage.6 Having in recent decades become 
more prominent in the social sciences and humanities, hybridity allows for 
a greater identification of sources of power and identity that are distinct 
from modern political and social domains. It has largely gained traction 
as a way to counter depictions of ‘state-failure’ and of ‘ungovernable’ 
populations, particularly in postcolonial states that have experienced 
large-scale violence including contexts where the modern state is unevenly 
constituted.7
Hybridity in this chapter is taken as a way of explaining contexts where 
multiple patterns of social integration—or ‘life-worlds’ as they will 
be referred to in shorthand—are in evidence to the extent that it is 
difficult to claim that one has a clear dominance over another. Instead, 
it is taken that there are multiple forms of sociality of significance; ‘life-
worlds’ that speak to the embedded assumptions that shape patterns 
of practice. Cohen and Arato describe a ‘life-world’ as ‘the reservoir of 
implicitly known traditions, the background of assumptions that are 
embedded in language and culture and drawn upon by individuals in 
everyday life’.8 This chapter follows in  similar sense, with the emphasis 
on the relationships between people (social integration) as manifest in 
the patterns of everyday practice. Extending further than the domains 
5  Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty, 2.
6  Dinnen and Kent, ‘Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Development’.
7  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding 
and Local Resistance; Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political 
Orders’; Mallet, ‘Beyond Failed States’; Richmond, ‘Post-colonial Hybridity’.
8  Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 427.
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of language and culture, however, these include socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical practices, and in turn encompass what these ‘assumptions’ 
are across space, time and epistemology.
A hybrid order refers to contexts where differing life-worlds are each co-
present to significant extents, with the focus here on the ‘customary’ and 
‘modern’. The customary reaches beyond culture, and in Timor-Leste 
is a way of describing a world view that reverberates through forms of 
exchange, production, organisation, communication and so on, framed 
by a cosmological view of the world bound very strongly to a sense of 
origin. The modern, however, is grounded in different forms of practice 
(for instance, the dominance of mass digital communication over the 
oral, technocratic leadership over genealogical authority), and where 
secular logic and rationality are the dominant ways in which society is 
integrated and ordered. This pushes the analytical lens past ideology for 
instance, which is itself a manifestation of modernity, and thus debates 
about the liberal peace are understood here as one possible manifestation 
of a  modernity in which the individual and a particular form of state 
(largely Weberian) come to the fore.9
It is difficult to claim that either the customary or the modern has 
a particular dominance in Timor-Leste. While speaking of ‘Timor-Leste’ 
is an immediate reference to a modern political formation, other ways 
of organising social life remain vitally important across the territory. 
The customary—often cast discursively as traditional, indigenous, local 
or even ‘culture’—on one hand, and the modern on the other, give an 
account of important moments in the texture and contours of social life. 
These terms are nevertheless heuristic devices used here to allow for analysis 
that distinguishes an ontological basis for patterns of practice. Analysis 
is an abstracting process and the separation of social life into categories 
(these, or others such as the state and civil society, or the local and the 
global) does not tend to exist in the same way in terms of how people see 
their own actions in an everyday sense. As such, these categories allow 
for analysis to occur, but are not necessarily representative of the ways 
people would readily see themselves or categorise their practice in the 
first instance (which can begin to occur when people are asked questions 
by researchers). In turn such categories do not necessarily create binaries, 
though analysis that assumes, for instance, there is a tension between 
9  Steger, The Rise of the Global Imaginary, Chapters 1–3.
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the two tends in that direction, and similarly where analysis implicitly or 
explicitly claims there are only two social possibilities: the modern and 
the otherwise (however categorised). As such, while drawing to these two 
categories of social integration, they do not present an overall unity nor 
claim to explain all the different dimensions of sociality. These are merely 
two points of emphasis that are relevant in Timor-Leste.
Customary and modern spatiality
The endogenously and exogenously driven modernising efforts that 
occur in Timor-Leste have not resulted in a demise of customary social 
relations.10 The customary and modern are often seen to create points of 
friction, or entanglement, in forms of governance, systems of exchange 
and—as per the following quote from a 2003 report—at the intersection 
of justice processes and gender relations:
Women leaders feel that the use of local justice systems is ‘not better that 
[sic than] nothing’ as it undermines attempts to implement standards of 
law which might combat factors preventing women from accessing it, 
such as powerlessness and shame. However, inherent cultural practices, 
beliefs and norms are so powerful that even with education in the era since 
Independence, standards of human rights and other modern concepts are 
being both misunderstood and completely lost due to the massive gap 
between these concepts and the realities on the ground.11
While the quote suggests tension between two life-worlds, it also gives 
rise to a sense of one being drawn into and reframed by the other (in this 
instance as modern concepts are ‘misunderstood’). More than a decade 
after this was written, women continue to navigate narrow possibilities 
across two forms of justice to the extent that some have called for 
a  formalised negotiation between different legal systems.12 Rather than 
examine the process of justice itself, this chapter takes a different route 
and argues that each ‘system’ is situated in a life-world and in analytical 
terms underpinned by different forms of epistemology, temporality and, 
as the focus here, spatiality.
10  Carroll-Bell, ‘Development Alternatives in Timor-Leste’; Hohe, ‘The Clash of Paradigms’; 
McWilliam, ‘Houses of Resistance in East Timor’.
11  Swaine, Traditional Justice and Gender Based Violence, 14.
12  Kovar and Harrington, Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence in Timor-Leste.
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Space is an abstraction that enables humans to order their relationship 
to both the material world and to one another. Space is distinguished 
by bounded areas that mark that which is inside and outside, and can 
be materially defined—for instance, the marked boundaries to land—to 
that which is seemingly immaterial: an online community, a network, 
a national space, a public sphere. As the existence of boundaries suggests, 
there are always multiple spaces; these layers cut across one another and, 
following Massey, are in a constant state of reproduction:
First, that we recognise space as the product of interrelations; as constituted 
through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately 
tiny … Second, that we understand space as the sphere of the possibility 
of the existence of multiplicity in the sense of contemporaneous plurality; 
as the sphere in which distinct trajectories coexist; as the sphere therefore 
of coexisting heterogeneity … Third, that we recognise space as always 
under construction. Precisely because space on this reading is a product 
of relations-between, relations which are necessarily embedded material 
practices which have to be carried out, it is always in the process of being 
made. It is never finished; never closed.13
In turn, ‘spatiality’ is taken here as referring to the relationship between 
social life and space. It is more than the domain itself in a dimensional 
sense, referring to the social relations that constitute that space. Its use 
here is similar to Silva’s approach to place in her work on Dili and the 
‘mountains’ in Timor-Leste, where she uses ‘the category place as a morally 
meaningful space to which certain actors and agencies are associated’.14 
While place here is understood as a fixed and identified geographic 
location, spatiality takes on the moral dimensions that Silva speaks to as 
well as other elements of social life, such as knowledge, rights and history.
One way of thinking about a hybrid order is conceiving it as a multitude 
of spatialities composed both across and within different patterns of 
practice that are in a constant state of reproduction and change. Here, 
then, to speak of customary and modern forms of spatialities is to draw 
back to a metatype that allows for generalised analysis, though as any 
inquiry becomes more specific the more immediate context would shape 
and contour any description, adding nuance and variation.
13  Massey, For Space, 9.
14  Silva, ‘Foho versus Dili’, 146.
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Customary space in an East Timorese context could be characterised by 
interrelationships in two ways: the genealogical and kinship connections 
between living people, and in turn their relationship with the ancestral 
domain. Space and place—the latter being the specific identified 
geographic location—tend to be closely proximate, their boundaries may 
not be contiguous, they tend to incorporate sacred sites that are exclusive 
to a specific group, and they are often associated with a powerful sense 
of origin. The ground, or land in a more generalised sense, tends to be 
of intense importance in this form of space.
Modern space, in the alternative, is treated as secular, empty, 
commodifiable, transferrable, unifiable and homogenous, and tends to 
be sharply delineated. To return to ‘Timor-Leste’, ‘territory’ is a form of 
modern space where what might have been fairly open frontiers are now 
hard borders measured to the centimetre by satellite systems.
In the remainder of this chapter I argue that in the context of a hybrid 
order different spatialities inform the patterns of violence against women. 
Challenges lie with external agencies and how they approach gender more 
broadly in Timor-Leste and, as discussed in the next section, different 
forms of spatiality may be transgressed in ways that could undermine the 
broader objectives of ending violence against women.
Rendering Timor-Leste
A recently published article opened with the explanation that ‘patriarchal 
traditions and a history of armed conflict in Timor-Leste provide a context 
that facilitates violence against women’.15 The sentence is ambiguous 
enough to avoid the claim of direct causality, though the reader is left very 
much with the impression that violence against women is inextricably 
linked to two localised characteristics, namely ‘tradition’ and ‘history’. 
Such a claim is hardly exceptional as Timor-Leste is frequently described 
as a ‘patriarchal society’, referring to the fact there is a clear power inequity 
between women and men that transpires in a myriad of ways. While 
the participation of women  is regulated on local governing councils 
15  Meiksin et al., ‘Domestic Violence, Marital Control, and Family Planning, Maternal, and Birth 
Outcomes in Timor-Leste’, 1338.
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(konsellu suku), and Timor-Leste leads the way in terms of participation of 
women in parliament, this has not translated into shifting power imbalances 
more generally.16
The key concern here is that while it is possible to classify Timor-Leste 
as patriarchal, when it is done as a broad descriptor—and as an implicit 
differentiator from other societies—then the effect is a powerful one. 
If it is accepted that virtually all societies reflect significant patterns 
of patriarchy, then differentiating on these grounds appears, when 
undertaken by outsiders, to establish points of separation rather than 
creating opportunities that allow for meaningful connections to be made. 
This is a kind of ‘rendering’ that labels a population negatively and as 
a  consequence approaches it as if it is in need of treatment.17 To  turn 
this around and speak of ‘patriarchy in an East Timorese context’ may 
appear only to make a minor discursive alteration, though here it 
is argued otherwise.
In the first instance, assertions of Timor-Leste as patriarchal per se and as 
an all-encompassing categorisation risk missing the agency of those who 
struggle against it, and in turn the identification of subsequent counter-
spaces. Such an approach also closes rather than opens pathways to build 
spaces for solidarities and mutual learning across societies. By contrast, 
rather than concentrating only on points of difference, acknowledging 
similarities may promote esteem and disable shame or self-blame if 
survivors of violence come to understand that they are not an exception, 
either individually or as a defined group.
Second, rendering Timor-Leste as patriarchal provides a kind of legitimating 
logic for a particular form of intervention into spaces that would otherwise 
be largely inaccessible to outsiders. Naming patriarchy—or the less 
confronting surrogate ‘gender inequity’—as a societal designator provides 
the raison d’être for foreign-funded programs to justify interventions. 
One of the challenges of working on violence against women is that 
it confronts entrenched forms of power and control in very embodied 
ways that call an intimate sense of self into question: sex and sexuality, 
fertility and procreation, household economies, spirituality and faith, the 
regulation of the body. These are not necessarily based in a customary 
‘life-world’, but in Timor-Leste they often are. Establishing points of 
16  Cummins, ‘The Problem of Gender Quotas’.
17  Pupavac, ‘Therapeutic Governance’.
245
14 . INSIDE AND OUT
difference then equips the outsider with a rationale for challenging  the 
very body and how it is understood, not least as they become focused at 
the same points of intimate life; into health and reproduction, or gender 
norms and behaviours, relationships and so on. These may or may not 
be helpful in and of themselves, but the point here is the danger in the 
assumed legitimacy of doing so and the onward effects.
To come back to the hybrid order discussed above, such a form of 
intervention in Timor-Leste can be seen as occurring across two forms 
of spatiality. In one way, the modernity of interveners—non-government 
organisations, aid and humanitarian workers, state agencies—often 
correlates to the way that practice is matched to conceptions of space. 
That is, programs are planned to forge social change within a modern 
space. As a result, activities are directed at the public sphere, into a civil 
society, through the state, into localised public spaces, school curriculums 
and so on. Despite the limited reach of television in Timor-Leste, TV 
commercials are made depicting ‘Feto Fantastiku’, a superhero woman 
dressed in a cape made of local weaving. Banners are hung across busy 
streets, posters placed at the offices of local leaders, T-shirts printed. 
Existing norms are contested as spatiality is imagined as the modernist 
either sees it or wills it to be: open, accessible, contestable via evidence 
and arguments of universal rights, and with the potential of carrying an 
authoritative voice via disembodied means.
Modern spatiality has remained the preoccupation of foreign-led 
interventions, though the justification of patriarchy also allows for 
a transgression of customary spatiality. By this it is meant there is a sense 
of a legitimate claim to penetrate social relations where access would 
otherwise be unlikely, such as challenging the role of customary leaders 
or social priorities (such as spiritual over material). This may be the case 
as ‘culture’ is seen as something that must change or simply because there 
is expatriate blindness to the existence of such a life-world at all. This 
is, in many respects, where the intervention is at its most powerful and 
helps us understand why discussions of violence in Timor-Leste often 
orient towards ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’. The exchange process at the 
time of marriage, commonly termed barlake in Tetun, is an example of 
a discursive signifier that carries a sense of oppression in spite of counter-
evidence. With the origins of violence against women then localised 
(doubly so when history of warfare is included), the conditions are set in 
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place where demands for change are focused inwards and across space that 
would otherwise be untraversable by the foreigner. The article quoted at 
the opening of this section ends up calling for exactly this outcome:
Our findings suggest that in the short-term, targeted interventions 
addressing family planning, maternal healthcare, and birth outcome 
vulnerabilities for Timorese women who have experienced DV or marital 
control would be a good use of public health resources, due to their 
elevated risk.18
There is a need here to be unequivocal about what is being argued. 
It  is entirely appropriate that there are aid-funded programs that work 
to support survivors of domestic violence, both specifically in terms of 
support services and prevention, as well as in health, justice, policing 
and so on. The challenge then is that this needs to be positioned as 
emancipatory rather than as a form of societal control, and this is far 
more difficult to achieve if the broad logic is shaped by differentiation 
rather than mutuality.
Over the decade or more since independence, it is possible to see, for 
instance, that resistance to the idea of gender, and gender equity, has 
developed within local populations and targeted as an ‘outside’ or foreign 
idea.19 Contestation is to be expected, and in some instances suggests 
a more rigid application of culture as men attempt to maintain control.20 
However, that ‘gender’ is often deemed a foreign concept that came after 
independence and is contrary to ‘local culture’ is also in part a dynamic 
generated by the way programs have been framed.21 Carrying a thread 
of the colonial encounter, power rests on maintaining differentiation 
and the demands for change cut into spheres of life without generating 
the inside legitimacy that enable traction. Simultaneously this dynamic 
demands virtually no reflexivity on the part of the intervener, for instance, 
in terms of exploring the reasons why violence against women remains so 
deeply intractable in societies typically designated as ‘modern’. In such 
circumstances, differentiation in this form will more likely lead either 
to internalisation or resistance, neither productive in terms of ending 
violence against women and providing support to those who experience it.
18  Meiksin et al., ‘Domestic Violence, Marital Control, and Family Planning’, 1346.
19  UNFPA, Gender-Based Violence in Timor-Leste.
20  Niner, ‘Hakat Klot, Narrow Steps’.
21  Smith, ‘When “Gender” Started’, 56.
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Customary spatiality and double sovereignty
A recently published Asia Foundation report found that women were often 
contained to a ‘domestic sphere’ where, for a combination of economic 
and political reasons, it was difficult for them to leave or seek assistance 
when experiencing abuse.22 Extending this analysis, the argument across 
the last two sections of this chapter is that while economic factors are 
central, they are one part in a pattern of control that is referred to as 
‘double sovereignty’, a term used to explain how a woman’s mobility 
is  contained and controlled across both customary and modern spaces. 
Sovereignty, as discussed in the Introduction, denotes a control over space, 
and while typically applied in the context of nation-states, here it refers 
to localised forms of spatiality that set the perimeters for the possibilities 
of everyday life.23
To turn to a discussion of the first element of this double sovereignty, 
a key aspect of customary spatiality in Timor-Leste is that access to space 
is based on genealogical and kinship ties. Legitimacy to participate in 
social life is dependent on how one claims a place in relation to extended 
familial networks and in turn access to space that is connected to 
production (the  home, land, water, forests, people), spirituality (land, 
lulik sites, graves, ancestors), knowledge (elders, sacred houses), exchange 
of commodities (extended family, including ritual belongings) and 
communication (people, embodied communal space).
Forms of customary spatiality are reproduced in a myriad of localised 
ways, both through designated sacred sites and at moments of ritual, as 
well as in terms of cosmological understandings of land and ancestors 
and conceptions of agency, power and control. As such it is also manifest 
in an unannounced way in how patterns of social life are constantly 
re-created. These come to the fore at the point of intersection between 
familial groupings (uma kains, as extended clans defined by genealogical 
and kinship connection). For instance, people announce their sacred 
house as they arrive at funerals, name sacred houses to denote precedence 
in relation to land, and terms such as kaben tama (the male enters the 
wife’s family on marriage) and kaben sai (the female leaves her family 
at marriage) are used to map the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
of families.
22  Grenfell et al., Beyond Fragility and Inequity.
23  Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty.
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This form of spatiality operates as a series of petit polities that—
as  discussed  in the Introduction—are formed around a kind of spatial 
sovereignty. Outsiders rarely transgress these in any kind of permanent 
way (and even a temporary transgression would often require some kind 
of negotiation). In Timor-Leste, migration without existing connections 
is uncommon where customary spatialities remain dominant. Customary 
regulations (lisan or adat) are seen to regulate households in ways that 
separate one extended familial unit from another. ‘According to our adat’ 
is a common preface to sentences. Moreover, there is a constant reference 
to matters being kept ‘within the household’, generally meaning either 
an immediate family (familia rasik) or a more extended familial unit 
bound by genealogy and affinal relations, and ordered through association 
to sacred houses. Hence, familial units are bound into different forms 
of sovereignty that are exclusive from one another.
There is a range of ways that customary forms of spatiality can be seen as 
reproducing patriarchal social relations. These can be seen as most clearly 
manifest in the overwhelming dominance of males in leadership positions 
(across the spectrum of spiritual and political), divisions of labour, control 
over the body, norms around procreation and mobility. The counter-
examples of matrilineal systems in Timor-Leste are both exceptional and 
shift the texture of power but not the power itself.24
In this context, sovereign control embedded in masculine identities, 
and manifest in the relationship between women and men, is exercised 
to control a women’s mobility through economic dependence, divisions 
of labour, patterns of procreation and forms of coercion. However, the 
sovereignty also means a resistance to external intervention because 
‘outsiders’—whether other East Timorese or foreigners—have no 
legitimacy to reach into the particularities of customary space. The outside 
world has restricted access, and, when it does enter, it does so frequently as 
negotiated by males such as where domestic violence cases are referred out 
to police and then back to the families. The 2010 Law Against Domestic 
Violence is designed to interrupt this space by mandating that all reported 
cases are investigated by the police, effectively pulling the inside-customary 
into the outside-modern space of the nation. However, this only works to 
a certain extent, not just because of resources but also because the police, 
health workers and others at the interface of intervention straddle the 
customary and modern themselves.
24  Grenfell et al., Beyond Fragility and Inequity, 56–68.
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Modern sovereignty and urban violence
The unevenness between the co-existing forms of spatiality in Timor-Leste 
does not necessarily shift the possibilities for women who are experiencing 
violent abuse. Despite the concentrations of law enforcement, support 
agencies, communication systems and transportation, rates of violence 
against women remain high in urban centres such as Dili.
The results show that intimate partner violence is a significant problem in 
all sites across Timor-Leste. However, rates of physical and sexual intimate 
partner violence were consistently higher in Dili than in other municipality 
sites, and higher in urban areas compared with rural areas. For example, 
in Dili 64 percent of ever-partnered women had ever experienced physical 
and/or sexual intimate partner violence in their lifetimes, compared with 
57 percent in other sites.25
In part to account for this, I argue here that modern forms of spatiality 
remain patriarchal and represent the second element or tier of a ‘double 
sovereignty’ that results in the control over women’s mobility. Critical to 
this is the way a sharp distinction emerges between public and private 
spaces as different articulations of modern spatiality.
In a predominantly urban site such as the capital, Dili, a modern spatiality 
comes to the fore via public spaces that are no longer genealogically 
determined: roads and pathways, transport, institutional formations such 
as universities, the public service and hospitals, public parks and soccer 
fields, commercial enterprises and, more abstractly, a public sphere via 
digital and print media. The non-contiguous boundaries of community 
often found in rural areas change for the more rigid boundaries dividing 
urban suku from each other.26 At the same time, the notion of a private 
sphere becomes grounded in the intimate family, and family size tends 
to diminish as does the ability to co-locate extended families. ‘Property 
rights’ designate access to bounded land while emergent ‘liberal rights’ 
defend against an intrusive state.
A commonality between customary and modern spatialities is found via 
the way that women remain contained overwhelmingly to the domestic 
sphere, albeit for different reasons. The allure of cash income within 
modern modes of production is sustained by unpaid labour at home 
25  Asia Foundation, Understanding Violence against Women and Children, 51–52.
26  Grenfell et al., Understanding Community.
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including care for children. Such activities are consistently mapped via 
essentialised notions of gender, and the private sphere becomes a new 
domain of containment. The result can be both a lack of access to the 
means of economic production (especially as women become disengaged 
from land) and a continued if not accelerated dependency on intimate 
partners, with an effect on gendered identity formations.
The significantly lower number of income-generating activities carried 
out by women in Dili, alongside the shift in perceptions that women’s role 
is solely that of ‘housewife’ rather than ‘farmer,’ could suggest an increase 
in women’s dependency as urbanisation increases. During participatory 
rural appraisals and focus group discussions in Dili, women tended to 
emphasise women’s role as primary caregiver and were more likely to state 
that the woman’s role was in the home whereas the man’s role was to 
generate income. This type of statement was rarely heard in the more 
rural settings.27
In speaking of the containment of women’s mobility, True points to the 
way some women in the global North offset their own risk of intimate 
partner violence by employing women from the global South:
In a mutually constitutive way, the strict division of roles in the domestic 
sphere constrains women’s public participation and their access to economic 
opportunities in the market, in turn creating inequalities in household 
bargaining power between men and women and entrapping women into 
potentially violent environments at home and at work. Some women, 
especially those in developed countries, avoid patriarchal, and potentially 
violent, situations in the family/private sphere by contracting out care work 
to poor women, including migrant women from the global South.28
Even without crossing national borders, a similar dynamic can often be 
seen in sites such as Dili. In cases where women find work and increase 
their economic independence, the need for unpaid labour as a carer for 
the home and children remains with them. In such cases young women, 
very often at some point of familial connection, are moved from rural 
communities to Dili and work at very low rates (or even just for board 
and meals). Where a male is employed but unmarried, then a female from 
the extended family will often live with him in order to cook and clean. 
Either way, there is a constant reproduction of modern private spheres 
being gendered as the essential domain for women.
27  Grenfell et al., Beyond Fragility and Inequity, 54.
28  True, ‘The Political Economy of Violence against Women’, 45.
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One of the features of modernity is the hard distinction that tends to 
emerge between public and private. In addition to the private sphere then, 
the public sphere is a second form of modern spatiality where patriarchal 
norms are consolidated. In the independence period in Timor-Leste, 
militaristic masculinities have become vaunted and celebrated via the 
heroic warrior image associated with the republic’s veteran leadership.29 
The creation of ideal forms emerge as marketing becomes more important, 
as seen at the icon of high modernity, the ‘Timor Plaza’ shopping centre 
parades of young women in ‘Little Miss Timor’ competitions. Nation and 
gender are connected via abstracted norms of the ideal woman.
While there are always exceptions and degrees of variation, the argument 
is that men often maintain a kind of sovereign control over modern forms 
of spatiality. Women remain overwhelmingly contained to the domestic 
sphere, redoubled by the essentialising symbolic trajectories in the public 
sphere. Mobility for women may of course be possible, but it is regulated, 
granted permission and ‘chaperoned’. Women might well, for instance, 
gain an education, but there will be immense pressure for children at 
some point regardless, and even in the event of professional work they 
will remain responsible for the home sphere. This creates an environment 
where women often remain financially dependent and, in periods of abuse, 
with restricted ability to leave. At the same time in this scenario it can be 
even more difficult to know where abuse is occurring, especially if  the 
familial networks that can provide support within a customary polity have 
largely dissolved in the modern urban sphere.
Concluding hybridity
The effect of this form of ‘double sovereignty’ is profound in that it 
multiplies the range of inequities and challenges faced when violence 
against women occurs. Moreover, here two forms of spatiality have been 
discussed as separate categories that allow for an analysis as they delineate 
different ways people engage with space. For instance, a woman who 
migrates to an urban centre for work or marriage may be subject to new 
forms of containment and yet remain bound into customary socialities 
in her origin community. Albeit in different ways then, these forms 
29  Kent, ‘Remembering the Past, Shaping the Future’; Kent and Kinsella, ‘A Luta Kontinua’; Niner, 
‘Hakat Klot, Narrow Steps’.
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of spatiality can overlap in order to compound the challenges faced, rather 
than provide pathways out of abuse, and be seen as sovereignty as control 
over women.
In summary then, I have drawn on the notion of hybridity—and 
more specifically a hybrid order—to consider how spatialities across 
different life-worlds exacerbate the experience of violence by women. 
The complexity of the hybrid order may allow for moments of navigation 
away from violence, though here the argument has been that—at least 
in terms of spatiality—neither modernity nor the customary necessarily 
provide a significant point of alleviation from violence. At a programming 
level, efforts to reduce levels of abuse that rest on designating populations 
as patriarchal and singularly localising, risk reducing longer-term efforts 
to prevent violence. These may allow for a form of justification for 
intervention, but may do so in a way that builds resistance as a kind of 
colonial encounter while failing to create a legitimate counterpoint to 
patriarchy locally. This is not to call for an end to interventions, rather it is 
an argument for them that is framed with a greater reflexivity on the part 
of outsiders with regard to their own modernity, and the role of violence 
and power within it.
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Hybridity and Regulatory Authority 
in Fiji: Vernacular Perspectives 
on Gender and Security
Nicole George
A bicameral parliament with a grass skirt, or some other sort of tokenistic 
nod to ‘the local’, does not amount to a hybrid polity. Instead, we see 
hybridity as a more local but scalar mixing of ideas, norms and personnel, 
with power in full view.1
Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the function of hybridised regulatory authority 
as it is configured in Fiji and focus specifically on the implications this 
has for the policing of gender in this Pacific island country. The quote 
that leads this chapter, from a recent article by Roger Mac Ginty and 
Oliver Richmond, prompted me to reflect on the symbolism of the 
dress uniforms that are worn by the Fiji Police Force. In particular, 
I was reminded of a photograph taken by Ali Rae, an accomplished 
photojournalist who accompanied me on a fieldwork trip to Suva in 
2013. This photograph shows the police force band at the launch of a new 
communal policing campaign in Suva, resplendent in parade uniforms 
1  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’.
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consisting of  a  navy dress  shirt and dazzling tailored white formal 
wraparound sulu (Figure 15.1). But contrary to the more conventional 
even-hemmed cut of this garment, the hem of the police sulu is styled in 
a way that references more traditional dress — that is, the pandanus or 
‘grass skirts’ of the region.
Figure 15.1: The Fiji Police Force band at the launch of a new communal 
policing campaign, Suva, 2013
Source: Photo by Ali Rae .
As this chapter will demonstrate, this ‘nod’ to the ‘local’ should not simply 
be read only as a tokenistic incorporation of islands ‘fashion’ in formal 
police dress. My contention is that this uniform is also more deeply 
symbolic of the hybridised ‘fashioning’ of regulatory enforcement in 
Fiji and the extent to which the everyday operations of the state security 
agencies in Fiji are shaped by, and intertwined with, powerful institutions 
of customary and religious authority. At first glance, this scenario may 
be taken to suggest that state policing authority, fashioned in this way, is 
brought ‘closer to the people’,2 resonating with the values, practices and 
protocols that lie at the heart of Fijian identity.3 What is less sure is the 
extent to which this system of authority makes ‘everyday emancipatory 
2  Baker and Scheye, ‘Multi-layered Justice and Security Delivery’, 512.
3  Brown et al., ‘Challenging Statebuilding as Peacebuilding’, 101.
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forms of peace’4 more achievable or more accessible to all who live within 
its jurisdiction. This question comes into sharp relief if we ask about 
the ways gender and sexuality are policed within this hybridised system 
of regulatory authority.
This question has critical implications for the study of hybridity and 
hybrid regulatory authority more generally. The concept of hybridity has 
been invoked by those aiming to understand where and how localised 
authority functions in ways that may potentially complement ‘top-down’ 
sites of regulatory authority, helping to consolidate order through stronger 
recognition of ‘local strengths and resilience’.5
But there are more sceptical appraisals of this concept, too. Some have 
illustrated the co-constitutive nature of the relationship between ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ sites of regulatory authority, and the extent to 
which formalised sites of authority may construct their own ‘local’ 
according to what they are able to ‘find, initiate or are willing to support 
financially’.6 Others have given close consideration to the ways cultural 
practices may be appropriated by particular groups to serve sectional 
interests in ways that potentially subvert the original aims, symbolism 
or meaning of that activity; a scenario which, in certain contexts, 
explains the increasing commercialisation of traditional gift giving 
as part of customary reconciliation practices, for example.7 A further 
critical contention, pertinent to debate on hybridity and enforcement, 
is that the recent hybrid turn aligns with a global neoliberal orthodoxy 
which encourages public sector retreat from security provision and the 
outsourcing of security agency work to privatised military and security 
companies with attendant problems of accountability.8
It is only recently that the concept of hybridity has been subject to 
gendered critique, work which has been pioneered by the likes of Annika 
Björkdahl,9 writing with Kristine Höglund10 and Johanna Selimovic.11 
Drawing on Anna Tsing’s foundational work in globalisation and 
4  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’, 220.
5  Brown et al., ‘Challenging Statebuilding as Peacebuilding’, 101; Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous 
Peace-Making’.
6  Heathershaw, ‘Towards Better Theories of Peacebuilding’, 280.
7  Wallis et al., ‘Political Reconciliation in Timor Leste’.
8  Abrahamsen and Williams, Security beyond the State.
9  Björkdahl, ‘A Gender-Just Peace?’.
10  Björkdahl and Höglund, ‘Precarious Peacebuilding’.
11  Björkdahl and Selimovic, ‘Gendering Agency in Transitional Justice’.
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friction,12 Björkdahl, writing with her various co-authors, has emphasised 
the ‘frictions’ that occur when there is an interplay between ‘bottom-up’ 
and ‘top-down’ sites of authority and the extent to which sites of ‘local 
agency’ working in cooperation with more formalised sites of authority 
can be generative of their own gendered exclusions and restrictions.13 
These studies pose important questions about the forms of social control 
that are legitimated within hybridised environments and how these may 
compound rather than alleviate gendered insecurity.
How might this frictional interplay between state and non-state sites 
of regulatory authority be explained in Fiji and what are the frictional 
gendered outcomes that are produced in this process? Scholarly enquiry 
into the indigenisation of state agencies of regulatory authority in Fiji 
provides an important context for this question. This ‘indigenisation’ has 
been explained as a contemporary extension of the paternalistic system 
of colonial authority, devised by the British in Fiji, which enabled them 
to manage, and keep distinct, the spaces in which indigenous Fijians 
and, with the beginning of indenture, the imported population of 
Indian labourers were able to move.14 Through a system of indirect rule, 
indigenous sites of authority were rearticulated into the formal system of 
state regulation. This strategy assisted the penetration of colonial authority 
into indigenous communities, and endowed the standing of Fijian 
populations with a particular sort of legitimacy in the eyes of the state. 
At the same time, this system of indigenised authority emphasised the 
distinctiveness of the Indian population and undermined the legitimacy 
of Indians’ demands for similar sorts of protective recognition within state 
structures of regulatory authority.15
Much has been written on the contemporary legacies of this scenario 
in Fiji and the implications this has for the operations of state agencies 
of security and enforcement.16 But, beyond the important work done 
by local gender advocates, very little attention has been focused on the 
various ways that this fusing of state and indigenous authority structures 
shapes the policing of gender and sexuality in Fiji in the contemporary 
context. In this chapter, I squarely address this issue. My contention 
12  Tsing, Friction.
13  Björkdahl and Selimovic, ‘Gendering Agency in Transitional Justice’, 167.
14  Firth, ‘Colonial Administration’.
15  Kelly and Kaplan, Represented Communities.
16  Halapua, Tradition, Lotu and Militarism in Fiji; Newland, ‘New Methodism and Old’; Trnka, 
‘Remythologizing the State’.
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is that even when policy reforms advocating a more liberal policing 
of  gender, or race, have been adopted, the particular configuration  of 
regulatory authority that operates in Fiji tends to result in everyday 
policing practice which punishes expressions of gender or sexuality that 
do not adhere to heterosexual conjugal norms. However, this defence of 
what I term ‘conjugal order’17 is undertaken by police, not simply because 
to do otherwise is understood by Fiji Police Force officers as a violation of 
cultural or religious values or protocols that lie at the heart of expressions 
of indigenous identity, but also because it is understood to pose a threat to 
widely and deeply held notions of community order and security.
I develop these claims more fully in the following sections of this chapter. 
First, I briefly establish an intellectual context for the arguments I make 
here, situating this particular enquiry within a broader debate on gender, 
rights and culture in the Pacific islands. Second, I draw on feminist 
contributions to debate on the concept of hybridity to develop a conceptual 
framework for my examination of gender and hybridised authority in Fiji. 
Third, I examine the way in which security as a concept is locally defined 
or ‘vernacularised’18 and why this is relevant to the policing of gender in 
Fiji. In the fourth section of this chapter, I discuss everyday examples of 
policing practice to substantiate my claims about state security agencies’ 
active defence of conjugal order, showing how this activity is understood 
to protect the foundations of communal and national order. I conclude 
with some reflections on the ways that gendered analysis of regulatory 
authority can contribute to debate on hybridised systems of governance 
and security into the future.
Gender and hybridity: A context for critique
Before I progress this discussion further, it is important to establish 
an intellectual context for the argument I defend here. My effort to 
uncover the gender-restrictive consequences that accrue when policing is 
shaped by intertwined sources of customary, religious and state security 
agency authority in Fiji may be taken by some to suggest that I view 
the relationship between gender, custom and faith, as this operates more 
generally in Pacific islands societies, with a feminist scepticism or that 
I see this relationship as solely disempowering for women.
17  MacKenzie, Female Soldiers in Sierra Leone, 4.
18  Bubandt, ‘Vernacular Security’.
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This chapter is not written with the aim of defending this view. It  is 
important to research the relationship between gender, rights and 
culture in the Pacific islands region with caution, sensitivity and in 
ways that accommodate nuance and contingency. In this vein, my past 
research on these questions has examined how women’s rights activists 
in Pacific island countries have advanced demands for increased political 
participation, or improved responses to high rates of gendered violence, 
in ways that also draw from local religious and cultural discourses.19 These 
acts of ‘translation’ have yoked universalistic political formulations which 
establish women’s ‘rights’ to participation and security with customary 
protocols and biblical teachings which promote respect for women or 
women’s matrilineal authority in familial or clan contexts. I have shown 
that for women activists in the Pacific islands, these hybridised political 
claims have been integral to challenging the idea that resistance to women’s 
disadvantage amounts to an acceptance of foreign or inauthentic values 
that have little resonance with local ways of thinking.20
One particularly powerful articulation of this bridging discourse, as it 
has been formulated in Fiji, has emphasised the significance of the i tatau 
in the context of debates on high rates of physical violence perpetrated 
against women in conjugal and family settings in Fiji. This indigenous 
customary practice requires new husbands to make a formal vow, on 
presentation of a tabua or whale’s tooth to their wife’s family, to care for 
and protect their daughter. Failure to uphold this vow makes the husband 
answerable to his in-laws, and has often been severely punished.21 This 
customary practice has been invoked by activists seeking to challenge 
the idea that assertions of women’s right to physical security in intimate 
conjugal or familial settings is a palagi or foreign practice that has no 
place in Fijian society.22 The i tatau example operates here to remind those 
who are suspicious of ‘rights-based’ political claims and equate them with 
‘heartless globalization and irreligion’23 that similar principles about the 
standing of women are upheld in Fijian cultural practice.
However, while my research has demonstrated the political significance 
of  processes of rights translation, I have also drawn attention to the 
enabling and constraining aspect of this political activity. This question 
19  George, ‘“Starting with a Prayer”’; George, ‘“Just Like Your Mother?”’.
20  See also Douglas, ‘Christian Citizens’; Jolly, ‘Woman Ikat Raet Long Human Raet o No?’.
21  Daurewa, ‘The Power of Fiji’s Women’.
22  Ibid.
23  Douglas, ‘Christian Citizens’, 21.
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gained prominence for me as a new researcher working in Fiji in the 
early 2000s. At this time, Fiji was recovering from a civilian-led rebel 
incursion  that ultimately resulted in the dismissal of the elected 
government of the day. This forceful reassertion of indigenous political 
authority put a brake on the gradual process of liberal reform that had 
been underway in  the country since 1997 when a new constitution 
allowed Fiji’s first Indian-led government to rise to power. The 2000 
civilian coup was an event that quickly resharpened and politicised lines 
of communal and ethnic difference in the country.24 Self-installed Fijian 
nationalists sat at the head of government and an authoritarian state. They 
were quick to legitimate their power grab through appeals to faith and 
custom and equally prompt to voice criticism of, and sometimes direct 
threats against, those who did not share their convictions. In this climate, 
women activists certainly reflected on the value of careful translation 
strategies when talking about women’s rights.25 But in the same breath, 
many also voiced misgivings over the necessity of delivering their message 
in this way. They sometimes expressed this frustration by stating that they 
felt ‘boxed in by culture’, or at least by the narrow and highly politicised 
interpretations of  culture that were being promoted by sections of the 
political elite at the time.26
For better or worse, the idea that nationalist invocations of culture or 
faith can be used to justify gender-restrictive practice (across a range of 
contexts) has shaped the way I come to the debate on hybridity. It is 
certainly important to recognise, document and celebrate hybridised 
forms of rights advocacy as they are developed by women activists in this 
context as evidence of political creativity and resourcefulness. But, as I will 
demonstrate, it is equally important to ask about the gendered relations 
of power that have been configured through interplaying systems of 
church and customary authority such as we find in Fiji, and to ask if or 
how this interplay or hybridity shapes the everyday delivery of regulatory 
authority. It is my contention that these things come together in Fiji in 
ways that compound the insecurity of particular groups of women in Fiji 
in significant ways.
24  Robertson and Sutherland, Government by the Gun.
25  George, Situating Women.
26  George, ‘“Just Like Your Mother?”’; George, Situating Women; George, ‘“Starting with a Prayer”’.
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Hybridity and the everyday policing 
of conjugal order in Fiji
It might seem odd to observers of Fiji’s politics that my study of gender 
and policing in Fiji is framed in terms that suggest a restrictive and 
indeed punitive security environment. After the military took power 
in Fiji in 2006 (a coup which was justified, on the surface at least, as 
necessary to curbing the excesses of indigenous nationalism), a number 
of legal reforms were introduced to improve the way police responded 
to the crimes of gendered violence, for example, or the way it treated 
homosexual citizens. The development of the 2009 Domestic Violence 
Decree, which aimed to reclassify a range of offences occurring in the 
‘family situation’ as criminal acts, is one example of this shift.27 Another is 
the Zero Tolerance Violence Free Community campaign, also launched in 
2009, which aims to encourage a rejection of gendered forms of violence 
at the village level.28 The 2013 constitution, replicating clauses present 
in the 1997 Fiji constitution that was overturned by the government in 
2009, also protects Fiji’s homosexual citizens from discrimination on the 
basis of their sexuality. This document also builds on a 2010 decree issued 
by the military government to decriminalise homosexuality, overturning a 
colonial-era legal statute making homosexuality a criminal offence. When 
considered together, these developments suggest that Fiji’s political elite, 
who were later democratically elected in 2014, have been keen to present 
their credentials as gender reformers. Nonetheless, government rhetoric 
on this subject is soundly contradicted by the everyday operation of state 
security agencies whose policing of gender seems to frequently operate as 
if this reform agenda does not exist.
To understand where and, more particularly, how this gap between 
policy and policing practice is present, it is important to examine 
how understandings of security are vernacularised in Fiji within 
a ‘hybridised’ system of regulatory authority and how this gives a particular 
shape to the  policing of gender in Fiji. To develop this aspect of my 
argument I draw on Nils Bubandt’s ethnographic approach to security. 
27  Radio New Zealand, ‘Decree in Fiji Aimed at Tackling Domestic Violence’.
28  ABC Radio Australia, ‘Fiji Women’s Minister Defends Domestic Violence Decree’.
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Bubandt’s  work calls attention to the way longstanding vernacular 
influences inflect prevailing ‘idioms of uncertainty, order and fear’ and 
help to legitimate specific ‘forms of social control’.29
Bubandt asks how localised factors shape ideas about ‘safe community’.30 
To do this he investigates how perceived threats to insecurity are 
framed or, in his words, generate an ‘ontological uncertainty’.31 From 
his perspective, efforts to come to grips with the ‘problem of security’ 
should pay attention to the ‘socially constructed anxiety that shapes 
pertinent kinds of danger, fears and concerns for a particular community 
at a particular time’.32 As he goes on to argue, this opens the way for 
investigating how different societies have different ways of ‘socially 
producing … discursively portraying … symbolically representing … and 
politically managing ontological uncertainty’.33 Against this backdrop, 
he suggests the concept of vernacular security as a ‘convenient shorthand’ 
to capture the connection that exists between ‘the political rhetoric of 
safety and an ontology of uncertainty’ and also how this connection is 
managed through the ‘relationship that exists between the ‘state and the 
community’.34
Following on from this, if we are to understand the gendered impacts of 
hybridised security environments in Fiji, or elsewhere, it seems important 
to first consider how multiple sites of regulatory authority operate in 
relation to one another to build social order and, second, to consider 
how threats to security are framed and legitimised in these contexts. 
Consequently, we might better understand how gendered forms of order 
and security are framed and managed by sites of regulatory enforcement 
but also how these framing and management strategies are reflective of the 
broader ontology of uncertainty that is generated within the hybridised 
security environment.
So what form does an ontology of insecurity take within Fiji’s hybridised 
security environment and what are its gendered dimensions? To give some 
texture to this idea I draw on reflections and observations on the links 
between indigenous nationalism in Fiji and indigenous insecurity from 
29  Bubandt, ‘Vernacular Security’, 277.
30  Ibid., 290.
31  Ibid., 277.
32  Ibid., 277.
33  Ibid., 277.
34  Ibid., 281.
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one of Fiji’s leading indigenous statesmen: customary leader, former vice 
president of Fiji and High Court judge, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi. According 
to Madraiwiwi, since the late nineteenth century, Fijians have feared that 
their culture, their land, their way of life, perhaps their very survival as 
a  people, is threatened by ‘forces of change’.35 These changes included 
those wrought by colonialism, most starkly the arrival of indentured Indian 
labourers to work in the colonial economy and whose descendants remain 
in Fiji and at one time outnumbered indigenous citizens.36 Colonisation 
also brought Wesleyan Methodist missionaries to Fiji’s shores. This latter 
group successfully converted large sections of the indigenous population 
to its church. Where religious conversion was not achieved voluntarily, 
the colonial state imposed its faith upon indigenous populations through 
militarised means.37
This early fusing of the state and Methodist church regulatory authority 
has survived Fiji’s transition to independence and continued to influence 
military and policing activity in Fiji’s highly communalised, postcolonial 
political environment. In this context, faith and custom function in an 
intertwined way as Janus-faced signifiers of order and disorder for Fiji’s 
indigenous and predominantly Methodist population. Faith and custom 
sustain a sense of distinctive Fijian unity and identity but, conversely, also 
stoke an insistent ontological uncertainty, giving rise to fears about Fijians’ 
ultimate survival and the need for vigorous state protection of indigenous 
custom and the centrality of their church.38 Some Methodist church 
leaders fuel these fears from the pulpit, encouraging their congregations to 
reflect upon the dangers posed to Fijian unity by urbanism, individualism, 
consumerism and sometimes even indigenous customs.39 For assisting 
this sense of unease, Fijian Methodism has been described as ‘not quite 
the opium of the masses’, but rather ‘the caffeine of the masses’ which 
‘energises people while intensifying their anxieties’.40
In this sense, to explain the function of hybridised regulatory authority 
in Fiji, it is important to consider how the exercise of state security and 
authority is actively shaped and influenced by religious and customary 
35  Madraiwiwi, ‘On Understanding the Fijian People’, 23.
36  Firth, ‘Colonial Administration and the Invention of the Native’.
37  Nicole, Disturbing History, 17.
38  Robertson and Sutherland, Government by the Gun, 50–74; Tomlinson, In God’s Image, 168.
39  Tomlinson, In God’s Image, 168.
40  Ibid., 25.
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institutions. But beyond this, we need to also examine the vernacularised 
(and gendered) understandings of security and order that circulate and are 
privileged within this regulatory system.
Feminist security studies provide an important backdrop for this type of 
enquiry, showing the anti-emancipatory, and indeed gender-restrictive, 
discourses that emerge when societies are perceived to be under threat. 
In these contexts, gendered tropes of protection come powerfully to the 
fore.41 In the process of holding off these threats, women are frequently 
identified by community leaders as the bearers of ‘distinctive’ feminised 
cultural norms which may be articulated in an idealised, restrictive and 
subordinating form.42 Nonetheless, these norms also establish a foundation 
for notions of gender security, emphasising dutiful and dependent women 
as those most worthy of protection.43 In these contexts, there may be 
a  vigorous policing of women’s identity and behaviour to ensure those 
gendered norms predominate. The aim here is not simply to regulate 
(women’s) individual behaviour, but to police these norms because they 
are understood to provide the foundation for a more generalised sense 
of community order that is perceived to be under threat.44
Megan MacKenzie develops the term ‘conjugal order’ to capture the 
idea that there is frequently a link to be drawn between the ‘laws and 
social norms that serve to regulate sexuality’ and broader notions of order 
and stability.45 Hence she considers how campaigns to protect strongly 
feminised ideals of domesticity, obedience and conjugal propriety become 
integral to the broader efforts to maintain forms of order. These broad 
trends may help to generate ideals of femininity that are upheld in 
a narrow, ‘ethnicised’ form46 that may deny women’s capacity for agency 
and casts activity that does not conform to the feminine ideal as gendered 
dissidence.
41  Cohn and Jacobson, ‘Women and Political Activism’, 114; Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases; 
Enloe, The Curious Feminist; Young, ‘The Logic of Masculinist Protection’.
42  de Alwis et al., ‘Women and Peace Processes’, 178; Young, ‘The Logic of Masculinist 
Protection’, 14.
43  McLeod, ‘A Feminist Approach to Hybridity’, 54; Young, ‘The Logic of Masculinist 
Protection’, 14.
44  Pettman, ‘Boundary Politics’, 196–197.
45  MacKenzie, Female Soldiers in Sierra Leone, 4.
46  Björkdahl and Selimovic, ‘Gendering Agency in Transitional Justice’, 167.
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To understand the ways in which gender and hybridised regulatory 
authority in Fiji intersect it is important to consider the particular kinds 
of institutional interplay that shape state policing authority and activity 
in this context. But beyond this, it is also important to consider the 
discourses that fuel an insistent ontology of uncertainty in this hybridised 
context, and how these elements come together to legitimate a restrictive 
policing of conjugal norms because this is understood to be foundational 
to the achievement of community order, safety and wellbeing.
In this context, the regulatory authority of custom, and Fijian Methodism, 
has been described as a normative ‘mould’ shaping the psyche of Fiji’s 
security agencies,47 which predominantly comprise Fijian personnel and 
tend, correspondingly, to assess and police threats to order in ways that 
reflect an indigenous ‘ontology of insecurity’. Narrow norms of conjugal 
order are upheld by agencies of regulatory authority in this context, not 
simply because this accords with the dictates of custom or faith, but 
because these norms are viewed as foundational to the achievement of 
a broader social order that requires vigilant protection. As I will now 
demonstrate, this scenario has resulted in practical policing which 
generates restrictive and sometimes highly punitive outcomes for women 
and men whose behaviour and expressions of sexuality are deemed to 
disrupt norms of conjugal order. It is my contention that these trends 
persist regardless of whether the political elite in power in Fiji advocates 
strongly nationalist or more reformist political sympathies. The gendered 
brunt of this hybridised exercise of authority has been particularly felt by 
Fiji’s sex-worker population, gay and lesbian communities, and women 
seeking protection from gendered forms of violence.
Policing conjugal order: Regulating sexuality
Scrutiny of policing in the years following the Fijian military coup of 
2006 indicates the consistent ways in which gender is policed within 
the country’s hybridised system of regulatory authority. Despite its 
commitments to ending the indigenous capture of the state, the military 
government that assumed power at this time appointed a conservative 
and deeply religious senior military officer to the position of police 
commissioner in 2007. Under this command, the Fiji Police Force then 
47  Teaiwa, ‘Articulated Cultures’.
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adopted an evangelistic approach to crime prevention known as the 
Souls to Jesus campaign which required officers to reflect on their duty 
to ‘be God’s Ambassadors’48 and, through their own example, encourage 
a  ‘reconfiguring of public morality’ as part of their crime-prevention 
work.49 Officers on patrol were instructed to carry bibles as part of their 
kit, desk officers were required to answer the phone saying ‘Praise the 
Lord’ and the police band was instructed to play only Christian songs of 
worship. Police officers’ morality enforcement saw them preach messages 
of restraint to couples embracing on Suva’s sea wall, or young people 
frequenting Suva’s busy nightclub strips.50
Those whose behaviour posed more serious threats to norms of conjugal 
propriety were subject to more serious forms of regulation. This was 
particularly so for sex workers who were subject to increasing forms 
of police surveillance. A new crimes decree enacted by the military 
government in 2009 gave police broader authority to round up and 
detain sex workers. But in Fiji, sex work is also discussed in ways which 
suggest it is a powerful source of ontological insecurity. Debates on the 
legalisation of sex work, for example, are commonly resisted in ways which 
pathologise this activity or which suggest that decriminalisation will invite 
‘divine retribution’ upon the country.51 Against this backdrop, regulatory 
interventions legitimised by the 2009 crimes decree saw detained sex 
workers subjected to brutal and degrading extrajudicial punishments 
while in police custody. These included detainees being forced to jump 
from bridges into the dark waters of sea inlets at night, detainees being 
stripped and having their heads shaved, and some subjected to forced 
labour inside military and police barracks.52
Fiji Police Force officers’ treatment of Fiji’s gay and lesbian communities 
was similarly discriminatory and punitive, despite a military decree in 
2010 decriminalising homosexuality. Like the issue of sex work, debate 
on homosexuality and the rights of gay people in Fiji tends to expose how 
these questions are publicly framed as posing a challenge to the prevailing 
conjugal order, and, more broadly, fuel ontological insecurity. My previous 
work on these questions has shown that, despite more moderate religious 
48  Trnka, ‘Remythologizing the State’, 81.
49  Ibid., 82.
50  McGeough, ‘An Unholy Alliance’.
51  Pratibha, ‘Rooting Out Prostitution and Associated Illicit Practices’; Singh, ‘Prostitution Law 
Changes Fiji’s Night Life’; Vakaliwaliwa, ‘Question of Prostitution’.
52  McMillan and Worth, Sex Workers and HIV Prevention in Fiji.
HyBRIDITy ON THE GROUND IN PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT
266
leadership on this issue, many highly vocal church leaders frame tolerance 
of homosexuality as a ‘cancer’ that will invade the country or a ‘curse’ 
that will ‘swamp’ Fiji like a ‘tsunami’.53 This helps to explain why, despite 
legal and constitutional provisions outlawing discrimination on the basis 
of sexuality, state regulatory authorities have a well-established history of 
discriminating and harassing Fiji’s homosexual community.54 In 2007, 
a new case of this sort brought these broader tendencies into stark and 
disturbing contrast.
This incident involved the conduct of an auxiliary policeman who was 
found guilty of raping his sister, an act which he allegedly perpetrated 
to punish her for her involvement in a same-sex relationship and to rid 
her of her homosexuality. When this case was later brought to court, 
the presiding judge found the perpetrator guilty but also exonerated 
his behaviour in a judgement which stated that his normal reason was 
impaired by drunkenness. The light sentence, suspended for eight years, 
required the perpetrator to be jailed only at weekends.55 This caused outcry 
among gender and human rights activists and was eventually overturned 
in the High Court after a long five-year interval. Nonetheless, this case 
conforms to a longstanding pattern of punitive and discriminatory 
responses displayed by regulatory authorities towards sex workers and 
homosexual citizens in Fiji.56 There exists a pattern suggesting that the 
violence perpetrated against these groups by regulatory authorities 
is excusable because it is less grave than the embodied threats these 
citizens are felt to pose, both personally and collectively, to the ordering 
of a ‘safe community’.
Policing conjugal order: Violence against 
women
In response to the excessive ways in which policing authority was 
exercised during the Souls to Jesus campaign, the Fiji Police Force later 
sought to soften its image through the development of a new community, 
or Duavata policing program, rolled out across a range of jurisdictions in 
53  Pratibha, ‘Rooting Out Prostitution’.
54  FWCC, Misogyny and Homophobia in the Fiji Police Force; George, ‘Contending Masculinities 
and the Limits of Tolerance’; George, ‘In Sickness and in Health’.
55  Narayan, ‘Sister Rapist Serves Sentence Only on Weekends’.
56  George, ‘In Sickness and in Health’.
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2010. The term duavata is Fijian and expresses the idea of communities 
coming together. It is used by the police force to encourage the idea that the 
police and the community are partners in the effort to ‘resolve identified 
problems in order to prevent crime’.57 Outwardly, this program seemed 
to traverse Fiji’s communal identifications and involved the participation 
of both Indian and Fijian industry, cultural and sporting groups, in a shift 
from the earlier Souls to Jesus campaign, which was exclusively Christian 
and evangelistic. Nonetheless, deeper scrutiny suggests that even within 
this new program, there is a hybridised aspect of state security agency 
operations that continues to function in gender-restrictive ways.
A central component of the Duavata policing program has been a zero-
tolerance initiative on violence against women that encourages villages 
to declare themselves ‘violence free’ and involves community members 
as both stakeholders and participants in law and order provision. The 
program is designed to work in collaboration with state policing, but 
also aims to build community awareness that gender violence is a crime. 
Hence community leaders are trained to become designated ‘gatekeepers’ 
equipped with skills to reconcile conjugal disputes so that violence in the 
home or family is de-escalated or avoided altogether.58 Should community 
interventions fail, the 2009 Domestic Violence Decree authorises a tough 
law and order response towards the perpetrators of gender violence.
But the Fiji Police Force’s hardline authoritarianism, operating in tandem 
with informal sites of authority, also undermines the success of this 
policing program. On one hand, local stakeholders have been found to 
encourage reconciliation between aggrieved family members so that the 
customary and religious integrity of the marriage and the family remains 
intact. Accordingly, women are often urged to return to violent conjugal 
or familial environments and deterred from seeking external forms of 
protection or justice by making complaints known to police officers. 
On the other hand, an under-reporting of incidents of gender violence to 
police authorities is also said to have occurred because villages who declare 
themselves ‘violence free’ are eager to maintain their positive profile with 
potentially punitive state authorities and have become fearful of unwanted 
police scrutiny.59
57  FPF, Fiji Police Duavata Community Policing Model.
58  ABC Radio Australia, ‘Fiji Women’s Minister Defends Domestic Violence Decree’.
59  FWCC, Somebody’s Life, Everybody’s Business; Tukuwasa, ‘Fiji Should Not Bank on Zero 
Reporting’.
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Government sources have proudly advocated the successes of this 
program,60 but women’s non-government organisations in Fiji continue 
to raise concerns about the efficacy of these initiatives.61 Allegations that 
state police officers are themselves perpetrators of this form of violence also 
undermines government advocacy of the policy gains on violence against 
women.62 In this context, reforms designed to improve state agencies’ 
responses to cases of violence against women have been undermined 
because they are layered over a hybridised system of regulatory authority 
where threats posed to conjugal and familial integrity are treated as a more 
serious source of ontological uncertainty than the physical insecurity that 
women might be exposed to within conjugal and familial settings and at 
the hands of police themselves. The community policing model may be 
designed to resonate with the ‘the grain of local beliefs’,63 but in practice 
it has not provided any strong guarantee that women who are exposed to 
violence in the home and within their families can rely on state protection 
or intervention to uphold their right to safety.
Conclusion
Hybridity as a concept may presently be much in vogue in the fields 
of policing studies and in studies of statebuilding, and drawn upon to 
explain the problematic consequences of international interventions that 
attempt to layer institutions of governance in contexts ‘without peace … 
without reconciliation’.64 According to Oliver Richmond, these challenges 
can be reconciled when there is a prior commitment to ‘a mutual process 
… which negotiates with local customary, cultural, political, social, 
class, economic and often religious dynamics’ in combination with the 
‘thin  cosmopolitan ideas upheld by democracy, human rights, welfare 
[and] rule of law’.65
It is perhaps revealing that Richmond’s list of local dynamics does not 
include a mention of gender. This oversight requires more than a passing 
acknowledgement. There is a need, in my view, for closer and more 
nuanced thinking about the vernacularised ontologies of uncertainty 
60  ABC Radio Australia, ‘Fiji Women’s Minister Defends Domestic Violence Decree’.
61  FWCC, Somebody’s Life, Everybody’s Business.
62  Tahana, ‘Fiji PM’s Violence Condemnation Rings Hollow for Some’.
63  Dinnen and Peake, ‘More than Just Policing’, 572.
64  Richmond, ‘Between Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’, 174.
65  Ibid.
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and insecurity that are generated in hybridised environments, and the 
potential for restrictive disciplinary outcomes to be legitimated as part 
of the interplay between state and non-state sites of regulatory authority.
As I have shown, this interplay can ‘fashion’ (to return to the metaphor 
invoked at the start of this chapter) the regulatory environment in Fiji so 
that it delivers strongly gendered forms of policing that do little to address 
the insecurities of those who are locally understood to pose a threat to 
norms of conjugal order and the integrity of the political community 
more generally. More systematic enquiry needs to be undertaken into 
the interplays that occur between formal and informal sites of regulatory 
authority and how these shape vernacular definitions of order and security 
and, ultimately, the conduct of state agencies. The examples discussed 
in this chapter show that hybridised systems of authority can produce 
a strong, but not always just, correlation of security ambitions. In practice 
these may also deliver gender-discriminatory, gender-restrictive and, 




Hybridity in Port Moresby: 
Gender, Class and a ‘Tiny Bit 




In 2007, I was staying at the Holiday Inn in Port Moresby, Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), with my family. During this time my friend Karuka 
(a  pseudonym) came to visit us. Knowing that my children would 
appreciate company to combat the boredom of being trapped in a Port 
Moresby hotel, she brought with her three of her younger siblings. 
On arrival at the front gate, Karuka and her family were forbidden entry 
by one of the security guards on duty. It was only when I went to the gate 
and clarified that the group were there to see us that they were allowed in.
Initially this incident appeared to be a case of ‘misreading’ Karuka on the 
part of the security guard. As those who spend time in Port Moresby’s hotels 
can attest, the guards are employed to ‘keep out’ undesirables as much as 
to ensure the physical safety of the paying guests. In the colonial era, this 
was simple—only expatriates or (sometimes) Papua New Guineans who 
entered with expatriates were allowed in to the more salubrious locations 
that in practice served as unofficial enclaves allowing expatriates to live 
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separately from those around them.1 Since independence and the gradual 
emergence of a middle class in PNG, deciding who may or may not enter 
a place has become more complicated. My perceptions and anecdotal 
evidence suggest guards make their boundary-keeping decisions on 
various aspects of a person’s appearance, including skin colour, ethnicity 
and clothing.
Usually, someone like Karuka—overseas educated and well dressed—
would drive in to the premises, thus avoiding scrutiny and being allowed 
to ‘pass’ by virtue of having arrived in a car. Cars themselves mark ‘class’ 
because of their prohibitive cost in PNG. But, in this instance, having 
walked up to the gate with other locals, Karuka was vulnerable to the 
guard’s subjective interpretation of her ‘status’ and his assessment of 
whether she and her family were allowed to enter the space. Unfortunately, 
the boundary keeping did not end there. Later that day, the same guard 
asked Karuka and her family to leave the poolside area because it was only 
for ‘paying guests’. Given that middle class Papua New Guinean families 
who are not staying at the hotel regularly use the pool on weekends, it is 
perhaps unsurprising to learn that the guard had something of a vendetta 
against Karuka and her family.
Karuka recognised the guard as being from Hohola, where she grew 
up and where her family still lives. Like much of urban PNG, Hohola 
is characterised by mixed housing including squatter settlements, 
underlying and sometimes violent ethnic tension, and inadequate and 
unreliable access to utilities. That the guard from Karuka’s area used his 
role as a  (literal) gatekeeper to exercise the form of authority to which 
he had access needs to be understood through reference to Karuka’s 
perceived privilege. Having won scholarships to attend school and then 
university overseas, Karuka has lived away from home since the age of 16, 
making occasional visits to see her family. At the time we coincided in 
Port Moresby, she was in town staying with her family while on holiday. 
Karuka said that the guard knew who she and her siblings were and 
speculated that he refused them entry in an attempt to reassert power over 
her because he viewed her as a bikhet meri (‘show-off woman’). As I have 
noted elsewhere, in urban PNG men have little to gain from supporting 
greater equality between men and women, at least in the short term.2 
But they can defend their own interests and negate the potential power 
1  Alpers, ‘Medical Research in the Highlands’; Gammage, ‘Moresby 1966’.
2  See Spark, ‘Gender Trouble in Town’.
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of educated and employed women by appealing to idealised versions of 
gender roles which locate women’s ‘proper place’ as being in the home. 
As an extension of this they can also refuse women entry to the places that 
are associated with the benefits of modernity. In my view, this was the 
dynamic evident between the guard and Karuka.
In their seminal work, Emerging Class in Papua New Guinea, 
anthropologists Gewertz and Errington discuss what they call the ‘hidden 
injuries of class’ as these play out between ‘grass roots’ and middle class 
Papua New Guineans living in Wewak.3 Writing in the late 1990s, they 
note an increasing tendency among middle class Papua New Guineans 
to construct people from the ‘grass roots’ as the ‘blameworthy poor’.4 
Demonstrating ‘what happens to the poor when class has become a fait 
accompli’, they construe middle class Papua New Guineans as detaching 
from less-affluent kin and acquaintances in order to protect their 
resources.5 But as Karuka’s experience with the guard indicates, people on 
both sides of the class border harbour stereotypes and prejudices against 
one another. Importantly, these interactions involve gender, not in an 
additive sense but at their core. While Karuka may have ‘made it out’ of 
the Moresby settlement by virtue of her education, on returning to visit 
her family in Port Moresby she temporarily inhabits the same world as 
the security guard, and in this world she is still regarded as a daughter 
and sister of people known in a particular locality. And here, as in most 
places now construed as postcolonial, encounters between ‘others’ reveal 
a complex interplay between ethnicity, gender and class that inform and 
underpin ideas about who is entitled to go where. Karuka’s difficulty 
entering and spending time in the spaces of the hotel demonstrates 
that in contemporary Port Moresby inclusion and exclusion, while class 
based, also reflect and affect the ways in which gender and ethnicity are 
constructed and understood.
Such encounters are common in PNG, and other middle-class and 
tertiary-educated women have told me about similar experiences. In these 
scenarios, male security guards, who typically have received only primary 
education, are endowed with a dubious power and responsibility.6 Policing 
the boundaries of the city’s locations on the basis of their subjective 
3  Gewertz and Errington, Emerging Class in Papua New Guinea.
4  Ibid., 84.
5  Ibid., 84.
6  See Lusby, ‘Preventing Violence at Home’; Sharp et al., ‘The Formal, the Informal and the 
Precarious’. See also Lusby, ‘Securitisation, Development and the Invisibility of Gender’.
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assessment of the class credentials of those seeking to enter, they are well 
positioned to turn these moments into opportunities to reassert what they 
perceive to be their ‘rightful’ place in the gender hierarchy, embarrassing 
middle class women in the process. As Sharp et  al. note, ‘employment 
as a security guard presents one of few options for men with little or no 
formal education, but wages are barely enough to sustain their families’.7 
The point here is not to ‘blame the guards’ but rather to note that the 
rank and file guards who occupy the lowest rungs of PNG’s lucrative 
security industry both reflect and are expected to enact ‘a hierarchy of 
social class and economic privilege in PNG’.8 As everyday instances of 
boundary making, such interactions and the hybridity they embody can 
be analysed to ground discussions of the power dynamics of ‘race, gender 
and class as these are enacted at both the local and global levels’.9 Below, 
I describe my approach to reading hybridity in Port Moresby, an approach 
which is descriptive rather than prescriptive and in which Karuka remains 
a central character.
There are many ways to explore hybridity in Port Moresby, not least because 
it is a rapidly expanding city, both in terms of its physical infrastructure, 
but also with regard to the population, now estimated to be as high as 
three quarters of a million.10 But following Laura McLeod’s injunction to 
notice the ‘diversity of the personal’ and to ‘pay deeper attention to the 
diverse ways in which the personal is political for both international and 
local actors’,11 I have chosen to consider hybridity as it is represented in 
the personal views that two ‘international’ women have about one of the 
city’s new locations, namely Cafe Duffy located in the suburb Gordons.
As one of the new places that is part of the ‘dynamic, exciting, dangerous, 
bewildering, hybrid environment that is Moresby’, it would be easy to 
argue that Duffy merely represents the global spread of cosmopolitan 
consumerism.12 But closer inspection reveals the cafe to be a hybrid site. 
As I argue here, Duffy is characterised by a blending of cultures which 
underpins and enables the development of perhaps more subversive 
modes of being than would usually be associated with places made for 
7  Sharp et al., ‘The Formal, the Informal and the Precarious’, 3.
8  Ibid.
9  Darling-Wolf, ‘Disturbingly Hybrid or Distressingly Patriarchal?’, 70.
10  Jones and Kep, ‘Understanding Urbanisation in the PNG Context’.
11  McLeod, ‘A Feminist Approach to Hybridity’, 52.
12  Goddard, ‘Introduction: About Moresby’, 18; see also Foster, Materializing the Nation; Foster, 
Coca-Globalization.
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consumption. My analysis of Duffy demonstrates that the site plays a role 
in the production of new sociospatial practices and identities—with the 
potential to challenge the dominant constructions of class and gender 
in Port Moresby.
To make my argument, I draw on a range of sources, including photos 
and commentary that Karuka shared with me after her November 2015 
visit to Port Moresby; my interviews with young middle class women who 
live in Moresby, including an interview I conducted with Duffy’s French 
owner and manager, Olga Girault; and a postcard that Girault designed 
to advertise Duffy. Typically, even within conceptualisations of hybridity, 
the  ‘international’ is represented as being ‘a structure or organisation’ 
with the local construed as ‘personal’. I challenge this construction, 
demonstrating that the ‘international’ can also be ‘personal’ and deeply 
imbricated with the ‘local’.13 Invoking the term hybridity in a manner 
consistent with discussions that occur in postcolonial explorations of 
identity, place and culture,14 and which reflect a process in which hybridity 
has the potential to ‘dislocate the process of colonization’,15 I argue 
that the emergence in Port Moresby of places such as Duffy indicates 
something other than the ‘failures of postcolonial development’16 or the 
dominance of consumption-based place making. Allowing young Papua 
New Guinean women an appealing palette of experience that is otherwise 
difficult to access in PNG, Duffy enables women to construct themselves 
as friends and customers—rather than daughters, wives or sisters—and 
in doing so provides momentary liberation from the ordinary constraints 
of life in Port Moresby.
Cafe Duffy: Karuka’s perspective
Karuka grew up in Hohola, a suburb of Port Moresby then considered 
a dangerous place.17 The first of three daughters in a family left by their 
father she had a profound sense as a child that she and her family were 
‘at the bottom of the pile’, saying ‘we were almost like subordinates’ and 
13  McLeod, ‘A Feminist Approach to Hybridity’.
14  See Bhabha, ‘Questions of Cultural Identity’; Cuninghame, ‘Hybridity, Transnationalism, and 
Identity’; Darling-Wolf, ‘Disturbingly Hybrid or Distressingly Patriarchal?’; Jacobs, Edge of Empire.
15  Cuninghame, ‘Hybridity, Transnationalism, and Identity’, 21.
16  Connell, ‘Regulation of Space in the Contemporary Postcolonial Pacific City’, 245.
17  See Spark, ‘Gender Trouble in Town’; Spark, ‘An Oceanic Revolution?’ and Spark, ‘“We Only 
Get the Daylight Hours’” for other discussions of Karuka’s background and experience.
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that, even at a young age, there was ‘already the sense that we were lower’. 
Perceiving overseas education as something that only the wealthy could 
afford, she thought ‘that happens to those wealthy people, but not to us’. 
Indeed, Karuka says it was only when she gained a scholarship and left 
PNG that she came to think that class need not determine opportunity 
in every case. Though currently completing postgraduate study in New 
Zealand, Karuka’s background and experience growing up in Moresby 
continue to shape her analysis of class interactions in the city.
Aged 33, Karuka had not been back to Moresby for three years when she 
went in late 2015. Interested in her impressions of the rapidly changing 
city, I asked her to send me photos and thoughts about the places she 
visited. She did this using WhatsApp and later produced a PowerPoint 
presentation, with accompanying commentary. I have extracted from 
this in the following discussion. One place Karuka took photos was Cafe 
Duffy where she went with two friends.
Duffy was established in 2012 by 22-year-old Olga Girault and her 
partner, local businessman Travers Chue, whose PNG-Chinese father 
owns Pacific Industries, a company that produces a range of drinks and 
foodstuffs sold across PNG. In contrast to the ‘new Chinese investors in 
Papua New Guinea’ who, as Graeme Smith notes, ‘fit Erving Goffman’s 
definition of a group that is “disqualified from full social acceptance” ’ 
on the basis that they tend to be perceived as mercenary and racist,18 
Pacific Industries has existed in PNG for 60 years and both the company 
and Duffy have an image of having successfully ‘localised’.19 Part of the 
group of what Smith calls ‘old Chinese’, they tend to be seen and to 
see themselves as ‘more benevolent’ and ‘less aggressive’ than the ‘new 
Chinese’ operating in PNG since 2007.
On one hand, the cafe represents a positive image of national and 
urban development of the kind dear to ‘elites and governments’.20 Indeed, 
Duffy has had such a positive reception that PNG’s National Airport 
Corporation invited Girault to establish a second cafe at the international 
airport when the airport was renovated for the 2015 Pacific Games. 
In 2016, Girault and Chue opened a third cafe at Harbour City located in 
Port Moresby’s banking and financial hub and, because of gated security, 
18  Smith, ‘Beijing’s Orphans?’, 327.
19  Ibid.
20  Connell, ‘Regulation of Space’, 248.
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an area difficult to enter without a car. But despite the cafe’s obvious 
association with the city’s professional elites, it would be erroneous to see 
Duffy merely as an embodiment of wealth, privilege and consumerism 
in the midst of a ‘planet of slums’.21 As feminist geographer Gillian Rose 
points out, spaces are ‘extraordinarily complicated’, allowing for a range 
of interpretations and meanings.22 While recognising Harvey’s insight 
that the contemporary urban experience gives (only) those with money 
‘the aura of freedom of choice’,23 I intend to explore the prospect that 
Duffy affords a greater range of rights and freedoms than might initially 
be thought.
Having become interested in Duffy as a site that reflects aspects of the 
‘new Port Moresby’, I interviewed Girault in August 2015. She said 
the cafe’s clientele are ‘now around 50/50’ in terms of ethnicity (that is, 
half expatriate and half Papua New Guinean). On the three occasions 
I have visited (the original) Duffy, the clientele has included professional 
Papua New Guineans as well as expatriates. But Girault said she noticed 
that some Papua New Guineans ‘will only purchase take away’, perhaps 
suggesting they are not entirely comfortable to spend time in the space 
of the cafe. Cindy, a 33-year-old Papua New Guinean friend of Karuka’s 
said that when she and her boyfriend went for brunch they were the only 
Papua New Guineans there ‘apart from the ladies behind the counter’. 
Consequently he was uncomfortable and wanted to ‘sit in the corner’. 
Though Cindy explicitly constructs her boyfriend’s discomfort in 
terms of ethnicity, it is also possible that Papua New Guinean men see 
Duffy as a feminine space, and that this rather than racism underpins 
their discomfort.
Duffy sells coffee, pastries, smoothies, juices and fresh bread, alongside 
a range of lunch items. With the exception of the fresh fruit and vegetables, 
most of which are locally sourced, the produce comes from Australia 
and New Zealand.
Along with the range, the quality of the food and beverages is rare in 
PNG,  offering, as Girault says ‘the best we can’ and ‘the best coffee 
in town’. The commentary accompanying Karuka’s photos testifies to this:
21  Harvey, ‘The Right to the City’, 37.
22  Rose, Feminism and Geography, 155.
23  Harvey, ‘The Right to the City’, 31.
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Duffy’s cafe—[at] 5 mile, had ace food—chocolate croissant —amazeballs. 
Location is ok as well, although it’s in the Gordons industrial area so 
I had initially been a little hesitant to go. But security was awesome. 
Duffy however can only be accessed by well to do people. Eg. My sisters 
mentioned ‘only money people go there’ and that they hadn’t been.
In addition to reporting that her sisters saw Duffy as a place for ‘money 
people’, Karuka also told me (in person) that she would not take them 
there because it would be like ‘opening a world to them that they 
could never have again’, once she was not in the country to pay for the 
experience. Representing a more optimistic perspective, Girault told me 
‘this coffee shop is open to everyone … and everyone is welcome to come 
here’. Realistically, however, the cost of the produce (a sandwich and 
drink costs around 40 PNG kina, which is equivalent to approximately 
AU$20) means that Duffy can only be afforded by a small proportion of 
Port Moresby’s population.
In advanced capitalist societies, where individualism goes hand in 
hand with modernity, access by virtue of one’s capacity to pay is widely 
accepted as part of life. But in PNG, places such as Duffy give rise to 
painful tensions for people like Karuka. On one hand, Duffy represents 
some of the positives of global capitalism and globalisation, including 
an opportunity for young women to participate in cosmopolitan 
consumerism, which, in PNG as elsewhere, tends to be associated with 
forms of (gendered) freedom and autonomy. For Karuka and her friends 
who can afford to visit Duffy, the site offers a valued opportunity to take 
part in the global cosmopolitan culture represented by purchasing quality 
cakes and coffee in their ‘home’ town. As Maggie Cummings writes, it is 
helpful to understand the social change associated with globalisation not 
as ‘something that happens to the people whose lives we study, but rather, 
something that they themselves do, participate in, drive, and shape through 
their own choices, actions, feelings, and theories’.24 Viewed through this 
focus on agency, we can see that when educated and professional women 
enter the space of Duffy they are participating in the ‘better future’25 that 
globalisation can and does deliver to Port Moresby inhabitants who do 
have money.
24  Cummings, ‘Imagining Transnational Futures in Vanuatu’, 383.
25  Ibid., 381.
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On the other hand, Duffy provides a stark reminder that ‘quality’ can 
only be afforded by a few, thus representing the problems associated with 
urbanisation and reliance on a cash economy.26 Of course affordability 
also  determines access in advanced capitalist societies, but in PNG, 
‘hybrid’  women like Karuka are related to and otherwise intimately 
connected with the many who feel uncomfortable about or cannot afford 
to go inside. As Keith Barber notes in his study of urban households, 
‘it is not as individuals that people survive in PNG’.27 Having grown up in 
a context in which reciprocity and resource sharing continue to form the 
basis of life and survival for many, including in many instances, themselves, 
Karuka and other overseas-educated women with whom I have spoken 
maintain a degree of commitment to this mode of life. Almost all the 
young women I know help to support their family members, including by 
paying for housing, food or assisting to educate younger siblings, nephews 
and nieces. At the same time, like other members of PNG’s middle class, 
they also seek to establish a degree of autonomy from family and tend 
to  reject the financial demands made on them by members of their 
extended families, preferring to limit their sharing to immediate family 
members.28
While the middle class in PNG are maligned for turning their backs on 
their grass roots counterparts, internationally educated and cosmopolitan 
women such as Karuka are acutely aware that they are products of 
a context in which some are afforded more opportunities than others. 
Moreover, this perspective is shaped in equal measure by local connections 
(including, for example, Karuka’s relationship with her sisters, whom she 
financially supports) and experiences such as the one Karuka had with the 
guard in 2007, as by her international education and outlook. Thus, in 
this interaction between an apparently ‘international’ person and a ‘local’ 
place, Duffy is a paradoxical space in which both people and place are 
shown to be hybrid.
26  Ibid., 383.
27  Barber, ‘Urban Households, Means of Livelihood and Village Identity in Moresby’, 95.
28  Cox and Macintyre, ‘Christian Marriage, Money Scams, and Melanesian Social Imaginaries’; 
Gewertz and Errington, Emerging Class in Papua New Guinea; Macintyre, ‘Money Changes Everything’.
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Cafe Duffy: Olga’s perspective
To add to the complexities of ‘reading’ Duffy’s hybridity within a modern 
PNG, it is worth delving further into Girault’s perspective as Duffy’s 
manager, for while she initially appears to represent the ‘consumption 
economy’,29 she too complicates easy dichotomies. Two things in 
particular stand out. The first is Girault’s approach to her staff, which, 
being respectful and mutually supportive, seems positively postcolonial 
in comparison to the more colonial master–servant relationships between 
employers and guards evident at most salubrious locations in PNG. 
Indeed, as Lusby notes, employer–guard relationships are characterised 
by violence, including ‘disciplinary beatings for breaches of the rules’.30 
A closer look at Girault’s perspective clarifies that she has transformed 
the role played by security at Duffy, encouraging them to see would-be 
entrants as customers rather than as constituting a threat.
Like most places in Moresby that expatriates frequent, there are security 
guards at the gate outside the entrance to Duffy. But these guards look 
noticeably different from others in PNG (Figure 16.1). Notably, they are 
not wearing a police or military style uniform or carrying batons as is 
commonly the case with guards working for private security companies. 
On arriving at Duffy, one observes that they appear happy and at ease and 
have warm and welcoming relationships with customers, rather than the 
typically deferential ones evident in other expensive locations. Wearing 
cheerful, rather than mirror sunglasses, they look more like they are on 
holiday than they do intimidating. As Karuka noted above, ‘security 
was awesome’ and Grace, a friend of Karuka’s, said she noticed the ‘very 
cheerful and enthusiastic attitude’ of the guards. These comments appear 
to reflect the pleasure that the guards’ welcoming attitude gives customers, 
many of whom, like Karuka, have experienced guards intimidating them 
and policing their appearance and ‘right to the city’.
29  Clifford, ‘On Collecting Art and Culture’, 141.
30  Sharp et al., ‘The Formal, the Informal and the Precarious’, 3.
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Figure 16.1: The friendly security team at Duffy
Source: Karuka (pseudonym), published with permission .
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Discussing Duffy’s security staff, Girault told me the story of their 
employment, describing how the guards had become part of the ‘Duffy 
family’:
We had a small number of staff and one of our first security [guards] was 
a guy who was in the streets actually and he was really malnourished, 
very skinny, had no family, he looked so sad … And now we’re his family 
pretty much. So it’s like all the people that are working with us all have 
a story with us but we are also a family, we call it the Duffy family so we 
say you have your family in the village but this is your second family, this 
is your Duffy family. So they’re all very loyal, all our security guards, they 
have been with us since day one.
Incorporating members of PNG’s ‘underclass’ into ‘the Duffy family’, 
Girault reverses the usual anthropological pattern in which the visiting 
international ‘other’ is fitted in to local kinship systems. This incorporation 
represents an implicit critique of those in the middle class who attempt 
to ‘detach’ from their less-affluent kin, thus challenging the neoliberal 
view that people are ‘poor because they make bad decisions’—a view 
Karuka also critiques since leaving PNG. Girault’s ‘everyday political 
analysis’31 of the situation in which the once homeless and hungry guards 
found themselves before being employed at Duffy is indicative of her 
border-crossing (as opposed to border-reinforcing) hybrid identity and 
politics.32 The ‘Duffy family’ suggests the need to read the new places of 
Port Moresby as reflecting and allowing a new mixing between cultures 
and people, which challenges existing borders of the political and ethnic 
communities in this context.
As noted above, this mixing between people and cultures is evident in 
the security guards’ interactions with customers. Guards display an 
obvious familiarity with customers, expatriate and otherwise, and there 
is a warmth and egalitarianism about their interactions at the entrance to 
the cafe. Girault says that she and Chue actively encouraged this way of 
relating, providing ‘incentives’ for the guards to ‘remember the customers’ 
names’ and greet them warmly.
Now we don’t need to tell them anything. They love it, they love having 
relationships with customers and get treated so well by customers. Every 
Christmas, they get so many gifts because customers love them.
31  Hudson et al., Everyday Political Analysis, 1.
32  Cuninghame, ‘Hybridity, Transnationalism, and Identity’, 29.
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Matthew, one of Duffy’s security guards, confirmed the gift-giving 
relationship with customers, saying:
We know our regular customers by name and they know us by our names 
and that makes us feel good. Sometimes when we become familiar, 
become friends, with a particular customer, and when he or she leaves to 
go back to where they come from, we [the guards] give them bilums and 
other PNG gifts. In return they give us gifts like clothes and other things.
Indeed, as Girault told me, some guards became so familiar they were 
kissing customers when they arrived—perhaps an over emulation of the 
French Girault—and she had to explain that this was going ‘too far’. 
As Iyall Smith notes: ‘those who occupy hybrid spaces benefit from having 
an understanding of both local knowledge and global cosmopolitanism. 
Those who can easily cross barriers in a world of amorphous borders have 
an advantage’.33 The guards’ kissing, which perhaps constitutes a moment 
of ‘excessive’ border crossing, serves as a reminder that familiarity with the 
‘global’ language of customer service within a ‘local’ context is a valuable 
skill in a hybrid environment.
Girault’s hybrid perspective is also captured in a postcard she produced 
to advertise the cafe. Using Roger Violett’s famous image of two French 
women entitled ‘Café et cigarette, Paris, 1925’, Girault asked her sister 
to digitally adapt the image by painting the two French women in bilas, 
traditional PNG decoration usually worn at celebrations and big events. As 
Girault explained, the image of women enjoying coffee and the reflection 
of this as bilas and painting on their bodies captures her own experience 
of drinking Papua New Guinean coffee, a moment, she says, that always 
makes her ‘feel a little bit Papua New Guinean’.34 Demonstrating the ways 
in which local and global cultures blend to create something new, the 
altered image of women enjoying leisure and friendship has a political 
potency in PNG where women continue to be constructed primarily 
through reference to their domestic and child-bearing responsibilities.
The desire to refigure local versions of femininity was another of Girault’s 
motivations for adapting and utilising this French image to advertise 
Duffy.
33  Iyall Smith, ‘Hybrid Identities’, 4.
34  See West, From Modern Production to Imagined Primitive, for a comprehensive analysis of the 
social world of coffee in PNG.
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I really like the picture of these two ladies, and … I’m really trying to 
empower women here. I guess I’m a tiny bit feminist, a little hint that I’m 
always for the women. I have meetings with the girls where I’m always 
you have to be proud independent blah blah blah, because especially 
in this country. Anyway for me it’s symbolic to have those two women 
having a coffee. Women you know.
Noting ‘it is socio-spatial practices that define places and these practices 
result in overlapping and intersecting places with multiple and changing 
boundaries’,35 feminist geographer Linda McDowell reminds us that what 
women do where changes the ‘nature’ of a place. While to a large extent 
normalised among women in the middle classes of advanced capitalist 
societies, meeting friends for coffee is still not the norm for most women 
in PNG. Consequently, when Papua New Guinean women come together 
in a place like Duffy to do just that, they are perhaps embodying a ‘tiny bit 
of feminism’ while simultaneously changing the local place in which they 
are engaged in this spatial practice. Playfully capturing a more optimistic 
perspective on the global flows that characterise transnationalism, the 
revamped postcard encapsulates a different perspective on young women’s 
leisure and consumption practices, demonstrating that while Parisian 
women can become ‘a little bit’ Papua New Guinean, so too can Papua 
New Guinean women become ‘a little bit’ French.36
Conclusion
Taking a descriptive over a prescriptive approach and rather than trying 
to ‘create or administer hybridity’,37 I have sought to demonstrate the 
value of hybridity for understanding the rapidly developing city of 
Port Moresby. I have observed how Karuka’s and Olga’s ‘international’ 
perspectives on Duffy, a particular place in their ‘home town’, enable us 
to consider hybridity in relation to the power dynamics of race, gender 
and class in contemporary Port Moresby. As this detailed analysis of 
their perspectives makes clear, ‘exposure to global communication and 
culture plant the seeds for the formation of a hybrid culture’.38 Discussing 
moments and places where this hybridity is embodied, I have shown it is 
35  McDowell, Gender, Identity and Place, 4.
36  Compare with West, From Modern Production to Imagined Primitive.
37  Miller, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 3.
38  Iyall Smith, ‘Hybrid Identities’, 5.
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insufficient to argue that class operates in PNG to produce boundaries 
on which the ‘oppressed’ and the ‘empowered’ exist on opposite sides.39 
Rather, it is useful to take a perspective on everyday boundary making 
which elucidates ‘the mixed and melded cultural forms that [are] ever 
more common in a globalized world’.40 The analysis also reveals that 
‘hybrid’ women such as those discussed in this chapter may be best placed 
to challenge the suspicions and ‘othering’ narratives that people on both 
sides of borders ‘tend to harbour against each other’41 and which were 
manifest in Karuka and the guard’s interactions at the Holiday Inn in 
2007. Demonstrating that gender intersects with class and ethnicity to 
produce new versions of people and place that defy neat categorisation, 
I have shown that Port Moresby both is, and continues to become, a more 
interesting, complex and hybrid place than it is usually represented to be.
39  For a discussion of boundary making, see Kyed, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: Legal 
Pluralism’.
40  Miller, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 3.
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